The Max‐Min Group Contest: Weakest‐link (Group) All‐Pay Auction

We investigate a group all‐pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group‐specific public good. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups. There are four types of equilibria: the pure strategy equilibria in which all (active) players exert the same effort; the semi‐pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy; the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support; and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support. We then analyze a general contest with n groups.     

Legal Penalties and Audit Quality: An Experimental Investigation*

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of legal penalties on audit quality under different legal regimes. We investigate whether audit quality is affected differentially due to the complexity inherent in legal regimes and the frequency of imposing legal penalties. Economic theory predicts that players adopt equilibrium strategies that reflect the expectation that a penalty will be incurred, but the actual occurrences of penalties, if consistent with this expectation, should not prompt an individual to modify his or her strategy. However, learning theory suggests that players' choices will be repeated in the future based on outcomes. We found that penalties triggered both increases and decreases in effort, and seemed to introduce a “shock” that increased the variability of effort. We also observed a “funnel” effect — that is. greater changes in effort closer to the imposition of penalties, and smaller changes as more periods go by without a penalty.     

Contests for Ranks: Experimental Evidence

We use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance. In our experiment (i) rank is defined as subjects' relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and (ii) subjects' earnings are independent of their performance. We find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive, and this result is independent of the group size. In the large group, the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive, but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives. Finally, the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher “prestige effect.” In additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the status‐prize winners, we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes. The last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status. The results are important for managerial practices.     

Restructuring Indonesia's sub-national public debt: reform or reversion?

Borrowing can be an efficient way for sub-national governments to acquire capital assets, but it also carries risks of fiscal distress and insolvency for borrowers. To minimise these risks, many governments around the world have developed ex-post insolvency remedies, including, most importantly, debt-restructuring mechanisms. In an effort to resurrect borrowing for local infrastructure development, the Indonesian government has designed and begun to implement debt-restructuring programs for sub-national government and sub-national government-owned water supply company defaulters. These programs constitute a major effort to reform an important, long-neglected and problematic aspect of sub-national public finances in Indonesia. There are a number of potential difficulties with the design and execution of the reforms, however, which collectively do not inspire much optimism for rapid progress in reviving financial flows to the sub-national public sector. Still, even halting advances in debt restructuring can substantially increase local infrastructure investment in the long run.     

Is Economics Useful for Public Policy?

Economists have always played an important role in major public policy debates. Even so, I believe that the role of economists in these public policy discussions has often been misguided because it has typically relied upon “best practices,” stated in the form of “general guidelines” or even “universal principles.” However, “best practices” are not best if the specific situation does not conform with the assumptions that underlie the advice. So my first conclusion is a cautionary, and negative, one: Specific circumstances differ so profoundly across individuals, firms, markets, countries, and time that most any attempt to define “best practices” that apply in all circumstances will lead to profoundly misleading public policy recommendations. However, even if economics cannot identify “the” truth, it can often identify “a” truth. So my second conclusion is a more positive one: Economists should continue to develop multiple theories that inform public policies, but we should also focus our efforts on identifying and testing the critical assumptions that drive the results of these theories, recognizing that the validity of any assumptions will depend intimately on specific circumstances. I illustrate these two main conclusions with specific examples from my own work. I conclude with some “best practices” recommendations of my own, recognizing the obvious irony of such an effort.     

Regulating the Anticommons: Insights from Public‐Expenditure Theory

This article offers a new interpretation of the traditional Cournot complements problem, or anticommons, by using the theory of public goods to gain a perspective on the problem. Specifically, I examine the pricing strategies and regulation of multiple monopolies that produce products which consumers view as perfect complements. I show that collusion by the firms increases total social welfare and that the collusion problem can be reinterpreted as a problem of provision of public goods from the point of view of the firms. I take this insight further and derive the familiar concepts of the Samuelson marginal condition and the ratio equilibrium for the firms. I compare these outcomes to the first best solution and then apply incentive‐compatible mechanisms to strategically implement the Pareto superior ratio‐equilibrium outcome and the optimal marginal‐cost pricing outcome. Finally, I show how this methodology can be applied to the more familiar Cournot model of oligopoly.     

