我们的电影生活

电影院线简称“院线”,是电影放映行业一种具有垄断性的经营体制。 “院线”以资本和供片为纽带。由一个电影发行主体和若干电影院组合形成。实行统一品牌、统一排片、统一经营、统一管理的发行放映机制。简单的说。院线制可以有效地规范电影发行市场,解决放映走私影片、瞒报票房、盗版光碟泛滥等现象：更重要的是,院线制将促使各院线公司投巨资对影院进行改造。活跃了市场,观众看电影将真正成为一种感、观享受。 中国最早出现的电影院线是本世纪初至20年代中期,西班牙电影商人雷玛斯在上海建立的,由虹口、夏令配克、维多利亚等七家电影院组成的电影院线;其后中国影戏院公司在京、津、沪等地也建成相当规模的电影院线;30年代,天一影片公司企业家邵氏兄弟在新加坡、马来西亚等地组建南洋电影院线。到目前为止,全国已有20多个省、市、区成立了36条跨区域的院线。将近千家影院收入麾下,控制全国90％左右的票房。     

整规图片报道

山东青岛:开展出版物市场清理专项行动崂山工商分局近日开展了出版物市场专项清理行动,重点检查印刷企业、个体书店,清理取缔非法流动书摊21个,查扣盗版光碟软件、非法音像制品1600余张,向存在问题的4家经营业户下达整改通知书。     

软件业盗版的博弈分析

本文通过建立博弈模型,对盗版事件的两方博弈主体,即软件初始制造者和软件盗版者之间的利益关系开展了博弈分析,并提出了应对我国软件盗版事件频发的对策建议。     

软件业盗版的博弈分析

本文通过建立博弈模型,对盗版事件的两方博弈主体,即软件初始制造者和软件盗版者之间的利益关系开展了博弈分析,并提出了应对我国软件盗版事件频发的对策建议。     

以经济学范式辨证看待盗版问题

近年来,侵犯知识产权的盗版现象日益频繁发生。从一般经济学理论看,这种现象有一定的市场选择的合理性。按照供求关系定律的解释,可以得出盗版产品的消费价值和生产价值高于正版产品的消费和生产价值的结论。盗版的存在,对于整个社会的影响不能一概而论。福利经济学告诉我们,时间的长短,竞争的最后趋势以及政府打击的严厉程度都将影响到半对于社会的作用。政府的理性选择并非完全的消灭盗版行为,而是根据市场原则,运用竞争机制为导向,修订法律法规,权衡盗版与打击的成本对比,实行适度的反击盗版的策略,最大限度地消除盗版的负面影响。     

新形势下中国盗版现象的经济学分析

随着经济全球化和我国社会主义市场经济的不断向前发展,知识产权问题已经越来越被人们广泛关注,虽然政府已经采取各种各样的措施来解决盗版问题,但时至今日,盗版问题仍然没有得到根本的解决,甚至还呈现愈演愈烈的局势,盗版产品仍然随处可见。文章运用微观经济学的方法,分析了盗版的现状,存在的市场基础,阐明了盗版存在的正负外部效应;最后给出了一些矫正盗版现象的策略。     

基于经济学视角下的盗版现象分析

本文运用微观经济学中的市场供求分析原理对目前世界上广泛存在的盗版行为进行了分析,指出盗版现象存在的社会根源和经济原因,并对反盗版问题进行了探讨。     

张宝全：廉价电影的冲击波

数字技术令张宝全找到了大幅度降低电影放映成本的可能,他要用 5元的票价把全中国人都吸引进电影院,低靡中的电影市场有了重获生机的可能     

国家工商行政管理局关于转发《关于几起假案的通报》的通报

各省、自治区、直辖市及计划单列市工商行政管理局：近年来,各级工商行政管理机关按照党中央、国务院的统一部署,认真开展反走私斗争,取得了显著效果。但在个别地区仍然存在一些执法单位和执法人员违抗政令,罚款放行、纵容走私等违法行为,严重损害了工商行政管理机关的执法形象,造成了很坏的社会影响。日前,针对河南省许昌县工商行政管理局在查处盗版光碟案件中罚款放行的严重错误,国家工商行政管理局转发了《关于对许昌县工商局在查处案件中罚款放行严重失职的通报》。最近,广东省工商行政管理局对一些市、县工商行政管理局办假案…     

咦，电影?

感觉上,相约到电影院看电影,是专属于正处对象的年轻男女的浪漫,而这样—种浪漫,还是发生在好久好久以前。"这年头,谁还(到影院里)看电影?"电影院与电影发行放映公司,就在这"好久好久"里感受着冬天,在"这年头"里体味着尴尬。     

Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry

This paper empirically investigates market behavior and firms?? lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a testable measure of lobbying coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and market conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular firms effectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs.     

制假贩假治理的博弈分析

通过引入特别设定的管制措施,使制贩假冒伪劣产品的供应商和零售商自陷于非合作博弈中,从而在供应商和零售商的制假贩假合谋中引入自抑制机制,打破制假与贩假构成的恶性利益循环。这一措施有助于促使制贩假冒伪劣产品的规模在某种条件下萎缩,并形成改善市场秩序的良性循环机制。     

Counterfeiting and firm survival. Do international trade activities matter?

