Tax avoidance and intra-family transfers

We study how taxes on intra-family transfers (bequests and gifts) affect parents' transfers to their children. Our focus is on the incentives for tax avoidance. These issues are important for families and their welfare, as well as for governments and their possibilities of raising revenue from transfer taxes. Using a theoretical model, we show how altruistic parents avoid taxes by changing the timing of transfers when inter vivos gifts are taxed separately from bequests (which is the case in many developed countries). The excess burden per tax dollar of the transfer taxes is sometimes infinitely large because of tax avoidance. All tax avoidance is eliminated if bequests and gifts from the same donor are jointly taxed.     

In-school labour supply,parental transfers,and wages

In many industrialised countries, teenagers have a significant spending power, and they are important customers for specialised industries. The income of teenagers still in full time education comes from two major sources: parental pocket money and earnings from part-time jobs. Little is known about the way these sources interact, and how they depend on parental, school and family characteristics. In this paper, we analyse labour supply of 16 year old British teenagers together with the cash transfers made to them by their parents. We first develop a theoretical model, where labour supply and transfers are jointly determined. We then estimate labour supply and transfers jointly, using unique data on labour supply of teenagers, the wages they receive, and the transfers from their parents. We show how these two processes depend on each other, and how transfers and labour supply react to changes in wages. We are grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for financial support for this research, which has also benefited from support to the IFS as a Designated Research Centre of the ESRC. We thank Murali Agastya, Richard Blundell, Ian Preston, Frank Windmeijer, and two anonymous referees and the editor Bernd Fitzenberger for useful comments.     

Intergenerational transfers in Philippine rice villages. Gender differences in traditional inheritance customs

The author presents findings from a study of education, land, and nonland asset transfers from parents to children in 344 households in five rice villages in the Philippines. A model with family fixed effects is developed which explains transfers better than either individual heterogeneity or observed parent and child characteristics without family fixed effects. Analysis revealed that families facing different land constraints exhibit significantly different patterns of educational investment in children. In a subsample with completed inheritance, daughters receive less education, land, and total inheritance, but are compensated with nonland assets. Parents also exhibit preferential behavior toward children of the same gender such that daughters of better educated mothers receive more land, nonland assets, and total inheritance. Better educated fathers, however, give land preferentially to sons, but favor daughters in education.     

Family Transfers Involving Three Generations

Most models of family transfers consider only two generations and focus on two motives: altruism and exchange. They also assume perfect substitution between inter-vivos downward transfers and bequests. Based on French evidence, we show that parent-to-child transfers belong to three distinct categories (investment in child's education, financial assistance, wealth transmission), and advocate a three -generation framework. Thus, transfer behavior of parents toward their children is strongly influenced by the behavior of their own parents. There is also some evidence of the Cox and Stark demonstration effect: parents help their own parents, expecting to receive comparable support from their children. Such behavior can be regarded as indirect reciprocity : the beneficiary does not give back to the initial giver but to a third person of another generation.
JEL classification : D 10; D 31; D 63; D 64     

Bequests, Inter Vivos Transfers, and Wealth Distribution

This paper constructs a heterogeneous agent overlapping generations model with bequests and inter vivos transfers. In the model, households in the same family line behave strategically to determine their consumption, working hours, gifts, and savings. Calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, the paper measures time preference and parental altruism consistent with the economy's capital-output ratio and the size of intergenerational transfers. The model with intergenerational transfers better explains, although not fully, the wealth distribution of the United States. The paper also analyzes the effects of government policy changes on wealth accumulation, distribution, and social welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D64, D91, H31.     

TRANSFERS FROM MIGRANTS TO THEIR CHILDREN: EVIDENCE THAT ALTRUISM AND CULTURAL FACTORS MATTER

This paper focuses on the determinants of financial inter vivos transfers by migrants living in France in 2003 to their adult children. From a theoretical viewpoint, such transfers may be explained either by altruism or by exchange. While parents would direct their assistance to their less well off children under altruism, support should be channeled to children who live nearby their parents under the exchange motive. We assess the relevance of these two motives using the French PRI survey. Unequal sharing is frequently observed and children are more likely to receive financial transfers when they are in poor circumstance, but not necessarily when living in proximity to parents. We also emphasize the role of cultural factors as determinants of the parental allocation among children. Muslim parents, in particular, are more likely to make transfers to sons than to daughters.     

