财务困境中CEO权力、高管层薪酬差距与公司业绩

以2005—2009年深沪两市上市公司为样本,设定财务困境公司与财务健康公司两个对比组,分析CEO权力对高管层薪酬差距的影响,以及薪酬差距、CEO权力和两者的交互效应对公司业绩的影响。研究发现:CEO强权在财务困境公司中不会导致高管层薪酬差距显著扩大,而在财务健康公司则会;财务困境公司中较大的高管层薪酬差距和CEO强权均能促进公司业绩的提升,且比财务健康公司更显著;CEO权力与薪酬差距对公司业绩的影响在财务困境公司中呈互补关系,而在财务健康公司中呈替代关系。     

CEO turnover and shareholder wealth: Evidence from CEO power in Taiwan

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO turnovers and shareholder wealth and/or the volatility of firm performance, and examines whether CEO power matters in this relationship. Successors tend to possess less power than predecessors. The announcement effects of CEO turnovers present higher abnormal returns for turnovers in which predecessors and successors share a similar power level and a lower volatility for turnovers in which successors have less power. Volatility is lower and liquidity is higher when CEO turnovers involve successors with less power.     

CEO控制权、事务所选择与审计公费

本文以2007-2014年A股上市公司为研究对象，实证检验了CEO控制权、事务所选择与审计公费之间的关系。研究发现： CEO 控制权越大，越不倾向选择“四大”，而更倾向选择本土大所； CEO控制权越大，越倾向支付较低的审计公费；控制了事务所自选择后，由“四大”审计的上市公司CEO控制权对审计公费的影响不明显，而由综合排名十大和本土十大审计的上市公司CEO控制权与审计公费显著负相关。     

CEO pay fairness as a predictor of stakeholder management

This study examines the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) pay fairness and future stakeholder management (SM) as well as the effect of the board of directors on this relationship. The results show that CEO pay fairness has an effect on future SM such that when underpaid, CEOs decrease SM and when overpaid, CEOs increase SM. Additionally, the relationship between CEO pay fairness and SM becomes stronger as the ratio of inside directors on the board increases, which suggests that as both management control increases and board diversity decreases, the CEO's control over SM increases. Implications for SM and CEO pay are discussed.     

CEO Power,CEO Age and the Policy Instrument Property of State-Owned-Enterprises

In this paper, we examine the relationship between CEO power, CEO age and the efficiency of policy implementation in listed corporations controlled by each province’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in China. We find that CEOs with more power implement policy are more efficiently. We also find that younger powerful CEOs will act more effectively than their older competitors. The reason for the difference is that younger powerful CEOs in state-owned companies are incentivized to implement their policy tasks to gain promotions or political capital. Our results are important to future SOE reform and to understanding the characteristics of SOEs as policy instruments.     

The impact of pay on CEO turnover: A test of two perspectives

We investigate the impact of pay on CEO turnover from two perspectives. One is managerial power perspective that focuses on power in the setting of CEO pay. The other is tournament theory that treats CEO pay as a top prize designed to motivate executives to work hard for the top position. Building on research that highlights the impact of power dynamics at the top of the firm on CEO turnover, we propose that managerial power perspective suggests a negative impact of CEO pay on CEO turnover, while tournament theory suggests a positive impact. Using data from a sample of 313 large U.S. companies from 1988 to 1997, we find that both the level of CEO pay and its ratio over the average pay of the firm's four other highest paid executives have a negative impact on CEO turnover.     

CEO duality leadership and corporate diversification behavior

This study examines an important, yet understudied relationship between CEO duality and corporate diversification. Results based on the data collected from Fortune 1000 U.S companies indicate that CEO duality is positively associated with corporate diversification into unrelated industries. Further analyses reveal that this relationship is moderated by a number of corporate governance mechanisms. We find that board equity ownership and institutional ownership concentration weaken the initially positive relationship between CEO duality and unrelated diversification while CEO tenure and board independence strengthen this relationship.     

Linking Societal Trust and CEO Compensation

We examine the association between societal trust and the levels of CEO compensation and the proportion of equity-based compensation of 897 firm-years from 18 countries over the 2007–2013 period. We find both the levels of CEO compensation as well as the proportion of equity-based compensation to be lower in countries with higher levels of societal trust. This suggests that costly regulations on CEO compensation may not be as necessary in jurisdictions with higher levels of societal trust. We also examine the association between pay disparity and societal trust. Consistent with our finding of lower pay at the CEO rank, we find pay disparities are lower in countries with higher levels of societal trust.     

