不完全信息下的逆向供应链中的信号博弈研究

本文旨在分析逆向供应链在现实市场条件下的运用问题.为此首先分析了基于完全信息假设下,制造商与回收商在逆向供应链中构成的staclelberg博弈模型.然后,又构建了不完全信息条件下制造商为主、回收商为从的信号博弈,分析了信号博弈的精炼贝叶斯均衡,推导出分离均衡、混同均衡、准分离均衡存在的条件,最后进行算例分析.     

博弈分析在企业并购中的应用

企业并购是一项复杂且风险较大的业务。论文将企业并购行为抽象为并购企业和目标企业之间的动态博弈,在各博弈方理性行为的前提条件下,利用逆推归纳法分析了并购双方在并购活动中的策略选择及各相关变量对并购活动结果的影响。     

项目经理能力评价博弈分析

本文通过对项目经理能力评价过程中的评价人和被评价人之间互动关系的考察，运用博弈分析方法，对评价过程中的双方行为、策略及评价的均衡结局建立模型，深入分析评价过程中项目经理能力信号传递失真现象，提出了具有实践操作性的对策。     

基于三角形分布的多维Cournot模型博弈及均衡分析

本文在不完全信息一维Cournot模型博弈的基础上,讨论了两个企业关于具有一定替代性的两种产品在三角形分布下不完全信息的多维Cournot博弈模型,并通过一个数值例子对均衡结果进行了分析.     

主制造商供应商合作协商定价让步博弈研究

本文针对由单一主制造商和单一供应商组成的供应链系统，基于主制造商供应商的战略合作模式和双方的利益追求，制定了主制造商供应商的谈判协商规则，建立了以价格谈判为切入点的战略谈判协商定价模型，并研究了主制造商和供应商分别为第一出标者下的让步均衡，求出了实现双方利益最大化下的最优出标量。最后通过算例分析，验证了本文所构建的主制造商供应商协商谈判模型的可行性，并对比分析了双方合作的纳什博弈结果与让步博弈结果。研究表明主制造商和供应商通过谈判制定让步规则，双方主体分别作为主导者和跟随者，确定各自价格的削减量，相对于低效的纳什均衡时的合作结果，能够实现双方的利益增加。     

两个制造商量子Stackelberg博弈

两制造商生产同质产品供应同一市场， 他们在市场中的地位不同， 跟随型企业根据领导型企业的产量确定自身产量。由经典Stackelberg博弈可知， 跟随型企业处于竞争劣势。本文通过量子博弈发现， 当博弈双方的策略纠缠程度从0增加至π /2时， 跟随型企业与领导型企业之间的博弈均衡产量与均衡收益的差距减少； 当纠缠程度达到π /2时均衡结果消失， 量子Stackelberg博弈消失， 退化成一般量子博弈， 双方可能达到“双赢” 局面。因此， 跟随型企业应该增强与领导型企业的纠缠程度， 以减少均衡产量与均衡收益的差距。双方的最优策略是达到完全纠缠程度， 如此可能实现双赢。     

保障性住房价格成本信息披露的博弈分析

信息不对称严重影响了政府对企业关于保障性住房价格的规制。纠正双方的信息不对称是政府确定合理的保障性住房价格的前提。基于委托代理理论,分析了政府与企业就成本信息披露的完全信息静态博弈,得出了混合策略下的纳什均衡。针对企业披露信息的真实程度,采用演化博弈分析的方法,分析了政府和企业的群体演化过程,在此基础上提出了政府监督企业信息披露的政策建议。     

基于互联网金融的创业企业融资优选模式研究

本文基于预购众筹、P2P 和股权众筹3种互联网金融模式的投融资决策过程，分别构建了投资者和创业企业（融资者）为决策主体的两阶段完全信息动态博弈模型，采用逆向选择法求取了纳什均衡，并分别详解了创业企业通过3种互联网融资渠道融资所获取的最优利润及其影响因素。研究发现，创业企业的融资目标金额、投资者获取的额外效用及收益贴现率是决定最优利润及其排序的关键指标。借助我国金融市场参数和互联网金融投资者偏好参数对收益贴现率和额外效用赋值后发现：随着创业企业融资目标金额的增加，创业企业为获取最优利润会依次优选预购众筹、P2P、股权众筹渠道进行融资。我国互联网金融平台的统计数据印证了这一结论。     

油气勘探开发项目投资决策的博弈分析

现行体制下我国油气勘探开发项目的执行者为各个石油公司的子（分）公司。由于项目的执行者具有各自独立的经济利益，因而存在虚报项目评价信息以获取集团公司投资的现象。在项目投资决策高度集中的体制下，在信息不对称的条件下，决策者和执行者之间的关系表现为一种博弈关系。集团公司的决策者和基层企业围绕投资决策形成的均衡一种混合策略的“纳什均衡”，支付矩阵的求解为集团公司政策的制定提供了理论基础。     

企业并购的定价及支付方式

在企业并购过程中,并购双方谈判的焦点无疑是被并购企业价格的确定,而企业价格确定的基础是并购双方以目标企业价值估算为基础的价格认定。从大量的实务经验看,谈判中对目标企业详尽的价值分析有助于强化并购双方的谈判力量,企业价值认定的差异源于不同评估人员,具有不同的经验,对目标企业有不同的理解,采用不同的价值认定方法,导致相同资产对不同的人来说具有不同的价值,应该说明的是,不存在任何一种完美无缺的价值认定方法,每一种方法都有长处和不足。本文拟浅析企业并购的定价及支付方式。     

The Collusive Equilibrium in a Quantity-Setting Supergame: An Application to Taiwan’s Flour Industry

This paper examines the stability of the collusive equilibrium in Friedman’s repeated game through an empirical study of Taiwan’s flour market. We calculate the payoff streams following a deviation or adherence for each firm. The evidence shows that the specified punishment path is credible, and could sustain the collusive allocation.     

