Liberalization of Opening Hours with Free Entry

Abstract. This paper studies competition in prices and opening hours in a model with free entry. It is shown that under free competition market failures arise: Entry is excessive and opening hours are under‐provided. The larger the demand elasticity, the larger market failures are going to be. Restrictions on opening hours aggravate this failure. We analyze the impact of a liberalization of opening hours. The model predicts that prices will remain constant in the short run but increase in the long run. Concentration in the retail sector will rise. Additionally, employment in the retail sector increases.     

Pitfalls in Restructuring the Electricity Industry

Abstract. This paper models some reductions in output that may follow the opening of electricity markets to competition. Specifically, we show that vertical separation of electricity generation, transmission and distribution could reduce welfare compared to the previous system of vertically integrated monopoly, if grid owners can act as monopolistic retailers or, alternatively, set access prices that maximize merchandizing surplus. Moreover, we show that a rule of non‐discriminatory pricing would not remedy any of these problems. Hence, to secure the efficiency gains of deregulation, the re‐regulation of the remaining monopolistic core – the electric grid – cannot rely on simple rules like cost‐based non‐discriminatory pricing.     

Deregulation of Shopping Hours: The Impact on Independent Retailers and Chain Stores

This paper studies shopping hour decisions by retail chains and independent competitors. We use a Salop‐type model in which retailers compete in prices and shopping hours. Our results depend significantly on efficiency differences between the retail chain and the independent retailer. If the efficiency difference is small, the independent retailer may choose longer shopping hours than the retail chain and may therefore gain from deregulation at the expense of the retail chain. The opposite result emerges when the efficiency difference is large. Then, the retail chain may benefit whereas the independent retailer loses from deregulation.     

Mergers in the food retailing sector: An empirical investigation

We address the problem of merger evaluation, for competition policy purposes, in the retailing sector. The likely effects of a possible merger are analysed ex ante. The novelty of the paper lies in the inclusion of downstream and upstream market power effects on the retailers. Also, it provides an empirical application to the Portuguese food retailing market. The effects of additional concentration on prices are estimated, as well as the price reduction insiders are likely to obtain via an improved bargaining position. The final effect on prices depends on how these cost reductions are reflected in insiders’ prices, i.e., on the pass-through rate. For realistic values of this rate we find that the merger in question will most likely increase consumer prices and, therefore, should not be allowed on an antitrust legislation basis.     

Effects of wholesaler concentration on retailers by format: evidence from Japanese brand-level price data

Using unique brand-level wholesale price data, this article examines how purchase prices of commodities for retailers are influenced by wholesale concentration. Compared with studies focusing on retail prices, little empirical work has measured the impact of wholesale concentration on wholesale prices. Economic theory suggests that the sensitivity of purchase price in response to degree of wholesale concentration is smaller for large retail formats than for small retail formats in the presence of intra-format retail competition. To test the validity of the theoretical implication, I measure the impact of the concentration on purchasing prices for retailers by format. Empirical findings support the hypothesis that the large retail format tends to draw advantageous purchase prices when wholesalers become increasingly oligopolistic.     

Price competition between big and small supermarkets: evidence from Seoul

This article empirically investigates the level of competition between superstores and smaller retailers in the Korean retail industry where market entry and operational hours of the former are restricted in order to protect the latter. Applying spatial econometric methods to store-level price data from Seoul, we find that while spatial price correlations among same-size stores exist, product prices across different-size stores are spatially uncorrelated. This result implies that consumers may not view superstores’ and smaller retailers’ products as close substitutes, and thus their markets are likely to be segmented from each other.     

Imports and the structure of retail markets

Abstract We construct a model of trade with heterogeneous retailers to examine the effects of trade liberalization on retail market structure, imports and social welfare. We are especially interested in investigating the transmission of lower import prices into consumer prices and the effects of retail market regulation. The paper shows that changes in import prices may have large effects on consumer prices and import volumes when changes in retail market structure are taken into account, and that restrictions on retailing, as they occur in several countries, may significantly alter this transmission mechanism by reducing imports and raising consumer prices.     

Vertical Control and Price Cycles in Gasoline Retailing

We examine Norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station‐specific observations from 2003 to 2006. The four big gasoline companies use a vertical restraint that is adopted industry‐wide (labeled price support). This moves price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters. Retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern, where we observe de facto simultaneous decision‐making by the headquarters (without knowledge of their rivals’ prices) when every Monday around noon they decide to increase pump prices to the same level. The price level on Mondays corresponds to the recommended prices published by the headquarters of the gasoline companies.     

General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach

We analyze a class of ‘large group’ Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models by applying different concepts of functional separability to the same set of first-order conditions for utility maximization. We show that multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) functions yield ‘constant relative risk aversion’ (CRRA), and, therefore ‘constant elasticity of substitution’ (CES), functions, whereas additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions yield ‘constant absolute risk aversion’ (CARA) functions. We then show that the CARA specification sheds new light on: (i) pro-competitive effects, i.e., profit-maximizing prices are decreasing in the mass of competing firms; and (ii) a competitive limit, i.e., profit-maximizing prices converge to marginal costs when the mass of competing firms becomes arbitrarily large.     

