Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism*

Accounting accruals are managers' subjective estimates of future outcomes and cannot, by definition, be objectively verified by auditors prior to occurrence. This causes audits of high-accrual firms to pose more uncertainty than audits of low-accrual firms because of potential estimation error and a greater chance that high-accrual firms have undetected asset realization and/or going concern problems that are related to the high level of accruals. One way that auditors can compensate for this risk exposure is to lower their threshold for issuing modified audit reports, an action that will increase modified reports and, therefore, lessen the likelihood of failing to issue a modified report when appropriate. We call this auditor reporting conservatism and test if high-accrual firms in the United States, are more likely to receive modified audit reports for asset realization uncertainties and going concern problems. Empirical results for a large sample of U.S. publicly listed companies support the hypothesis that auditors are more conservative, that is, more likely to issue both types of modified audit reports for high-accrual firms. Further analyses show that income-increasing accruals are somewhat more likely to result in reporting conservatism than income-decreasing accruals, and that only the Big Six group of auditors show evidence of reporting conservatism. These findings add to our understanding of the audit report formation process and the potentially important role played by accounting accruals in that process.     

Awareness of SEC Enforcement and Auditor Reporting Decisions

We find that non‐Big 4 audit offices with greater awareness of SEC enforcement are more likely to issue first‐time going‐concern reports to distressed clients; where SEC “awareness” is measured using (i) audit office proximity to SEC regional offices, and (ii) proximity to specific SEC enforcement actions against auditors. We also show that these non‐Big 4 audit offices issue more going‐concern opinions to clients who do not subsequently fail, indicating a conservative bias that reduces the informativeness of audit reports. This conservative reporting bias is also associated with higher audit fees and higher auditor switching rates. These findings are important because non‐Big 4 firms now audit 39 percent of SEC registrants and issue 88 percent of going‐concern audit reports. For Big 4 offices, we find some evidence that awareness of SEC enforcement may improve reporting accuracy by reducing Type II errors (failing to issue a going‐concern report to a company that fails), although the number of cases is small.     

Office Size of Big 4 Auditors and Client Restatements

Francis and Yu (2009) and Choi, Kim, Kim, and Zang (2010) report evidence that Big 4 audits are of higher quality when the engagement office is of larger size. Specifically, client earnings quality is higher and auditors in larger offices are more likely to issue going‐concern audit reports. We extend this line of research to test if larger Big 4 offices have fewer client restatements. A client restatement provides more direct evidence of a low‐quality audit than earnings quality metrics or going‐concern reports, because a restatement indicates the client's auditor did not effectively enforce the correct application of GAAP at the time the original financial statements were issued. We analyze 2,557 firm‐year restatements in a sample of 23,190 financial statements originally issued by U.S. firms from 2003 to 2008. We find that Big 4 office size is associated with fewer client restatements after controlling for innate client characteristics that may affect restatements (client size, financial performance, industry membership, nonfinancial measures, off‐balance sheet activities, and market‐related measures), and a set of controls for other auditor factors such as fees and industry expertise. The study raises important questions about the ability of smaller offices to deliver high‐quality audits for SEC registrants.     

公司社会责任对审计收费与审计意见影响的实证研究

本文利用2011年沪深两市上市公司发布的社会责任报告,对社会责任信息进行定量化的基础上,实证研究了审计师是否会对被审计单位的社会责任信息做出反应,以及如何做出反应.研究结果表明,公司社会责任履行情况会影响审计收费,且社会责任信息披露越充分,越有利于降低审计师收费;相比没有发布社会责任报告的公司,审计师对独立发布社会责任报告的公司出具持续经营审计意见的可能性会更低.     

Audit Report Restrictions in Debt Covenants

While the debt‐contracting literature has extensively examined financial covenants, there has been little attention paid to audit‐related covenants. We focus on a covenant that restricts the borrower from receiving a going‐concern audit report (GCAR covenant). We hypothesize that a debt agreement is more likely to include a GCAR covenant as the borrower's credit quality decreases and the length of the loan period increases, and that it is more likely to impose a covenant restricting the choice of auditor when the debt includes a GCAR covenant. Also, we expect that an audit client with a GCAR covenant will be charged a higher audit fee and is more likely to receive a going‐concern audit report. We test these hypotheses on a sample of firms that issue private debt. Our results generally support our hypotheses. Our study suggests that lenders rely on the auditor's assessment in contracting, and audit‐related covenants influence auditor behavior.     