Does CEO transformational leadership influence top executive normative commitment?

Grounded in social exchange theory logic, this study proposes that CEO transformational leadership causes high normative commitment among top executives but this relationship is nonlinear. Specifically, top executives in Turkey express less normative commitment when their CEOs exhibits moderate levels of transformational leadership than low or high levels of transformational leadership. Additionally, CEO transformational leadership exhibits a similar nonlinear relationship to affective commitment which fully mediated the J-shaped relationship between CEO transformational leadership and normative commitment. The findings highlight the need to consider the nonlinear effects of leadership types as well as implications for further exploration of antecedents of normative commitment.     

Power and responsibility: How different sources of CEO power affect firms' corporate social responsibility practices

Does greater CEO power come with more responsibility? Previous scholarly work in this field entails divergent results on this question. Based on the upper echelons theory and CEO power literature, this study aimed to explore the mechanisms underlying how different sources of CEO power, including structural, ownership, expert, and prestige power, affect firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and whether such relationships are moderated by firm visibility. Using a panel dataset comprising 6604 yearly observations of Chinese publicly traded firms from 2009 to 2019, we found that structural power is negatively related to CSR practices and that expert power is positively related to CSR practices, whereas ownership power and prestige power have no direct relationship with CSR practices. Our results show that firm visibility weakens the negative relationship between structural power and CSR practices and strengthens the relationship between expert power and CSR practices, respectively. Overall, this study reconciles the mixed results of previous studies on the impact of CEO power on CSR and integrates the effect of firm visibility as a contextual factor. This article concludes with practical recommendations on how to manage CSR engagement.     

Nonroutine CEO Turnover in Korean Chaebols

This study seeks to assess the relationship between firm performance and nonroutine CEO turnover in Korean conglomerates known as chaebols. Utilizing data collected from a period following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, findings indicate a negative relationship between performance and nonroutine CEO turnover. However, the status of CEOs as chaebol founding family members is also negatively correlated with nonroutine turnover. This research suggests areas where managerial accountability has been improved in chaebol and areas where further improvements are needed. The unique contribution of this study is that it considers corporate governance in chaebols after postfinancial crisis reforms and looks at CEO family membership as a factor.     

CEO tenure and ownership mode choice of Chinese firms: The moderating roles of managerial discretion

Based on upper echelon theory, this study has explored how CEO tenure affects ownership mode choice of Chinese firms investing abroad, and how some organizational factors, such as firm size, firm age and CEO duality, moderate this relationship. Using secondary data, this study finds CEO tenure has a positive relationship with the choice of full control mode, CEO duality can reinforce this relationship, but firm size and firm age have no significant moderating effect.     

CEO succession and firms’ internationalization processes: Insights from German companies

This article analyses the relationship between CEO succession events and German firms’ internationalization processes, which is represented by the degree of internationalization (DOI) growth and internationalization rhythm. Based on a theoretical framework combining elements of agency theory, institutionalism and upper echelons approach, we propose a longitudinal model to examine the relationships of both process variables with the number of CEO changes and succession type (internal vs. external succession), respectively. The results of our study of 102 German firms over 23 years (1990–2012) show an inverted U-shaped impact (no impact) of the number of CEO changes (succession type) on the DOI growth and a positive (negative) monotonic effect on the rhythm of internationalization.     

CEO Pay,Shareholder Returns,and Accounting Profits

We assess the impact on CEO pay (including salary, cash bonus, and benefits in kind) of changes in both accounting and shareholder returns in 99 British companies in the years 1972-89. After correcting for heterogeneity biases inherent in the standard specifications of the problem, we find a strong positive relationship between CEO pay and within-company changes in shareholder returns, and no statistically significant relationship between CEO pay and within-company changes in accounting returns. Differences between firms in long-term average profitability do appear to have a substantial effect on CEO pay, while differences between firms in shareholder returns add nothing to the within-firm pay dynamics.These findings call into question the rationale for explicitly share-based incentive schemes.     

