Why big fiscal deficits and low inflation can coexist

• ▀ The surge in government debt caused by ballooning fiscal deficits is a necessary response to the coronavirus crisis. But we doubt this will lead to a burst of inflation in the advanced economies (AEs), let alone a debt crisis.
• ▀ Our fiscal forecasts assume AEs’ budget deficits averaged 20% of GDP or so in Q2. However, our deficit forecasts point to a sharp narrowing thereafter and for public debt as a share of GDP to peak in 2021.
• ▀ The risks around this forecast skew firmly towards deficits remaining wide, reflecting the balance of risks around our GDP forecasts and the possibility that governments allow some fiscal slippage.
• ▀ A slower narrowing of fiscal deficits than we forecast wouldn't automatically lead to a period of above-target inflation. Indeed, we wouldn't be surprised if larger-than-expected deficits were associated with weak inflation.
• ▀ High levels of corporate debt and weak labour markets raise the risk of private sector retrenchment ahead. In that case, large and sustained fiscal deficits may be needed to fill the vacuum and prevent GDP and inflation from falling. As has been the case in Japan over the past 25 years, large deficits over coming years could be associated with weak GDP growth and below-target inflation.
• ▀ If economies begin to overheat but governments keep fiscal policy loose, inflation could, of course, pick up. But central bank tightening would offset it. We believe the risk of sustained inflation overshoots is limited unless monetary policy were made subservient to governments’ own objectives. And we think the risk of central banks losing independence remains slim.

     

Why the surge in savings won't last

• ▀ The coronavirus lockdown caused UK savings to surge. We think the household saving ratio will average over 15% in 2020 - almost twice its long-run average - while the corporate sector is likely to run a hefty financial surplus.
• ▀ Evidence suggests that economic shocks usually push up the desire to save, to the detriment of growth. But the uniqueness of the Covid crisis and its aftereffects could limit the extent of the private sector's increased prudence.
• ▀ Scarred by recent events, consumers may remain thriftier as normality returns. But the short duration of the economic contraction and the windfall nature of lockdown savings mean any long-term rise in savings rates could be modest.
• ▀ Meanwhile, post-pandemic, a more cautious attitude to investment and efforts to repair balance sheets suggest higher saving by firms. But the prospect of weak corporate profit growth will, in our view, offset those forces.

     

Why deflation may be a bigger risk than inflation

• ▀ Concerns about high inflation in the medium term are in our view overdone. In fact, we think the bigger risk is some economies sliding into deflation, due to the coronavirus pandemic's long-lasting negative impact on demand, which will intensify existing global disinflationary trends.
• ▀ We do not think the recent acceleration of monetary growth will lead to rapid inflation, despite the strong historic relationship between the two. The current monetary growth is taking place in extremely unusual circumstances, which may alter the usual link with inflation, and may also be temporary.
• ▀ Meanwhile, most market-based measures of deflation risk have risen recently – in some cases to historic highs. Some household surveys point to slightly higher inflation, but this may reflect short-term volatility in prices for key goods.
• ▀ A slide into deflation would have a variety of negative consequences, including feeding back into private saving, weakening growth, and potentially raising debt sustainability issues in some economies.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: World GDP now seen falling 2.8% in 2020

• ▀ With much of the global economy now in some form of lockdown due to the coronavirus pandemic, we expect world GDP to contract by about 7% in H1 2020. Activity is expected to rebound sharply in H2, but even so the severity of the shock is likely to lead to a permanent GDP loss for the global economy.
• ▀ While Chinese activity picked up in late-Q1 as lockdown restrictions were unwound, we expect Q1 GDP to have fallen 12% q/q before rebounding sharply in Q2. But this Q2 boost looks set to be swamped by the collapse in activity caused by the rest of the world going into lockdown.
• ▀ Although shutdown restrictions elsewhere are less severe than those imposed in China, business survey and labour market data still point to sharp falls in activity in most countries in Q2. Quarterly GDP declines of 8% or more in the US and eurozone seem likely. Overall, world GDP could fall by about 7% in H1, roughly double the size of the contraction during start of the global financial crisis in 2009.
• ▀ In those economies subject to some form of lockdown, we expect restrictions to begin to be lifted during Q2. As a result, growth should resume in Q3 as sectors that have been forced to shut down see some pick-up. But despite this rebound, world GDP is now seen shrinking 2.8% in 2020 overall — in 2009, the global GDP fall was 1.1%.
• ▀ The H2 pick-up, followed by a return to more normal conditions next year, will result in world GDP growth rising to almost 6% in 2021, helped also by the recent collapse in oil prices to about $30pb. But the scale of the disruption means that we expect a permanent loss of output from the shock. We expect global GDP in the medium term to be some 1.5% below the level we had anticipated before the coronavirus outbreak.
• ▀ The risks around this forecast are large and broadly balanced. But were stringent lockdowns or widespread disruption, perhaps due to renewed outbreaks of the virus, to extend into Q3, global GDP could fall by as much as 8% this year.

