Government ownership and stock liquidity: Evidence from China

This paper documents that state ownership is associated with higher stock liquidity, a finding consistent with lower investor risk perception of firms that benefit from state ownership, like preferential financing and implicit government guarantees. The effect is found to be stronger when government ownership confers stronger benefits like firms with state controlling rather than non-controlling shareholders, and when the benefits of government ownership are important – for smaller firms, for financially constrained firms, and especially during the financial crisis period. These results suggest that investors perceive government ownership as value-enhancing, which increases their willingness to trade in such stocks.     

The role of corporate governance in FDI decisions: Evidence from Taiwan

There has been a considerable literature on the determinants of why firms undertake foreign direct investment (FDI), but very little on whether firms with different governance characteristics are more or less likely to venture overseas. For example, are family-controlled firms more predisposed to FDI than firms, with similar attributes, but different forms of ownership? Does the presence of institutional shareholders suggest a greater propensity to invest abroad? Does the composition of the Board of Directors have an impact? Most extant studies of corporate governance focus on the impact of governance factors on firm performance. However, these performance outcomes are a function of the strategic decisions made by the firms, which suggests it might be useful to consider the relationship between corporate governance factors and particular strategic decisions. One example is the decision to undertake foreign direct investment. The two main strands of IB literature on the determinants of FDI have little or nothing to say about how corporate governance factors might affect the FDI decision. Both internalisation theory and the resource-based view see FDI primarily as a means by which firms can appropriate rents in overseas markets from the exploitation of their idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. This paper extends this literature by investigating the effects of governance factors on the decision to undertake FDI. In particular, we want to assess the impact upon the FDI decision of (a) the extent of family control, (b) the presence of domestic and foreign institutional shareholders, and (c) the composition of the Board of Directors. We investigate these effects using a sample of 228 publicly listed firms in Taiwan, and our results clearly indicate that family control and share ownership by domestic financial institutions in Taiwanese firms are associated with the decision to undertake FDI. We also find that corporate governance impacts in different ways with regard to Taiwanese FDI in China in comparison to Taiwanese FDI in the rest of the world.     

Capital Structure,Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis

This paper examines empirically the effects of management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of the firm from an agency theory perspective. The paper extends the US literature on the topic by examining the effect of interactions between management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of UK firms. For a sample of UK firms, the paper provides empirical evidence that suggests the debt ratio is positively related to management ownership and negatively related to ownership by large external shareholders. Furthermore, the presence of a large external shareholder acts to negate the positive relationship between debt ratios and management ownership; in the presence of a large external shareholder, no significant relationship between debt ratios and management ownership exists. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of large external shareholders affects the agency costs of debt and equity.     

Founder CEOs,personal incentives,and corporate social irresponsibility

This study integrates organizational identity (OI) theory and upper echelons theory to explore the impact of CEOs’ founder status on corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). We theorize that compared with other CEOs, a founder CEO is more likely to generate a high degree of OI with the firm, which will drive the founder CEO to actively avoid CSI that may damage the positive image and long-term development of the firm. Furthermore, we argue that CEO duality and CEO ownership will strengthen the aforementioned relationship by increasing the possibility of founder CEOs generating a high degree of OI. Conversely, CEO underpayment will weaken the relationship between founder status and CSI by decreasing the possibility of founder CEOs generating a high degree of OI. We obtained empirical evidence in support of our arguments from a large Chinese private listed company dataset. Overall, this study’s theory and evidence clearly show that founder status and personal incentives can jointly shape CEOs’ CSI decisions, thereby providing useful insights for corporate shareholders and government agencies to better prevent and govern firms’ CSI.     

International patterns of ownership structure choices of start-ups: does the quality of law matter?

The concentration of ownership of enterprises varies significantly among countries. In this paper we investigate the role that differences in legal systems among nations play in molding founders’ preferences with respect to the ownership structure of their start-ups. We develop an economic framework which articulates the impact that the quality of protection offered to shareholders and debt holders has on the supply of debt and equity financing and the incentives of the founders to recruit partners or opt for sole ownership. The theoretical analysis predicts that a positive relationship is likely to exist between the quality of the legal system and the ownership concentration of start-ups. This prediction is in contrast to the findings on relationships in large publicly traded firms. Using data obtained from the Adult Population Survey of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor project from 2001 to 2004 about ownership preference patterns, we confirm the prediction.     

Nonfinancial companies as large shareholders alleviate financial constraints of Brazilian firm

We analyze whether financial constraints of Brazilian firms are alleviated by ownership structure. More specifically, we study whether the presence of nonfinancial firms as shareholders of Brazilian firm mitigates financial constraints. We find that the presence of nonfinancial firms as significant shareholders reduces financial constraints, probably because such blockholders are able to reduce asymmetric information problems that are at the origin of financial constraints. This result indicates that the changes in the corporate ownership of the Brazilian firms, achieved within the country's structural changes, have been positive for firm investment and have contributed to the development of Brazil.     