Business Strategy,Financial Reporting Irregularities,and Audit Effort

This study examines whether clients' business strategies are a factor in determining the occurrence of financial reporting irregularities and the level of audit effort. We use the organizational strategy theory of Miles and Snow to develop a comprehensive measure of business strategy using publicly available data. We find that Miles and Snow's Prospector strategy is more likely to be involved in financial reporting irregularities and generally requires greater audit effort. The business strategy measure also appears to capture client business risk and provides incremental explanatory power beyond the individual measures of client complexity or risk used in traditional audit fee models. We contribute to the literature by constructing a replicable business strategy measure and identifying organizational business strategy as an important ex ante determinant of financial reporting irregularities and levels of audit effort. Our results suggest that investigating how audits can be improved to reduce financial reporting irregularities among Prospector clients is an important area for audit practice and future research.     

Policy choice and economic growth under factional politics: Evidence from a Chinese Province

This paper investigates how political elites make policy choices that have bearing on an authoritarian regime's economy, from the perspective of factional politics. A local leader makes policies primarily to secure his political survival, which is contingent on the support from either his higher-level patrons or his local grassroots constituents. Using a simple model, we show that a local politician with close factional ties to high-level patrons will invest more in sending loyalty signals to the latter to receive their protections, while a poorly-connected politician will make more effort to spur a broad-based economic growth that economically benefits his local constituents. Using a unique county level data on the factional politics of Zhejiang Province, China, we find that counties with weaker (closer) factional ties have lower (higher) tax burdens per capita, while spending more (less) on local public goods provision. The results are stable after various robustness tests.     

Individual Competence and Committee Decision Making: Experimental Evidence

Committee decision making relies on the competence of its members. The individual's competence is driven by the pre-meeting efforts. These investments constitute a public good and, consequently, free riding is a concern. We build off of previous theoretical results which point out that as committees grow in size, free riding becomes more severe. However, experimental and empirical research suggests that individuals are willing to make voluntary contributions. This motivation should lead to increased effort when the number who benefit increases. To differentiate between these hypotheses we explore experimentally the effect that changes in group size have on competence investment decisions in a committee setting. Decision problems differ by whether the expansion increases the number of voters on the committee or the number who are affected by the committee's decision. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that as committees grow in size there is a reduction in effort invested. We find some evidence of an adverse reaction to non-contributing beneficiaries is observed as well. Heterogeneous responses arise and are explored.     

Education signaling,effort investments,and the market's expectations: Theory and experiment on China's higher education expansion

China's higher education expansion has led to significant changes in younger generations' educational investments and labor market outcomes, and this trend is expected to continue due to the recent post-graduate education expansion in response to economic challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper investigates the impact of higher education expansion on labor market participants' choices, beliefs, and learning effects through an extended education signaling model, and uncovers the behavioral patterns in response to this policy change using a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects playing the role of workers generally follow a threshold strategy, and the changes in their effort investments and received wages after the enrollment expansion are consistent with the theoretical prediction. Using a hierarchical clustering method, we estimate different types of empirical strategies adopted by the subjects. In the low-enrollment treatment, the three types of empirical strategies are more distinct, and there is a strong tendency for effort over-investment by low-ability workers and under-investment by high-ability workers. In the high-enrollment treatment, the distinction between the estimated strategy types becomes much smaller. An analysis using elicited beliefs suggests that effort over-investment stems from workers' inconsistent beliefs regarding firms' wage offers — this inconsistency persists even in the last few periods of the game. Our findings provide a belief-based explanation for the discussion on over-education and are of great policy relevance.     