Hiring new key inventors to improve firms’ post-M&A inventive output

Although merger and acquisitions (M&As) are acknowledged as an important means to access innovative assets and know-how, firms’ inventive output often declines in the post-M&A period. Financial, managerial and organizational constraints related to the M&A event contribute to inventive output declines and inventors’ departure. Prior literature treats the acquiring firm as a passive observer of invention declines. This study argues that acquiring firms can take measures by hiring new key inventors. We show that the hiring of new key inventors in the post-M&A period can counteract invention declines in two ways. First, these newly hired inventors are associated with an increase of corporate inventive output after the M&A. Second, they are also associated with an improved inventive output of inventors already working for the acquiring firm. These results suggest that an appropriate hiring policy can counteract the declining inventive output of firms in the aftermath of M&As.     

COLLUSION AND RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES*

I examine the question whether cooperation in R&D among firms producing similar products leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated‐game framework. Innovation under non‐cooperative R&D leads to an inter‐firm asymmetry, destabilizing collusion in pre‐discovery and post‐discovery periods. Innovation sharing under cooperative R&D preserves the symmetry and also increases total profit, thereby facilitating collusion. However, welfare may increase with cooperative R&D. I also examine the condition for collusion under licensing and compare the results.     

基于期权博弈的企业价值边界均衡演化分析

本文应用期权博弈理论,对企业在面对市场环境不确定和竞争者行为不确定情况下企业价值边界的动态均衡演化过程做了深入分析。结果表明,企业价值边界确定在企业等待的期权价值与抢先的战略价值相均衡之处。企业抢先行动或等待都会引起不确定因素的变化,从而引起上述两类价值曲线的位移或曲率变化,并使得企业价值边界表现出动态均衡变化。而不同的不确定状况又决定了企业不同的策略行动,即是变得强硬而抢先,还是变得温和而等待,从而企业可以通过相机抉择保持可持续竞争优势,实现企业价值最大化。     

Strategic factor markets,scale free resources,and economic performance: The impact of product market rivalry

This paper analyzes how scale free resources, which can be acquired by multiple firms simultaneously and deployed against one another in product market competition, will be priced in strategic factor markets, and what the consequences are for the acquiring firms' performance. Based on a game‐theoretic model, it shows how the impact of strategic factor markets on economic profits is influenced by product market rivalry, preexisting competitive (dis)advantages, and the interaction of acquired resources with those preexisting asymmetries. New insights include the result that resource suppliers will aim at (and largely succeed in) setting resource prices so that the acquiring firms earn negative strategic factor market profits—sacrificing some of their preexisting market power rents—by acquiring resources that they know to be overpriced. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equilibrium market share—a measure of competitive strength

If an oligopoly is modelled as a non-zero-sum game, then the market shares associated with an equilibrium solution can be interpreted as measuring the competitive strength of the firms. By comparing afirm's equilibrium market share with its actual market share, one can conclude whether the firm has positive or negative growth potential in terms of market share, which has some implications for its investment strategy.     

The effects of M&As within the mobile ecosystem on the rival's shareholder value: The case of Google and Apple

As a result of the speed of information and communications technology convergence, the concept of the business ecosystem has been adopted for understanding the business value chain. Within the business ecosystem, keystones play a central role. Currently, Google and Apple are the keystones of the mobile ecosystem, and they have been quite active in acquiring firms over the past years. This study empirically examines the effects of these two firms’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As), especially the different effects on the acquirer and the rival depending on the type of target firm. After the target firms are classified according to the businesses of the acquiring firm that each target firm is related to, the study examines the effects of different types of M&As on the values of the acquirer, the rival, or both. The results provide a basis for understanding the complex relationship between two keystones within the mobile business ecosystem.     

Employment Effects of Acquisitions: Evidence from Acquired European Firms

This paper examines the employment effects of acquisitions for acquired European firms, taking non-random selection of acquisition targets explicitly into account. Following the empirical firm growth literature and theories put forward in the mergers and acquisition (M&A) literature, we control for convergence dynamics in firm size and distinguish between different types of acquisitions. Empirically, we estimate an endogenous treatment model using accounting data for a newly created sample of acquired and non-acquired European firms. Our results reveal positive employment effects for different types of acquisitions indicating that M&As likely induce efficiency gains.     

Geographic overlap and acquisition pairing

Research Summary: This study examines the role of geographic factors in explaining acquisition pairing using a novel conditional logic methodology. Drawing from information asymmetry arguments regarding acquisition decisions, we theorize that geographic overlap between the acquirer and potential targets’ businesses and operations enables the acquirer to collect more information about the potential target through its multiple business operations that are geographically proximate. We also demonstrate moderating boundary conditions. In particular, we examine acquiring firm characteristics, acquiring firm size and geographic dispersion, which both weaken the relationship between geographic overlap and acquisition pairing. Likewise, we examine two dyadic distance moderators, geographic distance and product dissimilarity, both of which increase information asymmetry between the acquirer and potential targets, which increases the effect of geographic overlap in facilitating acquisition pairing. Managerial Summary: Firms pursuing acquisition activities face severe information asymmetry when evaluating potential targets. This study investigates how acquiring firms leverage geographic conditions to overcome information asymmetry and choose targets that they can better evaluate. We find that acquirers are more likely to choose targets that have subsidiaries or business operations overlapping in the same states as the acquirers themselves. This is particularly true for small acquirers, which lack resources and capabilities to seek external assistance, and acquirers that have business operations in more concentrated locations. We also find that acquiring targets with geographically overlapped business operations is especially salient when the target's headquarters is distantly located from the acquirer or when the target offers dissimilar products from the acquirer.