Ownership Concentration and CSR Policy of European Multinational Enterprises

This study investigates how ownership concentration in European multinational firms is associated with these firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). We employ factor analysis on responsibility data from EIRiS and use a regression analysis. Using firm-level data for almost 700 European firms, we find that shareholder concentration is significantly related to such policies. That is, more concentrated ownership goes hand in hand with poorer CSR policies. In our analysis, we control for size, leverage, profitability, industry, and country of origin. We use several indicators for ownership concentration. We also find that with more concentrated ownership, CSR of the firm gets worse. We suggest that especially with large shareholders, CSR would need to be included in their performance assessment.     

Institutional Interest,Ownership Type,and Environmental Capital Expenditures: Evidence from the Most Polluting Chinese Listed Firms

This study empirically examines whether firms’ environmental capital expenditures impact institutional investors’ investment decisions in the Chinese market. We particularly examine the impact of ownership type on the relationship of environmental capital expenditures and the behavior of different types of institutional investors by classifying institutional investors into two categories, short-term and long-term investors. In addition, this study further investigates whether environmental capital expenditures related to ownership type increase firm value. We find that long-term institutional investors tend to invest in state-owned firms (SOEs) making environmental capital expenditures. Results also indicate that, with governmental backing and encouragement, the market value of SOEs making more environmental capital expenditures is likely to increase. However, no similar results are found for non-SOEs.     

The role of the stock market in the provision of Islamic development finance: Evidence from Sudan

This paper assesses the impact of stock exchange funding in the Shari'ya compliant Islamic economy of Sudan. Evidence suggests that while Islamic financial instruments have considerable potential in facilitating development finance through their emphasis on partnership this is better achieved by the banking system rather than the Khartoum Stock Exchange. A case study of the Sudan Telecommunications company shows that larger firms able to cross-list elsewhere are likely to choose regional markets in preference to their domestic one thus benefiting from lower costs of equity. However, governance preferences are likely to favour block shareholders following the Islamic finance partnership concept.     

Evaluating the effects of equity incentives using PSM: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the effects of equity incentives on firm performance in Chinese listed firms. We address the sample selection problem by employing the propensity score matching methodology. Results show that, (1) On the whole, performance is positively related to equity incentives even after controlling for sample selection bias; (2) The final control rights have an important impact on the effects of equity incentives. The execution of equity incentives in privately owned firms can significantly decrease the agency costs between shareholders and managers, but such effects cannot be observed in state-owned firms; (3) Effects of equity incentives depend on the incentive type, that is, comparing to stock-based incentives, option-based incentives can reduce the agency costs significantly, thus are more effective; (4) Ownership structure also has important impacts on the effects of equity incentives. The agency costs decrease in firms with more decentralized ownership after introducing equity incentive, while in concentrated firms the effect is negligible.     

R&D activity in Canada: does corporate ownership structure matter?

This study examines the link between ownership structures and R&D activities in Canada. We hypothesize that highly concentrated ownership structures or the presence of controlling minority shareholders negatively affects R&D intensity of Canadian manufacturing firms. Our results show that the concentration of voting rights is negatively related to the level of R&D expenditure and R&D outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the level of separation between the voting and cash flow rights held by dominant shareholders of “Controlling Minority Structure” firms has a positive effect on R&D intensity but a negative effect on R&D outcomes. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Government ownership and the cost of debt for Chinese listed corporations

This study investigates the impact of government controlling ownership on the cost of debt of Chinese listed corporations. We find that corporations under government control have a lower cost of debt compared to corporations under private control, and that government ownership is most beneficial when firms exhibit financial distress, have high excess shareholder control, or operate in provinces with low institutional development. Our evidence that government ownership plays an important role in reducing Chinese firms' cost of debt may help explain why government involvement in business corporations remains prevalent in China after decades of economic reform.     

The real effects of local mutual funds: Evidence from corporate innovation

This paper investigates whether the proximity between mutual funds and firms could explain corporate innovation. I find that local mutual funds tend to increase firms' R&D expenditures and productivity. Firms with greater local ownership produce more patents and patents with bigger impact. The positive relations are more pronounced for firms with low information quality and poor corporate governance. Further, local funds with more innovative firms outperform the ones with less innovative firms. Finally, firms with higher local ownership are less likely to fire CEOs who engage in innovation, which incentivizes CEOs for risky investments.     

Do Trademark Infringement Lawsuits Affect Brand Value: A Stock Market Perspective

Many firms find that they can benefit from copying orotherwise misusing the trademarks of their competitors. Firmsthat have maintained a positive brand image are likely to fightany dilution or eventual loss of their trademark by using lawsuitsagainst offending firms. These lawsuits help to staunch any lossesto the brand and leave the potential for the benefits from thetrademark to flow back to the firm. These benefits will be temperedby legal costs, potential infringement by other firms in futureand the need to file lawsuits in response. In contrast, firmsthat have infringed on a trademark are likely to lose if theowner of the trademark challenges them in court. This study relatesthe stock returns of firms to the filing of lawsuits to defendtrademarks. We study the impact of both the filing of the lawsuitand the eventual verdict of the court on the stock market valueof defendant and plaintiff firms. The protection of a trademarkby a plaintiff using a lawsuit resulted in a negative returnto the shareholders of the defendant firm that infringed on thetrademark. The returns to the plaintiff firms were mixed andof marginal magnitude due to offsetting factors although largefirms experienced positive returns.     

