The term structure of inflation expectations

We use information in the term structure of survey-based forecasts of inflation to estimate a factor hidden in the nominal yield curve. We construct a model that accommodates forecasts over multiple horizons from multiple surveys and Treasury real and nominal yields by allowing for differences between risk-neutral, subjective, and objective probability measures. We establish that model-based inflation expectations are driven by inflation, output, and one latent factor. We find that this factor affects inflation expectations at all horizons but has almost no effect on the nominal yields; that is, the latent factor is hidden. We show that this hidden factor is not related to either current and past inflation or the standard set of macro variables studied in the literature. Consistent with the theoretical property of a hidden factor, our model outperforms a standard macro-finance model in its forecasting of inflation and yields.     

The Effect of Market Structure on the Incentives to Quote Aggressively: An Empirical Study of Nasdaq Market Makers

We use data on Nasdaq stocks to study arguments that preferencing reduces incentives to quote competitively. We examine a market maker's volume as a function of various measures of quoting aggressiveness. We find that more aggressive quoting does indeed result in more business. We also examine the relation between volume and quote aggressiveness as a function of the competitiveness. We find that in less (more) competitive markets, increased quote aggressiveness has a smaller (larger) impact on market share. We argue that preferencing arrangements could be more harmful to public investors in markets where competition is weak.     

Consequences of fraud and overcoming negative market reaction

We examine the market reaction to a sample of firms following the announcement of the firms' involvement in fraud, referred to as the trigger event. We find that these firms experience negative and significant returns following the announcement of fraud, in contrast to a control sample. More importantly, we examine tactics, such as changes in executives, auditing firm, and company name, that these firms may use to regain the market's confidence. We find that the market reacts negatively right after the change in executives, but the negative trend is reversed in the long-term for firms that make an executive change quickly after the trigger event. Similarly, firms that quickly change their auditing firm fare better. We also find that there is significantly more information asymmetry during the trigger event and at the litigation date, as well as during changes in CEO, CFO, and auditor. We find a prompt change in CFO is positively and significantly related to, and therefore predicts, better long-term stock performance.     

Early indicators of fundraising success by venture capital firms

We show how a venture capital firm's fundraising is affected by its investment choices. We investigate three leading indicators that are calculated from the types of investments the venture capital firms make: style drift investments, follow-on investments, and investments in which the venture capital firm is not the lead investor in the portfolio company. We find that these investment characteristics are associated with lower fundraising. Characteristics and the reaction of fundraising to characteristics are both moderately stable through time. We also find some evidence that information about investment characteristics is more important for fundraising during bad states of the world and that ex-ante characteristics are related to eventual exit outcomes and financial performance.     

Disagreement and Learning: Dynamic Patterns of Trade

The empirical evidence on investor disagreement and trading volume is difficult to reconcile in standard rational expectations models. We develop a dynamic model in which investors disagree about the interpretation of public information. We obtain a closed‐form linear equilibrium that allows us to study which restrictions on the disagreement process yield empirically observed volume and return dynamics. We show that when investors have infrequent but major disagreements, there is positive autocorrelation in volume and positive correlation between volume and volatility. We also derive novel empirical predictions that relate the degree and frequency of disagreement to volume and volatility dynamics.     

The aggregate cost of equity underdiversification

We analyze equity diversification of all retail investors in a country (Denmark). We find that underdiversification is pervasive. We calculate the nationwide aggregate loss due to underdiversification and express it in absolute and expected‐return terms. The aggregate loss is large. We find that investors with low education, low income, and low wealth are more likely to underdiversify. Despite better diversification, the larger fraction of the aggregate loss nevertheless adheres to the top of the income/wealth distribution. Finally, our results indicate that underdiversification arises because investors have limited information about the benefits of diversification.     

