企业人力资本投资的困境

本文以产权理论为依据,分析了企业人力资本投资的困境.人力资本的天然私有性使得企业进行培训投资的直接结果是受训者人力资本水平的提高,企业在与培训后雇员的谈判关系中处于不利地位,企业必须将培训的部分收益给予雇员,形成企业人力资本投资的困境,从而对企业事前的培训投资产生一定的扭曲.只有当预期未来收益足够高时,企业才会提供培训.各种影响企业获得收益的因素都会对企业的培训产生影响.     

Training and worker effort: a signalling perspective

Abstract This paper analyzes the interaction between firms’ investment in general skills training and workers’ incentives. It shows that when a firm has an informational advantage over its workers, its provision of free general skills training can serve as a signal that there will be a long‐term relationship between the firm and its workers. This signal induces the workers to exert more effort in learning firm‐specific skills, which enhances the firm's profits. In contrast with most of the existing literature, the model implies that firms may provide free general skills training even if there is no labour market friction.     

Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle

According to the outside option principle the holdup problem can be solved when the non-investor has a binding outside option. The investor then becomes residual claimant, creating efficient investment incentives. This paper reports about an experiment designed to test this. We find that when the outside option is binding investment levels fall short of the efficient level, but holdup is less of a problem than predicted when the outside option is non-binding.     

Unions and Efficient Training

The paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time-consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. The firm has ex post monopsonistic power that drives trained workers' wages below the social optimum. The emergence of a trade union bargaining at the firm-level can increase social welfare, by counterbalancing the firm's ex post monopsonistic power in wage determination. Local union-firm wage bargaining ensures that the post-training wage is set sufficiently high to deter at least some quits, so that the number of workers the firm trains is nearer the social optimum     

Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm

We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regulator cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed. We characterize the regulated incumbent's incentive to invest when a deregulation process is initiated and an unregulated firm enters the market as a result. The change in the marginal return to investment depends on how the investment changes the firm's virtual cost—the sum of its physical production and information costs. When the marginal return to investment increases due to deregulation, social welfare increases as a result of higher investment and more competition. Otherwise, the change in social welfare depends on the total of the effects in the fall of investment and increased competition. We also present conditions under which deregulation enhances welfare.     

不对称雇主学习、外部选择与雇员谈判力

本文在非合作博弈（策略式）单边不对称信息讨价还价框架下,按照外部约束（而不是威胁点）的思路来模型化外部雇主的竞争,以分析不对称雇主学习的程度对处于信息劣势的通用性雇员谈判力的决定作用。本文提出的框架弥补了已有文献的一些不足,同时为不对称雇主学习这一劳动经济学概念提供了一个讨价还价理论基础。     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

On Corporate Tax Asymmetries and Neutrality

This article discusses the effects of corporate tax asymmetries under investment irreversibility. We introduce a tax scheme where the tax base is given by the firm's return net of a rate of relief. When the firm's return is less than the imputation rate, however, no tax refunds are allowed. Unlike symmetric tax systems, the scheme proposed is neutral with respect not only to income uncertainty but also to policy uncertainty.     

A model of periodic job training

This paper examines conditions under which a demand-constrained, cost-minimizing firm will provide industry-specific on-the-job-training to its employees, when a flexible stock of outside labor is available for hire. The term industry-specific is used to describe training with general components valued by other firms in the industry. This definition of on-the-job-training offers the possibility that trained workers could be poached by competing firms and provides limited opportunities for newly trained workers to seek alternative employment. The firm's decisions involve whether or not to invest in on-the-job-training, and whether to use in-house labor exclusively or a mix of in-house and outside labor. The cost-minimizing strategy is crucially dependent upon the mutual loyalty of the firm and its workers.This paper has benefited from numerous comments from the participants of the 41st International Atlantic Economic Conference in Paris, March 12–19, 1996.     