Corporate ownership and the theory of the multinational enterprise

This paper makes a contribution to the theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) and, in particular, to why firms undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than alternative strategies. We argue that FDI and its strategic alternatives involve different patterns of costs and returns over time, and hence different levels of risk and uncertainty. Traditional theories of the MNE conceptualize the firm as a risk-neutral decision-making entity with short-term efficiency objectives, and hence do not take these issues into account. This may be reasonable for firms with passive professional managers and widely-dispersed shareholders, operating in countries with the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. But many firms operate under quite different systems of corporate governance where concentrated shareholdings are commonplace and markets for corporate control are weak or non-existent. In these cases, shareholders exert considerable influence on all aspects of firm strategy including FDI. Furthermore, different groups of shareholders (State, family, institutions) are likely to have different objectives, different attitudes towards risk, and different decision-making time horizons. We thus suggest that the traditional theories of the MNE need to be extended to embrace consideration of corporate ownership (and other governance dimensions).     

Firm heterogeneity and technology transfers to local suppliers: Disentangling the effects of foreign ownership,technology gap and absorptive capacity

In this paper, I present novel microeconomic evidence on the effects of firm heterogeneity on the creation and impact of technology transfers from foreign direct investment (FDI) to local suppliers in a developing country setting. The main findings are threefold. First, FDI firms are significantly more involved in knowledge transfer activities than domestic producer firms. In particular, FDI firms offer more technological support, support with a direct positive impact on production processes of local suppliers. Second, the type of ownership also influences the effect of the technology gap on technology transfers. A large technology gap between a producer firm and its suppliers lowers the provision of support; however, FDI firms offer more technological support to their suppliers of material inputs when the technology gap is large. Independent of the support that the suppliers receive, foreign ownership of client firms and a large technology gap make it more likely that suppliers experience large positive impacts. Third, the level of absorptive capacity of local suppliers is also important for the impact of the technology transfers, confirming the notion that heterogeneity among both producer firms and local suppliers affect the level, nature and impact of local technology transfers.     

Top executive compensation: Equity or excess? Implications for regaining American competitiveness

The debate over compensation packages for top executives is discussed. Particular emphasis is placed on the decoupling of CEO pay and organizational performance. A contrast is drawn between firms that are owner-controlled and those that are manager-controlled. Owner-controlled firms tend to be more market-driven. In manager-controlled firms, however, ownership can become diluted to the point where decisions may not always be in the best interest of shareholders. The process of determining CEO compensation packages is examined, and special attention is given to the handling of stock options. In order to stem the threat of increased government intervention, suggestions are made for increasing the leverage of compensation committees and of shareholders in general.Bruce Walters is a doctoral candidate and research/teaching assistant in the department of management at the University of Texas at Arlington, with emphasis in business policy and strategic management.Tim Hardin is a graduate student in the department of urban affairs at the University of Texas at Arlington, with emphasis in urban management.James Schick is a summa cum laude graduate of the department of finance at the University of Texas at Arlington.     

Gefährden institutionelle Anleger den Wettbewerb?

The Monopolies Commission, which advises the German government in competition policy making, warns against potential anti competitive effects of indirect horizontal links between competitors via institutional investors. Through such common ownership, the competitive conduct between suppliers could be alleviated, because their (joint) institutional shareholders interest in the overall market return may outweigh their interest in the individual firms’ returns. Taking account of the ubiquity of such common ownership in European and global markets as well as a non consideration in current competition law, the Monopolies Commission’s call for more research and vigilance appears to be appropriate.     

Political embeddedness,media positioning and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from China

We examine the effect of political embeddedness and media positioning on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2009–2017, we provide evidence that firms with political embeddedness from the perspectives of both government ownership and managerial political connection (PC) perform more CSR than other firms, but their motivations for doing so are different. Employing media positioning, we find that firms controlled by the government conduct less CSR when they receive more positive media reporting, indicating that this is a firm's passive choice due to political pressure; and firms with PC are incentivized by negative media reporting to conduct more CSR, indicating an active choice to maintain political legitimacy. This association is robust to different media positioning measurements and endogeneity checks. Additional analyses show that this relationship is more pronounced in central government-controlled firms and regionally politically connected firms; in firms that disclose CSR reports voluntarily; and in the environment where CSR are more valued (following the 2012 national Anti-corruption Campaign and in provinces with higher levels of marketization). Overall, our study suggests that media positioning can help to identify the motivation for conducting CSR.     

Does share pledging affect firms' use of derivatives? Evidence from China

We investigate whether share pledging by controlling shareholders affects firms' use of derivatives. Our findings suggest that share-pledging firms are more likely to use derivatives than non-share-pledging firms. In cross-section analyses, we observe that the relationship is more pronounced when the margin call risk is higher, for example, if controlling shareholders own fewer shares, firms are located in regions with higher levels of marketization, or firms have a higher stock price crash risk. Our findings indicate that shares pledged by controlling shareholders steer firms toward the use of derivatives to hedge firm activities and alleviate the margin call risk.