Third-party endorsements of CEO quality,managerial discretion,and stakeholder reactions

Research on the influence of third-party endorsements of CEO quality generally does not account for the context in which such signs manifest. To address this limitation, the present study examines how a CEO's level of managerial discretion shapes boards' and shareholders' responses to external endorsements of his or her quality. Managerial discretion refers to the range of strategic options that executives have at their disposal in a given business context. The findings indicate that boards only react to CEO endorsements in high-discretion settings, and this reaction is positive (i.e., more pay). In contrast, shareholders – regardless of discretion levels – positively respond to CEO endorsements in the short-term, while these responses become more equivocal over the time. These results suggest that – at least in the short term – directors more adeptly interpret and respond to external information about CEO quality than shareholders.     

高管权力强度、 股权激励与高管显性腐败

文章以2006～2015年我国上市公司高管腐败案件为对象,从高管权力强度视角考察股权激励与高管显性腐败之间的关系,实证结果表明:(1)高管权力越大,其发生权力寻租行为的概率越大,同时代理成本也越高;(2)我国上市公司的股权激励计划,未能有效调节企业高管权力强度与高管显性腐败之间的关系,尤其是国有控股上市公司实施的股权激励计划,反而加大了高管腐败发生概率;(3)货币薪酬越少、 激励有效期越长,发生高管腐败行为概率越高.这些结论对公司决策层完善股权激励计划设计、 优化公司治理、 监督和约束高管权力具有参考意义,也能为证监会、 国资委制定政策提供借鉴.     

我国CEO任期与企业绩效关系实证研究

上市公司采用经营权和所有权分离的治理结构,使CEO无形中成为企业战略投资等重大决策的实际拥有者,CEO通过行使其权力对组织绩效产生重大影响。以沪市的197家制造类企业为样本,运用截面数据回归的方法,研究这些企业的CEO的任期长短与组织绩效之间的关系。研究结果最后表明,CEO的任期和组织绩效之间存在着倒U字型非线性关系。     

Internationalization process,impact of slack resources,and role of the CEO: The duality of structure and agency in evolution of cross-border acquisition decisions

This paper examines how the internationalization process evolves. We do so by examining the cross-border acquisition (CBA) decisions of multinationals under the contingent impact of slack resources and CEO power and influence. Grounding our arguments in Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, we identify how and why path-dependencies associated with CBA decisions give way to strategic change, demonstrating the duality of structure and agency in this evolutionary process. Further, we show that organizational slack and CEO overconfidence affect this relationship, albeit in dramatically different ways. Our hypotheses are tested on a large sample of 4812 CBAs of U.S. firms during 2000–2010, across 41 industries and in 44 target countries. The results hold for acquisition trajectories of multinationals in both categories of CBA decisions: majority as well as minority-owned.     

CEO经验及个性对企业动态能力的影响分析

在动态能力的理论框架下,不同CEO的经验和个性对企业运用和发展动态能力的影响不同,现探索不同CEO的经验和个性对企业适应环境变化的战略行为会产生哪些影响。实证研究表明,跨国工作经验和专业领域经验的CEO则对企业运用和发展动态能力具有显著的正向影响。具有外向性、开放性和情绪稳定性特征的CEO对企业运用和发展动态能力具有显著的正向影响。另外,CEO的跨国工作经验和专业领域经验对企业适应环境的变革行为具有调节作用。     

Influence of CEO characteristics in family firms internationalization

This research uses a survey dataset of 187 Spanish family firms to study the characteristics that may influence family firms in their decision of internationalize their activity. Based on individual and demographic variables, the study concludes that the CEO academic level of achievement influences the level of success in international expansion. In addition, the capacity for generating resources of the family firm provokes a lower resistance from family members to export. Moreover, we confirm that industry characteristics do matter in internationalization processes, noting that the specific market, product/service and technology characteristics influence the family firm internationalization. Contrary to expectations, the gender variable and the percentage of family members sitting on the board do not significantly predict the propensity to export.Our findings suggest family firm leaders seeking greater levels of firm internationalization to seriously consider the qualification level of their CEO. These insights can be useful for regulators who have to develop programs for supporting sales internationalization, as well as owners and managers of family firms, who need to understand the CEO abilities that may improve their capacity to internationalize their business.