Financial Constraints and Investment Decisions

In what follows we show that liquidity constraints can affect a firm's investment even when the constraints are not currently effective. This happens when, at any given time, the firm believes that internal finance is likely to become a constraint in the future. In these circumstances, the value of the firm becomes a non‐monotonic functional form of the fundamental. Thus, in a dynamic setting, the potential barrier to internal liquidity expansion exerts a global effect on the firm's investment policy, lowering its desired investment profile (Classification JEL: E22, E51 ).     

资产定价泡沫对经济的影响

本文采用具有技术进步和随机实质资本投资收益率的跨时迭代模型 ,从理论上分析了资产定价泡沫对经济的影响 ,同时对我国转轨时期经济的动态效率进行了实证研究。结果显示 :我国转轨时期经济正从动态无效向动态有效转化 ,在实质资本收益率确定的情况下 ,适当的资产定价泡沫 (如果存在的话 )对我国经济有益 ,会增加人均消费 ,加快我国经济向动态有效转化 ,使资源配置达到Pareto最优 ;在实质资本收益率随机的情况下 ,资产定价泡沫对经济的影响是不确定的 ,其效果依赖于个人对未来投资实质资本收益率的预期 ,因而加强投资者对未来实质资本投资的收益率持乐观态度的信心是至关重要的。     

Bounded rationality,expectations, and child labour

This paper develops a model with overlapping generations, where the household's optimal fertility, child labour, and education decisions depend on the parents’ expectations or beliefs about the return to education. It is shown that there exists a range of parental income where the fertility rate is high and children participate in the labour market and receive an incomplete education if a parent believes the return to education is low. The act of participating in the labour market reduces the child's ability to accumulate human capital; thus, the action of sending a child into the labour market is sufficient to ensure that the parents’ initially pessimistic expectations are fulfilled. It is then shown that a one‐time policy intervention, such as banning child labour and mandatory education, can be enough to move a country from the positive child labour equilibrium to an equilibrium with no child labour.     

The wage and non-wage costs of displacement in boom times: Evidence from Russia

This paper analyzes the costs of job loss over the years of a booming economy, 2003–2008, using unique data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. In addition to analyzing standard labor market outcomes, such as forgone earnings, employment, hours worked and wage penalties, our unique data set allows us to investigate additional non-wage costs of displacement, in particular, fringe benefits, the propensity to have an informal employment relationship or a temporary contract. We find that displaced individuals face large foregone earnings following displacement, which are heterogeneous across education and ownership type of firm from which the worker separated. There is no evidence of wage penalties for re-employed displaced workers. However, we find an increased probability of working in informal or temporary jobs if previously displaced and a reduction in the number of benefits.     

Why Some Firms Train Apprentices and Many Others Do Not

Abstract. The latest study investigating the cost–benefit ratio of apprenticeship training for Swiss companies has shown that most apprentices offset the cost of their training during their apprenticeship on the basis of the productive contribution of the work they perform. Given this outcome, it is worth investigating why so many firms choose not to train apprentices. Maximum-likelihood selection models were used to estimate the net cost of training for firms without an apprenticeship programme. The models show, firstly, that non-training firms would incur significantly higher net cost during the apprenticeship period if they would switch to a training policy and, secondly, that this less favourable cost–benefit ratio is determined less by cost than by absence of benefit. For the apprenticeship system as such the results indicate that, as long as training regulations and the market situation permit a cost-effective training of apprentices, companies do not need specific labour market regulations or institutions to offer training posts. In this respect, the Swiss findings might be of interest for the ongoing German discussion about the expected repercussions of a more general labour market deregulation on the apprenticeship training system.     

