中国上市银行薪酬激励与银行绩效

本文以14家股份制商业银行为样本,从公司治理视角分析上市银行CEO报酬及银行内的报酬差异与银行经营绩效间的关系。研究结果表明,中国上市银行员工薪酬激励与银行绩效有显著的正相关关系;缩小银行高管薪酬和员工薪酬差异对银行绩效有显著的正相关影响;股权激励对上市银行绩效的影响并不显著;银行高管内部薪酬差异却存在锦标赛竞争机制,即银行高管间适当的薪酬差异可以提升银行绩效。因此,改变目前中国上市银行报酬—绩效契约是今后的金融业改革中需要解决的重要问题。     

银行董事会特征、CEO报酬与银行绩效——基于对11家股份制银行的数据分析

本文通过采集2005～2008年11家已上市的全国股份制商业银行的数据,实证分析了银行董事会独立性与CEO报酬之间的关系,并在考虑银行CEO报酬内生性基础上,进一步检验了银行董事会独立性、CEO报酬和银行绩效的关系。研究结果显示:长任期的CEO、CEO兼任董事长、较大比例的内部董事和较大的董事会规模构成了中国上市银行的监管障碍。银行CEO的高薪酬是不足为奇的,因为高薪酬对应的是银行业绩的显著增长。CEO报酬是银行公司治理的强化机制,授予银行CEO合理的激励报酬可以克服银行监管障碍,提高银行治理水平。     

我国商业银行管理者薪酬"激励过度"的制度完善

本文利用2005～2008年我国15家商业银行年报的混合数据,就我国商业银行管理者薪酬与银行业绩的关系进行实证研究.研究结果表明,管理者薪酬与商业银行业绩之间呈现显著的倒U型关系.本文还发现,当前我国商业银行管理者薪酬较高,即存在所谓的"激励过度".本文认为,我国商业银行应适当降低管理者薪酬以充分发挥正向激励作用,而规范管理者薪酬的关键在于制度,特别是监督机制的完善.     

商业银行运营效率与董事会治理

本文在对中国16家上市商业银行绩效进行前沿效率分析的基础上,建立以董事会规模、外部董事监事占比、CEO薪酬和管理层人均薪酬为基础的二元选择模型,对中国商业银行运营效率同董事会治理的关系进行了实证研究。结果表明,独立董事在商业银行公司治理中的作用并不明显,CEO薪酬和董事会规模对商业银行业绩并无显著影响,董事会规模过大无...     

商业银行的社会责任与财务绩效研究——基于我国上市商业银行的实证分析

本文以2008～2012年间十家中国上市商业银行为样本,实证检验了商业银行社会责任与财务绩效之间的关系,研究结果发现,商业银行社会责任与财务绩效之间存在社会影响假说和可利用资金假说,即商业银行社会责任和财务绩效之间存在正相关关系,具体而言,商业银行履行企业社会责任情况越好,其财务绩效也越好;商业银行财务绩效越好,其企业社会责任水平也会得到提高。     

我国商业银行薪酬激励实证研究

薪酬激励是激励机制的重要组成部分,亦是商业银行治理结构的重要组成部分。其有效性直接影响到对代理人的激励效果,进而影响银行的经营效率。本文通过介绍和运用薪酬激励的基本理论和设计原则,对当前我国商业银行薪酬激励机制的现状进行了分析,认为存在如下现状：员工薪酬水平和银行效益水平较低,薪酬形式单一且结构不合理,高级管理人员薪酬与员工薪酬差距逐步较大,薪酬与业绩相关性存在差异。通过对薪酬激励有效性进行实证分析,认为我国商业银行薪酬激励基本有效。最后提出了完善我国商业银行薪酬激励机制的建议。     

我国上市商业银行社会责任对财务绩效影响的实证研究

文章以2010-2014年披露年报和社会责任报告的16家上市商业银行为样本,实证检验上市商业银行社会责任对财务绩效的影响.研究结果表明:银行社会责任的履行对其财务绩效有一定的正向影响,而目前我国银行在社会责任方面的履行存在不足,尤其是国有银行.     

商业银行公司治理结构与风险控制的实证研究北大核心SSCI

本文以中国16家上市商业银行为研究对象,选取2009～2012年的数据为样本,检验银行公司治理与风险控制之间的相互关系。检验结果表明,商业银行股权结构对银行风险控制产生显著影响,但第一大股东控股能力与风险控制存在显著的负相关性,因此,第一大股东控股能力不宜过强,股权的适度分散化有利于改善我国商业银行的治理结构,有利于提高风险治理能力;商业银行董事会规模、董事会独立性和高管人员薪酬激励标准都与银行风险呈显著负相关关系,它们对银行风险控制发挥了积极的作用。研究还发现,商业银行贷款规模与风险控制之间不存在显著的反向关系,现阶段商业银行通过贷款规模扩张来降低不良贷款率的方式已受到初步控制,风险治理初显成效。     

我国商业银行员工薪酬激励有效性的实证研究——基于上市商业银行2005—2013年的经验数据

首先在理论上运用契约理论等分析商业银行员工薪酬影响经营绩效的作用机理,得出它们之间存在倒U型关系。之后,选取2005—2013年中国15家上市商业银行数据为样本进行实证分析我国商业银行员工薪酬激励是否有效,考虑到内生性问题,运用系统GMM方法,对员工薪酬和商业银行经营绩效之间的关系进行回归,实证结果与理论分析相符,且目前我国上市商业银行员工薪酬激励处于相对无效状态。最后,建议我国商业银行应注重发挥其他激励方式的作用。     

上市商业银行分红会影响高管薪酬吗?——基于2010-2014年中国16家上市商业银行面板数据的实证分析

随着我国上市商业银行的改革深入,有关银行治理中的委托代理问题的研究逐渐成为热点,尤其是股东与高管之间的委托代理问题.通过对2010-2014年中国16家上市商业银行的面板数据分析表明,高管薪酬与银行业绩和银行规模间存在正相关关系,与股权集中度存在负相关关系,与银行分红不存在影响关系,说明在上市商业银行中存在着比较严重的委托代理问题.     