Social norms and gift behavior: Theory and evidence from Romania

In many developing and transitional countries with limited public income redistribution, inter-household transfers in general, and gifts in particular, are sizable and very important. We use unique Romanian survey data that enables us to isolate pure gifts from other private transfers. We explicitly focus on the importance of community-wide social norms, and find that they indeed play a major role for both the occurrence and the values of gifts. More exactly, our results suggest that the overall predominant gift motive among Romanian households is a norm of reciprocity. Moreover, this norm seems to be dominating for gifts to middle- and high-income households. Even though poor households receive to the same extent, norms of both impure altruism and reciprocity tend to be important. Hence, although the poor may not reciprocate gifts to the same extent as the rich, they still receive, since there is a social norm to give, especially to the poor.     

The inheritance function

Even though inheritances are of great importance for economic inequality, little research has so far been done on the factors determining the size of the inheritances a person will receive during his lifetime, or when during his lifetime he is most likely to get his inheritance - if he gets one at all. This article provides an approach to these questions. Using Swedish data an inheritance function is estimated.     

Subjective Inheritance Expectations and Economic Outcomes

In this paper we investigate whether and to what extent inheritance expectations act as a driver of economic choices. We use survey data that are representative of the Dutch adult population with a specific module on subjective probabilities on receiving an inheritance and its amount in the next 10 years. We analyze whether the expected inheritance acts as a deterrent to saving. Results suggest that individuals perceive the expected inheritances as a potential increase of personal wealth, which leads to a reduction in savings. Expectations also appear to matter for the intentions to bequeath and for intended choices on work versus leisure in the future.     

Nature of transfers,income tax function and empirical estimation of elasticity of taxable income for Brazil

This article aims to estimate the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), taking into account the nature of transfers and their use as a redistribution package (involving cash and in-kind transfers) to households in Brazil. Our contributions are twofold. First, we provide a simple model with balanced-budget government that reveals the role played by cash and in-kind transfers on the labour supply (and income tax revenues thereof). Next, in order to estimate ETI in the presence of cash and in-kind transfers, Brazilian population surveys (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios [PNAD]) are used to explore a limited tax reform that was implemented between 1997 and 1998. This reform only affected the higher income tax bracket. Our findings suggest that in-kind (cash) transfers are positively (negatively) associated with reported taxable income and precise estimation of ETI requires estimates of both types of transfers. Last, we estimate the ETI for Brazil in the range from 0.4 to 1.3 not different from those that maximize income tax revenues.     

Social Security and Growth in an Altruistic Economy

This paper studies the macroeconomic impact of private and public intergenerational transfers in the presence of endogenous growth. It focuses on two-sided altruism implying that individuals have both a motive to make gifts to their parents and a motive to leave bequests to their children. The growth effects of social security depend on whether children are making gifts to their parents or parents are leaving bequests to their children. Which of the transfers is operative, in turn, depends on the size of social security benefits. Social security is legislated endogenously. The introduction of a social security program which definitely reduces per capita income growth and harms future generations is contemplated by altruistic individuals even if non-altruistic individuals disapprove it.     

私人代际转移动机研究*——基于CHARLS的实证分析

经济学家对代际的物质和时间转移的兴趣引发了人们对转移动机的研究与思考。传统的解释有两种：利他主义与交换互惠。本文利用CHARLS数据，对中国的代际转移动机进行实证研究，发现受传统文化的影响，中国的代际转移更多地表现出利他主义倾向，同时示范效应也有所体现，即个体在照顾父母的同时也在教育自己的孩子赡养父母，以期退休后得到子女的照顾。相对西方国家来说，我国养老金体系的压力较小。但随着老龄化的加剧和生育率的下降，为了缓解未来独生子女赡养双方父母的压力，应当在减少挤出私人代际转移的基础上完善社会保障体系，提高我国老年人口的生活质量。     

THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL HELP AND GIFTS ON HOUSING DEMAND AND COST BURDENS

Financial transfers are an important source of income for many households and recipients may use these funds to pay for housing services. This paper examines the separate impact of financial help and substantial gifts on both housing demand and housing cost burden. The results indicate receiving gifts has a positive and statistically significant impact on housing demand. Households receiving help or gifts have substantially higher housing cost burdens, all else being held constant. These findings have implications for the financial well-being of recipient households and ultimately, the mortgage industry . ( JEL R20, R21)     

The Impact of Inheritance on the Distribution of Wealth: Evidence from Great Britain

Using the British Household Panel Survey, we investigate the role of inheritance in shaping the distribution of household wealth in Great Britain during 1995–2005a period characterized by a substantial increase in wealth and an equally important decrease in wealth inequality. Abstracting from behavioral effects, we find that inheritances received during this period accounted for 30 percent of the increase in wealth of inheritors. Regression estimates of the effect of inheritance on wealth accumulation suggest that households spend 30 percent of their inheritances on average, and that there is substantial heterogeneity in household responses. Households that accumulated more wealth saved a larger share of their inheritances, as did middle aged households and those with lower initial wealth. Although inheritances are highly unequal they had a small impact on overall wealth inequality. This mainly reflected the fact that their size relative to other sources of wealth was very small.     

Choosing between gifts and bequests: How taxes affect the timing of wealth transfers

A number of theories have been advanced to explain the size and timing of intergenerational transfers. One factor only recently explored is the effects of taxes, and in particular the estate tax, on such transfers. This paper represents the first attempt to explore how capital gains and gift taxes, in addition to the estate tax, interact to influence incentives in the timing of transfers. Using estate tax data and exploiting variations in state inheritance, gift, and capital gains tax rates, this paper finds taxes to be an important consideration in the choice between gifts and bequests. In particular, each of capital gains and gift taxes are found to be important determinants of the timing of transfers. These findings are robust to a number of specifications that control for borrowing, charitable bequests, marital status, and the portfolio composition of wealth transfers.     

Intergenerational transfers,demographic transition,and altruism: Problems in developing Asia

This paper develops a three‐period overlapping‐generations model where middle‐aged agents care about not only their own lifetime utility but also their old parents' and children's well‐being. The doubly altruistic agents choose amounts of intergenerational transfers to their old parents and children as well as private savings. The government specifies amounts of public transfers from working adults to the dependents. The model also takes the effects of demographic transition on the burdens of supporting the elderly and children into account. Using 23 countries' data from the National Transfer Accounts (NTA ), we estimate the degrees of filial and parental altruism and adjust them for their respective life expectancy and fertility rates. The findings suggest that people in developing countries are more parentally altruistic than those in developed ones while the adjusted degree of filial altruism tends to be low in developing Asia. Our welfare analyses reveal that the developing Asian countries must introduce more comprehensive public welfare programs for the elderly to maximize social welfare. Moreover, their low adjusted degree of filial altruism may trap the developing Asian countries at the low levels of public old‐age support and social welfare as the further demographic transition ensues.     

Do estate and gift taxes affect the timing of private transfers?

Proposals to alter the estate tax are contentious and have been considered largely in an empirical vacuum. This paper examines time series and cross-sectional variation to identify the effects of estate and gift taxation on the timing of private transfers. The analysis is based on data from the 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Legislative activity during this period reduced the tax disadvantage of bequests relative to gifts. Moreover, the magnitude of this reduction differed systematically across identifiable household categories. We find that households experiencing larger declines in the expected tax disadvantages of bequests reduced inter vivos transfers relative to households experiencing small declines in the tax disadvantages of bequests. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the timing of transfers is responsive to applicable gift and estate tax rates. The results also provide evidence of a systematic bequest motive for high-wealth households.     

Intergovernmental transfers and political competition measured by pivotal probability - Evidence from Hungary

I estimate the effects of political competition on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers to Hungarian municipalities between 1998 and 2006. The intergovernmental transfers were intended to finance schooling, elder care, and administrative needs in municipalities. Rather than use closeness of the dominant blocks' vote share, which is the standard measure of political competition, I instead employ (Myerson, 2000)'s pivotal probabilities, calculated at the municipality level. As a result, the number of voters, in addition to the vote difference, is taken into account when describing political competition at the municipal level. I argue that under mixed-member proportional systems, as well as under proportional systems in general, pivotal probability reflects the political reality better than closeness can. I find evidence that swing municipalities in villages are targeted and, ceteris paribus, that poorer regions receive larger transfer amounts than other areas.     

In search of welfare-improving gifts

Gift giving is thought to decrease welfare. Recipients are sometimes stuck with gifts they would not have purchased because the giver does not perfectly know the recipient's preferences and in-kind gifts cannot be costlessly refunded. Such gifts are welfare reducing compared to giving cash if, in addition, recipients possess full information as to which stores carry their desired goods and the ability to reach these stores costlessly. We replace these two latter assumptions with the more realistic assumptions of uncertainty about the location of goods and search costs. In contrast to existing economic models, gifts in our model enhance expected welfare. Moreover, gift giving cannot be replaced by a profit-maximizing trader nor the introduction of nearby specialty stores carrying gift goods. We use our model to explain a number of stylized facts about gift giving, the organization of retail trade and in-kind government transfers.     

CASH TRANSFERS,INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY,AND THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT

We examine how cash transfers affect an individual's education investment, intergenerational mobility, and economic growth. We find that providing larger transfer amounts to higher ability children is desirable to foster growth if the economy has relatively low wage inequality.