Buyer search and price dispersion: a laboratory study

We study markets with costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. Buyers costlessly observe one or (with probability 1−q) two of the posted prices, and can accept one or pay to search again. The experiment varies q, the search cost, and the number of buyers. Equilibrium theory predicts a unified very low (high) price for q=0 (q=1) and predicts specific distributions of dispersed prices for q=1/3 and 2/3. Actual prices conform closely to the predictions in some treatments. Buyers’ reservation prices are biased away from the extremes, however, and sellers’ prices have positive autocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation.     

Innovation,licensing, and price vs. quantity competition

In this paper, we develop a differentiated duopoly model with endogenous cost-reducing R&D and review the argument on welfare effect of price and quantity competition in the presence of technology licensing. We show that, with licensing, the standard conclusion on duopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984) is completely reversed. Cournot competition induces lower R&D investment than Bertrand competition does. Moreover, Cournot competition leads to lower prices, lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and higher social welfare than Bertrand competition.     

Entry and pricing on Broadway

This article investigates the pricing decisions of Broadway shows. We find evidence that incumbent Broadway shows lower prices several weeks prior to the opening of a new show. In addition, prices are lower when the threat of competition, due to more entrants, is larger. A decomposition suggests that prices are more important than quantities for changes in revenue prior to entry and that this pattern reverses after entry occurs.     

Dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition: input versus output spillovers

We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D that generates input spillovers. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger as competition over quantities always yields the largest producers’ surplus.     

Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams

We conducted an experimental study of price competition in a duopolistic market. The market was operationalized as a repeated game between two “teams” with one, two, or three players in each team. We found that asking (and winning) prices were significantly higher in competition between individuals than in competition between two- or three-person teams. There were no general effects of team size, but prices increased with time when each team member was paid his or her own asking price and decreased when the team's profits were divided equally. This result is consistent with a simple model of individual learning.     

Price response,information, and asymmetry of price dispersion

In this study, we examine how differently gasoline prices in 25 regions of Seoul, Korea respond to asymmetric information between retailers and consumers. We estimate the region-specific likelihood that retailers engage in price undercutting under asymmetric information and investigate inter-regional differences. We find that in response to increases in wholesale price, regions with a high likelihood of price undercutting experience intensified gas station price competition while dispersions of price and markups tend to decrease more in response to cost shocks. Understanding the geographical dispersion of retailers’ price responses to information frictions and search intensity is crucial to lowering information barriers across regions and redistributing profit among market participants.     

Vertical separation with location–price competition

While the literature has generally found that vertical separation helps buffer competition and harm consumers in a duopolistic market, we find the exact opposite. To induce the retailers to locate closer to consumers and earn a larger market share, the manufacturers set wholesale prices below marginal cost. This market share effect dominates the previously focused coordination effect under which a higher wholesale price helps coordinate the retailers’ pricing decisions. For each manufacturer, vertical separation is a dominant strategy so the endogenous determination of vertical separation versus vertical integration is a prisoner’s dilemma game.     

Pricing access: Forward-looking versus backward-looking cost rules

Regulators across many different jurisdictions and industries have recently adopted the practice of setting access prices based on the current costs of providing the relevant facilities. Though widely regarded as being efficient, the efficiency implications of using current costs instead of historical costs have not been formally analyzed. Our analysis shows that given stochastic costs, forward-looking access prices retard investment and are generally dominated by access prices determined by historical cost whenever investment is desired.     

ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF COLLUSION IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY WITH A CARTEL AND A FRINGE

We discuss the effects of the existence of non‐colluding (fringe) firms on cartel sustainability. We obtain, using trigger strategies, that with product differentiation collusion is always more easily sustained when firms compete in prices than when firms compete in quantities. This is true basically because (i) price competition is more intense than quantity competition, and (ii) fringe firms exacerbate the fact that cartel firms have more incentives to deviate from the agreement under quantity competition. This result reverses previous findings where, in the absence of fringe firms, product differentiation plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of price or quantity competition in sustaining collusion.     

Return policies, market outcomes, and consumer welfare

Abstract.  The effect of return policies on market outcomes is studied in a model where consumers differ in their valuations of time. Product reliability is identified with defect rates. Producers first choose reliability levels and then compete in prices. For given defect rates, allowing returns makes products closer substitutes, enhancing competition and reducing prices. Being closer substitutes makes higher reliability less worthwhile, which reduces reliability. While the decrease in reliability reduces consumer welfare, the decrease in prices raises it. The latter dominates, so that aggregate consumer welfare increases with return policy.     

ON THE PROFITABILITY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE WHEN DEMAND IS UNCERTAIN

A previous study finds that in a market where a manufacturer faces uncertain demand and sells to consumers through competitive retailers, the manufacture wishes to support adequate retail inventories by imposing resale price maintenance (RPM). I show that if retail inventories are allocated to consumers through first‐come‐first‐served rule rather than efficient rationing rule in the game with unconstrained retail competition, imposing RPM may not be profitable. It may not encourage more retail inventories either. RPM may also lower consumer surpluses and social welfare. This study casts some doubt on the demand uncertainty theory that supports RPM.