     

The global monetary boom - no cause for panic

• ▀ Global monetary growth has been its fastest for decades over recent months, but we continue to believe inflation risks are lower than many think. A modest inflation overshoot in the coming years is possible but would not be very damaging.
• ▀ While headline money growth figures still look strong, heavy precautionary borrowing by firms in March-April is already starting to unwind in the US and UK. About 80% of the rise in borrowing by large UK firms has been repaid.
• ▀ In addition, tightened lending standards at banks are likely to weigh on future corporate borrowing and money growth. A net 70% of US banks tightened corporate credit standards in the latest Fed survey. Rising loan defaults risk exacerbating this.
• ▀ Heavy government borrowing and accompanying central bank QE have been key drivers of monetary growth and are likely to remain so, notwithstanding a slowdown in the pace of central bank bond purchases. This is the main risk factor those who fear inflation cite.
• ▀ But if credit to the private sector starts to shrink, deficit financing of this sort may be essential to prevent long-term weakness in money, credit, and economic growth. Japan's experience in the 1990s and 2000s is relevant here.
• ▀ Inflation also has room to overshoot current targets, if necessary, given the substantial undershoots of the last decade. This consideration in part explains the recent shift in Federal Reserve thinking towards targeting an average inflation rate over time

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: World growth still seen at just 2.5% in 2020

• ▀ Although recent developments suggest that the risks of an escalation in US-China trade tensions have eased, we doubt this will deliver a significant boost to the global economy. We still expect world GDP growth of just 2.5% this year, the weakest since the global financial crisis, after an estimated 2.6% in 2019. But the risks around the forecast now seem less skewed to the downside.
• ▀ While our view remains that global GDP growth is likely to have softened further around the turn of the year, the decline remains gradual. And latest survey-based measures of activity and sentiment show tentative signs that prospects are beginning to improve, consistent with our long-standing view that the low point for global growth will be in Q1 2020.
• ▀ Just as importantly, the likelihood of the US and China formally signing off a phase one trade deal in mid-January has reduced the chances of a further flare-up in trade tensions between the two economies. However, this has to some degree been offset by the troubling events recently unfolding between the US and Iran.
• ▀ We remain sceptical that the global economy is set for a major growth boost. Any healing in US-China relations may quickly be unwound and a full reversal of the tariffs already implemented remains a distant prospect. Furthermore, some of the associated growth boost is likely to be offset by less policy support. As a result, we have raised our 2020 GDP growth by just 0.1pp in the US but by a more significant 0.3pp in China.
• ▀ Meanwhile, although the ongoing and broad-based monetary policy loosening in both AEs and EMs should start to feed through to growth this year, we doubt this will be a game-changer. Not only is policy loosening at a global level set to be fairly muted, limited spare capacity, the rising stock of global debt and elevated asset prices are likely to reduce the positive impulse from policymakers' actions.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Outlook darkens as coronavirus spreads

• ▀ What began as a supply shock in China has morphed into something much more serious. The effects of financial market weakness and the disruption to daily life around the world will trigger lower consumer spending and investment on top of the disruptions to the global supply chain. We now expect global GDP growth to slow to 2.0% this year from 2.6% in 2019, before picking up to 3.0% in 2021. But a global pandemic would lead to a far bigger slowdown this year.
• ▀ China seems to have made progress in containing the spread of the coronavirus, but the slow return to business as normal has prompted us to cut year-on-year GDP growth in Q1 from 3.8% to 2.3%, the weakest in decades. But we expect a healthy growth rebound in Q2 which will also provide Asian economies with a lift.
• ▀ It is isolation policies not infection rates that determine the economic impact. Outbreaks around the world are leading authorities to announce a growing list of measures to curb the virus spread. At a global level any Q2 rebound will thus be small at best. We expect investment in the advanced economies as a whole to contract on a year-on-year basis in Q2 for the first time since the global financial crisis, while annual household spending growth may slow to its lowest since the eurozone crisis.
• ▀ Our baseline assumes that the global economy will return to business as usual in Q3 and that some catch-up will result in robust H2 GDP growth. Combined with favourable base effects in early-2021, this is expected to result in world GDP growth averaging about 3% in 2021.
• ▀ Since January, we have cut our 2020 global GDP growth forecast by a hefty 0.5pp. But larger revisions may be required if the disruption triggered by shutdowns and other responses to coronavirus proves longer than we assume currently or if more draconian actions are needed in the event of a global pandemic. Our scenarios suggest that the latter could push the global economy into a deep recession.