Independence Threats,Litigation Risk,and the Auditor's Decision Process*

This study examines the effect of independence threats and litigation risk on auditors' evaluation of information and subsequent reporting choices. Using a Web‐based experiment, I tracked auditors' information gathering and evaluation leading to a going‐concern reporting decision. Specifically, 48 audit managers assessed client survival likelihood, gathered additional information, and suggested audit report choices. I found that auditors facing high independence threats (fear of losing the client) evaluated information as more indicative of a surviving client and were more likely to suggest an unmodified audit report, consistent with client preferences. In contrast, auditors facing high litigation risk evaluated information as more indicative of a failing client and were more likely to suggest a modified audit report. In addition, the association between risk and report choice was fully mediated by final information evaluation. This suggests that it is unlikely that different reporting choices resulted from a conscious choice bias, but rather that motivated reasoning during evidence evaluation plays a key role in the effect of risk in auditor decision making.     

Public Company Audits and City‐Specific Labor Characteristics

Prior research emphasizes the centrality of audit offices in understanding auditing practices, and documents significant interoffice variation in audit outcomes based on industry expertise and office size. Our study examines how two city‐specific labor characteristics also affect audit offices and local audit markets: the city's average educational attainment, and the number of accountants in a city, which proxy for a city's human capital. Our argument draws on the urban economics literature and predicts that the level of human capital in a city is positively associated with an audit office's ability to conduct high‐quality audits. As expected, there is a positive association between audit quality (quality of audited earnings and accuracy of going‐concern reports) and average education level in the city in which the lead engagement office is located. This association is generally significant for both Big 4 and non‐Big 4 offices, but is relatively stronger for non‐Big 4 firms that are more tied to local labor markets. A company is also more likely to choose a non‐Big 4 auditor in cities with higher educational levels and relatively more accountants, and there is evidence of higher non‐Big 4 audit fees as a city's education level increases. Collectively, these results suggest that local labor characteristics affect audit offices, audit quality, and the ability of non‐Big 4 auditors to compete with Big 4 auditors in the audits of public companies.     

Auditor Responses to Shareholder Activism

In this paper, we investigate how auditors respond to shareholder activism against their clients. Our study is important because activism may be viewed by auditors as a source of increased engagement risk, thereby impacting audit outcomes. The potential relationship between shareholder activism and audit outcomes leads us to predict that activism targets will pay higher audit fees and also will be more likely to receive adverse internal control opinions (ICOs) and first‐time going concern opinions (GCOs). Our results, which support all three predictions, suggest that the public scrutiny associated with activism campaigns heightens auditors' concerns about reputational damage and litigation risk. Consistent with this notion, we find that activism targets are more likely to experience accounting‐related lawsuits. We also find that the increased likelihood of adverse ICOs documented in our baseline tests reflects higher‐quality reporting rather than increased auditor conservatism. Overall, our findings suggest that activism campaigns spur auditor diligence while also increasing the possibility of negative outcomes that may not be fully anticipated by activist investors.     

Investor Sentiment,Misstatements, and Auditor Behavior*

High investor sentiment has been linked with opportunistic managerial behavior in the face of more optimistic investors and analysts. We extend this line of work by documenting that the likelihood of misstatements is higher when sentiment is high. Although this would suggest elevated audit risk, we posit that a contemporaneous reduction in auditors' litigation cost could drive down audit fees and going concern opinion (GCO) reporting conservatism in order to please clientele. Consistent with this notion, we document that auditors charge lower fees and report GCOs less conservatively when sentiment is high. However, this reduction in reporting conservatism is unwarranted; results reveal that auditors are less likely to issue GCOs to clients which subsequently file for bankruptcy during high sentiment periods. We conduct additional tests to examine whether auditors' litigation costs indeed vary with sentiment and document that auditors are less likely to be sued and the market reacts less negatively to misstatement announcements when sentiment is high. Collectively, our findings suggest that, although misstatement risk is increasing with sentiment, auditors' litigation risk actually declines.     

Debt Covenant Violations,Firm Financial Distress,and Auditor Actions

We conduct a comprehensive study on the associations between debt covenant violations (“violations”) and auditor actions for financially distressed and nondistressed firms. Our study is motivated by a lack of research on the consequences of violations resulting from auditors' actions. We find that firms with violations have significantly higher audit fees, a greater likelihood of receiving a going‐concern opinion, and a greater likelihood of experiencing an auditor resignation. Importantly, the positive associations hold for all types of firms, including financially nondistressed firms. In fact, we find that, after controlling for other financial information, the relation between violations and an increased likelihood of a going‐concern opinion is stronger for nondistressed versus distressed firms. Our evidence is consistent with belief‐revision research in auditing that finds auditors react more strongly to information that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs. This study provides further evidence on the indirect yet significant consequences of covenant violations on firms resulting from auditor actions.     

What is the Relationship Between Audit Partner Busyness and Audit Quality?

