The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

Currency Hedging For Export-Flexible Firms *

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a competitive exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market, after observing the true realization of the exchange rate. It is shown that the separation theorem does not hold under export flexibility, i.e., the firm's optimal output depends on the firm's preference and on the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. Furthermore, the export- flexible firm underhedges its exchange rate risk exposure in a currency forward market where in the forward exchange rate contains a non-positive risk premium. [D21, F31]     

Currency Options and Export-Flexible Firms

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a globally competitive firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm is risk averse and possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market after observing the realized spot exchange rate. To hedge against its exchange rate risk exposure, the firm can trade fairly priced currency call options of an arbitrary strike price. We show that both the separation and the full‐hedging results hold if the strike price of the currency call options is set equal to the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices. Otherwise, neither result holds. Specifically, we show that the optimal level of output is always less than that of an otherwise identical firm that is risk neutral. Furthermore, an under‐hedge (over‐hedge) is optimal whenever the strike price of the currency call options is below (above) the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices.     

PRICE CONSTRAINTS,FORWARD MARKETS AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER PRICE UNCERTAINTY*

This article proposes a model of the competitive firm simultaneously facing price constraints and forward markets under price uncertainty. The incorporation of a forward market is shown to be very important because a risk-averse firm will set its production decision to the forward price regardless of its attitude toward risk. In addition, we show that risk aversion is a sufficient condition for a decrease in risk to reduce the amount hedged when risk is reduced through a mean-preserving price squeeze.     

Export-Flexible Firms and Forward Markets

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of an exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm is export flexible in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market, after observing the realized spot exchange rate. The firm is a monopoly in the domestic market but a price-taker in the foreign market. It is shown that the separation theorem holds if selling exclusively in the domestic market is suboptimal even under the most unfavorable sport exchange rate. Otherwise, the firm's optimal output depends on its preference and on the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. Furthermore, the export-flexible firm underhedges its exchange rate risk exposure in a currency forward market wherein the forward exchange rate contains a non-positive risk premium. [D21, F31]     

Export Flexibility And Currency Hedging*

This article studies the behavior of an export‐flexible firm under exchange rate uncertainty. We show that the separation theorem holds if selling exclusively in the domestic market is suboptimal even under the most unfavorable spot exchange rate. Otherwise, the firm's optimal output depends on its preferences and on the underlying uncertainty. We further show that the full‐hedging theorem holds only when the firm always finds it optimal to sell its entire output in the foreign market. Otherwise, export flexibility introduces a convexity into the firm's foreign exchange risk exposure, which calls for the use of currency options for hedging purposes.     

Regret theory and the competitive firm

This paper examines the production decision of the competitive firm under uncertainty when the firm is not only risk averse but also regret averse. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference between the actual profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal production decision had the firm observed the true realization of the random output price. If the firm is not too regret averse, we show that the conventional result that the optimal output level under uncertainty is less than that under certainty holds. Using a simple binary model wherein the random output price can take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability, we show the possibility that the firm may optimally produce more, not less, under uncertainty than under certainty, particularly when the firm is sufficiently regret averse and the low output price is very likely to prevail.     

Imperfect Forward Markets and Hedging

This paper considers a hedging model of a risk-averse competitive firm facing output price uncertainty. Imperfections exist in forward transactions in that the firm faces a downward-sloping demand function for its forward sales. We show that the optimal output and hedge ratio of the firm are, in general, not separable, and are related in a deterministic manner. We also derive some economic implications of production and hedging decisions when firms differ in their attitudes towards risk. A more risk-averse firm is shown to produce less and hedge more than a less risk-averse firm.
(J.E.L.: D21, D81).     

