契约理论发展评述：建立一个综合性分析框架

一、契约理论发展的综合性评述科斯在其经典论文“企业的性质”( 1937)一文中 ,首次从交易费用角度对企业性质和边界问题作出了阐释。他论述道 :“当追加的交易 (它可以是通过价格机制协调的交易 )由企业家来组织时 ,企业就变大 ,当企业家放弃对这些交易的组织时 ,企业就变小” ,“企业将倾向于扩展直到在企业内部组织一笔交易的成本等于通过在公开市场上完成同一笔交易的成本或在另一个企业组织同样交易的成本为止”。科斯从理论逻辑上证明了市场交易费用的存在 ,认为市场与企业是资源配置的两种可互相替代的手段。在市场上 ,资源的配置由…     

企业家市场选择制度

企业家市场选择制度扬州市委党校钱存林☆企业改革ＱＩＹＥＧＡＩＧＥ企业家市场选择制度是运用价格、供求、竞争等机制规范和约束企业家选择行为的一系列规则。目前，国有企业改革已经进入制度创新阶段，能否迅速转变企业家选择方式，运用市场机制选择企业家，实行行业家...     

企业家作用机制研究

企业家在企业中起主导作用,这种主导作用的本质是对于企业机制的创新。由于企业家的企业机制创新活动,是利用既有条件以计划机制取代价格机制的过程,具有结构化的创新空间和创新路径,因此存在着企业家作用机制。企业家作用机制既不同于企业机制,又不同于企业家机制,是指企业家在企业机制建设中的创新活动机制,研究这一机制对于依靠企业家转变企业机制具有重要意义。     

企业:一种人力资本使用权交易的粘性组织

本文沿着科斯的思路 ,把企业理解为一种人力资本使用权交易的粘性组织。企业用权威关系替代价格机制 ,而权威关系能够减少交易费用的原因在于“组织粘性”的存在。企业是一种有粘性的契约 ,而市场是一种无粘性的契约。企业的组织粘性把关键员工和企业联在一起 ,并使企业在引入企业家才能时有更低的临界交易效率。企业的边界由交易费用和组织粘性共同决定。     

公司治理与公司管理关系研究

一、企业与市场的关系 科斯认为，企业与市场是资源配置的可相互替代的方式。企业的存在是因为它可以节约交易费用，从而可取代市场机制。市场的运行是有成本的，而企业的出现可以借助于其权威关系，通过减少交易次数，实现比市场机制更有效的资源配置。两者的不同主要体现在，市场是通过非人格化的价格机制自发运行的，而在企业内部，则是通过以官僚组织结构为基础的行政权威来实现的，     

分工视角：企业剩余权与国有企业效率

企业是分工演进的一种重要后果，其实质上是一种劳动力市场的契约。企业的剩余权作为企业家活动的一种间接价格，将交易效率极低的企业家活动卷入分工，反过来极大地促进了分工和经济发展。企业家活动是企业效率的保证，企业家的剩余收益权又是企业家活动的保证。企业家剩余权得不到保护是国有企业效益低下的根本原因．而保护国有企业的企业家剩余收益权是提高国有企业效率的关键。为了保护国有企业的企业家剩余收益权，必须推进市场化进程，建立合理的激励机制，以及进行全面的社会制度改革。     

技术创新、企业与宏观经济运行——新兴马克思主义企业经济学分析

传统经济理论中"以市场为中心"的理论和交易成本框架下"以企业为中心"的理论,都难以在交易、生产成本和技术创新之间寻求平衡,也难以从技术创新的层面去揭示企业本质及其在宏观经济中的作用。马克思的企业理论克服了这种不足,但同这两种理论一样,都忽视了企业家在价格机制和市场均衡中的调节作用。因此,将马克思关于企业的质的分析和宏观动态分析与交易成本经济学的微观企业组织(或治理机制)理论结合起来,建立"一种更为全面的理论",以揭示技术创新、企业组织及宏观经济运行之间的内在联系,实现企业组织和市场的互动,这是新兴马克思主义企业经济学的理论特色和发展方向。     

论劳动力指导价位制度及其市场价值

劳动力市场运行的核心机制就是工资机制，没有健全的工资机制，就不会有完善的劳动力市场；而劳动与工资、劳动力与劳动力价格都是不可分割的统一体，工资作为劳动力的价格，劳动力价格作为劳动力市场价值的货币表现，当然要受劳动力供求关系的影响，并在劳动力市场中形成。在这个过程中，“看不见的手”不是万能的，我们早就明确过，建设社会主义的市场经济必须“市场机制调节，企业自主分配，职工民主参与，国家监控指导。”     

多维企业家社会资本、企业吸收能力与企业绩效研究

基于社会资本理论,将企业家社会资本划分为市场、制度及金融3个维度,利用139家中国创业板上市公司数据,对企业家社会资本、企业吸收能力、企业财务绩效及创新绩效的内在关系进行实证分析。实证结果表明,企业家市场社会资本对企业财务绩效和创新绩效具有显著的正向影响,企业吸收能力与企业财务绩效及创新绩效显著正相关。企业吸收能力正向调节企业家市场社会资本与企业财务绩效和创新绩效的关系,也正向调节企业家制度社会资本与企业创新绩效的关系。     

什么粘住了中国企业自主创新能力提升的翅膀

中国企业的自主创新能力总体面临着"理论上重要但实践中滞后"的情形.本文指出企业是经济活动的真正主体,企业家是企业自主创新的最终推动者,企业家对企业自主创新的决策取决于对市场的判断和对生产要素价格的权衡.据此,中国的渐进式改革诱发了要素市场发育程度滞后于商品市场,结果土地、资本、劳动等要素价格存在不同程度的"低估"现象,这刺激了企业和企业家密集使用有形要素、而较少有动力和压力投资于自主创新,企业自主创新能力滞后是企业家在现有要素市场和价格下理性进行要素组合的结果.未来提升企业自主创新能力的要害是持续推进要素市场的发育和完善,通过"健全要素市场"和"矫正要素价格"来促进企业自主创新能力的持续提升.     