Contemporaneous studies generally find a negative relationship between audit partner busyness (APB), measured as the number of clients in an audit partner's portfolio, and audit quality. Their argument is that a busy partner does not devote sufficient time to properly audit his average client. Contrary to these studies, we argue that when busyness is optimally chosen by the partner, in equilibrium, there is no causal relationship between APB and audit quality. Using Australian data for the 1999–2010 period, we show that APB is not reliably linked to audit quality, consistent with this equilibrium theory. We argue that causality can be ascribed to the APB‐audit quality relationship when accounting scandals exogenously shocked the Australian audit market during the 2002–04 period and APB likely deviated from optimum levels. Supporting this disequilibrium view, we find that higher APB reduces a partner's propensity to issue first‐time going‐concern opinions during this period. Our evidence highlights the importance of the equilibrium condition in testing empirical associations between audit outcomes and endogenous auditor attributes, and shows that the detrimental effect of APB on audit quality is not as pervasive as contemporaneous studies suggest.     

Do Client Bankruptcies Preceded by Clean Audit Opinions Damage Auditor Reputation?*

There is a maintained assumption within the accounting literature that client bankruptcies preceded by clean audit opinions (Type II going concern opinion (GCO) errors) damage an auditor's reputation. Consistent with this view, the PCAOB proposes that stakeholders may use Type II GCO errors as indicators of low audit quality. This study examines audit committee and investor responses to Type II GCO errors. I find no evidence that audit offices with Type II GCOs are more likely to be dismissed, have lower subsequent audit fees, or have a lower likelihood of being selected for new audit engagements. These findings are consistent with audit committees not using Type II GCO errors as indicators of low auditor quality. Using event study analysis, I find evidence of modest incremental negative investor responses for clients of audit offices with Type II GCO errors. However, these negative investor responses are found only during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010 and are observed only within windows of 30 days or less. Given this limited evidence that stakeholders do respond to Type II GCO errors, I examine whether stakeholders should respond to Type II GCO errors. I find that audit office Type II GCO errors are positively associated with subsequent restatements, an established measure of low audit quality. Taking the results as a whole, I do not find that audit offices incur substantial reputational costs for Type II GCO errors. However, the negative investor response and the positive association with restatements provide some evidence that Type II GCO errors may serve as indicators of low audit quality.     

IQ and Audit Quality: Do Smarter Auditors Deliver Better Audits?

This study examines the role of an individual auditor's cognitive ability in delivering high‐quality audits. Our results from analyzing archival data from Sweden show that audit partners' IQ scores obtained from psychological tests are positively associated with going‐concern audit reporting accuracy and audit fee premiums. We also find some, albeit weak, evidence that audit partners' IQ scores are negatively associated with the income‐increasing abnormal accruals of the client. These results suggest that, although audit services are standardized through various control mechanisms and audits are conducted by teams rather than by individual auditors, the cognitive ability of audit partners responsible for an audit remains important in delivering high‐quality audit services.     

Audit Pricing for Strategic Alliances: An Incomplete Contract Perspective

We study the pricing of audit services for strategic alliances, a governance structure involving an incomplete contract between separate firms. Since incomplete contracts do not specify all future contingencies, we expect that the nonverifiability of information and potential agency behavior in alliances increase audit complexity, resulting in higher audit fees. Our findings support this prediction. We then separate strategic alliances into joint ventures and contractual alliances, as the latter involve more complexity. We find that our audit fee results are largely driven by contractual alliances. We perform additional tests to rule out the concern that our audit fee results might be attributable to the impact of strategic alliances on distress risk, audit risk, or control risk. Contrary to the distress risk argument, we find that auditors are less likely to issue going‐concern modified opinions when there is an increase in strategic alliances. Contrary to the audit risk argument, we find that an increase in strategic alliances is unrelated to the likelihood of financial misstatements. Contrary to the control risk argument, we find that an increase in strategic alliances is unrelated to internal control weakness opinions.     

社会化网络媒体关注与审计费用—基于微博媒体数据的分析

以2012-2014年创业板上市公司数据为研究对象,抓取新浪微博公众号上对被审计企业负面报道的关键词,研究了社会化网络媒体的负面报道对审计费用的影响。研究发现,媒体对上市公司的态度越负面其审计费用越高;但重复负面报道对审计费用的影响却是无效的。另外,相比“十大”会计师事务所,非“十大”会计师事务所对被审计单位负面消息更加敏感。在被审计单位被媒体负面报道后,新任会计师事务所会要求更高的审计费用。上期审计意见为非标意见对审计费用有正向影响,但其并没有增强媒体关注对于审计费用的影响效果。     

Differences in Auditors' Materiality Assessments When Auditing Financial Statements and Sustainability Reports

