“内部人控制”悖论

“内部人控制”并非“内部人控制问题”,不能将其混为一谈。“内部人控制”在美日的产业发展史、公司治理中都起着积极的作用。内部人控制下的组织创新是价值创造的源泉,外部人控制最终要通过“内部人”而起作用,依靠合理、有能力的内部人予以有效地控制是当前中国公司治理的现实选择。虽然该观点与主流观点相左,但它将使人们以一种全新的思路来理解公司治理的深层含义。     

企业内部人控制与产权关系

中国的企业内部人控制问题既有内部人控制的一般特征,也有中国自身的变异特征,解决内部人控制问题就是要协调所有者与经营者的关系和冲突问题,包括持有公司股份、重新设计报酬合同、增设外部董事、建立经理市场和机构投资者等措施,但最关键的是产权关系的深刻变革。     

公司内部人控制的会计学思考

＂内部人控制问题＂是国有企业中普遍存在的一个问题,是由于生产资料的所有者与公司的经营者利益的不一致,导致独立于投资者的经营管理人员实际掌握了公司实际控制权的一种现象。文章叙述了＂内部人控制＂存在的问题,剖析了公司＂内部人控制＂问题产生的原因,并从会计学角度对完善公司内部控制提出了若干建议。     

会计委派制与国有企业内部人控制问题的博弈分析

随着我国改革开放的深入,内部人控制问题已成为我国国有企业改革急需解决的问题。但代理理论解释不了内部人控制问题,会计委派制解决不了内部人控制问题。只有建立健全公司治理结构,在优化对内部人的激励机制的同时,建立对内部人的规范有效的约束机制,充分发挥董事会的作用,才能从根本上解决内部人控制问题。     

现代企业内部人控制问题的治理新思路

现代企业所有权与控制权的分离而产生的委托代理关系中,由于信息不对称等因素,内部人控制问题成为一个非常突出的问题。本文在对内部人控制问题的定义、产生机理及深层原因进行分析的基础上,从企业内部治理的角度,提出了内部人控制问题治理的新思路,同时提出了相关治理措施,为企业更好地认识和解决内部人控制问题提供一定的参考。     

国有企业内部人控制问题的特殊性及其治理

新古典理论在完美信息的假定下,认为通过内部治理和外部治理结构可以有效实现企业经营者和所有者的利益一致。由于现实中的信息不对称,内部人控制是现代大企业股权分散情况下普遍存在的问题。但是由于西方国家较为完善的治理结构,内部人控制造成的问题相对较小。由于转轨过程中国有企业的特殊性,国有企业的内部人控制有着自己的特点。本文分析了产生国有企业内部人控制的主要原因,认为减轻国有企业内部人控制问题需要建立有效的公司治理结构。     

国企内部人控制分级预警机制研究

本文通过对我国国有企业内部人控制问题的现实表现进行分析,从产生条件、实现途径以及基本特征三个方面选择相应的指标,将内部人控制问题产生的基本条件和严重程度指标进行区分,设置每一指标的取值范围以及反映的内部人控制的严重程度,提出了分级预警机制。     

行业协会的内部人控制问题分析

内部人控制问题是行业商会这类中间组织面临的组织治理失灵现象之一,作为非营利性互益性会员团体组织,内部人控制协会问题的产生既有深层次的理论原因,又有现实基础。行业协会的治理既需要职业化经理人的努力付出,来争取社会合法性,但如果秘书长权利过大,可能对协会的健康运行造成不利影响。文章以粤浙两地的实际调研数据为样本进行了实证分析,最后提出了解决内部人控制协会问题的对策建议。     

我国上市公司的股权结构与内部人控制

现代企业理论表明,内部人控制产生与公司股权结构有关。当股权相当集中时,不易产生内部人控制。我国上市的国有企业的股权高度集中（国有股常一股独大）,但内部人控制现象普遍惊人,根源在于所有缺位,董事会成员与经理人员都是代理人,都有为了自己利益而偏离全体股东利益的动机。因而,解决内部人控制问题,必须改善公司股权结构。     

