Corporate Lobbying, Regulatory Conduct and the Porter Hypothesis

Michael Porter, the influential Harvard management guru, has promoted the idea that compliance with stricter environmental regulations can afford secondary benefits to firms through improved product design, innovation, corporate morale and in other ways. Once these secondary benefits are factored, the net cost of compliance is argued to be lower than conventionally thought and may even be negative. Whilst environmental economists have rejected the Porter Hypothesis as being based on excessively optimistic expectations of the likely size of such secondary benefits the underlying ideas do enjoy significant credence in the business community. In the context of a lobbying model of regulatory policy-making we argue that the EPA should change the way it conducts regulatory policy to take account of Porter's views – even if it knows those views to be misguided. The model serves to illustrate the more general point that fashions in management thinking can be expected to impact the optimal conduct of regulatory policy.     

Information Cascades in the Labor Market

A model of herding behavior in the labor market is presented where employers receive signals with limited precision about the workers types, and can observe previous employers decisions. Both the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities. In particular, the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the workers type whereas the worker wants to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the workers type, but he follows his own signal if the workers history is good.     

Institutional Evolution through Purposeful Selection: The Constitutional Economics of John R. Commons

The paper relates John. R. Commons view on the roleof human design in institutional evolution to the views thathave been advanced on this matter by F. A. Hayek, in German ordo-liberalism,and in constitutional political economy. It is argued that Commonsconcept of purposeful selection points in the direction ofa theoretical perspective that consistently integrates the notionsof institutional evolution and constitutional design.     

Protest Responses in Contingent Valuation

A significant number of respondents to contingent valuation surveys tend to either state a zero bid, or refuse to state a bid at all, for reasons associated with the process of valuation. These protest responses are routinely removed from contingent valuation samples because it is assumed that they are not indicative of respondents true values. The censoring of protest responses has led to the emergence of a definitional controversy. One view is that the definition of protest responses and the rules for censoring them are dependent on whether the practitioner conceives of the contingent valuation survey as a market or as a referendum. However, what is not acknowledged is the possibility that protest responses and their meaning may vary according to the type of good being valued, the elicitation format, and the interaction between these elements and external factors. This potential renders the development of unambiguous rules for censoring protest responses difficult. Moreover, when willingness to pay is viewed as a behavioural intention, it becomes important to determine what the responses actually mean. This approach does not assume an interpretative position a priori against which the responses should be judged, but seeks to inform an existing understanding which is inadequate.     

Biological Adaptation in Human Societies: a ‘Basic Needs’ Approach

The groundzero premise (so to speak) of the biological sciences is that survival and reproduction is the basic, continuing, inescapable problem for all living organisms; life is at bottom a survival enterprise. It follows that survival is the paradigmatic problem for human societies as well; it is a prerequisite for any other, more exalted objectives. Although the term adaptation is also familiar to social scientists, until recently it has been used only selectively, and often very imprecisely. Here a more rigorous and systematic approach to the concept of adaptation is proposed in terms of basic needs. The concept of basic human needs has a venerable history – tracing back at least to Plato and Aristotle. Yet the development of a formal theory of basic needs has lagged far behind. The reason is that the concept of objective, measurable needs is inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions that have dominated economic and social theory for most of this century, namely, valuerelativism and cultural determinism. Nevertheless, there have been a number of efforts over the past 30 years to develop more universalistic criteria for basic needs, both for use in monitoring social wellbeing (social indicators) and for public policy formulation. Here I will advance a strictly biological approach to perationalizing the concept of basic needs. It is argued that much of our economic and social life (and the motivations behind our revealed preferences and subjective utility assessments), not to mention the actions of modern governments, are either directly or indirectly related to the meeting of our basic survival needs. Furthermore, these needs can be specified to a first approximation and supported empirically to varying degrees, with the obvious caveat that there are major individual and contextual variations in their application. Equally important, complex human societies generate an array of instrumental needs which, as the term implies, serve as intermediaries between our primary needs and the specific economic, cultural and political contexts within which these needs must be satisfied. An explicit framework of Survival Indicators, including a profile of Personal Fitness and an aggregate index of Population Fitness, is briefly elucidated. Finally, it is suggested that a basic needs paradigm could provide an analytical tool (a biologic) for examining more closely the relationship between our social, economic and political behaviors and institutions and their survival consequences, as well as providing a predictive tool of some value.     

Tax Interaction Effects,Environmental Regulation,and “Rule of Thumb” Adjustments to Social Cost

Preexisting distortions in factor markets complicate the estimation of the social welfare effects of regulatory interventions. The existence of these tax interaction effects (TIEs) suggests that general equilibrium (GE) approaches should be used to evaluate regulatory policies. However, formal GE analysis is not always feasible for the numerous environmental regulations proposed by federal, state, and local agencies. The question addressed in this paper is whether an empirically based rule of thumb upward adjustment factor is appropriate to properly scale social cost estimates in environmental policy. We argue that such rule of thumb adjustments are significantly less reliable than estimates based on a detailed general equilibrium analysis because of the uncertainty about both the magnitude and sign of the social cost distortion. In addition to addressing this question, the paper gives an overview of TIEs and their relevance to environmental policy.     

