Environmental Economics and Modeling Marketable Permits

This paper reviews fundamental concepts in environmental economics and explores theoretical results regarding the choice of the key policy instruments for the control of externalities: taxes, subsidies and marketable permits. The paper explains why today market mechanisms are increasingly being used as a tool for allocating unpriced rights and scarce resources. We survey how significant market imperfections, a pre-existing regulatory environment and concentration in both permit and output markets can impede the proper functioning of a permit system. The main factors that affect the effectiveness of marketable permits are then discussed. Given the importance of understanding the emission permit price formation, we overview recent attempts at developing valid price models for emission permits, taking into account banking and borrowing opportunities, pollution abatement measures, strategic trading interactions and the presence of asymmetric information in the permit market.     

A welfare comparison of ad valorem and unit tax regimes

This paper strives to merge two strands of the literature. The first group of papers compares ad valorem and unit taxes in a tax competition framework in terms of welfare. The second group of papers regards capital income taxes as a conjunction of taxes on pure profits and taxes on capital income. We find that, given decreasing returns to scale, there always exists a level of the share of deductible capital costs strictly smaller than one, such that for all values larger than this threshold, an ad valorem tax regime unambiguously Pareto-dominates a unit tax regime.     

Policy instruments for pollution control in developing countries.

Economic development in developing countries must be accomplished in a manner that does not harm the environment with pollution. Pollution harms human health and productivity. Thus appropriate strategies must be developed that promote growth, reduce poverty, and protect the environment. A review of the current literature is performed with attention paid to cost-effective interventions i.e., comparisons of regulatory and fiscal instruments that can reduce pollution. Both direct instruments (like effluent charges, tradable permits, deposit refund systems, emission regulations and regulatory agency funding for purification, cleanup, waste disposal, and enforcement) and indirect instruments (like input/output taxes and subsidies, substitution subsidies, abatement inputs, regulation of equipment and processes, and development of clean technologies) are examined. Examples are used to show how indirect instruments can be successful when monitoring and enforcement is too costly. A careful examination of distributive concerns illustrate how the effect on the poor may need particular consideration and how groups with vested interests can help evaluate the probable success of such interventions.     

The Relationship between Energy Taxation and Business Environmental Protection Expenditures in the European Union

Businesses are often subject to energy taxes that impose a charge on greenhouse gas emissions. Theoretically, energy taxes should motivate business spending on emissions abatement up to the point that, at the margin, the cost of reducing emissions equals the amount of the tax that is avoided. We use European Union (EU) data from 2001 to 2008 to test the hypothesized positive relationship between energy taxes and business spending on abatement initiatives for the protection of ambient air and climate. We find that while overall business spending and business investment expenditures are positively related to energy tax rates, current period expenditures are not related to energy tax rates.Supplemental analyses indicate that the imposition of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2005 affected these relationships. In the pre-ETS period, energy taxes were not related to overall business spending or to current period expenditures, but there was a significant positive relationship between energy taxes and investment expenditures. After the ETS was introduced, there was a significant positive relationship between energy tax rates and both overall business spending and business current period abatement expenditures, but the relationship between business investment spending and energy tax rates was not significant.Our results indicate that energy taxes are effective in motivating business spending on emissions abatement. However, the nature of the effect varies across investment spending and current period expenditures. As both long-term and current initiatives are necessary to meet abatement goals, policymakers should be aware of these differences.     

Vested interests and technology adoption

The asymmetric ability of different interest groups to exclude non-members and the concentrated benefits and diffused costs of policies favoring vested interests matters for technology adoption. We analyze a political economy model where coalitions of workers in many small industries lobby government for a prohibition on the adoption of superior technologies. For reasonable parameter values, the “smallness” of industry lobbies leads to barriers to the adoption of technologies that would make all workers more productive. Higher government corruption can lead to lower levels of TFP and per capita output. The model can generate TFP growth cycles.     

Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation in Asymmetric Cournot Oligopolies

This paper compares ad valorem and specific taxes in asymmetric homogenous Cournot oligopolies with constant marginal costs. We show that for any given level of industry output, ad valorem taxes are superior to specific taxes in terms of revenue raised. If the tax rates are sufficiently high, for any given specific tax one can find an ad valorem tax that leads to greater tax revenue, consumer surplus, and industry profits.     

The relative efficiency of market-based environmental policy instruments with imperfect compliance

We study how the relative cost efficiency of three market-based instruments—emission taxes, tradable permits and output taxes—is influenced by the combination of accounting for incomplete compliance and pre-existing labor taxes. First, accounting for violations makes the policy instruments less effective so that environmental damages have to be larger to justify a policy. Secondly, including fines in a second-best setting provides a new means of collecting government revenues and of lessening existing tax distortions. We show that the relative position of grandfathered tradable permits vis-à-vis emission taxes improves considerably when incomplete compliance is incorporated in a second-best setting. A simple AGE model illustrates the results.      