Counterfeiting is a phenomenon that threatens global competition and economic growth, and it is well-known that the presence of illicit fake products unfairly altering competition, can affect firm profitability and even, in some cases, force owners to close their businesses or declare bankruptcy. By introducing three new complementary measures of counterfeiting, this study examines the intra- and inter-industry effects of counterfeiting on Italian firm survival taking into consideration the differing degree of a firm’s involvement in international trade activities. Overall, the results of micro-econometric analysis indicate that the probability of a genuine firm exiting the market increases when the effect flows from the “fake” sector to its upstream genuine suppliers; vice versa, it decreases when the effect flows from the “fake” sector to its downstream genuine customers. However, when classifying firms as trading and no trading firms, we found that these results are confirmed only for the latter. Our evidence, which is robust to different estimation methods, provides room for policy and manager interventions.     

Creating and detecting fake reviews of online products

Customers increasingly rely on reviews for product information. However, the usefulness of online reviews is impeded by fake reviews that give an untruthful picture of product quality. Therefore, detection of fake reviews is needed. Unfortunately, so far, automatic detection has only had partial success in this challenging task. In this research, we address the creation and detection of fake reviews. First, we experiment with two language models, ULMFiT and GPT-2, to generate fake product reviews based on an Amazon e-commerce dataset. Using the better model, GPT-2, we create a dataset for a classification task of fake review detection. We show that a machine classifier can accomplish this goal near-perfectly, whereas human raters exhibit significantly lower accuracy and agreement than the tested algorithms. The model was also effective on detected human generated fake reviews. The results imply that, while fake review detection is challenging for humans, “machines can fight machines” in the task of detecting fake reviews. Our findings have implications for consumer protection, defense of firms from unfair competition, and responsibility of review platforms.     

When unionisation is profitable for firms in network industries

In an industry characterised by the presence of network effects, this paper investigates a duopolistic game in which firms may choose whether to bargain over wages and employment with unions or to face a competitive labour market (i.e., without unions). If unions are sufficiently wage‐sensitive, it is shown that the presence of sufficiently large network effects makes unionisation the Pareto efficient sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for firms.     

Firm Heterogeneity and FDI in Distribution Services

Distribution services play a large role in intermediating production and consumption across borders. Using firm‐level data on Japanese multinationals in wholesale and retail sectors, this study examines FDI decisions of distribution firms for local distribution services at the extensive and intensive margin. Consistent with the model of heterogeneous firms on multinational production, I find that more productive multinationals are more likely than less productive multinationals to enter a larger number of markets, to penetrate less attractive markets and to generate larger sales per each market. While these findings are consistent with previous evidence on manufacturing multinationals, I find some distinctive determinants of FDI in distribution services.     

Acquisitions in a Patent Contest Model with Large and Small Firms

Big companies and small innovation factories possess different advantages in a patent contest. While large firms typically have better access to product markets, small firms often have a superior R&D efficiency. These distinct advantages immediately lead to the question of cooperations between firms. In this paper, we model a patent contest with heterogeneous firms. In a pre-contest acquisition game large firms bid sequentially for small firms to combine respective advantages. Sequential bidding allows the first large firms to bid strategically to induce a reaction of its competitor. For high efficiencies both large firms prefer to acquire immediately leading to a symmetric market structure. For low efficiencies strategic waiting of the first large firm leads to an asymmetric market structure even though the initial situation is symmetric. We also discuss two different timing setups of the acquisition stage. In all setups, acquisitions increase the chances for a successful innovation.     

Vertical Product Differentiation and Advertising

A duopoly model is developed in which firms' strategic variables include brand quality, the number of distinct market segments to enter and price. Informative advertising is used to overcome consumer ignorance about brands. In contrast to many existing models in which firms engage in price competition, the subgame perfect equilibria of the game are not characterised by the production of vertically differentiated products. Further, whilst the firms typically produce identical high quality products, in some circumstances the production of homogeneous low quality brands can be an equilibrium strategy.     

Resource dependency and parent–subsidiary capability transfers

In this paper, we treat the multinational firm as an internal market in which various business units compete for scarce resources. By using the resource dependence theory to examine the parent–subsidiary relationship, we view this relationship as more of a political coalition than a hierarchy. We studied the pattern of capability transfers from the headquarters to the subsidiary to highlight this relationship. Using Taiwan-based multinational firms as the sample, our results show that the pattern is more reminiscent of a power game than an effort to maximize global efficiency. In essence, a triangular power play between the headquarters, subsidiary, and local networks determines the extent to which firm-specific capabilities are to be transferred abroad. It is almost certain that capabilities will never be completely transferred. A subsidiary can leverage local market potential to prompt more capability transfers from the headquarters, but any inclinations for the subsidiary to differentiate itself from the parent will discourage such transfers.     

基于博弈论的OTC金融衍生品市场监管必要性分析

基于博弈论的OTC金融衍生品市场监管必要性分析表明:在政府行政监管、行业协会自律管理及市场参与者内部控制的博弈中,单凭市场本身的内部调节机制并不能完全发挥持续稳定市场的效力,政府监管职能对规范市场行为有重大作用;行业自律组织监管是市场监管中不可替代的有机组成。应加强OTC衍生品市场内部控制与风险管理,完善行政监管机制,提高行业协会自律监管能力,特别是加强金融机构表外业务风险的监管,以保证金融机构的稳健经营。