An empirical analysis of household savings in France 1984–1998

In this paper we analyse the saving behaviour of French households by cohort and by age. We exploit two data sets: the Household Budget Surveys (HBS) allow us to define saving as residual of income minus consumption, while the Financial Assets Surveys (FAS) give us saving as changes in wealth. We make use of both financial assets surveys, gross them up using national accounts, and distinguish between “active” and “passive” saving.In France, tax policies appear to be one of the main factors that explain the recent evolution of household saving rates. The complex tax treatment of savings and capital income as well as the way in which households perceive the future of the French retirement pension system (5) also help to explain the composition of active and passive saving.     

Globalization,Neoliberalism and the attack on social security

Neoliberal political movements advocate privatization of public pension systems. Globalization imposes pressure on nations to conform to neoliberal policy views with respect to the design and structure of social insurance, including public pension systems. The paper begins with an investigation of the economic, ethical and ideological dimensions of the privatization debates in the U.S.; it argues that privatization advocates may be largely moved by ideology, since the other reasons advanced appear weak or unfounded. The second part discusses the history of Social Security, the purposes for its creation, and some of its economic effects. Differences between public and private pension systems are considered. A brief international comparison of some aspects of public pension system finance and benefit structures is presented. The final section considers the ethical, macroeconomic and distributional implications of privatization, prefunding and payroll tax funding, and argues for a pay as you go system financed with income taxes. In order to promote equity, economic security, community, and social cohesion, public pension systems should be universal in coverage. In order to reduce the inequality, income insecurity, and aged poverty generated by market economies, public pension systems ought to be progressive: benefit/contribution ratios should be inversely proportional to income, and progressive income taxes should finance the system. To promote economic growth, the systems should be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and should not be prefunded except for an emergency reserve. The fiscal policy recommendations partially depend upon the theory developed by Abba Lerner in the 1940s, and recently advanced by Wynne Godley and Randy Wray: Lerner's “principle of functional finance.”     

Options and strategies for fiscal consolidation in India

This paper uses a multi-region dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to study options and strategies for fiscal consolidation in India. The challenge for India is how to put public finances on a more sustainable footing while preserving the potential for high growth and attenuating the adverse consequences on the needy. We analyze the macroeconomic implications of three fiscal consolidation scenarios. A “benchmark” case based on authorities' intentions that reduces government consumption, general transfers, and strengthens consumption tax collection; a “growth-friendly” that reallocates the savings to more public investment; and a “social-friendly” scenario that equally reallocates the savings between more public investment and more transfers to households excluded from the financial system. The simulations indicate that fiscal consolidation yields considerable long-term benefits and also entails output costs in the near term. Growth outcomes are better under the growth-friendly and social-friendly scenarios. These consolidation scenarios alone are not enough to maximize net gains for India. Other factors, such as the pace of consolidation, the combination with structural reforms and external economic conditions, play a critical role in the success of fiscal consolidation.     

Redistribution,taxes, and the median voter

We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the “bang-bang” property.     

Marital Status and Derived Pension Rights: A Political Economy Model of Public Pensions with Borrowing Constraints

This paper develops an overlapping‐generations models featuring four types of households: single female, single male, one‐breadwinner couple, and two‐breadwinner couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of derived pension rights for one‐breadwinner couples. In an economy with a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, borrowing‐constrained one‐breadwinner couples may prefer a lower tax rate than do other types of households, although the former attain a higher benefit‐to‐cost ratio of public pension than do others. Changes in the gender wage gap, the level of derived pension rights, and the fraction of two‐breadwinner couples produce an inverse U‐shaped relationship between the relevant variable and the tax rate.     

On Optimal Lifetime Redistribution Policy

In this paper, we examine various aspects of the optimal lifetime redistribution policy within a cohort. We characterize the optimal tax policy when society consists of individuals who do not differ only in productivity, but also in time preference. We extend Diamond's analysis on nonlinear taxation of savings into the three-type and four-type models. To gain a better understanding of the lifetime redistribution, the problem is also solved numerically. Our results provide a rationale for distortions (upward and downward) in savings behavior in a simple two-period model where high-skilled and low-skilled individuals have different nonobservable time preferences beyond their earning capacity. If we interpret our model so that instead of private savings there is public provision of pension in the second period, then in the three-type model, we find a nonmonotonic pattern of the replacement rates. The numerical results suggest that retirement consumption is less dispersed than the first-period consumption in a paternalistic case. Paternalistic government policy also increases second-period consumption compared to the welfarist case.     

Financial market lobbies and pension reform

We develop a model in which firms in the financial market lobby the government to lower compulsory contributions to the public pension system. Firms lobby in order to increase demand from households for their old-age savings products. We conclude with a comparison of two major pension reforms in Europe exemplifying the influence of financial market lobbies on pension policies.     