News release and the role of different types of investors

We examine how investors react to positive and negative news in the Chinese stock market. We show that positive news is followed by a reversal in stock price, while negative news reports are accompanied by a drift. Using a unique account-level dataset, we find that institutional investors' attention bias contributes to the market's absorption process for different types of news, which is different from the conclusion that the phenomenon is driven by retail investors in the U.S. market. We explain the differences between the two markets as the short-sale constraints induce the attention bias of institutional investors in China. Individual investors are not able to correctly judge the content of news reports, and act as a liquidity provider. We highlight the market regulation plays an important role in the process of investors analyzing information.     

The networking function of investment banks: Evidence from private investments in public equity

We examine investment banks' networking function in capital markets, using a sample of Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs). We argue that investment banks develop relationships with investors through repeat dealings, and that investment banks' networks of relationship investors form the basis of their networking function. We find that investment banks, especially those with larger investor networks, help issuers attract investors. Correspondingly, an issuer that desires more investors is more likely to hire an investment bank than place the shares directly. We also find that issuers pay higher fees to hire investment banks with larger investor networks. Our empirical findings suggest that the networking function of investment banks is important in securities offerings.     

Assessing the Efficiency of an Insurance Provider—A Measurement Error Approach

The purpose of this paper is to compare the cost efficiency of private and public property insurance providers in Switzerland. The most commonly used measure for this kind of exercise is the claims-premium ratio. We argue that this measure may give strongly biased results. We develop a simple model to test whether the elasticity of premiums with respect to claims is less than unity. We address the fact that premium income is relatively stable across time, while claims are not, using estimation techniques that correct for measurement error. We develop tools to cope with heteroskedasticity in such measurement errors and apply the model to a data set on 19 firms in housing insurance markets in Switzerland. We show that the public insurance providers are about 20% more cost efficient than their private counterparts.JEL Classification No.: C21, D21, L84     

Patterns of behavior of professionally managed and independent investors

In this paper, we analyze the investment patterns of a large number of clients of a major Israeli brokerage house during 1994. We compare the behavior of clients making independent investment decisions to that of investors whose accounts were managed by brokerage professionals. Our main objective is to investigate whether the disposition effect (i.e., the tendency to sell winners quicker than losers), demonstrated in the US only for individual investors, also holds for professional investors. This analysis is important, as accepted financial theory predicts that prices are determined mainly by decisions made by professionals. We show that both professional and independent investors exhibit the disposition effect, although the effect is stronger for independent investors.The second objective of our study is the comparison of trade frequency, volume and profitability between independent and professionally managed accounts. We believe that these comparisons not only provide insights of their own, but also help to put the differences in the disposition effect in a wider perspective. We demonstrate that professionally managed accounts were more diversified and that round trips were both less correlated with the market and slightly more profitable than those of independent accounts.     

On the efficiency of long intermediation chains

Intermediation chains represent a common pattern of trade in over-the-counter markets. We study a classic problem impeding trade in these markets: an agent uses his market power to inefficiently screen a privately informed counterparty. We show that, generically, if efficient trade is implementable via any incentive-compatible mechanism, it is also implementable via a trading network that takes the form of a sufficiently long intermediation chain. We characterize information sets of intermediaries that ensure this striking result. Sparse trading networks featuring long intermediation chains might thus constitute an efficient market response to frictions, in which case no regulatory action is warranted.     

The determinants of price discovery: Evidence from US-Canadian cross-listed shares

We examine the determinants of price discovery for Canadian firms cross-listed on the main US stock exchanges over the period 1996–2011. Sampling at a one-minute frequency, we compute Gonzalo and Granger Component Shares (CS) and employ a system GMM approach to control for persistence in price discovery and endogeneity between CS and its determinants. We find that price discovery is highly persistent and that there is strong evidence of simultaneity between CS and its determinants. We conclude that lower relative spreads and higher relative trading activity increase an exchange’s contribution to price discovery. We also document that it is small trades that drive price discovery, particularly since the introduction of decimalization.     