CAPITAL MOBILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A PANEL DATA APPROACH

In this paper we are primarily concerned with assessing the degree of capital mobility in sub‐Saharan Africa. Using the methodology as proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980)—later termed the “Feldstein‐Horioka puzzle”—we test the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility against the alternative of imperfect capital mobility. Following Vamvakidis and Wacziarg (1998) and Isaksson (2000), provision is made in our model to show the dependency of the lesserdeveloped countries on international finance and aid and how a more open economy contributes towards improving the level of capital movement in these countries. We also assess the change in the degree of capital mobility over the time period in an effort to see whether institutional and political changes have been successful. We show that, compared to the region, South Africa is, to a large extent, more developed and should therefore play a leading role in the “African Renaissance”. Stationary panel data estimation techniques are applied to a sample of 36 sub‐Saharan African countries over the time period 1980–2000. The benefits of using one‐way error component models are derived from simultaneously employing time and cross‐section dimensions of the data, resulting in a substantial increase in the degrees of freedom. The fixed and random effects models enable us to acknowledge country heterogeneity within the panel, making provision for differences across countries like capital control policies, financial and capital market structures and exchange rate regimes.     

禀赋来源和框架影响人们的分配行为吗——基于Dictator game的实验研究

文章运用Dictator game将禀赋的来源和不同的框架结合起来,研究这两种因素对人们分配行为的共同影响。禀赋的来源是指通过努力或者运气得到初始禀赋,不同的框架是指根据Dictator分配自己挣得的禀赋或者分配接受者挣得的禀赋,分为给予和拿取两个不同的框架。实验结果表明：1）禀赋的来源对人们的分配行为存在显著的影响;2）在通过努力挣得初始禀赋的情况下,强化了人们应得权利的意识,从而激发了框架对人们分配行为的影响;在靠运气得到初始禀赋的情况下,并没有这种强化作用,从而框架的影响并不显著。实验结果论证了微观行为会受社会情境的影响,即微观个体是受社会因素影响的适度社会化的人。另一方面,实验结果揭示了相对运气挣得的财富,人们更加认可通过努力挣得的财富,即在分配问题上人们更倾向于支持机会平等,更加支持勤劳致富。     

基于公众期望的企业社会责任承担方式研究

通过对广东移动公司CSR活动的公众评价调查发现,与公众期望相一致的企业社会责任行为具有较高的知晓度和满意度,公众普遍期望国有企业在突发事件中能及时承担社会责任,并期望相应行为具有持续性;同时,形成品牌的企业社会责任主题能获得较高社会认同。因此,企业应以公众期望的方式承担社会期望,将承担社会责任真正融入企业发展战略,保持社会责任活动主题的持续性和品牌性。     

新公共管理理论对政府再造的影响及其反思

20世纪70年代,西方发达国家在社会、经济、政治等问题接踵而至的情况下,掀起了规模宏大的公共行政改革;"新公共管理"理论在此背景下产生和发展,并深刻影响着西方政府的改革。本文在阐述其产生的背景及理论基础上,分析了新公共管理理论对政府职能再造的具体指导,并对"新公共管理"理论进行了理性反思和质疑,从而用辩证的眼光看待"新公共管理"理论的真正内涵。     

On Optimal Social Investment in the Sciences and Humanities

This essay examines the optimization of public, non-profit investment in the natural and social sciences and humanities, given that the individual project outcomes are spread over time and are uncertain. The more distant the results, the greater is the uncertainty, as measured by the success-or-failure variance. Diversification into many simultaneous projects reduces but does not eliminate this risk. By contrast, in a deterministic, no-risk model, there is no way to optimize undertakings in pure science other than to accept social or political consensus. The commonly-used planners’ discount rate of zero is shown in the Appendix to have the additional property of leading to the Golden Rule.     

The Informativeness of Relative Performance Information and Its Effect on Effort Allocation in a Multitask Environment

Prior research documents that providing relative performance information (RPI) motivates employees to increase effort; however, a potential downside of RPI is that it also motivates employees to distort their effort allocations between tasks such that it can be detrimental to overall firm performance. This study investigates via an experiment how the informativeness of RPI affects employees' effort allocations and performance in a multitask environment. We investigate the informativeness of two RPI design choices that are observed in practice: detail level and temporal aggregation. Regarding detail level, firms may provide each employee's performance ranking on tasks, which is less informative than providing the actual performance score of each employee. Regarding temporal aggregation, firms may provide RPI that is reset each period, which is less informative than RPI that is based on cumulative performance. We find RPI detail level and temporal aggregation interact to influence effort distortion. Specifically, we find that, compared to reset RPI, cumulative RPI leads to greater distortion of effort away from firm‐preferred allocations and that this effect is magnified when RPI provides actual performance scores rather than performance rankings. Finally, high levels of effort distortion hurt overall performance, thereby demonstrating the potentially detrimental effect of effort distortion on performance. Results of our study enhance our understanding of how firms can use their control over the design of RPI to enhance its usefulness in directing employees' effort in multitask environments by highlighting the role that informativeness of information can have on employee behavior.     