A Model Under Siege: A Case Study of the German Retirement Insurance System

This study evaluates the positive and negative features of the German public pension system and discusses three reasons for its increasing perceived and real difficulties: maturation, negative incentive effects, and the problems of demographic change. The German system in its current form may be able to limp through the coming decades but will cease to be the exemplary Bismarckian machine that has created generous retirement incomes at reasonable tax rates. Current policy proposals are insufficient and a few but incisive design changes and some degree of prefunding could rescue the many positive aspects of the German retirement insurance system.     

The design of a consumption tax under capital risk

This paper focuses on the design of a consumption tax in a world of capital risk. The certainty literature discusses two standard options, namely the cash flow method and the pre-payment method (i.e., the wage tax), and finds the two approaches to be equivalent. Models that consider capital risk (via asset choice) reach different conclusions. This discrepancy arises in part due to a different choice of the social discount rate. In light of the failure of the discount-rate argument to resolve the issue at hand, we explore the market certainty equivalence of risky government revenue. We let revenue risks stay in the private sector, and examine the market value of the feasible transfer (e.g., in the form of a public good) back to households. We reach three broad conclusions. First, we find that if the state returns to each household its own tax-revenue risks, equivalence will be re-established as in certainty models. Next, we show that if the state engages in intergenerational risk sharing (e.g., through a system of stochastic tax transfers), the wage tax cannot be construed to be a valid pre-payment alternative to the cash flow or a modified wage-tax-ation system. Efficient risk allocation across generations under a cash flow tax (or, one that includes future capital gains as well as wages in the tax base) leads to a Pareto improvement over the simple wage tax. Finally, a major policy implication follows; in order to be practicable, a consumption tax would have to be implemented via registered savings accounts much in the fashion of the Canadian registered retirement savings plans program rather than through the pre-payment route.     

Are Tax Expenditures of Individuals Only a Tool of Tax Optimisation?

The paper focuses on tax expenditures of individuals, which are one of the fiscal tools of the state. In the Czech Republic they are primarily aimed at housing policy, pension policy, and philanthropy, and the question is the extent to which tax expenditures can influence the preferences of tax payers. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effect of tax expenditures of individuals in the form of tax deductions for social policy, housing support and retirement savings. We also evaluate whether these tax deductions fulfill the fiscal functions for which they were introduced and the extent to which taxpayers use them. Methodically, the research is based on the analysis of secondary statistical data of the Financial Administration of the Czech Republic and results from aggregated tax returns filed for the period 2005–2015. The effect of tax deductions was decreased by abolition of the progressive rate of personal income taxes and by introduction of a uniform tax rate of 15%. Tax deductions for retirement savings do not have a sufficiently strong motivational impact and do not affect taxpayers in the context of public policy. Deductions for mortgage interest can be regarded as a form of major housing support, but are related to taxpayer income and favor those with higher incomes.     

Myopia, redistribution and pensions

This paper reviews a number of recent contributions that study pension design with myopic individuals. Its objective is to explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects pension design when individuals differ also in productivity. This double heterogeneity gives rise to an interesting interplay between paternalistic and redistributive considerations, which is at the heart of most of the results that are presented. The main part of the paper is devoted to the issue of pension design when myopic individual do not save “enough” for their retirement because their “myopic self” (with a high discount rate) emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. Some extensions and variations are considered in the second part. In particular we deal with situations where labor disutility or preferences for consumption are subject to “habit formation” and where sin goods have a detrimental effect on second period health. Myopic individuals tend to underestimate the effects of both habit formation and sinful consumption, which complicates public policy.     

ACHIEVING FISCAL BALANCE IN JAPAN*

Japan is aging and has the highest government debt‐to‐output ratio among advanced economies. In this article, we build a micro data‐based, large‐scale overlapping generations model for Japan in which individuals differ in age, gender, employment type, income, and asset holdings, and incorporate the Japanese pension rules. Using existing pension law, current fiscal policy, and medium variants of demographic projections, we produce future paths for government expenditures and tax revenues, with implications for government debt and the public pension fund. Additional pension reform, a higher consumption tax, and higher female labor force participation help achieve fiscal stability.     

Who cares about the day after tomorrow? Pension issues when households are myopic or time inconsistent

Pension economics has traditionally guided pension policy with the help of formal models based on individuals who think in a life‐cycle context with perfect foresight, full information, and in a time‐consistent manner. Associated macro models were mostly based on a single country. This paper sheds light on several aspects of pension economics when these assumptions do not hold using—to our knowledge—the first multi‐country model of procrastinating households. Our focus is on the interaction between the share of procrastinators in a country, the speed and extent of population aging, and the size of an existing PAYG‐DB pension system. Starting from the insight that procrastination reduces the volume of savings, we focus on three questions that are particularly relevant for the quickly aging Asian economies: What are the consequences for the balance between pay‐as‐you‐go and fully funded pension systems? Where will retirement savings be invested in a globally linked world with very different pension systems and demographics? How large are global spillover effects of pension reforms in one region for the other regions in the world?     

