Interest rate deregulation: Monetary policy efficacy and rate rigidity

This paper examines the effects of interest rate regulation, and subsequent deregulation, on the efficacy of monetary policy and rigidity of retail bank deposit rates in Hong Kong. Using an error-correction model, we find that interest rate deregulation increases the efficacy of monetary policy by improving the correlation between retail bank deposit rates and market interest rates and increasing the degree of long-term pass-through for retail bank deposit rates. Our study also shows that the adjustments in retail bank deposit rates are asymmetric and rigid upwards during the regulated period, but tend to be rigid downwards during the deregulated period. The spreads between retail bank deposit rates and market rates have also tightened sharply after the removal of interest rate controls.     

Deregulation and oligopolistic rivalry in bank deposit markets

This paper provides a partial equilibrium analysis of a deregulated market for bank deposits in which banks behave oligopolistically but entry and exit are freely permitted. It is demonstrated that the effects of variations in market interest rates, reserve requirements, and bank cost and demand conditions upon the market quantity of bank deposit money are fundamentally altered if the degree of bank rivalry adjusts endogenously. Hence, banking deregulation may produce significant changes in the relationships between these variables and the stock of deposit money.     

An analysis of bank risk and deposit rate ceilings: Evidence from the capital markets

The effect of deposit rate regulation on bank solvency is an important and unresolved issue that has received only limited attention. In this paper, capital market data is used to assess changes in both systematic and non-systematic risk of a portfolio of bank stocks at the time of deposit rate deregulation. The evidence indicates that neither measure of capital market risk is significantly affected, leading to the conclusion that bank solvency risk will not be increased by the deregulation of interest rates on deposits.     

Private information,deposit interest rates,and the ‘stability’ of the banking system

The regulation of deposit interest rates has received little support from economists. The same is true for the original rationale for such regulation: that bank competition for deposits generates inherent ‘instability’ in the banking system. This paper develops an ‘adverse selection’ model of banking in which this rationale is correct. Moreover, in this model instability in the banking system can arise despite the presence of a ‘lender of last resort’, and despite the absence of any need for ‘deposit insurance’. However, in the world described, the regulation of deposit interest rates is shown to be an appropriate response to ‘instability’ in the banking system. Finally, it is argued that ‘adverse selection’ models of deposit interest rate determination can confront a number of observed phenomena that are not readily explained in other contexts.     

DIDMCA and bank market risk: Theory and evidence

This paper examines the theoretical and empirical consequences of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 on the market risk of the US banking industry. We survey several theoretical arguments linking deregulation of deposit interest rates to market-based measures of bank risk. Capital market data for a sample of large commercial bank holding companies provides evidence that deregulation has accompanied increases in both systematic and nonsystematic measures of bank risk.     

The impact of loan prepayment risk and deposit withdrawal risk on the optimal intermediation margin

Numerous studies have analyzed how a bank's intermediation margin varies with respect to such factors as credit quality, funding risk, bank capital, deposit insurance and other factors. However, these studies ignore the potential that loans tend to prepay if interest rates decline and deposits tend to be withdrawn if interest rates rise. Taking this very fundamental fact into account, we derive optimal loan rates and deposit rates when the bank is subject to loan prepayments and deposit withdrawals. Among other things, we find that greater volatility of interest rates tends to increase the margin. The strength of the correlation between the level of interest rates and the propensity to prepay loans (withdraw deposits) also plays an interesting role.     

Consumer deposit demand,interest rate differentials,and public welfare

Empirical estimates of the bank certificate of deposit demand schedule obtained in this study provide the basis for evaluating interest rate deregulation. A Box-Jenkins transfer function estimates bank deposit responses to intraindustry pricing changes and a sensitivity analysis shows microeconomic effects of interest rate differentials. The study concludes that 1) the public substantially subsidizes banks but banks achieve suboptimum deposit levels under thrift differential regulation, 2) removal of deposit rate regulation causes bank deposit demand schedules to shift slowly, not immediately, up with respect to interest rates, and 3) the consumer deposit demand curve is clearly interest elastic.     

