Fiscal Transparency,Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings

Fiscal transparency can provide policymakers with incentives to adopt better policies by enhancing the public debate on the design and sustainability of fiscal policy and establishing accountability for their implementation. Fiscal transparency can also reduce uncertainty about fiscal policy and fiscal outturns by providing more information on the underlying fiscal position and fiscal risks. Both effects suggest that countries should benefit from adopting transparency enhancing policies through better market assessments of their sovereign risk. In this paper, we investigate whether fiscal transparency has an effect on market perceptions of sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign credit ratings, and if so, through which channels. We find that fiscal transparency has a positive and significant effect on ratings – one standard deviation increase in fiscal transparency increases credit ratings by 0.7 and 1 notches (or steps in the credit rating scale) in advanced and developing economies, respectively – but its effect works through different channels in advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies, fiscal transparency is associated with better fiscal outcomes, leading indirectly to higher credit ratings. In developing economies, the direct uncertainty‐reducing effect of fiscal transparency seems to be more important. Indeed, the effect of fiscal transparency on fiscal performance is found to increase with the level of institutional development.     

Heterogeneous Consumers and Fiscal Policy Shocks

This paper studies empirical facts regarding the effects of unexpected changes in aggregate macroeconomic fiscal policies on consumers that differ depending on individual characteristics. We use data from the Consumption Expenditure Survey to estimate individual‐level responses and multipliers for government spending. We find that unexpected fiscal shocks have substantially different effects on consumers depending on their income and age levels: the wealthiest individuals tend to behave according to predictions of standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) models, whereas the poorest ones behave according to standard IS–LM (non‐Ricardian) models, most likely due to credit constraints. Furthermore, government spending policy shocks tend to decrease consumption inequality.     

Fiscal consolidations and bank balance sheets

We empirically investigate the effects of fiscal policy on bank balance sheets, focusing on episodes of fiscal consolidation. To this aim, we employ a very large data set of individual banks' balance sheets, combined with a newly compiled data set on fiscal consolidations. We find that standard capital adequacy ratios such as the Tier-1 ratio tend to improve following episodes of fiscal consolidation: for the median bank in our sample, a 1% of GDP fiscal consolidation increases the Tier-1 capital ratio by around 1.5 percentage points over two years. Our results suggest that this improvement results from a portfolio re-balancing from private to public debt securities which reduces the risk-weighted value of assets. In fact, if fiscal adjustment efforts are perceived as structural policy changes that improve the sustainability of public finances and, therefore, reduce credit risk, the banks' demand for government securities should increase relative to other assets.     

Sovereign default risk and state-dependent twin deficits

This paper analyzes the impact of the government debt-to-GDP ratio on the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account. Above a government debt-to-GDP ratio of 90 percent the correlation of the two balances decreases by 0.16 in a sample of 12 euro area countries and by 0.17 for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. This paper develops a small open economy model with defaultable government debt and riskless international capital markets to explain the empirical evidence of a state-dependent change in the correlation. In the model high public debt-to-GDP ratios raise sovereign risk premia as the default probability increases, leading to higher uncertainty about future taxes. In this case precautionary savings of households increase and partially compensate current account deficits that result from fiscal deficits. The increase in households' saving reduces the correlation of the two balances by the same magnitude as documented in the data. The model calibrated to Greece matches further business cycle moments and the empirical default frequency.     

Interaction of Government Tiers and Central Banks in a Federation: An Empirical Test

Fiscal rules are necessary to protect monetary policy from the consequences of unsustainable or active fiscal policy for inflation. Monetary unions, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), require even stronger fiscal rules to avoid free riding by regional fiscal authorities on the common monetary policy. By contrast, in a fiscal federation, the federal government internalises the effect of active regional policies on the overall price level. Federal fiscal policy contributes to price stability either by enforcing fiscal rules or by adjusting its own stance. Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), we test whether federal and regional governments in Germany behave in an active or passive way. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on other regions. The German federal government offsets the effect on the price level by running passive policies. The Bundesbank's prime objective of price stability is therefore endorsed by fiscal policy. The results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.     

Fiscal Policy,Business Cycles and Economic Stabilisation: Evidence from Industrialised and Developing Countries*

This paper empirically investigates the responsiveness of fiscal policy to business cycles and the effectiveness of fiscal policy in reducing economic fluctuations. From regressions on the responsiveness of fiscal policy to business cycles, we find that the government's current expenditures and subsidies & transfers move counter‐cyclically, whereas taxes and capital expenditures move pro‐cyclically. Using economic fluctuations in neighbouring countries as an instrumental variable, we show that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates understate the responsiveness of fiscal policy to economic fluctuations. We also find that fiscal policy responds asymmetrically over economic fluctuations. In investigating the effectiveness of fiscal policy in reducing economic fluctuations, we mitigate omitted variable bias by adding four important factors ‐ military expenditures, oil production, economic fluctuations in neighbouring countries and fiscal policy responsiveness to business cycles. The results of effectiveness regressions are consistent with the responsiveness regressions, highlighting the importance of current expenditures, especially subsidies and transfers, in responding to business cycles and stabilising the economy.     