COMPETITIVE LONG RUN INDUSTRY EQUILIBRIUM AND FACTOR-PRICE UNCERTAINTY*

In this paper we have considered competitive long run industry equilibrium with factor-price uncertainty. We discussed the long run equilibrium output of firms with risk neutrality, output price and their responses to changes in uncertainty, factor price and industry demand. In the first part of this paper we have derived a result that, given risk neutrality, the firms operate at proper capacity, i.e. where expected long run marginal cost is equal to expected long run average cost, as shown in the case of output-price uncertainty. This result is, however, different from that obtained from Sheshinski and Dréze (1976). From the comparative static analysis we first discovered that even under risk neutrality factor-price uncertainty affects the long run industry equilibrium: that is, a mean preserving increase in uncertainty leads firm's to enter the industry, because they can decrease expected long run costs as the variability of factor price increases. Consequently, output price goes down. In contrast, firm size is kept invariable in response to its increase as long as the cost function is separable, i.e. the separability of the cost function holds when production functions are the Cobb-Douglas and CES types used commonly in empirical work, although firm size might, generally, be affected by the increase. It is an interesting fact that firm size and industry size will express different responses to a change in risk. The result that the long run industry equilibrium with cost uncertainty is explicitly affected is a sharp contrast to the result under output-price uncertainty and provides a new aspect for understanding about the behaviour of the industry with uncertainty. Secondly, increased factor-price causes the number of firms in the industry to decline and output price to rise. In addition, firm's size will expand with its increase if that factor is inferior, while the effect on firm size is ambiguous if it is normal. The firm's output, i.e. firm size, is, however, kept constant if the cost function is separable. Thirdly, the long run equilibrium output of the firm remains intact but the number of firms increases as industry demand rises. This result holds, regardless of the firm's attitude towards risk. Finally, we find throughout the paper that the functional form of the cost function plays a significant role in determining the behaviour of the industry with factor-price uncertainty.     

RETAIL PRICE REGULATION AND THE OPTION TO DELAY

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper examines a two-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we consider a monopolist who faces no downstream (final good) competition but is subject to retail price regulation. We identify the welfare-maximizing regulated prices when the unregulated market outcome is set as the benchmark. We show that if the regulator can commit to ex post regulation – that is, regulated prices that are contingent to future demand realization – then regulated prices that allow the firm to recover its total costs of production are welfare-maximizing. Thus, under ex post price regulation there is no need to compensate the regulated firm for the option to delay that it foregoes when investing today. We argue, however, that regulators cannot make this type of commitment and, therefore, price regulation is often ex ante – that is, regulated prices are not contingent to future demand. We show that the optimal ex ante regulation, and the extent to which regulated prices need to incorporate an option to delay, depend on the nature of demand uncertainty.     

BACKGROUND RISK AND THE THEORY OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER UNCERTAINTY*

This paper examines the optimal production decision of a firm under output price risk á la Sandmo when the firm also faces a dependent background risk. It is shown that standard risk aversion plus a non-negative association between the output price risk and the background risk are sufficient to ensure a reduction in the firms optimal output upon introduction of the background risk. The paper investigates the impact of a deterministic transformation of the background risk on the firms optimal production decision. It is shown that decreasing absolute risk aversion in Ross' sense is among the sufficient conditions that generate an unambiguous negative comparative static result.     

Economic hysteresis in hog production

German hog production only responds in a very limited way to price fluctuations in the pork market. The hog production concentrates on a few regions though it is not bound to special natural conditions such as soil quality. Furthermore, the volume of production does not vary over time. Relatively high market risks, sunk costs and the flexibility of the decision maker to defer investments characterize decision problems in hog production. Thus the real option approach is chosen to explain the inertia in production capacity. By the use of panel data of specialized hog farms from the German Farm Accountancy Data Network, an empirical investment model is estimated. Formally, the model has the structure of a generalized ordered probit model. This approach allows to test for economic hysteresis in the adjustment of hog production capacity. The results confirm that uncertainty and flexibility widen the optimal range of inaction.     

A SMOOTH AMBIGUITY MODEL OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM

This paper examines the optimal production decision of the competitive firm under price uncertainty when the firm's preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity is modeled by a second‐order probability distribution that captures the firm's uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the price risk. Ambiguity preferences are modeled by the (second‐order) expectation of a concave transformation of the (first‐order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution of the price risk. Within this framework, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the ambiguity‐averse firm optimally produces less in response either to the introduction of ambiguity or to greater ambiguity aversion when ambiguity prevails. In the case that the price risk is binary, we show that ambiguity and greater ambiguity aversion always adversely affect the firm's production decision.     