The impact of bank merger growth on CEO compensation

We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links.     

How does corporate social responsibility affect financial performance,financial stability,and financial inclusion in the banking sector? Evidence from Pakistan

This paper examines the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the financial performance, financial inclusion, and financial stability of the banking sector, focusing on annual data for 20 Pakistani commercial banks for the period 2008–2017. The results suggest that CSR, as well as age and size, has a positive impact on all three factors. However, high levels of leverage reduce financial inclusion and financial stability, while financial inclusion is also negatively associated with the tangibility of assets.     

The implications of TARP: Evidence from bank performance and CEO pension benefits

This study examines the effect of compensation restrictions introduced by the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) of 2008 on the performance of banks and their compensation structures. It documents significant performance improvement among TARP banks that experienced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) resignations after their banks accepted TARP funds. The improvement is most significant in the year following CEO resignation. In addition, TARP banks that kept their CEOs show a significant increase in CEO pensions post-TARP. TARP banks that did not experience CEO resignations, thus, appear to substitute pension increases for their CEOs to mitigate the TARP-induced decrease in conventional forms of compensation. Further analysis on all banks without CEO resignations shows that TARP banks have significantly higher increase in pension benefits post 2009 than banks that chose to decline TARP funds. The evidence shows that increased pension arrangements play a significant role in CEOs’ decisions to remain in their roles despite the constraints imposed by TARP.     

Do powerful chief executives influence the financial performance of UK firms?

Drawing on a framework from agency theory, we examine the relation between the decision-making power of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and the financial performance of 468 United Kingdom (UK) publicly listed companies (plcs) using a dynamic panel data estimation method for the six years 2003–2008. We measure CEO power using a ‘power index’ which captures the extent to which the autonomy of the CEO to make unilateral decisions could influence firms' financial performance. To test for robustness, our analysis is conducted using different measures of financial performance. Our results reveal that, consistent with previous UK research, CEO power, as defined by CEO-Chair duality, CEO-tenure and CEO share ownership, is negatively related to financial performance. We also find that concentrated ownership is inversely related to the performance of UK plcs. CEO's compensation and board structure, however, do not appear to be related to the financial performance of the UK plcs.     

商业银行高管薪酬改革适应新常态特征的路径研究

薪酬体系是否科学合理影响到经营管理者的积极性。我国商业银行薪酬体系建立在外部经济环境和内部经营规律的基础上。以往高经济增长的环境下,商业银行经营效益大幅度提升,高管薪酬也十分高企。但自金融危机发生以来,中国经济出现了增幅下降、结构急需调整等“新常态”特征,这对商业银行经营管理特别是薪酬体系设计也提出了新的要求。与此同时,国有企业整体改革的推进,又为商业银行高管薪酬改革提供了方向指引。目前,商业银行的薪酬体系改革必须充分考虑经济新常态的特征、国有企业改革对商业银行薪酬改革的影响,结合金融企业发展规律,坚持遵循价值规律原则,加速推进限制性股权制、股票期权制、绩效回收制、加大延期支付力度、构建社会比价指导与活跃职业经理人市场、完善商业银行治理机制等是新常态背景下商业银行高管薪酬改革的基本策略。     

金融危机条件下我国商业银行履行社会责任问题研究

我国商业银行自身发展取得良好成绩的同时,履行社会责任问题日益受到社会各界的关注.本文首先阐述了商业银行社会责任的基本内涵,指出了商业银行履行社会责任的重要意义,然后结合当前的经济金融形势,提出了我国商业银行履行社会责任过程中存在的一些不足,最后提出了今后一段时期我国商业银行履行社会责任的具体措施.     

CFO role and CFO compensation: An empirical analysis of their implications

Given concerns over CFO pay, especially incentives, and considering the tension between a CFO’s fiduciary responsibility and being a key member of the firm’s executive team, we examine the determinants and effects of CFO compensation amount, incentive intensity, and proximity to CEO compensation in a sample of European companies (FTE 500, 2005–2009). First, we focus on the CFO role as a determinant of CFO compensation. Like prior work, we proxy for CFO roles by using hand-collected public data on education and past professional experience, but we supplement these proxies with proprietary data to more directly capture the firm-specific nature of the CFO job in term of its similarity with that of the CEO. We thus argue how CFOs can have varied roles characterized by different levels of financial expertise and CEO-likeness, and document that it is this latter aspect that is associated with CFO compensation. Second, we study the effects of CFO compensation design on outcomes in the CFO’s realm related to financial reporting. We find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated with financial reporting quality, while a CFO’s pay long-term incentive intensity and a CFO’s incentive compensation proximity with the CEO are negatively associated with financial reporting quality. Overall, then, our results suggest that CFOs get rewarded for their CEO-likeness, and particularly for their being similar to the CEO in terms of tasks and decision making authority. But it is their financial expertise that is positively related to financial reporting quality. At the same time, using compensation that is more incentive intensive and more similar to that of the CEO appears to be potentially detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. These results are relevant for boards involved in selecting highly expert CFOs, and their compensation committees charged with defining subsequently effective incentive compensation plans for those CFOs.     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.