基于股权结构的“内部人控制”问题研究

"内部人控制"问题产生的原因,并非所有权与经营权的分离,而是因为股权稀释后产生大量的中小股东,且中小股东的权利未得到充分保障所致。本文阐释了两类"内部人控制"问题,分析了股权结构影响"内部人控制"问题产生的机理,认为股权结构越分散越容易出现代理型的"内部人控制"问题,股权结构越集中越容易出现大股东对中小股东的侵害。     

An Experiment Testing the Determinants of Non-Compliance with Insider Trading Laws

Recent stories of corporate insiders avoiding losses and, in some cases, generating enormous personal profits as their companies crumbled have led investors to question the integrity of American business and the fairness of the United States stock markets. The SEC tries to ensure the fairness of the stock markets by making and enforcing laws against unfair practices such as insider trading. In the United States, when insiders trade stock based on non-public information, they have broken the law and betrayed the trust that has been placed in them.This study used student subjects to test the relationship between the likelihood of trading based on insider information and subjective probabilities of deterrents and motivations for insider trading. Expected gain, guilt, cynicism, and fairness of laws were the determinants that had a significant relationship with the intent to trade based on insider information. This study also found support for prospect theory with regard to insider trading. The results indicate that subjects are more likely to trade based on insider information to avoid a loss than to achieve an abnormal gain. The study also finds evidence of social desirability response bias.Additional findings of the study were that subjects did not view the determinants for themselves in a manner consistent with how they viewed those same deterrents and motivations for other people. Also, a test of the effects of gender found that certainty and social stigma were significantly higher for female respondents than for male respondents.     

Insiders' personal stock donations from the lens of stakeholder,stewardship and agency theories

This paper studies the relationship between personal stock donation by top executives and board of directors (insiders) of publicly traded corporations and their personal tax, shareholders' returns, and social responsibility. The study finds evidence that the timing of stock donations is driven by personal tax gain. The study further shows, comparing stock gift corporations relative to their non‐stock gift cohorts, that personal stock gifts are associated with lower short‐term and long‐term stock returns to shareholders. This implies that stock donation driven by insiders' personal gain adversely affects shareholder wealth. However, the likelihood and intensity of insiders to make personal stock donation is reduced when firms have strong corporate social responsibility (CSR). Agency theory explains insiders' opportunistic behavior, stakeholder theory is also supported by evidence that stock donation is negatively related to CSR, and stewardship theory offers a different view to explain the rationale behind insiders' stock donation and shareholders' reactions to stock gifts.     

How insiders traded before rules

UK company insiders, such as directors, were legally allowed to trade in the shares of their own companies up until the Companies Act of 1980. This article investigates the trading behaviour of directors over the period 1890 to 1909 in the UK. It finds relatively few instances of directors who exploited their informational advantage. However when they did sell their own shares, it tended to be before a period of poor profitability and poor stock market performance.     

关于完善我国独立董事制度的探讨

在我国二元制公司治理结构下,独立董事制度的引入有利于解决我国上市公司长期以来存在的“内部人控制”现象,更有效地保护中小股东的利益,完善公司治理结构。如何进一步完善与发展独立董事制度,须在具体引进过程中明晰独立董事的“独立性”、权利与义务、激励和约束机制以及与监事会职能的协调等问题。因此,应借鉴国外的经验,并结合自身的实际情况,合理的构建我国的独立董事制度。     

内部人控制、股权特征与异常派现

基于终极控制权,选取2071家中国上市公司2008—2009年的数据作为研究样本,对不同股权特征下内部人控制模式与异常派现之间的关系进行研究,结果表明:异常高派现多发生在股东控制类公司,该派现重视短期利益,与公司的盈利能力不相关,会使公司的现金流匮乏,投资机会受到限制,可持续发展能力下降;异常低派现多发生在经理控制类公司,该派现虽与公司的盈利能力显著相关,但与公司投资机会不相关,公司留存的现金流可能用于谋取内部人私利。     

Disclosure and Exchange of Inside Information*

This paper investigates how cooperation of stock analysts can affect voluntary disclosures of corporate inside information. Previous studies show that corporate insiders have incentives to disclose the information commonly shared by stock analysts, taking stock analysts’ actions as given. We focus on the strategic interactions between corporate insiders and stock analysts, and between stock analysts themselves. We show that voluntary disclosures may occur only when stock analysts intend to share their specialized information. In some sense managers are “forced” to disclose information because if they do not, stock analysts’ information sharing would put them at a disadvantage. Our results highlight the role of information exchange between stock analysts in stimulating voluntary disclosures, and provide an alternative explanation of managers’ motives for voluntary disclosures.     