An econometric analysis of veterans’ health care utilization using two-part models

Based on the 1992 US National Survey of Veterans, we analyzed veterans inpatient and outpatient health care utilization patterns by estimating count data two-part hurdle models. We also identified factors that affect veterans choice of health care between VA and non-VA facilities using count data selection models. Not surprisingly, we found that health condition measures are the most important factors in determining veterans health care utilization. Gender, disability, and employment status are also significant. Veterans with lower socio-economic status, without other health insurance coverages, or living near VA health care facilities are more likely to use VA health care system for outpatient visits and inpatient admissions. Our study underscores the role of alternative sources of health care and insurance in discerning the true effects of the explanatory variables on an individuals total demand for health care and its allocation between alternative providers.Jel classification: C35, I12, H51This research was done under a contract with the VA Health Care Network, Upstate New York (VISN 2). We are grateful to A. Colin Cameron, Diane Dewer, Joe Engelhardt, Terrance Kinal, Hamp Lankford, Frank Windmeijer, and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions and comments. We alone are responsible for the views expressed, and deficiencies remaining, in the paper.First version received: September 2001/Final version received: February 2003     

Environmental market creation: saviour or oversell?

In recent years considerable attention has been paid to the notion of market creation for the conservation of environmental assets. Market creation establishes a market in the external benefit or cost in question (e.g. biodiversity or pollution reduction) and leaves the relevant parties to adjust their behaviour accordingly. While most attention has been paid to market creation through tradable permits and taxes (the polluter-pays), it is less easy to secure a perspective on beneficiary-pays initiatives. Both polluter-pays and beneficiary-pays initiatives are examples of modified Coaseian bargains in which governments intervene in the bargains to lower transactions costs, establish property rights, deal with public goods issues, or act on behalf of disadvantaged groups. This paper reviews four major initiatives in this respect - debt-for-nature swaps, bioprospecting and the Global Environment Facility at the global level, and the Costa Rican Forest Law at the local level. It finds that while there is much to applaud in initiatives in these new markets, serious questions remain about the modest flows of funds associated with such global bargains, and the extent to which they secure environmental improvements relative to the baseline of business-as-usual.JEL Classification: D49, D62, H41, O19, Q57, Q2I am indebted to members of the Wildlife Conservation Research Unit at Oxford University and to David Simpson of Resources for the Future and University College London for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. Any remaining mistakes are entirely my responsibility.     

Regulatory ‘Balancing’ and the Efficiency of Green R&D

We identify and analyse several dynamic implications of setting environmental standards such as to balance marginal costs and benefits. The adoption of such a regulatory approach is shown to effect (i) the speed of improvement of abatement technologies; (ii) the direction (in a sense to be defined) of that improvement; (iii) its source and the distribution of the rents from it; and (iv) the rate of development of defensive (averting) technologies. Existing views are thoroughly synthesised in the context of a simple diagrammatic model, several new results are derived and at least one conventional wisdom questioned. The message of the analysis for legislators and regulators is that cost–benefit balancing should be done with care.     

The Economic Logic for Conditioning Bell Entry into Long Distance on the Prior Opening of Local Markets

One of the most important and most contentious issues for regulation and competition raised by the 1996 Telecommunications Act is when to authorize the regional Bell companies to offer long-distance services. The Department of Justice (DOJ) adopted a standard requiring that a Bells local market must first be irreversibly open to competition. This paper analyzes the competitive benefits and costs of authorizing Bell entry, explains the DOJs standard, and argues that the incentives created by this standard will help achieve the Acts competitive goals more efficiently and rapidly than other standards, ultimately reducing the need for intrusive regulation.     

Stated Preferences, Real Behaviour and Anchoring: Some Empirical Evidence

We compare different contingent valuation question formats with each other and with observed behaviour for a non-monetary estimation task, the expected number of kilometers travelled by automobile. Open-ended questions, open-ended follow-up questions, dichotomous choice (DC) questions, and double-bound DC questions are included. The single and double-bound DC questions result in an estimated mean about twice as high as the actual value and the open-ended mean. The DC question overestimation seems to be due to an anchoring effect leading to yea-saying behaviour. Our results about the difference between DC questions and open-ended questions is consistent with the pattern observed in contingent valuations studies of the willingness to pay. Our results indicates that DC questions seem to be associated with a general overestimation problem that is present even for simple non-monetary estimation tasks.     

A Survey and a Theoretical Model of Distance Education Programs

In search of a distance education programs crucial success factors, this research was conducted through a designed survey and evaluation instrument, for a predominantly doctoral program at DE University (DEU, an adopted name). Also, the survey has identified some challenging factors along with students most crucial reasons for adopting distance education programs. The author has presented a Testable theoretical model of distance education programs. The top four success factors were revealed to be program quality, general recognition and academic integrity, students satisfaction, and students progress toward the ultimate goal of graduation. Lack of time and worries about the degree recognition by prospective academic and nonacademic employers were the most crucial challenging factors.The 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference Lisbon, Portugal, March 10–14. This research is appreciably funded by a research grant from Walden University.     

