股权结构代理成本与外部审计需求

本文基于一个两时点大股东掠夺模型,考察了股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求之间的关系。我们的模型分析结果表明,第一大股东持股比例与企业价值成U型曲线关系,而与外部审计需求成倒U型曲线关系。即:代理成本较高的上市公司更有可能聘请高质量的外部审计师,以降低代理成本,提高公司市场价值。我们以中国A股上市公司2001和2002年的数据,对上述结论进行了实证检验并得到支持,本文分析还表明,债务融资与外部审计在降低代理成本方面具有相互替代性。     

On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.     

Audit committee characteristics and investment in internal auditing

Regulators and others recently highlighted the increasingly important role of internal auditing in supporting and interacting with the audit committee to ensure the integrity and quality of financial reporting. Likewise, one of the roles of the audit committee is to oversee the quality of monitoring mechanisms implemented by the firm, which includes the internal audit function. However, our understanding of the relationship between the audit committee and internal auditing is limited. We fill this void by providing the first empirical evidence of the association between audit committee characteristics and the investment in internal auditing. Our analyses, from a sample of 181 SEC registrants, suggest that the investment in internal auditing (internal audit budget) is negatively related to the presence of auditing experts on the committee and the average tenure of audit committee members, but positively related to the number of audit committee meetings (a proxy for audit committee diligence). These observations suggest potential complementary and substitution effects between the audit committee and internal auditing, and thus raise important implications for future research.     

Institutional investment horizon and investment–cash flow sensitivity

This paper examines the relevance of institutional investors’ investment horizon, as reflected in the response of firm investment to internal cash flows. We argue that institutional investors with longer investment horizons have greater incentives and efficiencies to engage in effective monitoring. This improved monitoring mitigates asymmetric information and agency problems, and in turn reduces the wedge between the costs of internal and external funds. As a result, the sensitivity of firms’ investment outlays to internal cash flows decreases in the presence of institutional investors with long-term investment horizons. Using a sample of 8402 US firms over the period 1981–2008, we provide empirical evidence consistent with these arguments.     

The construction of persuasiveness of self-assessment-based post-completion auditing reports

In this study, we investigate how persuasiveness of self-assessment-based post-completion auditing (PCA) reports on capital investment is constructed. We examine what makes companies consider that information in these reports rises to an acceptable quality level. The investigation was motivated by extant agency theory (AT) informed literature suggesting that self-auditing will entail obvious risks for the quality of PCA reports in terms of data manipulation. We employed actor-network theory as our method theory. The empirical evidence of our case study came from 24 semi-structured interviews and the analysis of the construction of 22 PCA reports of strategic investments in one of the major European forest companies. We add to the capital budgeting literature by identifying and discussing the role of various conditions affecting the construction of persuasiveness of PCA reports. We maintain that the existence of three conditions (i.e. an appropriate collective process, alignment with relevant external/internal reference points, and following of formal guidance) can play a major role in facilitating the production of a persuasive PCA report. Additionally, the paper is able to make sense of the complex process of fabricating the persuasiveness of PCA reports, which would remain a black box when examined from the AT viewpoint only.     

Determinants of audit report modifications in Finnish municipalities

Although municipalities are major economic and social actors in most countries, remarkably little is known about their audits, particularly the determinants of their audit report modifications. The existing evidence is ambiguous at best and scarce, which provides opportunities for further accounting studies in this area. Therefore, based on an agency theory framework, we fill this important research gap by exploring three determinants of audit report modifications in municipalities: (1) economic performance, (2) decentralization of decision-making across different decision-making bodies, and (3) political competition between political parties in local councils. These determinants are examined based on a large panel of data on Finnish municipalities for the period from 2009 to 2013, covering virtually all of the country’s municipalities. We find that a striking 33 percent of audit reports had modifications during this period, which raises serious concerns about the state of municipal management, accounting, and auditing in Finland. Regarding the above determinants, the following conclusions can be made based on our analyses. First, we find partial evidence that weak economic performance increases the likelihood of audit report modifications. Second, the lower the competition among political parties in a local council, the lower the likelihood of audit report modifications. Finally, the more decentralized decision making is across the different decision-making bodies under the local council, the higher the probability of audit report modifications. These results are consistent with agency theory’s explanations regarding the value of auditing.     

Agency Cost,Dividend Policy and Growth: The Special Case of REITs

Dividend distribution enhances information transmission, and mitigates agency conflicts by restricting managers’ access to free cash flow, and exposing firms to the scrutiny and monitoring by market participants when raising external capital. The reduction in agency costs and improvement in information dissemination reduce the cost of funds, and investment at more competitive cost of capital enhances firm value. For REITs, because of the mandated high dividend distribution, growth depends on the availability of external capital at competitive rates, such that mitigation of agency costs is critical to sustain growth. We examine the relation between dividends and growth with a sample of U.S. equity REITs. Our data reveal a significantly positive relation between externally financed growth and dividend payments. The relation is stronger among REITs with more growth opportunities, and REITs that issue new equity and debt. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the notion that by reducing agency costs and facilitating capital raising, dividends enhance growth.     