Export,Exchange Rate Risk and Hedging: The Duopoly Case

Abstract. This paper studies a Cournot duopoly in international trade with firms exposed to exchange rate risk. A hedging opportunity is introduced by a forward market on which one firm can trade the foreign currency. We investigate two settings: First, we assume that hedging and output decisions are taken simultaneously. It is shown that hedging is exclusively done for risk‐managing reasons as it is not possible to use hedging strategically. Second, the hedging decision is made before the output decisions. We show that hedging is not only used to manage the risk exposure but also as a strategic device.     

Timing of decisions and the competitive firm under input price uncertainty

This paper studies the behavior of a competitive firm faced with input price uncertainty when the ex ante decision variable is output, not the quantities of the inputs. Highly unconventional results are obtained about the effects of uncertainty and of marginal increases in risk.     

Intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty

This paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power. Under uncertainty, the unconstrained firm 'waits longer' before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary, enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry. In the certainty case, the imposition of an inter-temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution; by contrast, under uncertainty, it cannot. Even if the price cap is optimally chosen, under uncertainty, the monopoly firm will generally (a) under-invest and (b) impose quantity rationing on its customers.     

THE EFFECT OF FORWARD MARKETS ON MULTINATIONAL FIRMS

This paper presents a model of a risk averse multinational firm under exchange rate risk. The firm, which owns and controls assets in two countries, is engaged in production, sales and forward contracting whenever forward markets exist. First, we investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty without any risk sharing markets. It is shown that the firm internalizes missing hedging markets by increasing foreign production and lowering foreign sales. Therefore the firm hedges by repatriating foreign profits in the form of goods. Second, the implications of the existence of forward markets of global market decisions are discussed. It is shown that a separation theorem holds. This does not imply that the multinational firm shifts all the risk into the forward exchange market.     

Strategic Choice of Quantity Stickiness and Stackelberg Leadership

This paper re‐examines endogenous Stackelberg leader–follower relations by modelling an explicitly dynamic market. We analyze a twice‐repeated duopoly where, in the beginning, each firm chooses either a quantity‐sticky production mode or a quantity‐flexible production mode. The size of the market becomes observable after the first period. In the second period, a firm can adjust its quantity if and only if it has adopted the flexible mode. Hence, if one firm chooses the sticky mode whilst the other chooses the flexible mode, then they respectively play the roles of a Stackelberg leader and a Stackelberg follower in the second marketing period. Somewhat intriguing is the finding that such a Stackelberg‐like equilibrium can arise only when the relative weight of the pre‐Stackelberg first marketing period is sufficiently high, with time preferences being sufficiently strong.     

Export Flexibility and Hedging

The paper considers a risk-averse international firm which sells its output in either the domestic or the foreign market. The firm possesses export flexibility, and so it can choose between the domestic and export markets after considering the foreign exchange rate. It is shown that a separation property holds if the proper hedging instrument is used: the firm's production depends on market prices and technology and does not depend on its attitude towards risk nor on its expectations. A full-hedge proposition is derived.     

Determinants of the premium in forward contracts

Whilst the benefits of forward contracting for goods and services have been extensively researched in terms of mitigating market power effects in spot markets, we analyse how the risk in spot price formation induces a counteracting premium in the contract prices. We consider and test a wide-ranging set of propositions, involving fundamental, behavioural, dynamic, market conduct and shock components, on a long data set from the most liquid of European electricity forward markets, the EEX. We show that part of what is conventionally regarded as the market price of risk in electricity is actually that of its underlying fuel commodity, gas; that market power has a double effect on prices, insofar as it increases spot prices and induces a forward premium; that oil price sentiment spills over and that the premium reacts to scarcity and the higher moments of spot price uncertainty. We observe that considerations of the scale and determinants of the forward premium are at least as important as the market power effects in spot market price formation when evaluating the efficiency of wholesale power trading.