On the Consequences of Pro‐Cyclical Fiscal Policy

There is widespread evidence that pro‐cyclical fiscal policies have been prevalent in developing countries and often in some industrial nations. It is therefore surprising that, in contrast to the wealth of studies on the sources of pro‐cyclical policy, potential consequences of such seemingly suboptimal policies have been largely ignored in the existing literature. By utilising a comprehensive set of indicators from 114 countries for 1950–2010, we aim to address the following important question: does it matter whether a country adopts a pro‐cyclical fiscal policy stance rather than a counter‐cyclical one? Our results produce a resounding ‘yes’ to this question. We find that fiscally pro‐cyclical countries have lower rates of economic growth, higher rates of output volatility and higher rates of inflation.     

Do SMEs Benefit from Unconventional Monetary Policy and How? Microevidence from the Eurozone

We study the impact of the announcement of the European Central Bank's (ECB's) Outright Monetary Transactions Program on small firms’ access to finance using a matched firm‐bank data set from eight Eurozone countries. We find that following the announcement, credit access improved relatively more for firms borrowing from banks with high balance sheet exposures to impaired sovereign debt, with such firms less likely to be refused a loan or to be price rationed. Loan terms also improved as manifested by lengthening of loan maturities. Unconventional monetary policy has a positive impact on firms’ investment and profitability, while its effect on firm innovation is weaker.     

Identifying Discretionary Fiscal Policy Reactions with Real‐Time Data

We propose a method of identifying discretionary fiscal policy reactions using real‐time data. Automatic stabilizers should depend on true GDP, while discretionary fiscal policy is contingent on the information that policy makers have in real time. We can compute a real‐time measurement error by comparing the first release of GDP data with later revisions. Discretionary fiscal policy is influenced by this measurement error, whereas automatic fiscal policy is not. We use this identification approach to test the central identifying assumption of Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) seminal structural vector autoregression (VAR). According to this assumption, fiscal policy makers do not react to GDP developments contemporaneously in a discretionary fashion. We find that government expenditure is adjusted upward if GDP growth in real time is lower than true GDP. This suggests that fiscal policy makers use short‐term funds to buy goods and services in response to their perception of GDP dynamics.     

Why hasn’t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU

The integration of European financial markets in the early 1980s created an environment of near-perfect capital mobility across countries that had harmonized indirect taxes but maintained large differences in factor taxes. The years that followed witnessed several rounds of competition in capital taxes with puzzling results. Instead of the dreaded “race to the bottom” in capital taxes, the UK lowered its capital tax to a rate closer to those of France, Germany and Italy, while capital taxes changed slightly in these countries. The UK increased its labor tax marginally, but the other countries increased theirs sharply. This paper shows that these results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a dynamic, Neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition that incorporates the key international externalities of tax policy operating via relative prices, wealth distribution and fiscal solvency. Tax competition is modeled as a one-shot game over time-invariant capital taxes with dynamic payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to European data. The calibration is preceded by an empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem to respond to foreign taxes. The solutions of the games show that when countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency, there is no race to the bottom and the Nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes. In contrast, if consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, competition over capital taxes triggers a “race to the bottom,” but this outcome entails large welfare gains. Surprisingly, the gains from coordination are small in all of these experiments.     

Banking crises: An equal opportunity menace

The historical frequency of banking crises is similar in advanced and developing countries, with quantitative parallels in both the run-ups and the aftermath. We establish these regularities using a dataset spanning from the early 1800s to the present. Banking crises weaken fiscal positions, with government revenues invariably contracting. Three years after a crisis central government debt increases by about 86%. The fiscal burden of banking crisis extends beyond the cost of the bailouts. We find that systemic banking crises are typically preceded by asset price bubbles, large capital inflows and credit booms, in rich and poor countries alike.     

U.S. Monetary Policy and International Bond Markets

This paper analyzes how U.S. monetary policy affects the pricing of dollar‐denominated sovereign debt. We document that yields on dollar‐denominated sovereign bonds are highly responsive to U.S. monetary policy surprises—during both the conventional and unconventional policy regimes—and that the passthrough of unconventional policy to foreign bond yields is, on balance, comparable to that of conventional policy. In addition, a conventional U.S. monetary easing (tightening) leads to a significant narrowing (widening) of credit spreads on sovereign bonds issued by countries with a speculative‐grade credit rating but has no effect on the corresponding weighted average of bilateral exchange rates for a basket of currencies from the same set of risky countries; this indicates that an unanticipated tightening of U.S. monetary policy widens credit spreads on risky sovereign debt directly through the financial channel, as opposed to indirectly through the exchange rate channel. During the unconventional policy regime, yields on both investment‐ and speculative‐grade sovereign bonds move one‐to‐one with policy‐induced fluctuations in yields on comparable U.S. Treasuries. We also examine whether the response of sovereign credit spreads to US monetary policy differs between policy easings and tightenings and find no evidence of such asymmetry.     