An analysis of time-varying commodity market price discovery

We propose a model of time-varying price discovery based on a rolling-window error correction framework. We show that price discovery in nine commodities is dominated by the spot market, while, in only six commodities, price discovery is dominated by the futures market. Our findings, therefore, challenge the well-established view in commodity markets that it is the futures market which dominates the price discovery process. We also show the economic significance of price discovery through a portfolio construction and hedging strategy.     

The influence of incoming CEOs

We introduce a novel index capturing the power of an incoming CEO and explore the association between the appointment of a new CEO and turnover in the top management team (TMT). We document a statistically and economically significant relation between the level of new CEO power and the departure of senior executives. Specifically, we find that in addition to CEO origin, new CEO power is positively related to TMT turnover. We also find that in the post-SOX period, CEO power is more significant in affecting TMT turnover and that directorship and ownership of senior executives reduce departure.     

An improved estimation method and empirical properties of the probability of informed trading

We report evidence that boundary solutions can cause a bias in the estimate of the probability of informed trading (PIN). We develop an algorithm to overcome this bias and use it to estimate PIN for nearly 80,000 stock-quarters between 1993 and 2004. We obtain two sets of PIN estimates by using the factorized likelihood functions in both [Easley et al., 2010] and [Lin and Ke, 2011], respectively. We find that the estimate based on the EHO factorization is systematically smaller than the estimate based on the LK factorization, meaning that there is a downward bias associated with the EHO factorization. In addition, we find that boundary solutions appear with a very high frequency when the LK factorization is used. Thus it is necessary to use the LK factorization together with the algorithm in this paper. At last, we document several interesting empirical properties of PIN.     

Intra-lndustry Effects of Corporate Capital Investment Announcements

We examine how announcements of corporate capital investments by one firm affect the stock prices of its competitors. We find that on average, rivals experience a signifi cantly negative valuation effect. The results suggest that for the sample as a whole, the competitive effect dominates the contagion effect. We further examine various factors that could potentially explain the heterogeneous intra-industry effects of capital investment announcements. We find that rivals' share prices are more adversely affected when the announcer experiences a higher announcement effect or is the first mover in the industry. We also show that rivals experience a greater wealth loss when they have poorer investment opportunities or higher financial leverage.     

The power of sentiment: Irrational beliefs of households and consumer loan dynamics

We examine whether household sentiment can explain fluctuations in newly issued consumer loans. We construct a novel measure of household sentiment using detailed data from the harmonized consumer surveys conducted in European countries. We differentiate between rational sentiment, which mimics dynamics in macroeconomic fundamentals, and irrational sentiment, which proxies households’ optimism/pessimism on top of their rationally sourced beliefs. We show that shocks to the sentiment of households do have a measurable impact on growth of consumer loans. Specifically, we assert a significantly positive role of irrational sentiment on top of the economic fundamentals identified in the literature. Moreover, a closer examination reveals that the studied relationship is not symmetric over the business cycle — the effect of irrational sentiment is present only in periods in which a country’s output is well above its potential.     

The use of performance measurement systems in the public sector: Effects on performance

We study the use of performance measurement systems in the public sector. We hypothesize that the way in which these systems are being used affects organizational performance, and that these performance effects depend on contractibility. Contractibility encompasses clarity of goals, the ability to select undistorted performance metrics, and the degree to which managers know and control the transformation process. We expect that public sector organizations that use their performance measurement systems in ways that match the characteristics of their activities outperform those that fail to achieve such fit. We test our hypotheses using survey data from 101 public sector organizations. Our findings indicate that contractibility moderates the relationship between the incentive-oriented use of the performance measurement system and performance. Using the performance measurement system for incentive purposes negatively influences organizational performance, but this effect is less severe when contractibility is high. We also find that an exploratory use of the performance measurement system tends to enhance performance; this positive effect is independent of the level of contractibility. The effectiveness of the introduction of performance measurement systems in public sector organizations thus depends both on contractibility and on how the system is being used by managers. These findings have important implications, both for practice and for public policy.