Monetary Policy in Illiquid Markets: Options for a Small Open Economy

Two impediments to effective monetary policy operation include illiquidity in bond markets and the zero bound of interest rates. Under these conditions alternative means of enacting monetary policy may be required. This paper empirically explores policy options implemented through equity and currency markets that will generate similar inflation responses at different time horizons. In terms of GDP loss the least costly means of achieving a particular long run inflation outcome is via the current monetary policy arrangements. Currency market alternatives are volatile but less expensive than the equity market in terms of output loss for short term inflation horizons.

Fiscal policy and direct crowding-out in a small open economy

This paper analyses the welfare effects of fiscal policy in a small open economy, where private and government consumption are substitutes in terms of private utility. The main findings are as follows: fiscal policy raises output, bringing it closer to its efficient level, but is not welfare-improving even though government spending directly affects private utility. The main reason for this is that the introduction of useful government spending implies a larger crowding-out effect on private consumption, when compared with the ‘pure waste’ case. Utility decreases since one unit of government consumption yields less utility than one unit of private consumption. In any case, the marginal rate of substitution between private and government consumption is a key parameter in governing the welfare effects of fiscal policy.

促进环境保护的财政政策选择

可持续发展理论、外部性理论和公共产品理论为财政政策干预环境保护提供了理论依据。当前,我国财政政策在环境保护方面存在投入不足、排污收费不合理以及缺乏有效的环境税收政策。对此,本文提出了相应的改进措施。     

Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making

In this paper, we consider a dynamic game model of two identical countries. Policy-makers of both countries have quadratic intertemporal objective functions and want to stabilize domestic output, domestic inflation, and the real rate of exchange. We present different analytical and numerical solutions for this policy game. Noncooperative open-loop equilibria are interpreted as requiring unilateral commitment and policy-makers' credibility. Potential gains from cooperation are present, as the noncooperative equilibrium solutions are not Pareto-optimal. Under an information pattern that admits memory strategies, the possibility of obtaining cooperative results without coordination and commitment arises.     

The estimation of monetary policy reaction function in a data-rich environment: The case of Japan

This paper reports the estimates of a monetary policy reaction function for the Bank of Japan in a data-rich environment. There are two main findings. First, a weak identification problem arises in the estimates under the specifications that some previous works employ, though in a data-rich environment it may be possible to avoid this problem. Second, the evidence from the estimates in a data-rich environment suggests that the Bank of Japan only controlled the inflation forecast, and placed no weight on output stabilization directly over the period from November 1988 through February 2001.     

Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union

Do plans for a monetary union in Europe call for limits on the freedom of the country members of the union to use fiscal policy? In order to provide a tentative answer, we simulate the IMF model MULTIMOD, given various shocks, in the case of a European Monetary Union consisting only of France and Germany. The results clearly indicate the possible value of allowing unfettered use of fiscal policy in both countries. The reasons lie partly in differences in the initial position of the two, partly in differences in their preferences. We also examine the change in the policy significance of the current account in the monetary union. Current account imbalances clearly cease to have the same significance in a monetary union; but they do not therefore become irrelevant.     

Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU

Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that montary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetary Union (EMU), while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services.