Crash risk of the euro in the sovereign debt crisis of 2009–2010

The economic-political instability of a country, which is tied to its credit risk, often leads to sharp depreciation and heightened volatility in its currency. This paper shows that not only the creditworthiness of the euro-area countries with weaker fiscal positions but also that of the member countries with more sound fiscal positions are important determinants of the deep out-of-the-money euro put option prices, which embedded information on the euro crash risk during the sovereign debt crisis of 2009–2010. We also find evidence of information flow from the sovereign credit default swap market to the currency option market during the crisis.     

Sovereign risk and belief-driven fluctuations in the euro area

Sovereign risk premia in several euro area countries have risen markedly since 2008, driving up credit spreads in the private sector as well. We propose a New Keynesian model of a two-region monetary union that accounts for this “sovereign risk channel.” The model is calibrated to the euro area as of mid-2012. We show that a combination of sovereign risk in one region and strongly procyclical fiscal policy at the aggregate level exacerbates the risk of belief-driven deflationary downturns. The model provides an argument in favor of coordinated, asymmetric fiscal stances as a way to prevent self-fulfilling debt crises.     

INDEPENDENT EXPERT'S REPORTS IN TAKEOVER BIDS

This paper reports an empirical examination of independent expert reports in takeover bids using the 170 reports that were issued in the 364 cash-based bids that occurred between January 1988 and December 1991. It was found that bid premia offered in takeover bids where an expert's report was issued were not significantly lower than bid premia in other bids. This may be attributable to independent experts acting as a countervailing influence on bidders holding a superior pre-bid bargaining position. Next, some dimensions of the “fair and reasonable” criterion that experts are required to use are examined. These are the single-test and dual-test interpretations of the phrase, the relation between offer price, market price and the expert's valuation of the target, the cost and length of expert's reports and, finally, the influence an expert has on the outcome of a bid.     

International evidence on fiscal solvency: Is fiscal policy “responsible”?

We conduct a cross-country empirical analysis of fiscal solvency based on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium conditions. The results show evidence of fiscal solvency, in the form of a robust positive conditional response of the primary balance to changes in public debt, in panels for emerging and industrial economies and in a combined panel. Emerging economies show a stronger response and hence converge to lower mean debt-output ratios, as observed in the data. The results are weaker for countries with debt ratios exceeding panel means and medians. Hence, we can separate countries where fiscal solvency holds from those where it remains in doubt.     

基于Logistic回归模型的个人小额贷款信用风险评估及应用

构建二分类 Logistic信用风险评估模型,运用光大银行某分行样本数据,评估商业银行互联网金融个人小额贷款信用风险。结果显示：客户性别、学历、年龄、收入、职业、属地等因素对个人小额贷款信用风险影响显著。其中,年龄、收入、学历等与客户信用等级呈正向关系,女性信用风险显著低于男性,持有信用卡、存贷比越低的客户其信用等级越高;一、二线城市客户的履约率普遍高于县地级市客户的履约率。鉴此,商业银行应对互联网金融个人小额贷款信用风险进行有效规避和分散。     

The global financial crisis: Explaining cross-country differences in the output impact

What explains differences in the crisis impact across developing countries and emerging markets? Using cross-country regressions to assess the factors driving the growth performance in 2009 (compared to pre-crisis forecasts for that year), we find that a small set of variables explain a large share of the variation in the growth impact. Countries with more leveraged domestic financial systems, stronger credit growth, and more short-term debt tended to suffer a larger effect on economic activity, although the relative importance of these factors differs across country groups. For emerging markets, this financial channel trumps the trade channel. For a broader set of developing countries, however, the trade channel seems to have mattered, with more open countries affected more strongly and those exporting food commodities being less hard hit. Exchange-rate flexibility helped in buffering the impact of the shock, particularly for emerging markets. There is also some evidence that countries with a stronger fiscal position prior to the crisis were impacted less severely. We find little evidence for the importance of other policy variables.     

Sovereign risk premia: The link between fiscal rules and stability culture

There is a growing empirical literature studying whether permanent constraints on fiscal policy, such as fiscal rules, reduce sovereign risk premia. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters. In our analysis of European bond spreads before the financial crisis, we shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies. These proxies refer to a country's past stability performance, government characteristics and survey results related to general trust. We find evidence that these preference indicators affect sovereign bond spreads and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules. Yet, the interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules to restore market confidence in countries with a historical lack of stability culture.     

Sovereign to Corporate Risk Spillovers

The first Greek bailout on April 11, 2010 triggered a significant reevaluation of sovereign credit risk across Europe. We exploit this event to examine the transmission of sovereign to corporate credit risk. A 10% increase in sovereign credit risk raises corporate credit risk on average by 1.1% after the bailout. The evidence is suggestive of risk spillovers from sovereign to corporate credit risk through a financial and a fiscal channel, as the effects are more pronounced for firms that are bank or government dependent. We find no support for indirect risk transmission through a deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals.