外生单向溢出效应下纵向差异化产品Cournot和Bertrand竞争均衡的比较研究

研究价格(Bertrand)和数量(Cournot)竞争模式下,单向溢出对企业质量选择、利润的影响。以纵向差异化市场结构为例,建立了基于单向质量溢出的不对称寡头竞争模型,运用赋值计算对模型的均衡解进行了比较分析,结论是:1给定溢出因子和学习效应的合理取值范围,领先和跟随企业的质量与利润在价格竞争下都小于数量竞争;2质量间的单向溢出效应、跟随者的学习努力都会导致领先者初始质量的下降,但在价格竞争时,这种"逆向选择"效应的程度较低;3跟随者的学习激励随着溢出效应的提高而降低,并不受竞争策略变化的影响。这些发现可以解释中国轿车产业竞争模式对合资和自主创新企业关系变化的影响。     

Virtual Patent Extension by Cannibalization

We propose a model to explain the recent practice of pharmaceutical firms of introducing generic substitutes for their own branded products before their patents expire. By this early introduction, a branded product's provider seeks to establish a Stackelberg leadership role in the forthcoming generic substitute market. Along with the early introduction of the generic substitute for its branded product, the firm optimally raises the price of its branded product above its prior monopoly level. However, despite its Stackelberg leadership position in the subsequent generic substitute market, the firm's branded product's price declines for a sufficiently large number of entrants into that market. Consumers, who are assumed to be composed of a brand-loyal segment and a price-sensitive segment, are better off both before and after the branded product's patent expires as a result of the branded products' suppliers early introduction of generic substitutes. The branded products' suppliers are also better off but the generics' suppliers are not as a result of this practice. However, total producer profits are higher than they would be if the branded products' suppliers were not involved in supplying their own generic substitute.     

Market Performance Implications of the Transfer Price Rule

The “transfer price rule” (TPR) defines a vertical price squeeze as an input price, output price combination set by a vertically‐integrated firm monopoly producer of an essential input that would not allow the firm's downstream unit to earn at least a normal rate of return on investment in the “as‐if” case that it had to purchase the input at the price charged independent firms. In its 2009 linkLine decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the TPR for the purpose of enforcing the anti‐monopolization prohibition of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In contrast, a vertical price squeeze, defined by a TPR‐like standard, is an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In this article, we model the impact of the TPR on market performance. We find that the TPR increases consumer surplus and net social welfare if all firms remain active in the downstream market. It sometimes induces the upstream firm to refuse to supply the downstream firm, and in such cases, consumer surplus and net social welfare are reduced. The impact of the TPR on market performance thus depends on whether or not an upstream firm can refuse to supply downstream firms on terms that would offer it at least a normal rate of return on investment.     

Endogenous market structure and foreign market entry

Models dealing with cross-border acquisitions versus greenfield investment usually assume that the entry of a foreign firm into a market has effects on the outputs of all domestic firms in that market, but exit or entry of local firms is not considered. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the acquisition versus greenfield versus exporting question under fixed versus free entry assumptions for local firms. Our finding is that greenfield entry and exporting options are more attractive relative to acquisition when the local market structure adjusts to foreign entry through local entry or exit than when it is fixed. With respect to welfare in the host economy, existing theory models and policy discussions maintain that the effects of greenfield versus acquisition entry differ substantially. We show that under free entry and exit, there is no difference between the two for consumer surplus, but acquisition improves welfare a little through rent extraction by the local acquired firm. Thus the existing conventional wisdom may be leading to inappropriate policy choices by host governments.     

Profitable Mergers in a Cournot Model of Spatial Competition

This paper investigates the profitability and locational effects of mergers when Cournot firms compete in spatially differentiated markets. A two-firm merger is generally profitable because the merged partners can coordinate their location decisions. The merged firm locates its plants outside the market quartiles with distance from the market center being an increasing function of the number of nonmerged firms remaining at the market center. Profitable two-firm mergers reduce competitive pressure, leading to higher prices and reduced consumer surplus. The merger increases total surplus by increased locational efficiency and the increased profits of the merged and nonmerged firms.     

消费品牌意识下的自有品牌产品质量特性的选择

随着品牌意识的逐步增强,消费者更愿意选择具有品牌效应的商品。文章以空间差异化分析模型为基础,引入消费者品牌意识变量,建立了一个新的产品差异化模型。依靠于参数情况,给出了消费者强、弱、一般三种典型的品牌意识下产品质量特性竞争的纳什均衡类型。结果表明,消费者对某类商品品牌意识越弱。产品之间越会差并化,低质量特性产品所获得的市场份额及其利润也会越大。而随着消费者品牌意识增强,零售商越愿意提供高质量特性的产品,其对应的市场份额及其利润也会越大。这从而解释了在消费者品牌意识较弱的产品品类中,零售商发展低质量自有品牌产品的原因。     

Sharing the Market or Getting Closer for a Fight? Strategic Reaction to Reduced Trade Costs

Electronic coordination links markets that have initially been separated by transport costs, which in turn raises competitive pressure and affects incentives to differentiate products. We analyze private and social incentives to invest in a repositioning of products in a heterogeneous goods duopoly with two spatially separated markets. We consider both price and quantity competition to be able to distinguish between digital and physical products, respectively. For low transport costs, firms want to enhance product differentiation as expected. However, if transport costs remain close to prohibitive levels, they have an incentive to reduce heterogeneity.     