Going public: The impact of insiders' holdings on the price of initial public offerings

Many entrepreneurs dream of seeing their company's securities trading in the public marketplace. Although going public has many benefits for a firm's founders and insiders, the process is often confusing and intimidating. One of the questions that investment bankers are asked frequently by insiders is, “What determines the price of a stock in the initial public offering?” This article presents empirical evidence that the stock price in an initial public offering (IPO) is directly related to the percentage of the firm's equity retained by the insiders. In other words, the offering price is relatively high when it appears that the insiders are not “bailing out” when the firm goes public.This research investigates equity ownership structure as a determinant of the pricing of IPOs. The hypothesis to be tested is: IPOs with higher (lower) insider holdings at the time of the offering are priced higher (lower) as a result of lower (higher) required rates of return. Support for the hypothesis is based on agency theory, which postulates that additional risk is created when there is a perceived separation of ownership and control.There are several implications of this research. First, a greater appreciation of the sophistication of the IPO market with regard to the actions of the insiders should be gained. Second, the reader's knowledge of the activity and relative pricing of IPOs during the 1978–1985 time period should be enhanced. Third, insiders should realize that actions regarding their relative equity holdings at the time of the offering have an impact on the price of the offering. Finally, the reader should recognize that even in “hot markets” the actions of insiders at the time of an initial public offering regarding the sale of equity are monitored by the market.     

辽宁上市公司董事会报告透明度影响因素研究

以46家辽宁上市公司为样本,对影响董事会报告透明度因素的研究发现:股权集中度、管理层持股比例、董事会规模、独立董事比例与董事会报告透明度呈正相关关系;股权制衡度,董事长与总经理是否两职合一,审计意见类型与董事会报告透明度呈负相关关系。上市公司应该通过股票期权等方式提升管理人员的持股比例,激励他们积极治理公司,提高董事会报告信息披露的透明度;上市公司第二大股东应适度提高持股比例,防止一股独大现象;同时减少董事长与总经理两职合一,也会有助于提高董事会报告的透明度。     

我国上市公司股权激励中的机会主义问题研究

股权激励的制度安排是为了解决委托代理关系产生的利益矛盾,将管理层与股东利益一致起来。同时,股权激励也可能导致管理层的机会主义行为,即通过盈余管理、股利政策、投融资决策等影响业绩和股价,使之向对自己有利的方向发展。强化内外监督和约束、防范股权激励的负面影响,是推进股权激励制度建设中不可或缺的重要环节,具体包括:一是优化公司治理结构;二是提升我国证券市场的有效性;三是培育经理人市场。股权激励这种上市公司内部的制度安排需要外部的一系列制度安排来配套才能有效地发挥作用。外部配套的制度安排会通过影响管理层的预期来影响管理层的行为选择,从而较好地降低和防止管理层的机会主义行为。     

我国反收购之立法政策:股东会中心主义的制度基础与保障

随着我国股权分置改革的推进,我国证券市场将面对全流通的全新环境。在上市公司壳资源仍很稀缺的背景下,加之《上市公司收购管理办法》还确立了部分要约收购制度,且部分要约收购可兼采现金、证券方式,敌意收购发生的可能性将大大增加。而为应对敌意收购,不少上市公司已通过修订公司章程采取了反收购措施。在敌意收购发生时,势必还会引入各种形式的反收购措施。因此,法律应如何规制,就面临一个立法政策选择的问题。通过西方国家收购制度的考察,可以发现,各国均不同程度地确立了反收购制度,但存在限制的程度与股东会中心主义与董事会中心主义的区别。中国也应确立设置有严格限制的反收购制度,将反收购决定权赋予股东会,且须基于对少数股东的保护,对股东会反收购决议作出特别限制。