The interest elasticity of household savings: a structural approach with German micro data

This paper empirically investigates the effects of changes in the interest rate as well as in the current and expected future consumer price levels on households’ consumption–savings decision. In a structural demand model applied to German consumption data, we use cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in prices and tax rates to construct individual after-tax interest rates and cluster-specific consumer prices. We find that the compensated own-price elasticities for savings as well as consumption are significantly negative, while the theoretical model implications of homogeneity and symmetry must be rejected. Importantly, we estimate the uncompensated interest rate elasticity of savings, in line with the literature, at around zero. Some heterogeneity in this elasticity is found along the savings and wealth distribution. We conclude that short-term policy-induced variation of net returns to savings is expected to have no significant effects on the level of compound savings.     

Tax–Benefit Linkages in Pension Systems: A Note

This note shows that a public pension system with a fairly general individual tax–benefit linkage is (computationally) equivalent to a system without linkages. The "equivalent" pension system without linkages not only facilitates simulations of policy experiments but also offers some insight into the implied tax structure of the tax–benefit linkage. It is shown that implicit tax rates may differ considerably across age groups even if the statutory tax rate is constant over the life-cycle.     

Bequest Motives and the Demand for Life Insurance in East Germany

Empirical studies of household saving remain inconclusive about the role of bequest motives. This may be due to the diluting effect of different tax regimes across countries and time on estimates of bequest motives. Relative to market‐based economies, the former German Democratic Republic can be viewed as an experimental institutional setting where life‐insurance demand was not influenced by tax considerations. This allows isolating bequest motives from other life‐cycle and precautionary savings motives. Analyzing the demand for life insurance, we find a significantly higher ownership probability among households with children and a high regard for the family, confirming bequest motives in life‐insurance demand.     

The tax advantage of public firms over private firms in the German household solid waste disposal industry

We measure the tax advantage of public firms over private firms, which operate at municipality level in the German household solid waste disposal industry. Public firms with sovereign duties pay no taxes, but equivalent private firms have to. In a simple risk-free setting, we develop a measure of the percentage difference of the charges of both types of firms demanded under their respective tax treatments. We model a cost-covering public firm and a net present value maximizing private firm. For sensible model parameters from the German waste disposal industry the private firm has to demand an about 16% to 18% higher charge. The by far biggest impact on the measure has the value added tax, with revenues as a much larger tax base than profits. Tax savings, which directly affect pre-tax profits, only alleviate the disadvantage bit. There is some evidence that at least one type of private firms—that is, private law firms that are also majority privately owned, are productive enough to overcome the tax advantage of public firms and be able to charge a lower price than public firms.     

Direct Versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisited

This article studies the optimal direct/indirect tax mix problem when individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics (productivity and endowments). It presents general expressions for the optimal commodity tax rates and proves that contrary to Atkinson and Stiglitz's (1976) result, differential commodity taxation remains a useful instrument of tax policy even if preferences are separable between labor and produced goods. When cross substitution effects are zero, the expressions resemble traditional many households Ramsey rules. In a Cobb–Douglas illustration, where endowments differ only in good 1 (interpreted as “wealth”), the tax on good 2 provides an indirect way to tax the unobservable wealth.     

Comment on ‘Competition Tests with a Non‐Structural Model: The Panzar–Rosse Method Applied to Germany's Savings Banks’

Abstract. In a recent issue of this journal Gischer and Stiele (2009) applied the ‘Test for “Monopoly” Equilibrium’ advanced by Panzar and Rosse (1987) to German savings banks and came up with the claim that savings banks maximize profits under conditions of monopolistic competition in the meaning of Edward Chamberlin. Their proposition is not conclusive since it would require free entry and for savings banks to operate under increasing returns to scale. Available evidence, however, shows them being subject to constant or decreasing returns to scale. The empirical findings of Gischer and Stiele can more convincingly be explained by assuming savings banks abide by their legal goals to pursue the public interest.     

New evidence on taxes and portfolio choice

Identifying the effect of differential taxation on portfolio allocation requires exogenous variation in marginal tax rates. Marginal tax rates vary with income, but income surely affects portfolio choice directly. In systems of individual taxation – like Canada's – couples with the same household income can face different effective tax rates on capital income when labor income is distributed differently within households. Using this source of variation we find portfolio responses to taxation among more affluent households. The estimated effects are statistically significant but economically modest. In a “placebo” test, using data from the U.S. (which has joint taxation), we find no effect of the intra-household distribution of labor income on portfolios.