The Impact of Dual Agency

In 1984, the State of Hawaii’s legislature enacted a law making it mandatory for real estate agents engaged in dual agency relationships (i.e., when the seller’s and the buyer’s agents are employed by the same real estate firm) to disclose this fact to both parties in writing. The assumption was that the dual agency relation was damaging to the seller. This study analyzes the effect of disclosed and undisclosed dual agency, and the impact of the legislation, using data prior to and after the legislation (approximately 2,000 residential sales in each period). To account for property characteristics, hedonic models for the log of sale price and for the log of days on market are estimated in each period. Our empirical analysis suggests that dual agency significantly reduced the sales price, but the influence was much smaller after the legislation (8.0 versus 1.4%). In addition, dual agency significantly decreased the time on market by approximately 8.5% pre-legislation and 8.1% post-legislation, although the influence was much stronger for lower priced residences. These results are confirmed using a seemingly unrelated regression model.

How accounting and auditing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safety-nets in banking: Some international evidence

This paper suggests that accounting and auditing systems can be effective devices to counteract tendencies for firm risk-taking associated with bank safety nets. Results are obtained from an international sample of publicly traded banks after controlling for other regulatory control devices for bank risk such as restrictions on banking activities, minimum regulatory capital requirements and official discipline. The efficacy of accounting and auditing systems in controlling bank risk diminishes with bank charter value and increases with moral hazard stemming from a country's deposit insurance. The results also indicate that accounting and auditing systems are complements for minimum capital requirements, but substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline.     

Tax avoidance and underleverage puzzle: Korean evidence

This paper examines whether tax avoidance substitutes for the use of debt, as well as investigating the impact of the tax-exhaustion effect and the cost of debt in this relationship. Applying a modified version of the tax-avoidance measure in Desai and Dharmapala (Rev Econ Stat 91:537?C546, 2006), I determine the marginal substitution effect of tax avoidance for the use of debt for a large sample of Korean firms, generalizing the evidence of Graham and Tucker (J Financ Econ 81:563?C594, 2006). Furthermore, I find that the debt-substitution effect increases with the probability of losing tax shields, suggesting that the tax-exhaustion effect interacts with the debt-substitution effect. In addition, the debt-substitution effect becomes stronger when the cost of debt is high, indicating that the cost of debt is a determinant of the substitution effect. The debt-substitution effects of tax avoidance suggest that tax-avoidance activities could offer a partial explanation for the underleverage puzzle.     

From Member of the Company to Registered Auditor: The Role of the External Auditor in Corporate Governance

Corporate governance has often been defined in a narrow way as comprising 'the range of control mechanisms that protect and enhance the interests of shareholders of business enterprises' ( Fama and Jensen 1983 ). In the corporate governance literature there has also been a general focus on the structure and functioning of boards of directors and the responsibilities of audit committees in relation to external auditing ( Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990 ; Shleifer and Vishny 1997 ). This article looks at the evolution of the role of external auditing in corporate governance. The role of the external auditor has changed through time, and consequently it should not be assumed that the role of external auditing is fixed or that it cannot be changed to meet societal needs and expectations. This observation leads to the primary argument of our article, which is that the role of the external auditor in corporate governance ought to be expanded in order to enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance for the benefit of a wider spectrum of stakeholders and society generally.     

Are Debt and Incentive Compensation Substitutes in Controlling the Free Cash Flow Agency Problem?

This paper investigates the governance implications of a firm's capital structure and managerial incentive compensation in controlling the free cash flow agency problem. The results suggest: debt and executive stock options act as substitutes in attenuating a firm's free cash flow problem; failure to incorporate the substitutability and endogeneity leads to underestimates of the magnitude and economic implication of the disciplinary role of both mechanisms; firm characteristics differ across the prevalence of debt usage versus option usage, suggesting the heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of the monitoring devices; and all the above effects are more pronounced in firms that tend to have more severe agency problem.     

The Determinants of REIT Cash Holdings

The factors influencing the cash holdings of REITs are examined with the view that the REIT industry should yield new information regarding the drivers of corporate cash policy due to their unique operating conditions. The availability of REIT line of credit data also allows us to test the association between cash holdings and line of credit access and use. Data constraints in prior investigations have left this an unresolved empirical question in the cash holdings literature. The baseline results show that REIT cash holdings are inversely related to funds from operations, leverage, and internal advisement and are directly related to the cost of external finance and growth opportunities. Cash holdings are also negatively associated with credit line access and use. The results imply that REIT managers elect to hold little cash to reduce the agency problems of cash flow thereby increasing transparency and reducing the future cost of external capital.

Determinants of corporate hedging decision: Evidence from Croatian and Slovenian companies

This paper presents the research results on determinants of corporate risk management decisions in large Croatian and Slovenian non-financial companies. Research has revealed that the explored hedging rationales have little predictive power in explaining corporate risk management decisions both in Croatian and Slovenian companies. The evidence based on both univariate and multivariate empirical relations between the decision to hedge in Croatian non-financial companies and financial distress costs, agency costs, costly external financing, taxes, managerial utility and hedge substitutes, fails to provide any support for any of the tested hypotheses but one - costly external financing measured by investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. The same analysis conducted for the Slovenian companies has shown that there is no statistically significant explanatory variable for the decision to hedge; therefore it is not dependent on any of the predicted theories of hedging.     

Explaining Underutilization of Tax Depreciation Deductions: Empirical Evidence from Norway

Many corporations do not claim all of their allowable tax depreciation deductions. Intuitively, this kind of behavior might seem odd. However we propose several possible explanations. First, we find strong evidence that firms facing current tax losses or carrying forward past losses underutilize depreciation in order to recover tax losses before they expire. Second, corporations with bad economic performance tend to underutilize their deductions, suggesting that corporations use costly windowdressing on their accounting measures. Third, we find support for the hypothesis that tax compliance costs discourage the utilization of accelerated depreciation, especially by small firms. We do not find much support for other hypotheses. For example, we find no evidence of substitution between tax depreciation and private debt due to competition between the benefits of private bank monitoring and the tax savings from using tax allowances to postpone tax payments, as suggested in earlier literature. We also study the effects of the uniform reporting accounting system (typical of many European countries) which can, under certain circumstances, constrain dividends. Forgoing some tax depreciation can loosen the dividend constraint, but the evidence does not support this motivation. Unusual access to extremely detailed individual firm tax return forms in Norway made our empirical analysis possible. In addition, the 1992 Norwegian tax reform provided a natural experiment for testing some of the hypotheses. We use the time-series and cross-sectional variation across Norwegian corporations in 1988, 1991, 1992 and 1993.     

How accounting and auditing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safety-nets in banking: Some international evidence

This paper suggests that accounting and auditing systems can be effective devices to counteract tendencies for firm risk-taking associated with bank safety nets. Results are obtained from an international sample of publicly traded banks after controlling for other regulatory control devices for bank risk such as restrictions on banking activities, minimum regulatory capital requirements and official discipline. The efficacy of accounting and auditing systems in controlling bank risk diminishes with bank charter value and increases with moral hazard stemming from a country's deposit insurance. The results also indicate that accounting and auditing systems are complements for minimum capital requirements, but substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline.     

Executive compensation and conflict between shareholders and creditors: Evidence from creditor litigation

Using creditor litigation data from China, we investigate whether creditors can participate in corporate governance when agency conflict between shareholders and creditors is severe. By comparing firms that have experienced creditor lawsuits (litigation firms) with those that have not (non-litigation firms), we find that litigation firms have lower pay-performance sensitivity before lawsuits, suggesting that these firms have weaker corporate governance. This result is consistent with our expectation that creditors participate in corporate governance by introducing external monitoring when internal monitoring, dominated by shareholders, is insufficient. We also find that the association is stronger for firms with more severe shareholder-creditor agency conflict. Moreover, creditor litigation is strongly related to low pay-performance sensitivity when the external legal environment is strong. Our results remain robust to different model specifications and after addressing endogeneity problems.     

Corporate governance and board effectiveness

This paper surveys the empirical and theoretical literature on the mechanisms of corporate governance. We focus on the internal mechanisms of corporate governance (e.g., corporate board of directors) and their role in ameliorating various classes of agency problems arising from conflicts of interests between managers and equityholders, equityholders and creditors, and capital contributors and other stakeholders to the corporate firm. We also examine the substitution effect between internal mechanisms of corporate governance and external mechanisms, particularly markets for corporate control. Directions for future research are provided.     

The case for process mining in auditing: Sources of value added and areas of application

Process mining aims to extract knowledge from the event logs maintained by a company's ERP system. The objective of this paper is to make the case for why internal and external auditors should leverage the capabilities process mining offers to rethink how auditing is carried out. We do so by identifying the sources of value added of process mining when applied to auditing, which are as follows: 1. process mining analyzes the entire population of data and not just a sample; 2. critically that data consists of meta-data—data entered independently of the actions of auditee—and not just data entered by the auditee; 3. process mining allows the auditor to have a more effective way of implementing the audit risk model by providing effective ways of conducting the required walkthroughs of processes and conducting analytic procedures; 4. process mining allows the auditor to conduct analyses not possible with existing audit tools, such as discovering the ways in which business processes are actually being carried out in practice, and to identify social relationships between individuals. It is our argument that these sources of value have not been fully understood in the process mining literature, which has focused on developing it as a statistical methodology rather than on applying it to audit practice. Only when auditors and audit researchers appreciate what is new and unique about process mining will its acceptance in auditing practice become feasible.     

Accounting conservatism and corporate governance

We predict that firms with stronger corporate governance will exhibit a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Governance level is assessed using a composite measure that incorporates several internal and external characteristics. Consistent with our prediction, strong governance firms show significantly higher levels of conditional accounting conservatism. Our tests take into account the endogenous nature of corporate governance, and the results are robust to the use of several measures of conservatism (market-based and nonmarket-based). Our evidence is consistent with the direction of causality flowing from governance to conservatism, and not vice versa, indicating that governance and conservatism are not substitutes. Finally, we study the impact of earnings discretion on the sensitivity of earnings to bad news across governance structures. We find that, on average, strong-governance firms appear to use discretionary accruals to inform investors about bad news in a timelier manner.