论抵押担保在不对称信息信贷市场中的作用

信贷市场中的信息不对称是银行惜贷的主要原因之一。本文运用信息经济学的有关原理,通过建模首先对信息不对称条件下的信贷市场逆向选择和道德风险的发生机理进行了分析,揭示了银行惜贷的原因。然后分别对银行将抵押担保品作为甄别信号和负激励措施以减少逆向选择和道德风险的运行机制进行了探讨,分析了抵押担保品在减少逆向选择和道德风险中的积极作用及局限性。最后得出结论:抵押担保在一定程度上是防止信贷市场逆向选择和道德风险的可行手段,但过高的抵押担保要求可能产生新的逆向选择。     

信贷市场的经济学分析

文章针对目前信贷市场所存在的问题 ,利用经济博弈理论中的信息非对称原理 ,通过建立经济学模型对信息非对称条件导致的信贷市场中的逆向选择和道德风险进行了理论分析 ,在此基础上提出了银行如何防范信息非对称条件下信贷市场的逆向选择和道德风险思路 ,并对信息非对称条件下信货市场中不同市场参与者之间存在的信息差异提出建议     

蔬菜生产市场的逆向选择与道德风险

随着人们生活水平的提高,蔬菜质量安全问题日益凸显,在很大程度上损害了人民的身心健康。对引起蔬菜质量问题的原因,运用经济学中的逆向选择和道德风险的原理进行分析,然后提出了政府应该如何进行干预,解决蔬菜生产市场的逆向选择和道德风险问题,确保人们能消费上质量高的蔬菜。     

论新型农村合作医疗中的道德风险与逆向选择问题

道德风险和逆向选择问题在新型农村合作医疗中较为突出,如不能处理好这一问题,将给新型农村合作医疗的持续、稳定发展带来隐患。本文结合信息经济学的有关理论,对新型农村合作医疗中道德风险与逆向选择的表现、危害及成因进行分析,提出了规避措施。     

中小企业融资困难的原因初探——融资信息不对称

中小企业在我国经济建设中起着不可低估的作用,但是由于中小企业与银行之间存在信息不对称而引发的逆向选择和道德风险,从而导致了其融资困难.资金需求方的中小企业,应提高其融资管理水平,降低"道德风险"所产生的融资成本.资金供给方的政府和金融机构,应重新考察企业融资制度,降低融资市场的"逆向选择".     

商业银行资产业务中的信息不对称及博弈论分析

信息经济学认为,现实经济运行中交易者之间普遍存在着信息不对称.信息不对称将导致事前的逆向选择和事后的道德风险.商业银行的日常经营中信息不对称现象普遍存在.分析信息不对称对商业银行资产业务的影响,并从成本效益角度,运用博弈论理论分析逆向选择和道德风险形成的原因,就如何减少商业银行经营中的信息不对称提出一些政策措施.     

我国农村信贷市场信息不对称问题及对策研究

在我国农村信贷市场上,信息不对称现象广泛存在,而信息不对称造成的逆向选择和道德风险则是不良贷款发生、农村金融抑制的重要原因.本文主要分析逆向选择和道德风险产生的原因,并提出了相关的对策,力求解决农村信贷市场上的信息不对称问题.     

商业银行对小微企业贷款的信号传递与信息甄别模型

小微企业向商业银行贷款过程中存在着信息不对称,由此导致了逆向选择和道德风险问题。将信号传递和信息甄别模型应用于小微企业贷款市场,可以有效地缓解逆向选择和道德风险带来的负面影响。     

我国农村信贷市场信息不对称问题及对策研究

在我国农村信贷市场上，信息不对称现象广泛存在，而信息不对称造成的逆向选择和道德风险则是不良贷款发生、农村金融抑制的重要原因。本文主要分析逆向选择和道德风险产生的原因，并提出了相关的对策，力求解决农村信贷市场上的信息不对称问题。     

道德风险与逆向选择:构成存款保险制度缺陷的诱因

三大“金融安全网”之一的存款保险自创立以来，一直受信息不对称问题的困扰，道德风险与逆向选择使得该制度的作用在各国受到了广泛置疑。为此。本文结合信息经济学和保险学的相关知识分析了道德风险与逆向选择是如何构成存款保险的制度性缺陷的。     

Adverse selection in annuity markets: Evidence from the British Life Annuity Act of 1808

We study adverse selection using data from an 1808 Act of British Parliament that effectively opened a market for life annuities. Our analysis indicates significant selection effects. The evidence for adverse selection is strongest for a sub-sample of annuitants whose annuities were purchased by profit-seeking speculators, a sub-sample in which “advantageous selection” resulting from multi-dimensional heterogeneity is unlikely to have been significant. These results support the view that adverse selection can be masked by advantageous selection in empirical studies of standard insurance markets.     