The Determinants of Sticky Prices and Sticky Plans: Evidence from German Business Survey Data

So far, there is no consensus on the price adjustment determinants in the empirical literature. Analyzing a novel firm‐level business survey data set, we provide new insights on the price setting behavior of German retailers during a low inflation period. Relating the probability of both price and pricing plan adjustment to time‐ and state‐dependent variables, we find that state‐dependence is important; the macroeconomic environment as well as the firm‐specific condition significantly determines the timing of both actual price changes and pricing plan adjustments. Moreover, input cost changes are important determinants of price setting. Finally, price increases respond more strongly to cost shocks compared to price decreases.     

Price adjustment in an atomistic market

This paper considers the price adjustment process in a market which retains the characteristics of a perfectly competitive market except that individual firms are price-setters. Buyers, unaware initially of what prices which firms are charging, indulge in search by contacting a sample of firms and buy (according to a demand curve) from the lowest-price firm encountered. Firms set prices to maximise profits over their perceived (or estimated) demand curve, and update their estimated demand curve in accordance with the observed change in demand between successive time periods. It is shown that the price distribution converges to a degenerate distribution centred on the monopoly price.     

Modelling economic hysteresis losses caused by sunk adjustment costs

Transition from one economic equilibrium to another as a consequence of shocks is often associated with sunk adjustment costs. Firm-specific sunk market entry investments (or sunk market exit costs) in case of a reaction to price shocks are an example. These adjustment costs lead to a dynamic supply pattern similar to hysteresis. In analogy to “hysteresis losses” in ferromagnetism, the authors explicitly model dynamic adjustment losses in the course of market entry and exit cycles. They start from the micro level of a single firm and use explicit aggregation tools from hysteresis theory in mathematics and physics to calculate dynamic losses. The authors show that strong market fluctuations generate disproportionately large hysteresis losses for producers. This could give a reason for the implementation of stabilizing measures and policies to prevent strong (price) variations or, alternatively, to reduce the sunk entry and exit costs.     

A model of the socialist firm in transition to a market economy

This paper models the dynamic adjustment path of a socialist firm in transition to a market economy by a price shock that renders old capital obsolete. The firm can adjust with investment in more productive capital equipments. The optimal time paths of investment, output, and employment are analyzed and the impact of fiscal incentives like investment subsidies and a reduced corporate income tax rate are studied. Like output, the aggregate capital stock follows a J-curve. The conditions for viability of firms and the impact of variables such as wage increases on the value of the firm are discussed.     

Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS

A well-known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm. I show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account, even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone. I then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase I of the EU ETS. I find that some firms’ excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation, and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions. My results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets.     

Human Capital and Growth: New Evidences from African Data

Assuming that all firms have rising marginal costs, merger between a dominant firm and one of the firms in the competitive fringe is considered. The effects on market price and output, profits and market power are shown when the dominant firm operates as a two-plant firm after merger and output arises from both plants. It is proved that if merger offers no efficiency gain, then market price always rises; and if merger results in efficiency gain, then market price falls if and only if there are sufficiently large number of firms in the fringe. In any case, there is profit incentive for merger to take place. [611]     

The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

Price Volatility and Risk Exposure: On the Interaction of Quota and Product Markets

We consider an industry with firms that produce a final good emitting pollution to different degree as a side effect. Pollution is regulated by a tradable quota system where some quotas may have been allocated at the outset, i.e. before the quota market is opened. We study how volatility in quota price affects firm behaviour, taking into account the impact of quota price on final-good price. The impact on the individual firm differs depending on how polluting it is??whether it is ??clean?? or ??dirty????and whether it has been allocated quotas at the outset. In the absence of long-term or forward contracting, a grandfathering regime??where clean firms are allocated no quotas and dirty firms are allocated quotas for a part of their emissions??minimizes the impact on firm behavior relative to a risk-neutral benchmark.With forward contracts and in the absence of wealth effects initial quota allocation has no effect on firm behaviour. Allowing for abatement does not change the qualitative nature of our results.     

Antidumping Regulations: Anti‐Competitive and Anti‐Export

In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an antidumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the home firm to reduce the degree of competition in the home market. The home firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the home firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the home market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.     

Forward Markets and the Behaviour of the Competitive Firm with Production Flexibility

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when a forward market for its output is available. The firm possesses production flexibility in that it makes its production decision after the resolution of the output price uncertainty, albeit subject to a capacity constraint on production. We show that the firm optimally acquires a higher level of capacity investment than an otherwise identical firm with no production flexibility. We further show that production flexibility allows the firm to implicitly hedge against its output price risk exposure by the ex post production decision. The firm as such under‐hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a non‐positive risk premium.