Environmental Policy and Public Revenue with International Capital Mobility

In the presence of preexisting distortionary taxes, it is often argued that auctioned emission permits are preferable to non-auctioned permits, because the former generate revenues that may be used to reduce other taxes. This paper shows that when capital is internationally mobile, it may be optimal to use a combination of non-auctioned and auctioned emission permits, for both environmental and fiscal reasons. By letting the number of non-auctioned permits be a positive function of the amount of capital used domestically, they will attract capital to the home country. This may create environmental benefits in terms of reduced transboundary pollution and may lead to increased public revenue because the price of emission permits may increase and because the tax base may be enhanced. It is also shown that the optimal number of non-auctioned permits may increase as the marginal costs of public funds increase. JEL Code: D62, F21, Q28     

Modeling RBRT adoption and its effects on cost of capital

In the capital market, firms compete to obtain capital at a lower cost than their rivals. In order to do so, firms may try to increase their information disclosure by adopting new information technologies, such as a real-time business reporting technology (RBRT). The financial accounting literature has empirically provided positive evidence of increased transparency (e.g., resulting from RBRT adoption). We attempt to link the transparency and cost of capital literatures and extend organizational innovation adoption theory.We adapt some constructs from existing innovation adoption theory, as well as contribute some that apply to a RBRT context, to develop a mathematical model on the relationship between RBRT adoption and the cost of capital. The model considers both micro-(firm) level factors and macro-level factors that affect the adoption decision. We argue that cost of capital savings, uncertainty, risk aversion, transaction and transformation costs, and governmental policy affect a firm's decision of whether and when to adopt a RBRT. A number of propositions are derived, based on our model, which may help firms formulate their adoption strategy. Our model also provides a basis for further empirical study on this new issue.     

Taxation and Venture Capital Backed Entrepreneurship

In recent years, venture capital has increasingly become a factor in the financing of new firms. We examine how the value of mature firms determines the incentives of entrepreneurs to start up new firms and of venture capitalists to finance and advise them. We examine how capital gains taxes as well as subsidies to start-up costs of new firms affect venture capital backed entrepreneurship. We also argue that dividend and capital gains taxes on mature firms have important consequences for start-up firms as well.     

Term Structure Multiplicity and Clientele in Markets with Transactions Costs and Taxes

The authors investigate term structure with realistic transactions costs and taxes. Its properties are derived from a certain no-arbitrage condition via duality theory in convex programming. Transactions costs imply an infinite multiplicity of term structures. A simple example with realistic transactions costs shows that this multiplicity can induce a valuation range of over 277 basis points. Transactions costs also allow equilibrium without short sale restrictions. The authors find the minimum transactions costs that prevent arbitrage. In addition, the exact conditions for weak clientele, in which investors will not buy some bonds and may not sell any that they already hold, are established.     

Capital, corporate income taxes, and catastrophe insurance

We provide estimates of the equity capital needed and the resulting tax costs incurred when supplying catastrophe insurance/reinsurance using a partial equilibrium model that incorporates a specific loss distribution for US catastrophe losses. After consideration of insurer investment in tax-exempt securities, tax loss carry-back/forward provisions, and personal taxes, our results imply that the tax costs of equity finance alone have a substantial effect on the cost of supplying catastrophe reinsurance. These results help explain a variety of industry developments that reduce tax costs. Also, when coupled with non-tax costs of capital, these results help explain the limited scope of catastrophe insurance/reinsurance.     

Environmental Finance: Innovating to Save the Planet*

This article demonstrates that it is not only possible, but urgently necessary, to apply principles of finance and economics—efficient use of scarce capital, price transparency, and lowered transaction costs—to environmental issues. From limiting acid rain with the sulfur dioxide‐allowance market to the implementation of the Clean Water Act, market‐based solutions have proven consistently more effective in protecting the environment than government regulation alone. Project financing, public‐private partnerships, and tradable permits have come to supplement or replace conventional command‐and‐control regulation and purely tax‐based instruments. Tradable permit systems have been deployed to phase down use of leaded gasoline, end the use of ozone‐depleting chloro‐fluorocarbons, and even reduce air pollution in the smoggy skies above Los Angeles. And the United Nations Environment Program has launched a Finance Initiative as a formal means of mobilizing the financial sector to take a more active role in protecting the environment. Such an approach can minimize the aggregate costs of achieving environmental targets while providing dynamic incentives for the adoption and diffusion of greener technologies.     