Establishing banking market definitions through estimation of residual deposit supply equations

We employ a procedure suggested by the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines (but never before applied to banking) to determine whether nonbank financial institutions should be included as participants in defining the product market relevant to antitrust analyses of proposed bank mergers. We estimate bank “residual supply” relationships indicating the responsiveness of small-scale deposit funds supplied by consumers to the level of interest rates offered for such deposits. Estimated elasticities of residual deposit supply are quite small, implying that only commercial banks should be included as participants in the “antitrust market” relevant to proposed bank mergers.     

Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline,Deposit Insurance,and Banking Crises

This paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. We evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline. Aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises, regardless of bank fundamentals, and investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises.     

Deposit interest rate ceilings as credit supply shifters: Bank level evidence on the effects of Regulation Q

How did deposit interest rate ceilings, an important feature of the U.S. regulatory regime until the mid-1980s, affect individual banks’ lending and the transmission of monetary policy to credit? I estimate the effect of deposit rate ceilings inscribed in Regulation Q on commercial banks’ credit growth using a historical bank level data set starting in 1959. Banks’ credit growth contracted sharply when legally fixed deposit rate ceilings were binding. Interaction terms with monetary policy suggest that the policy impact on bank level credit growth was non-linear and significantly larger when rate ceilings were in place. Bank size and capitalization mitigate these effects. At the bank level, short-term interest rates exceeding the legally fixed deposit rate ceilings identify policy induced credit supply shifts that disappeared with deposit rate deregulation and thus weakened the bank lending channel substantially since the early 1980s.     

Evidence of Early Withdrawal in Time Deposit Portfolios

The embedded options found in some securities are known to have significant impact on product pricing, secondary market valuation, and risk measurement and management. The option to withdraw commonly found in bank deposits is one of the least studied of these. We help to fill this gap by examining the level and interest rate sensitivity of early withdrawals of retail time deposits using panel data from the Thrift Financial Report. We find that longer-maturity time deposit portfolios commonly experience early withdrawals at economically significant levels. Further, we find that depositors respond positively, with increased levels of early withdrawal, to the reinvestment incentive they face when new deposit rates rise. These findings increase our understanding of consumer behavior with regard to financial products and have significant implications for the competitive pricing of deposit products and the management of bank interest rate risk.     

Deregulation, Deposit Markets, and Banks' Costs of Funds

Deposit interest rate deregulation and financial service innovation have led to dramatic changes in large banks' deposit composition. This paper presentes a statistical cost analysis of changes in unit costs faced by banks under comprehensive financial deregulation. The results of this paper show that the unit cost of retail deposits-demand and passbook savings deposits-has increased relative to wholesale deposits-federal funds, certificates of deposit, and money market time deposits. We show, contrary to conventional wisdom, that changes in unit costs have been caused by processing costs rather than by interest expenses.     

Optimal Bank Reorganization Policies and the Pricing of Federal Deposit Insurance

Optimal dynamic regulatory policies for closing ailing banks and for deposit insurance premia are derived as functions of the rate of flow of bank deposits, and interest rate on deposits, the economy's risk-free interest rate, and the regulators' bank audit/administration costs. Under competitive conditions, the threshold assets-to-deposits ratio below which a bank should be optimally closed is shown to be greater than or equal to one. Optimal deposit insurance premia and probabilities of bank closure are shown to be nondecreasing in the bank's risk on investment and nonincreasing in the bank's current assets-to-deposits ratio.     

Measuring interest rate sensitivity of consumer depositors

The impetus for the deregulation of consumer deposits presumed that institutions need flexibility in setting rates to control deposit levels. Previous research indicated that institutions may find varying levels of sensitivity of depositors which will make it difficult to predict volume response. This study examined the timed response of interest rate changes on deposit volume changes. Using available time series techniques, it found that volume response varied with market characteristics as well as money market conditions. In some markets, deposit volume responded significantly to interest rate differentials, while in others the deposits were insensitive to small differentials. Thus, an institution is well advised to study its particular deposit market before implementing a liability rate strategy.     