     

The consequences of pandemic-driven inequality

• ▀ According to our analysis, the Covid-19 pandemic is likely to exaggerate global inequality, leading to more aggregate debt among lower earners and higher savings for those at the top. The surge in savings will raise demand for safe assets, which would put downward pressure on long-term government bond yields - already depressed from a chronic shortage of safe assets.
• ▀ Historically, pandemics can trigger a rise in inequality, even over medium-term periods. Pandemics damage confidence in using in-person services, which disproportionately exposes low-skilled work to displacement. A unique feature of this pandemic is that the ability to work from home is proving a key factor in determining job losses - those that can are typically in higher paid jobs.
• ▀ The poorest households spend more of their income on essentials such as housing and basic food. When their incomes fall, they still have to spend on these essentials and so are often forced to take on debt. Conversely, the richest often consume near maximum capacity, so any additional income goes into savings to support future consumption.
• ▀ Higher aggregate savings would, all else equal, drive up demand for safe assets and therefore lower interest rates. Other factors such as weak nominal GDP growth, demographics and a chronic shortage of safe assets will also contribute to keeping yields depressed over the next five years.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Coronavirus to cut global growth to new lows

• ▀ The rapid spread of coronavirus will weaken China's GDP growth sharply in the short term, causing disruption for the rest of the world. We now expect global GDP growth to slow to just 1.9% y/y in Q1 this year and have lowered our forecast for 2020 as a whole from 2.5% to 2.3%, down from 2.6% in 2019.
• ▀ Prior to the coronavirus outbreak, there had been signs that the worst was over for both world trade and the manufacturing sector. However, this tentative optimism has been dashed by the current disruption.
• ▀ While the near-term impact of the virus is uncertain, the disruption to China will clearly be significant in Q1 – we expect Chinese GDP growth to plunge to just 3.8% y/y. Even though growth there will rebound in Q2 and Q3, it will take time for the loss in activity to be fully recovered and we now expect GDP growth of just 5.4% for 2020 as a whole, a downward revision of 0.6pp from last month.
• ▀ Weaker Chinese imports and tourism and disruption to global supply chains will take a toll on the rest of the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. And the shock will exacerbate the ongoing slowdown in the US and may result in the eurozone barely expanding for a second quarter running in Q1.
• ▀ Weaker oil demand in the short term has prompted us to lower our Brent oil price forecast. We have cut our projection for growth in crude demand in 2020 by 0.2m b/d to 0.9 mb/d and now forecast Brent crude will average $62.4pb in 2020, down from about $65pb in our January forecast.
• ▀ Quarterly global growth is likely to strengthen a little in H2 this year as the disruption fades and firms make up for the lost output earlier in the year and the effect of China's policy response starts to feed through. But for 2020 overall, global growth is now likely to be just 2.3%, 0.2pp weaker than previously assumed as a result of the epidemic.

     

Five ways the pandemic could alter the economy

• ▀ Economic crises are often turning points, and the upheaval triggered by coronavirus may prove one of them. A permanently bigger state and public borrowing, persistently cowed consumers, a more ‘national’ UK economy and the impetus for beneficial reforms are all possibilities.
• ▀ We think the scale of state intervention in the economy to protect public health will increase pressure to do more in aid of other social goals. The austere ‘Treasury view’ of deficits is also likely to wane.
• ▀ Meanwhile, evidence suggests that major economic shocks can exert a decades-long drag on consumers’ desire to spend, giving another reason why higher government borrowing may persist long after the pandemic has faded.
• ▀ Supply-chain vulnerabilities exposed by the virus may crystallise the more ‘UK-first’ approach to economic policy that Brexit ushered in. Although greater protectionism could threaten economic dynamism, the crisis could be the stimulus to structural reform, offering a potential growth upside

     

Don't rely on public investment to save the day

• ▀ We think public investment in the advanced economies should be increased, but we're also sceptical that, on its own, it can save economies from recession in the event of further negative shocks.
• ▀ Deteriorating infrastructure and low bond yields make a compelling case for sustained increases in public investment. And given the shortage of safe assets and the global savings glut, higher government borrowing seems unlikely to have big negative repercussions for private sector borrowers.
• ▀ But the scope for a sustained and aggressive rise in public investment to counter shocks is limited. Even when funds are plentiful, governments often struggle to meet capital spending targets due to other constraints.
• ▀ Spikes in public investment during downturns typically dry up the capital pipeline, leading to falling investment further ahead. As a result, it's harder to sustain increases in investment, compared to other government spending.

     

Government bond yields will remain stuck to the floor

• ▀ The fallout from the pandemic will cement the trend of safe haven bond yields remaining low over the next five years. Any rises will be gradual and limited. We project bond yields will struggle to get much above end-2019 levels by 2024.
• ▀ Despite record issuance by US, UK, German, and Japanese governments, the rise in private sector savings and demand from central banks will keep the flows of demand and supply for safe assets in broad balance. Overall, the world will still suffer a chronic shortage of safe assets, keeping yields depressed.
• ▀ Weak prospects for nominal GDP growth, demographics, and rising inequality in the aftermath of the pandemic all point to low yields. This would also be consistent with historical experience following pandemics.

     

“Whatever it takes” may not be enough

• ▀ Concerns over risks to the global economy from actual and perceived limits to fiscal and monetary policy are well-founded. A decade on from the global financial crisis, evidence highlights chronic demand deficiency, related weakness in supply and a prolonged period of underperformance among the most policy-constrained advanced economies. All lie within the eurozone.
• ▀ To gauge the risks from such policy constraints, we model a broadening of the eurozone slowdown. Despite the ECB's commitment to mitigate adverse cyclical developments, we find that - in the absence of significant accompanying fiscal support - a period of protracted eurozone weakness would ensue.
• ▀ The implications are far-reaching. Our analysis suggests that such a protracted eurozone slowdown would spill over globally, taking 0.4ppts off average global growth over the next five years.

     

Brexit deal and demographics drag on long-term outlook

• ▀ We have revised down our long-term forecast for GDP growth based largely on our expectation that the UK is headed for a much looser relationship with the EU. This will result in damage to trade and lower FDI inflows.
• ▀ We now expect potential output growth to slow to 1.4% a year from 2020–2030 down from 1.6% a year from 2010–2020. In the two decades after 2030 we expect the drag from Brexit-related effects to fade, but weaker contributions in labour supply and human capital will cut output growth to 1.2% a year.
• ▀ Demographics have been a key contributor to potential output growth over the past 30 years. But an ageing population and a more restrictive immigration regime are likely to mean the workforce grows far more slowly in the future.
• ▀ Our long-term growth forecast is weaker than the OBR's and implies that future governments will face a combination of disappointing growth in tax revenues and increasing demands for government spending from an ageing population.

     

Why ‘King dollar’ is reigning supreme

• ▀ After a pause in late 2017 and early 2018, the dollar has resumed its rise. Our analysis suggests the long-term factors influencing the dollar are likely to remain supportive in 2020, ebbing only in 2021.
• ▀ Alongside positive interest rate differentials, several key factors explain the recent dollar strength including relatively strong economic growth, a contained external deficit and significant equity market outperformance.
• ▀ Over 2018–2019 US growth has been faster than the rest of the G7, which suffered more downside surprises this year. Meanwhile, the deterioration in the US external deficit was less than expected, despite the Trump fiscal stimulus.
• ▀ The massive improvement in the US oil balance over recent years looks like an important long-term structural support for the dollar. It allows the US to grow faster and have a stronger currency than would otherwise have been the case.
• ▀ The dollar is also supported by its still-dominant position in global financial markets. Recent talk of ‘de-dollarisation’ looks to be largely hype - the dollar's share of cross-border transactions, trade invoicing, and FX reserves is high and either stable or rising.
• ▀ The conditions necessary to create another dollar bear market like that in 2002–2008 may be hard to reproduce. A period of relative underperformance in US stocks is conceivable, but the 2002–2008 period also featured large US basic balance of payments deficits and persistently negative long-term real yield differentials, which look less likely to materialise.

     

Don't expect a big lift from central bank policy easing

• ▀ During the current global slowdown, the world's central banks have delivered a broad-based policy easing that has been larger than during the previous two mini-downturns of the current cycle.
• ▀ We expect this to halt the downward momentum in the early part of this year and is a key factor behind our baseline view of no global recession in 2020.
• ▀ But limited further central bank wriggle room or a reluctance to use it adds a question mark over the efficacy of monetary policy and means we doubt it will deliver a big growth bounce, particularly in the advanced economies. In addition, fiscal support is likely to be limited in 2020.

     

Fixed versus floating: vulnerability to rising interest rates

• ? Looking at different economies' exposure to fixed‐ and floating‐rate private‐sector debt reveals how vulnerable they could be to rising interest rates. Our analysis finds that Hong Kong, Sweden, China and Australia are potentially most exposed via floating rates to rising debt service costs. A 150bp rise in rates would also push several other countries' debt service ratios above the peaks of 2008. Less vulnerable economies include the US and Germany.
• ? High levels of floating‐rate debt imply a large and rapid pass‐through of rising interest rates to firms and households, with negative consequences. Exposure to floating‐rate debt as a share of GDP varies greatly: the highest levels are in Hong Kong, China, Sweden, Australia and Spain, with the lowest levels in the US, France and Germany.
• ? Growing shares of fixed‐rate housing debt in the US, Eurozone and UK mean the impact of higher interest rates may be less severe than a decade ago. Private deleveraging in countries such as the US, UK and Spain could also soften the impact.
• ? A rise of 100bp in short‐term interest rates would raise the debt service ratio after one year by around 2.5% of GDP in Hong Kong, with increases of 1.5–1.7% of GDP in Sweden, China and Australia. The smallest effects would be in the US and Germany.
• ? A 100–150bp rate rise would push debt service ratios in China, Hong Kong, Canada, France and the Netherlands well above their peaks of a decade ago. A similar rate rise would take debt service ratios in Sweden, South Korea and Australia close to, or above, previous peaks.
• ? The distribution of debt within economies, which our analysis does not cover, is also important. For example, there is some evidence that the US corporate sector has a high concentration of debt among borrowers with weak finances. Countries that are highly vulnerable to interest rate rises may see their central banks normalise policy rates more slowly than they otherwise would.

     

No-trade-deal Brexit would lower GDP by 1ppt by 2022

• ▀ A no-trade-deal Brexit would result in UK GDP being 1ppt lower than our baseline forecast at the end of 2022. Increased trade frictions and a negative reaction from financial markets would more than offset looser policy settings.
• ▀ Even if an FTA is agreed, trade between the UK and EU will be subject to new customs and regulatory trade barriers. If a trade deal is not agreed, tariffs will also be levied on UK-EU trade, while non-tariff barriers are likely to be higher.
• ▀ A no-trade-deal outcome would almost certainly see the BoE undertake further quantitative easing. A further, temporary, loosening of fiscal policy would also be likely, with higher government investment an obvious option.

     

The great rotation in global credit risks

• ? The pattern of global credit risks looks very different today than in 2007. Risks are now mostly centred in China and emerging markets. “Excess” private debt in China is as high as $3 trillion compared with $1.7 trillion in the US a decade ago. Yet some pockets of significant risk still exist in advanced economies, which not only implies vulnerability to rising interest rates, but also that the scope for rate rises may be limited.
• ? With policy normalisation underway in the US and the scaling back of asset purchases expected to start soon in the Eurozone, we focus on assessing vulnerabilities across global credit markets. This article explores the topic using a top‐down, cross‐country approach. We find that although private debt and debt service ratios look more benign in advanced economies than a decade ago, they have deteriorated markedly in many emerging markets in recent years.
• ? Based on a measure of excess private debt – comparing private credit‐to‐GDP ratios with their trend – China, Hong Kong and Canada are the riskiest. When comparing debt service ratios relative to their long‐term averages, risks are also mainly concentrated in emerging countries. But Canada, Australia and some smaller European countries also have high debt service ratios that have failed to drop since 2007, despite the slump in global interest rates.
• ? Overall, aggregate private debt indicators look less worrying than in 2007. We would also argue that the concentration of excess private debt levels in China reduces the risk of a sudden financial crisis based on massive credit losses, such as the one in 2007–2010. But with corporate debt levels in the US, Canada and some other G7 countries above their long‐term trend, investors need to be attentive to these considerable pockets of risk.

     

What's in new BoE boss Bailey's in-tray?

• ▀ The new BoE governor takes the job at a time when the economy is struggling to generate momentum. His first big call will be over whether the central bank should continue its divergent stance of resisting calls to loosen policy.
• ▀ With little room to support the economy with interest rate cuts, the next downturn could force the MPC to dive deeper into the use of unconventional monetary policy tools with all the uncertainties and controversies that implies.
• ▀ Governor Bailey will also need to tackle new problems, including the run-down of the BoE's balance sheet, overseeing the financial sector's future post-Brexit, and pressures to address climate change.
• ▀ But with the new governor bound by the BoE's remit, and fiscal and microeconomic policy likely to play a bigger role in stabilising the economy, the economic significance of the position should not be overstated.