On the short-run effects of labor market reforms

While several countries have recognized the need of introducing flexibility to their labor markets, there are different ways of doing so. Using a small open economy with tenure-dependent separation taxes, this paper compares introducing a full reform with two partial alternatives: (1) the introduction of temporary contracts, and (2) the elimination of separation costs from all new hires while freezing them on the workers that were hired prior to the reform. The first alternative can achieve a first-best long run outcome but leads to a sharp initial recession. The second alternative generates a similar long run outcome but avoids the recessionary adjustment.     

Intangible investment and Ramsey capital taxation

The standard analysis of optimal fiscal policy aggregates different types of assets into a unique capital good and all types of capital taxes into a unique capital tax. This paper considers a disaggregated framework: an economy with corporate and dividend taxes, where firms invest in both tangible and intangible assets (which can be expensed or sweat). In our setup, firms can always respond to changes in the timing of taxation. We find that the optimal long-run policy features zero corporate taxes and positive dividend taxes, with labor and dividend taxes being identical. Moreover, the initial capital levy is relatively small.     

Fiscal-monetary policy interactions in the presence of unionized labor markets

This paper develops a framework for studying the interactions between labor unions, fiscal policy, monetary policy and monopolistically competitive firms. The framework is used to investigate the effects of labor taxes, the replacement ratio, labor market institutions and monetary policymaking institutions on economic peformance in the presence of strategic interactions between labor unions and the central bank. Given fiscal variables, higher levels of either centralization of wage bargaining, or of central bank conservativeness are associated with lower unemployment and inflation. However the forward shifting of changes in either labor taxes or in unemployment benefits to labors costs is larger the higher are those institutional variables. The paper also considers the effects of those institutions on the choice of labor taxes and of unemployment benefits by governments concerned with the costs of inflation and unemployment, as well as with redistribution to particular constituencies. A main result is that, normally, higher levels of centralization and conservativeness induce government to set higher labor taxes. JEL Classification: E5 · E6 · H2 · J3 · J5 · L1     

The Limits of Limited Liability: Evidence from Industrial Pollution

We study how parent liability for subsidiaries' environmental cleanup costs affects industrial pollution and production. Our empirical setting exploits a Supreme Court decision that strengthened parent limited liability protection for some subsidiaries. Using a difference‐in‐differences framework, we find that stronger liability protection for parents leads to a 5% to 9% increase in toxic emissions by subsidiaries. Evidence suggests the increase in pollution is driven by lower investment in abatement technologies rather than increased production. Cross‐sectional tests suggest convexities associated with insolvency and executive compensation drive heterogeneous effects. Overall, our findings highlight the moral hazard problem associated with limited liability.     

Absorption versus direct costing: the relevance of opportunity costs in the management of congested stochastic production systems

This paper investigates the relative performance of absorption versus direct costing procedures. Traditionally, absorption costing procedures have been defended on the basis of them acting as a proxy for hard to measure opportunity costs. We question the validity of this traditional defence by explicitly considering the extent to which absorption costing-based accounting calculations actually provide good proxies. Our analysis shows that in some situations absorption costing so over estimates opportunity costs that it would be preferable to use direct costing even though this implicitly assumes opportunity costs are zero. Thus, given that we establish that one can notalwaysuse the existence of opportunity costs as a defence for the adoption of absorption costing procedures we next identifyspecificconditions for which if satisfied, we can unambiguously defend the adoption of absorption costing. We develop an ‘open acceptance condition’ which if satisfied insures that a production system directed by absorption costs out performs a system based upon direct costs.     

Market reaction to and valuation of IFRS reconciliation adjustments: first evidence from the UK

We investigate the market reaction to, and the value-relevance of, information contained in the mandatory transitional documents required by International Financial Reporting Standards 1 (2005). We find significant negative abnormal returns for firms reporting negative earnings reconciliation. Although the informational content of the positive earnings adjustments is value-relevant before disclosure, for negative earnings adjustments it is value-relevant only after disclosure. This finding is consistent with managers delaying the communication of bad news until IFRS compliance. A finer model shows that adjustments attributed to impairment of goodwill, share-based payments, and deferred taxes are incrementally value-relevant but that only the impairment of goodwill and deferred taxes reveal new information. Our results indicate that mandatory IFRS adoption alters investors’ beliefs about stock prices.     

Dividend taxes and stock volatility

How do dividend taxes affect stock volatility? If a risk-averse executive faces price risk through his incentive contract, changes in stock volatility due to dividend taxes may increase agency costs and therefore decrease overall welfare. In this paper, I use a decrease in dividend taxes as a natural experiment to identify their effect on the firm’s idiosyncratic stock return volatility. Stock volatility decreased after the tax cut for firms at which executives have larger sensitivity to stock price in their incentive compensation package relative to firms at which executives have a smaller sensitivity. Therefore, with risk-averse executives and risk-neutral shareholders, dividend taxes may exacerbate agency costs. The increase in agency costs will decrease shareholder welfare, which can be partially offset by the use of options in the employment contract.