Giffen goods and market making

Summary. This paper shows that information effects per se are not responsible for the Giffen goods anomaly affecting traders demands in multi asset noisy, rational expectations equilibrium markets. The role that information plays in traders strategies also matters. In a market with risk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents have a dual trading motive: speculation and market making. The former entails using prices to assess the effect of error terms; the latter requires employing them to disentangle noise traders demands within aggregate orders. In a correlated environment this complicates the signal extraction problem and may generate upward sloping demand curves. Assuming (i) that competitive, risk neutral market makers price the assets or that (ii) uninformed traders risk tolerance coefficient grows unboundedly, removes the market making component from informed traders demands rendering them well behaved in prices.Received: 30 April 2002, Revised: 3 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: G100, G120, G140.Support from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA and the Ente per gli Studi Monetari e Finanziari Luigi Einaudi, are gratefully acknowledged. I thank Anat Admati, Jordi Caballé, Giacinta Cestone, and Xavier Vives for useful suggestions. The comments provided by the Associate Editor and an anonymous referee greatly improved the papers exposition.     

Competing Against Experienced and Inexperienced Players

In certain markets success may depend on how well participants anticipate the behavior of other participants who have varying amounts of experience. Understanding if and how peoples behavior depends on competitors level of experience is important since in most markets participants have varying amounts of experience. Examining data from two new experimental studies similar to the beauty contest game first studied by Nagel (1995), the results indicate that (1) players with no experience behave the same against competitors with and without experience but (2) players quickly learn to condition their behavior on competitors experience level, causing (3) behavior to stop moving toward the equilibrium whenever new players enter the game and (4) experienced players to earn more money than less experienced players. The paper discusses the implications of the results for understanding and modeling behavior in markets in which participants have different amounts of experience.This revised version was published online in May 2005 with corrections to the acknowledgements.     

Prosecutorial Discretion at the EPA: Some Evidence on Litigation Strategy

This paper examines the determinants of the EPAs litigation strategy between 1977 and 1996 focusing on the tenure of Ann Gorsuch. Two hypotheses about this period are tested: (1) that changes in the EPAs litigation strategy were in fact an effort to reduce the expected penalty for violating environmental laws or (2) that the changes made in litigation strategy were consistent with efforts to reduce transaction cost. Contrary to previous research, I find no conclusive evidence of an overall shift toward business interests in EPA prosecutions. There is, however, clear evidence of shifts in the EPAs litigation strategy across administrations.     

Efficient Environmental Taxation Under Worker-Firm Bargaining

We study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm-worker bargaining over each firm's surplus, and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments. An uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment, implying a tradeoff between the two. When tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms' hiring or investments, employment may also increase, creating a double dividend from the pollution tax. A pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy, and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm. We show that the (hypothetical) pollution tax implementing the first-best solution exceeds the Pigouvian tax. The second-best tax exceeds this first-best tax when we have a double dividend, and is below it when we do not.     

Political and Regulatory Risk: Beta Sensitivity in U.K. Electricity Distribution*

To establish price caps, regulators must determine appropriate returns for utilities capital employed. This paper uses the techniques of the Kalman Filter to estimate daily betas for the U.K.s regional electricity companies in the period from privatization to end-1998. The paper demonstrates that utilities risk is time-variant, and establishes significant political and regulatory influences in the systematic risk faced by shareholders. It finds beta to be mean reverting, with little evidence of cyclical variation across the regulatory review cycle. The paper confirms the prevalence of significant excess returns in U.K. privatized electricity distribution and suggests that over-estimation of the systematic risk faced by investors may imply further excess returns in the next regulatory review period.     

Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation

From 1994 to 2003, New Zealands corporatized electricity lines networks operated with no industry regulator, but under the spotlight of mandatory information disclosure. As a result there exists a large body of detailed, audited and publicly available accounting data on the financial performance of these businesses. Using that data, this paper finds that price-cost margins have widened substantially since deregulation. We estimate the extent to which light-handed regulation has allowed profits to exceed the levels which would have been acceptable under the old rate-of-return regulatory framework, and find that the answer is about $200 million per year, on an ongoing basis.We thank colleagues at Victoria University, and two anonymous referees for this journal, for constructive comments on this paper. Any remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.JEL classification: D21; K23; L11; L43; L51     

Bid Design Effects in Multiple Bounded Discrete Choice Contingent Valuation

A potential concern in multiple bounded discrete choice contingent valuation surveys – where the respondent is asked to express voting certainty, rather than a simple yes or no, on a large number of payment amounts (bids) – is whether responses are influenced by the particular position of bids in the bid-voting panel rather than solely on the respondents willingness to pay (WTP). For instance, respondents may systematically state they would pay the first few bid amounts and not pay all subsequent bids – regardless of the actual dollar values. Such systematic bid design effects would suggest that this method does not provide a valid measure of WTP. Using a split-sample survey, we compare responses to three different bid arrays that have an identical minimum bid, maximum bid, and number of bids. Using nonparametric estimation techniques, we find that estimated WTP distributions and corresponding welfare measures are not statistically different across survey samples.