企业内部资本配置和金融体系二分法

从投融资实践看,企业内部存在一个活跃的资本市场;企业内部资本配置是区别于外部资本市场运作的资本配置机制。企业管理者运用内部资金实施投资项目的同时也就实施了一定的融资功能,因而企业组织本身就是金融体系的重要组成部分。传统的直接融资—间接融资或银行主导型—资本市场主导型二分法不足以刻画和概括金融体系的特征,新二分法"外部资本市场—企业内部资本市场"是对传统研究视角的有益补充。     

Career concerns and firm – sponsored general training

This article studies the provision of firm-sponsored general training in the presence of workers' career concerns. The model builds on the argument that the provision of general training reduces the employer's monopsony power. In this context, it is shown that the worker's implicit incentives to provide effort increase with the level of acquired general skills. The employer takes this reciprocal effect into account and becomes more willing to invest in general human capital. When the positive effect of training on worker's effort incentives is strong enough, the equilibrium outcome may involve overinvestment relative to the first-best. It is also shown that a sharper increase in worker's power associated with additional training may either strengthen or weaken the employer's investment incentives and can have either beneficial or detrimental effects on welfare.     

Economics of Guanxi as an Interpersonal Investment Game

The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model of guanxi given stylized facts. I first outline the intrinsic characteristics of guanxi to draw the stylized facts, and then use these facts to model it as an interpersonal investment game. I find that the degrees of the ability and loyalty of the Recipient must be reasonably high enough for the interpersonal investment to take place. After the investment has occurred, the degree of loyalty must be higher than that of the ability to guarantee stable gaunxi relationships. When the interpersonal investment is made, it is a signal of trust in the ability and loyalty of the Recipient. However, if the ability factor dominates, then the Recipient will not always feel loyal enough to return the favor. This indicates that loyalty counts for more than ability. A related result is that a stable guanxi relationship is unlikely to occur for a highly able person given the equal chance of the two characteristics. This paper also presents some interesting implications for corruption and lock‐in relationships.     

Horizontal mismatch and vocational education

ABSTRACT

Recent literature suggests that vocational education and training (VET) provides individuals with smoother transitions into the labour market but lower wages over the lifecycle, compared to general education. A possible mechanism explaining lower wages is horizontal mismatch, defined as a mismatch between the type of qualifications acquired by individuals and those required for their current job. Some studies have found higher mismatch wage penalties when individuals’ education is more specific, suggesting higher penalties for workers with VET. Therefore, we analyse horizontal mismatch in Switzerland, the country with the highest proportion of firm-based VET in the OECD. We use two measures from the Swiss Household Panel that cover different aspects of horizontal mismatch. While we find sizable mismatch wage penalties in OLS estimations, effects are small or insignificant in fixed-effects regressions. This holds for workers with vocational and general education background alike. We conclude that VET is more transferable than often assumed. We finish with recommendations on concept and methods for future analyses of horizontal mismatch.     

关系专用性投资对企业创新的影响

从客户参与创新视角，探究了关系专用性投资对企业创新的影响，并利用制造业上市公司数据进行了验证。结果显示：关系专用性投资和企业创新投入之间存在倒U型关系，在达到某一阈值前，加大关系专用性投资有利于企业创新投入，但在超过某一阈值后，增加关系专用性投资会对企业创新投入产生负面影响。除此之外，创新投入与创新绩效之间存在正相关关系。     

When Do Opening Stock Returns Tend to be Higher?

Abstract

In this study, I make an effort to formulate a trading rule that would make use of some systematic interday patterns in individual stocks’ opening returns. I analyze intraday price data on all the stocks that were S&P 500 Index constituents during the period from 1993 to 2012. I document that if the general market direction of the previous day's opening session is controlled for, then a stock's opening return tends to be higher if, on the previous trading day, its opening return was relatively high (either positive, or higher than the same day's opening market return) and its open-to-close return was relatively low (either non-positive, or lower than or equal to the same day's open-to-close market return). Finally, for the sampling period, I construct two different investment portfolios involving a long position in the stocks on the days when, according to the findings, their opening returns are expected to be high and a short position in the stocks on the days when, according to the findings, their opening returns are expected to be low. Both portfolios are found to yield significantly positive returns, providing evidence for the practical applicability of the documented patterns in opening stock prices.