Deposit Insurance and Forbearance Under Moral Hazard

We study the efficacy of forbearance using a real options approach. Our model endogenizes moral hazard embedded in credit risk undertaken by the bank. The bank's interest rate risk is modeled as duration mismatch. Other modeling improvements over previous studies include such features as stochastic interest rates and deposits, continuous interest payments on an ongoing deposit portfolio, and a stochastic forbearance period. We find that the bank does have an incentive to engage in undue risk taking. Even in the presence of moral hazard, however, forbearance can still be a desirable course of action in reducing the FDIC's expected liability. In addition, the capital ratio plays an extremely important role in determining the fair insurance premium. Finally, using the mismatch of asset and deposit durations as the correct measurement of interest rate risk, our model reveals that an optimal asset variance may exist for a particular bank, contrary to what the contingent claims framework would predict. Therefore, we resolve the puzzle that banks in practice do not increase asset risk to take full advantage of the limited liability.     

Bank Time Deposit Rates and Market Discipline in Poland: The Impact of State Ownership and Deposit Insurance Reform

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and changes in the deposit insurance system on the market for bank time deposits in Poland. In an environment of less restrictive bank supervision and a deposit insurance policy that favored state banks, we find that depositors exacted a price for risk-taking. After a new law increasing insurance coverage for private banks went into effect, however, bank specific variables became less important in explaining differences in deposit interest rates. We report, however, that the three fully guaranteed state banks pay significantly lower rates than private banks. Moreover, other state-owned banks, with the same explicit guarantee as private banks, pay significantly lower rates than private banks, so it appears that depositors treat these state-owned banks as if they have a larger implicit guarantee.     

Monetary policy effects in times of negative interest rates: What do bank stock prices tell us?

This paper investigates bank stock performance following different monetary policy actions in times of positive and negative interest rates. Controlling for the broader stock market, monetary policy announcements that cause an unanticipated downward shift in the yield curve and a flattening of the shorter-end of the yield curve are found to persistently reduce bank stock prices once the interest rate environment is negative. Consistent with the deposits channel of monetary policy, the effects are larger and more persistent for banks that are relatively dependent on deposit funding. By contrast, a surprise movement in the slope of the longer-end of the yield curve does not impact bank stock prices in times of negative interest rates. Accounting data confirm that a parallel drop in the yield curve following a monetary policy decision in a negative interest rate environment hurts banks through shrinking deposit margins.     

The Value of Deposit Insurance in the Presence of Interest Rate and Credit Risk

In this paper we employ the theory of the term structure of interest rates and the pricing of interest contingent contracts to determine the fair value of insurance for depository institutions. The balance sheet of a bank is taken to consist of long and short positions in various fixed income securities. Deposit insurance for the bank is a put option on the value of the assets. The value of deposits, assets, the implied exercise price of the put and the value of the put are all determined simultaneously as part of the same valuation solution. The approach is developed initially for a single‐state term structure. It is extended to incorporate credit risk on bank assets.
The most important policy implication is that for a bank whose assets are longer term than its liabilities and whose borrowers are not excessively leveraged the properly calculated, risk‐adjusted deposit insurance premia are increasing functions of the level of interest rates. Sensitivity analyses also treat such factors as the bank's deposit to asset ratio, duration gap, interest volatility, the volatility of assets backing the bank loans, and the bank's borrowers' debt to equity ratio.     

Optimal Futures Positions for Large Banking Firms

In this paper, we extend earlier work on hedging models so that uncertainty about both deposit supply and loan demand is incorporated as well as random rates of return on loans and CD's. Our model suggests that the optimal forward position is the sum of three ratios that should be estimated simultaneously. Using bank-specific data, the optimal hedge ratios are estimated in both the pre-deregulation and deregulation subperiods. Our results show that previous studies of bank hedging with interest rate futures have greatly overstated (a) the volume of short futures positions that banks should take and (b) the degree of homogeneity of optimal hedge ratios across the banking system. Similarly, deregulation has not uniformly affected the interest rate risk borne by different institutions.     

Geographical segmentation of US capital markets

Demographic variation in savings behavior can be exploited to provide evidence on segmentation in US bank loan markets. Cities with a large fraction of seniors have higher volumes of bank deposits. Since many banks rely heavily on deposit financing, this affects local loan supply and economic activity. I show a positive effect of local deposit supply on local outcomes, including the number of firms, the number of manufacturing firms, and the number of new firms started. The effect is stronger in industries that are heavily dependent on external finance. The deregulation of intrastate branching reduced the effect of local deposit supply by approximately a third.