Multi-product firms and exporting: a developing country perspective

In this paper we make the distinction between single-product and multi-product firms to contribute to our understanding of the complex relationship between multinational enterprises (MNEs), exporting and economic development. Using firm-level data for Thailand we show that the number of goods produced causes a larger variation in exports volumes than production volumes. Whilst the number of products and the total volume of exports are positively correlated we find, in contrast to US studies, a negative correlation between the number of products produced and the volume of production per product. We then investigate the characteristics associated with multi-product firms and find a distinction between foreign-owned and domestic firms. The presence of foreign firms producing single products solely for the domestic market as well as those producing many products for export demonstrates the diversity of behaviour of foreign-owned firms in developing countries.     

Process and product innovation: A differential game approach to product life cycle

We investigate the timing of adoption of product and process innovation using a differential game where firms may invest in both activities. We consider horizontal product innovation that reduces product substitutability, and process innovation that reduces marginal cost. First, we demonstrate that the incentive for cost‐reducing investment is relatively higher than the incentive to increase product differentiation. Second, depending on initial conditions: (i) firms activate both types of investment from the very outset to the steady state; (ii) firms initially invest in only one R&D activity and then reach the steady state either carrying out only this activity or carrying out both; or (iii) firms do not invest at all in either type of innovation. Comparing R&D investments under Cournot and Bertrand behavior shows that quantity competition entails lower R&D incentives than price competition in both directions.     

Assessing Consumer Gains from a Drug Price Control Policy in the United States

We use national data from 1960 to 2000 to estimate the demand for pharmaceuticals in the United States. We then simulate consumer surplus gains from a hypothetical drug price control policy that would have limited drug price increases to the rate of inflation from 1981 to 2000. Using a range of values for the real interest rate, coinsurance rate, and own-price elasticity of demand, we find that the consumer surplus gains from this policy equal $472 billion by the end of 2000. According to a recent study, that same policy would have led to 198 fewer new drugs being brought to the U.S. market. Therefore, the average social opportunity cost per drug developed during this period was approximately $2.4 billion. Research on the value of pharmaceuticals suggests that the social benefits of a new drug are far greater than this estimate. Hence, drug price controls could do more harm than good.     

The Economic Effect Of Competition Law Enforcement: The Case Of The Netherlands

Summary  In this paper we try to bridge the gap between the outcome ambitions of competition policy in terms of welfare gains and consumer surplus and the longer term effects of competition policy on growth and employment. First of all, an overview is given of the different definitions of welfare. We explain why maximising the consumer surplus is an important part of the mission statement for most competition authorities. In the second part of the paper we estimate the impact of the introduction of the competition law on economic development. The effects of antitrust policies, merger control and energy regulation on the consumer surplus appear substantial. This increase in consumer surplus can be interpreted as a cut in the “market power wedge” which, from a modelling point of view, is comparable to a cut in the tax wedge. A model simulation for the Netherlands shows that the economy responded positively to this increase in the consumer surplus. We find that production has grown by an extra 0.5% and that employment has increased by 0.4% as a result of the enforcement of the Competition Law. The authors are respectively Chief Economist of the NMa and senior advisor at the Office of the Chief Economist of the NMa. This paper is the background paper for the presentation with the same title at the conference “Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement”, held in The Hague, 17 and 18 October 2007. The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.     

CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externality

We investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation á la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function. If the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, accumulates more capital, and earns higher profits than its profit‐seeking rival.     

Quality and capacity choices in a vertical differentiation model with congestion

We consider a vertically differentiated market in which consumers’ utility is assumed to depend on the price, congestion level and the stand‐alone quality of the good or service. Two firms compete on this market, choosing capacities, stand‐alone qualities and prices. We characterize completely the subgame perfect equilibrium for the homogenous market case (where only one firm is active without congestion). We prove that both firms are active, choosing minimal differentiation along the capacity and quality dimensions. Therefore, the presence of congestion rules out market preemption as a possible outcome in equilibrium and weakens the incentive to differentiate.     

Corporate hierarchy, promotion, and firm growth: Japanese internal labor market in transition

This paper investigates the incentive systems and the hierarchical design of the Japanese firms as integral parts of employment structure. Using the survey cross-section data on job ranks and wages, we analyze the promotion policy and compensations system as the key incentive mechanism in these firms with highly developed internal labor markets. We find that the incentive as well as hierarchical structures of the large Japanese firms are highly sensitive to the longrun growth rates of these firms. This finding is supported by a prediction of a model of internal promotions developed in the paper. We also find that the span of control, incentive effects of promotion, and wage-age profile at each job rank are all increasing in the longrun growth rates of these firms. These findings are jointly consistent with and in support of the hypothesis that the expected gains from the promotion is the key incentive in inducing efforts of the employees.     

How the Rapid Development of VoIP Technologies Affects Consumer Welfare and the Market

Abstract

The impact of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) growth on other telecommunication services, such as landlines and mobile telephony, has gained significant interest in Korea recently. An emerging alternative to landline telecommunications, VoIP is experiencing explosive growth in demand and is providing significant economic utility to consumers. The rapid growth of smart phones has also created a considerable amount of controversy regarding the potential impact of VoIP on the mobile phone market. This study provides quantitative estimations of consumer surplus for landline, mobile and VoIP services in the Korean telecommunications market using monthly call data from January of 2006 to June of 2009, a period when VoIP services grew rapidly. Empirical analyses are conducted to estimate consumer surplus based on the demand functions of each telecommunication service. Additional analyses are conducted on consumer surplus change as well. Policy implications for the rapid growth of VoIP and its impact on consumer surplus change are also discussed.     

Optimal R&D Policy and Managerial Delegation Under Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

The paper investigates the optimal research and development (R&D) policy in a vertically differentiated market with managerial delegation. We consider not only discriminatory R&D policy but uniform R&D policy as well. It shows that R&D policy can vary depending on the regulator's objective: social welfare, consumer surplus or producer surplus; however, the outcomes are invariant to the nature of market competition. Undoubtedly, the relative‐performance contract plays a crucial role for elaborating policy effects. The government prefers discriminatory R&D policy to uniform policy under a consumer‐oriented objective. On the contrary, under a producer‐oriented objective, the government would prefer to choose uniform R&D policy rather than discriminatory policy.     

Product design in monopolistic competition

We consider a model of monopolistic competition where producers can manipulate an elasticity parameter at an early stage. We interpret this as a choice of product specialization. Lower marginal costs of production lead to more generic products in all equilibria, which lead to fewer varieties under free-entry. Entry of a new firm increases overall specialization and increases prices, that is, the environment exhibits price-increasing competition. The loss of consumer surplus due to higher prices and lower consumption is compensated by the value of additional variety, hence entry also increases consumer surplus. Therefore, price-increasing competition need not be anticompetitive under endogenous specialization.     

Free entry,market diffusion,and social inefficiency with endogenously growing demand

This paper analyzes market diffusion in the presence of oligopolistic interaction among firms. Market demand is positively related to past market size because of consumer learning, networks, and bandwagon effects. Firms enter the market freely in each period with fixed costs and compete in quantities. We demonstrate that the nature of the inefficiency under free entry can change as the market grows, and more importantly, that S-shaped diffusion can be a signal that the number of firms under free entry is initially insufficient, but eventually excessive.     

How revolving-door recruitment makes firms stand out in land market: Evidence from China

The fact that firms seek political connections through revolving-door recruitment is widely acknowledged around the world. Using an original database including the information of listed firms' board members and parcel-level land transaction records, this paper documents how revolving-door recruitment makes firms stand out in China's land market. We show that firms with revolving-door recruitment receive special deals in land transactions, which are simultaneously reflected in the quantity and price of land. Specifically, connected firms buy more parcels and larger areas of land in the primary land market. Due to the particularity of industrial land, price discounts are only identified for commercial and residential land, while not for industrial land. Measuring economic activity by night light intensity, we find no evidence that land transaction under the influence of political connections has a negative impact on economic activity on land. Our research advances the understanding that the state-business relationship is an essential factor in resource allocation in an emerging market with government intervention.     

成本节约的不确定性、效率抗辩与并购评估审查

横向并购可能给参与并购的企业带来成本节约而产生效率效应,同时也可能产生反竞争效应。在横向并购反垄断审查的效率抗辩中,并购企业只要能够证实成本节约的效率效应能够抵消反竞争效应进而增进社会总福利水平,就可以获得反垄断当局的批准。然而,成本节约及其实现程度具有不确定性,成本节约的不确定性不仅会影响消费者剩余和社会总福利水平,而且将对效率抗辩和反垄断当局并购审查的判定规则产生影响。本文以Cournot模型为基础,系统分析了成本节约的不确定性对于横向并购反垄断评估审查中效率抗辩、判定规则和预期消费者福利的影响,为反垄断当局在并购评估审查中如何考虑效率因素提供决策参考。