Auditor Liability and Business Investment*

We model a firm's investment decision, an auditor's effort‐rendering behavior, audit fees, and prices of the firms under two auditor liability rules: strict liability and negligence liability. We show that an auditor's effort level is socially optimal under strict liability, while it is not generally so under negligence liability. Furthermore, both the firm owner's expected benefit and the audit fee are higher under strict liability than under negligence liability. We define the legal error under negligence liability as the difference between the assessed audit effort (that is, the estimate of audit effort made by the court) and the actual audit effort and prove that the greater the variance of the legal error, the more incentive an auditor has to exert effort under negligence liability compared with strict liability. Finally, the number of investments being undertaken could be higher under strict liability because more firm owners are willing to hire auditors to go public.     

The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy

A pressure group model where environmental and industry lobby groups offer political support in return for favorable pollution tax policies is used to explain and predict the equilibrium pollution tax in sectors protected by tariffs. The political economy effects of trade liberalization are investigated. The pollution tax is shown to decrease if the lobbying effort by the environmental lobby decreases more rapidly than by the industry lobby ceteris paribus. The level of political conflict falls with trade liberalization. Pollution may increase because of a reduction of the pollution tax, and tax revenues may fall simultaneously as pollution increases.     

Price and Volume Reactions to Public Information Releases: An Experimental Approach Incorporating Traders' Subjective Beliefs*

This paper examines how market prices, volume, and traders' dividend expectations respond to public information releases in laboratory markets for a long-lived financial asset. The objective is to study deviations from the symmetric information risk-neutral rational expectations (RE) benchmark, which predicts no trade in such settings. The results of a series of double-auction and call markets are reported in which traders manage a portfolio of cash and asset shares over 15 rounds of trading. A public signal regarding the value of the liquidating dividend is released every third round, and traders' subjective expectations of the liquidating dividend are elicited each round as cash-motivated forecasts. We find that, despite the public dividend signal, traders' dividend forecasts are heterogeneous. Forecasts and prices both underreact to the public signals, with prices under-reacting more than forecasts. In general, price changes are not closely associated with public signals, and there is greater excess price volatility in double auctions than in call markets. Forty-three percent of trades are inconsistent with the trader's forecasts, and inconsistent trades occur more frequently in the double-auction markets. On average, approximately 10 percent of the outstanding shares are traded in each round, and trading volume is increasing in the mean absolute forecast revision and decreasing in the contemporaneous dispersion in forecasts. These results suggest that differential processing of the public signal and/or speculative trading for short-term gain may help to explain why symmetric information RE predictions are often not supported in empirical and experimental settings. They also suggest that market reactions to public information releases may be influenced by market microstructure.     

Service delivery frameworks as instruments of citizen empowerment: A tale of two experiences,India and South Africa

This paper presents a comparative assessment of South Africa and India's service delivery improvement strategies, challenges, successes and lessons learnt in advancing their service delivery reform programmes. The cardinal argument in the paper is that the public administrative systems adopted and inherited in the post-democratic epochs in India and South Africa were incapable of meeting the service delivery needs of their respective citizens. They epitomised the traditional and hierarchical public administrative systems that were the object of reforms in the 1990s. The reform initiatives also coincided with global reforms on public administration systems taking place under the aegis of the new public management framework. A key feature of new public management is its application of private-sector ideas to the public sector, such as individual accountability. The paper further undertakes a comparative review of service delivery improvement frameworks of South Africa (Batho Pele) and India (Sevottam) in relation to their objectives and implementation modalities.