The Impact of Second Loans on Subprime Mortgage Defaults

An estimated 12.6% of primary mortgage loans were simultaneously originated with a second loan from 2004 until 2008, although relatively little is known about how the presence of such subordinate loans affects the default decisions of borrowers. We use a novel data series of loan servicing records from 2002 until 2010 to identify such borrowers and find evidence that the default behavior of these borrowers significantly differs from borrowers without second loans. Estimating a discrete‐time proportional odds hazard model, we find borrowers with a second loan were 62.7% more likely to default each month on their primary loan when conditioning alone on the attributes of the primary loan. However, borrowers of second loans were 58.3% less likely to default on their primary loan as compared to single‐loan borrowers with equivalent current combined attributes (i.e., loan‐to‐value, balance and interest rate). We hypothesize and provide empirical evidence that this occurs because borrowers with second loans have the option to sequentially default on each loan since subordinate lenders will not pursue foreclosure if borrowers have insufficient equity. Lenders of defaulted subordinate debt may revisit their decision to foreclose in the future after housing markets start to recover, thus prompting a new round of foreclosures.     

Subprime Refinancing: Equity Extraction and Mortgage Termination

This article examines the choice of borrowers to extract wealth from housing in the high-cost (subprime) segment of the mortgage market and assesses the prepayment and default performance of these cash-out refinance loans relative to the rate of refinance loans. Consistent with survey evidence, the propensity to extract equity is sensitive to the relative interest rates of other forms of consumer debt. After the loan is originated, our results indicate that cash-out refinances perform differently from non–cash-out refinances. For example, cash-outs are less likely to default or prepay, and the termination of cash-outs is more sensitive to changing interest rates and house prices.     

The information value of online social networks: Lessons from peer-to-peer lending

We examine whether social networks facilitate online markets using data from a leading peer-to-peer lending website. We find that borrowers with social ties are consistently more likely to have their loans funded and receive lower interest rates; however, most borrowers with social ties are more likely to pay late or default. We provide evidence that these findings are driven by lenders not fully understanding the relationship between social ties and unobserved borrower quality. Overall, our findings suggest caution for using online social networks as a signal of quality in anonymous transactions.     

A Note on Mortgage Risk: Default vs. Loss Rates

This note reexamines the role of the loan-to-value ratio on mortgage risk. Whereas previous studies have focused on the default rate as a function of this term, this study considers the additional effect on the loss rate of defaulted loans. Because the dollar loss per amount originated is the product of the default rate and the loss rate on defaulted loans, the impact of the loan-to-value ratio on both the default and loss rates is crucial to explaining the impact of the loan-to-value ratio on mortgage risk. I find that both rates are significantly positively related to loan-to-value ratio and that the loss rate accounts for between 13% and 20% of total loan-to-value impact.     

Search Cost and Price Dispersion in Vertically Related Markets: The Case of Bank Loans and Deposits

Using data on marginal interest rates of loan and deposit products by Spanish banks, we find that the level of interest rates on loans (deposits) across geographic markets decrease (increase) with the number of banks in each market, and that the level of interest rates on loans increases with the level of interest rates of deposits. We also find that the dispersion of interest rates of both loans and deposits increase with the number of banks. This evidence is interpreted as evidence of customer’s search costs in retail banking, consistent with predictions from the Carlson and McAfee (J Polit Econ 91:480–493, 1983) model of market competition with search costs.     

Lender Steering in Residential Mortgage Markets

In this article, we examine the incentives for lenders to steer borrowers into piggyback loan structures to circumvent regulations requiring primary mortgage insurance (PMI) for loans with loan‐to‐value ratios (LTV) above 80%. Our empirical analysis focuses on propensity score‐matched portfolios of piggyback and single‐lien loans having the same combined LTV based on a full set of observed risk characteristics. Our results confirm that mortgages originated with the piggyback structure have much lower ex post default rates and faster prepayment speeds than corresponding PMI loans. We also find a significant causal effect of interstate banking deregulation on the growth of piggybacks in these years, confirming that the ex post performance gap is primarily driven by lender steering on the supply side and not by borrower self‐selection. We then perform a number of tests to explore different origination and execution channels of mortgage steering.     

Semivariance of Property Value Estimates as a Determinant of Default Risk

Standard practice in the residential mortgage underwriting industry is to estimate collateral values via independent appraisals conducted by third parties. This paper empirically examines the role of property value ( i.e. , appraisal) uncertainty as a determinant of default on residential mortgage loans. Based upon an analysis of 1,428 residential loans drawn from the portfolio of a national mortgage lender, we find evidence that semivariance in property value uncertainty is related to default risk. Specifically, subject properties that are valued above the sales price of recently sold "similar and proximate" properties show evidence of greater default risk. Interestingly, a variance (range) measure of property value uncertainty is not significantly related to default risk.     

Origination Channel,Prepayment Penalties and Default

This article presents evidence that nonbank‐originated subprime mortgages have a higher probability of default than bank‐originated subprime mortgages, but only for loans with prepayment penalties. Evidence also indicates that nonbanks price prepayment penalties less favorably to borrowers than banks do, and nonbanks originate disproportionately more loans with prepayment penalties in locales with less financially sophisticated borrowers. State antipredatory lending law provisions restricting the use of prepayment penalties eliminate the elevated default risk of nonbank originations relative to bank originations. These findings are consistent with incentives generated by nonbank compensation via yield spread premiums on loans with prepayment penalties.     

The Impact of Homeowners' Housing Wealth Misestimation on Consumption and Saving Decisions

Using a unique data set of 81,943 house value estimates by the homeowners and their financial institution, I find that homeowners overestimate their house value by 3.1%. After controlling for homeowners' socioeconomic characteristics, I find that ex ante homeowners who rate (cash-out) refinance an existing loan to increase savings (consumption) are significantly more likely to underestimate (overestimate) their house value. Moreover, overestimators (underestimators) are more likely to increase (reduce) their spending ex post . Finally, I also find that underestimators are more likely to prepay their loans and overestimators are more likely to default on their loans.     

Lenders’ pricing strategy: Do neighborhood risks matter?

This article explores the different pricing strategies of lenders who originate both government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) and non-GSE loans. We find that conditional on loan and borrower characteristics and some observable local economic factors, mortgage rates on GSE loans vary significantly across regions. However, we observe no sizable regional variation in loan amounts or default risk. By contrast, the mortgage rates on non-GSE loans depend almost entirely on borrowers and loan characteristics. In addition, we find that spatial variations in GSE mortgage rates are highly responsive to regional prepayment risk. Our results are robust to various controls for neighborhood characteristics, including regional-level bank competition, borrower accessibility to mortgages, and household income levels. Overall, the findings offer a novel insight into how lenders adjust pricing strategies in response to a changing lending environment. The results provide implications relating to the present and imminent dangers of housing bubbles and the intensified refinancing wave following the COVID-19 pandemic.     

Income, Location and Default: Some Implications for Community Lending

This paper investigates differences in default losses across income groups and neighborhoods, in an effort to see if there are significant differences between default experience on loans to low-income households or low-income neighborhoods and other loans. We find that while defaults and losses are somewhat higher in low-income neighborhoods, default behavior is similar in the sense that responses to negative equity are similar across neighborhoods, and remaining differences are small and might be explained by omitted variables such as those measuring credit history.     

Determinants of Multifamily Mortgage Default

Option–based models of mortgage default posit that the central measure of default risk is the loan–to–value (LTV) ratio. We argue, however, that an unrecognized problem with extending the basic option model to existing multifamily and commercial mortgages is that key variables in the option model are endogenous to the loan origination and property sale process. This endogeneity implies, among other things, that no empirical relationship may be observed between default and LTV. Since lenders may require lower LTVs in order to mitigate risk, mortgages with low and moderate LTVs may be as likely to default as those with high LTVs. Mindful of this risk endogeneity and its empirical implications, we examine the default experience of 495 fixed–rate multifamily mortgage loans securitized by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) during the period 1991–1996. The extensive nature of the data supports multivariate analysis of default incidence in a number of respects not possible in previous studies. Consistent with our expectations, we find that LTV evidences no relationship to default incidence, while the strongest predictors of default are property characteristics, including three–digit ZIP code location and initial cash flow as reflected in the debt coverage ratio. The latter results are particularly interesting in that they dominated the influence of postorigination changes in the local economy.     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Securitization on Mortgage Market Yields: A Cointegration Analysis

Securitization of the residential mortgage market has completely transformed the process of financing home loans in the U.S. over the last two decades. We examine the effects of securitization on yield spreads in the primary mortgage market. Cointegration techniques are employed to test the relationship between the increasing volume of mortgage securities over time and the yield spread on mortgage loan rates. We find that a 10% increase in the level of mortgage securitization as a proportion of total mortgage originations decreases yield spreads on home loans by as much as 20 basis points. Other results indicate that, while prepayment speed has a significant effect on mortgage yield spreads, default risk does not. We conclude that securitization of the residential mortgage market plays an important role in decreasing the cost of home loans.     

Do Riskier Borrowers Borrow More?

Conventional wisdom in the mortgage industry holds that loan-to-value (LTV) ratios are positively correlated with mortgage default rates. However, not all empirical studies of mortgage loan performance support this view. This paper offers a theoretical signaling model of why the correlation between LTV ratios and default risk is contingent upon the default costs of the borrower. Specifically, the model proposes that when default costs are high there exists a separating equilibrium in which risky borrowers will self-select into lower LTV loans to reduce the probability of facing a costly default, while safe borrowers will self-select into higher LTV loans as a signal of their enhanced creditworthiness. This adverse selection process gives rise to the possibility of higher default probabilities for lower LTV loans. Conversely, when default costs are low the conventional result, in which risky borrowers select higher LTV loans than safe borrowers, is obtained. Empirical results, based on a sample of 859 single-family residential mortgage loans drawn from the portfolio of a national mortgage lender, are consistent with the separating equilibria predicted by the model.     

A Note on Hybrid Mortgages

We extend previous research on traditional one-year adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) by analyzing the performance of 3/27 hybrid instruments. Under this contract innovation, which first appeared in the mid-1990s, note rates are fixed for three years after which they convert to a traditional one-year adjustment schedule with periodic and lifetime caps. We find high rates of prepayment, particularly at time of initial rate adjustment, and relatively high rates of default, as would be consistent with the payment shock that often affects adjustable-rate loans.     

Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, Economic Fluctuations, and Lender Portfolio Change

In this study we examine the effects of economic fluctuations on the repayment behavior of a portfolio of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). Because the U.S. experience with ARMs is quite recent, we have used data on a form of ARM used in Canada, the rollover mortgage. The results of our analysis suggest that use of ARMs similar to the rollover mortgage may reduce but not eliminate interest-rate risk for lenders, as borrowers, albeit constrained, prepay above-market-rate loans. In addition, we find that the periodic payment change inherent in the rollover mortgage does not lead to higher default rates and, therefore, credit risk.     

Green Buildings in Commercial Mortgage‐Backed Securities: The Effects of LEED and Energy Star Certification on Default Risk and Loan Terms

We study the impact of green building on loans in the CMBS market. A hazard model shows green buildings carry 34% less default risk, all else equal. A matched‐sample analysis gives similar results. We attribute the effect to a loan‐to‐value channel, where risk is lowered by a green price premium. The benefit comes at least partly from the level of green achievement, not only the label itself. Loans on buildings that were green at loan origination have slightly better terms than loans on nongreen buildings. That difference is growing over time, but the effect is economically small compared to default risk.     

Owner-occupancy fraud and mortgage performance

We identify occupancy fraud—borrowers who misrepresent their occupancy status as owner-occupants rather than investors—in residential mortgage originations. Unlike previous work, we show that fraud was prevalent in originations not just during the housing bubble but also persists through more recent times. We also demonstrate that fraud is broad-based and appears in government-sponsored enterprise and bank portfolio loans, not just in private securitization; these fraudulent borrowers make up one third of the effective investor population. Occupancy frauds obtain credit at lower interest rates, suggesting a motivation for undertaking fraud. These fraudulent borrowers perform substantially worse than similar declared investors, defaulting at a 75% higher rate. We also provide evidence consistent with fraudulent borrowers’ defaults being more “strategic,” suggesting that this population poses a risk in the face of declining house prices.     

The Performance of Low-Income and Minority Mortgages

This article analyzes the performance of low-income and minority mortgages (LIMMs) from a large sample of fixed-rate conventional conforming mortgages. We find that low-income borrowers are less likely to prepay when it is optimal, whereas black and Hispanic borrowers prepay more slowly than other borrowers, regardless of the option's value. After controlling for equity, credit history and some other variables, LIMMs default slightly more frequently and have about the same loss severity as other loans. Our results suggest that, for most yield curve situations, differences in LIMM prepayment behavior have little effect on pricing.