With increased interest in voluntary sustainability reports from investors and other stakeholders, more companies are having these reports assured. The issue of what is considered material in these assurance engagements is important, and yet research on materiality has focused only on financial statement audits. This article reports the results of an experiment where auditors assess the materiality of audit differences in the same magnitude for both a financial audit and a sustainability (water) assurance engagement. Two factors, the risk of breaching a contract and community impact, are manipulated between‐subjects. We find that auditors assess the materiality of an audit difference significantly higher for a financial case than for a water case. This difference is significantly greater when there is no risk of breaching a contract than when there is a risk of breaching a contract. The risk of breaching a contract has a stronger effect on the difference in auditors' materiality assessments when there is no community impact than when there is a community impact. Overall our findings suggest that qualitative factors have a greater impact on sustainability (water) materiality assessments than on financial statement materiality assessments when an audit difference is between 5 percent and 10 percent of a relevant base. Understanding the factors that impact material judgments in sustainability reports is important as these factors affect the reliability of the reported disclosures.     

Audit‐Firm Tenure and the Quality of Financial Reports*

This study examines whether the length of the relationship between a company and an audit firm (audit‐firm tenure) is associated with financial‐reporting quality. Using two proxies for financial‐reporting quality and a sample of Big 6 clients matched on industry and size, we find that relative to medium audit‐firm tenures of four to eight years, short audit‐firm tenures of two to three years are associated with lower‐quality financial reports. In contrast, we find no evidence of reduced financial‐reporting quality for longer audit‐firm tenures of nine or more years. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence pertinent to the recurring debate regarding mandatory audit‐firm rotation — a debate that has, to date, relied on anecdotal evidence and isolated cases.     

Audit Partner Tenure and Internal Control Reporting Quality: U.S. Evidence from the Not‐For‐Profit Sector

This study examines the effects of audit partner tenure and audit partner changes on internal control reporting quality for large U.S. not‐for‐profit (NFP) organizations. Regulators contend that audit partners lose their objectivity over successive audits, reducing audit quality. A large body of research has examined this issue, primarily in non‐U.S. jurisdictions, with mixed results. We examine the associations between audit partner tenure and audit partner changes and the incidence of reported internal control deficiencies (ICDs), the quality of internal control reports (following PCAOB audit quality indicators), and the severity of reported ICDs. We find negative associations between audit partner tenure and the incidence of reported ICDs, the quality of internal control reports, and the severity of reported ICDs. Together, these findings indicate that internal control reporting quality deteriorates with audit partner tenure. However, we find no association between audit partner changes and internal control reporting, which is consistent with partners lacking client specific knowledge in their first year with a client. Finally, we find no association between either audit partner tenure or changes and the likelihood of remediation. Our findings contribute large‐sample U.S. evidence on the association between audit partner tenure and internal control reporting quality and provide useful information to government regulators, NFP boards charged with the oversight of the external auditor and internal controls, and NFP stakeholders.     

Whistleblowing Allegations,Audit Fees,and Internal Control Deficiencies*

We investigate whether audit fees and auditors' opinions on internal controls are associated with whistleblowing allegations externally filed to regulatory agencies. We find that firms subject to whistleblowing allegations have significantly higher audit fees, regardless of the substance of these allegations, whereas an auditor is more likely to issue an adverse opinion on internal controls when the allegation is substantiated, rather than frivolous. Further, our findings suggest that auditors are involved in the auditing of whistleblowing when the allegation is still in an internal stage. We also show that firms subject to external whistleblowing allegations have a lower likelihood of restating financial statements prepared in the allegation year when greater audit effort is made in that year. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of auditors in the context of whistleblowing.     

Implications of the Joint Provision of CSR Assurance and Financial Audit for Auditors' Assessment of Going-Concern Risk

We examine whether the joint provision of corporate social responsibility (CSR) assurance services and financial audit by the same audit firm influences auditors' assessment of going-concern risk. We predict that the provision of CSR assurance and financial audit by the same audit firm creates CSR-related knowledge spillovers from the CSR assurance team to the financial audit engagement team, which helps in the auditor's assessment of going-concern risk. Using more than 28,000 firm-year observations from 55 countries, we document that, relative to audit firms that provide only the financial audit, audit firms that provide both CSR assurance and financial audit for the same client (i) issue more frequent going-concern opinions and have lower Type II going-concern errors, (ii) have clients that book larger environmental and litigation provisions, (iii) report earnings that are more persistent and value-relevant and are less likely to book income-decreasing earnings restatements, and (iv) do not charge higher audit fees or total fees. Our results are important especially because of firms' increasing exposure to CSR risks and the growing number of countries that require assurance of CSR reports.