基于最优化理论的药物不良反应率问题研究

目的研究制药企业在选择药物不良反应率时的行为。方法博弈论方法。结果与结论制药企业在选择药物不良反应率时,会考虑以下选择,若隐瞒药物真实的、较高的不良反应率虽然会存在一定的不良反应率发生的事件概率,但可以实现更多的销售,即使发生了严重的不良反应事件,扩大的销售额或许也可以弥补这些损失;而若如实的公布这些不良反应率则有可能会影响销售,若降低不良反应率则会增加成本。因此,制药企业会在隐瞒不良反应率和降低不良反应率之间进行博弈,而患者则会根据药物不良反应率来选择药物,也能制约制药企业对药物不良反应率的选择。     

Adverse Selection in the Annuities Market and the Impact of Privatizing Social Security

The observation that few Americans purchase life annuities has often been attributed to adverse selection. A still unanswered question is whether observable price increases caused by adverse selection can be generated endogenously in a life cycle model. This paper calibrates a pure life cycle model for a characteristic US cohort and reproduces three stylized facts. Adverse selection increases annuity prices by 7–10 percent; the cost of adverse selection rises with the age of the annuitant; and the cost is smaller for females than for males. Social security privatization could reduce annuity prices by between 2 and 3 percent.     

信息不对称、逆向选择和市场均衡

几乎所有研究信息不对称与逆向选择问题的文献都隐含着一家厂商在同一时刻只能提供单一质量水平产品的假设。本文在厂商可以同时提供高质量产品和低质量产品的假设基础上,通过建立模型来探讨信息不对称与逆向选择的关系。研究结论表明,当考虑到这一前提条件时,信息不对称所导致的逆向选择程度可能并不像先前的研究者所认为的那么严重,甚至可能不存在。此外,模型也指出,消费者所拥有的财富数量将严重地影响到逆向选择的程度,财富数量与逆向选择的严重程度存在着负相关关系。这个结论可以很好地解释在发展中国家假冒伪劣现象十分普遍的原因。最后,拟以浙江省龙井茶市场为例来验证本文所发展的理论。     

Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection

Summary. The paper analyzes an economy with two-sided adverse selection, focusing on equilibria that satisfy a refinement based on the notion of strategic stability. In the familiar case of one-sided adverse selection, agents reveal all of their private information as long as the contract space is rich enough. However, with two-sided adverse selection, the sufficient conditions for separation are much stronger. Received: September 3, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999     

Adverse selection and statistical discrimination: An analysis of Canadian automobile insurance

Statistical discrimination occurs when a characteristic, such as sex, is used as an indicator of the risk group of an individual. The theory of adverse selection is used to explain the occurrence of statistical discrimination. A model of the market for collision insurance, which is based on the theory of adverse selection, is estimated on Canadian data. The results suggest that adverse selection occurs in this market. Simulations of the effect of prohibiting sexual discrimination in the 21–24 age group indicate that the premiums for single females would increase substantially and that a significant proportion would no longer purchase collision insurance.     

Adverse selection and corporate governance

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse selection component than non-GLCs.     

Taxation,insurance, and precautionary labor

We examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in competitive insurance markets. In a previous literature, it has been shown that, with perfect insurance markets, social insurance improves welfare since it is able to redistribute without creating distortions. This result has been taken as robust to the introduction of adverse selection as this would only provide additional justifications for social insurance. We show, however, that adverse selection can weaken the case for social insurance compared to a situation with perfect markets. Whenever social insurance mitigates private underinsurance, it also causes welfare-reducing effects by decreasing precautionary labor supply and hence tax revenue. In addition, adverse selection may reduce the redistributive potential of social insurance. We illustrate our general results using different equilibrium concepts for the insurance market. Notably, we derive conditions under which a complete renunciation of social insurance is optimal and the government only relies on income taxation to achieve its redistributive objectives.     

Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions

Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed participant is known to be active, uninformed bidders will be more aggressive and the selling price will be higher. We conjecture that observable family links between buyer and seller entailed superior information and find a strong price premium when a related buyer purchased a slave, indicative of information asymmetry. We then test for adverse selection using sale motivation. Our results indicate large discounts on voluntary as compared to involuntary sales. Consistent with adverse selection, the market anticipated that predominantly low-productivity slaves would be brought to the market in voluntary sales.     

Genetic adverse selection: Evidence from long-term care insurance and Huntington disease

Individual, personalized genetic information is increasingly available, leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time, particularly in individual-payer insurance markets. We use data on individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD), a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity, to estimate adverse selection in long-term care insurance. We find strong evidence of adverse selection: individuals who carry the HD genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term care insurance. This finding is supported both by comparing individuals at risk for HD to those in the general population and by comparing across tested individuals in the HD-risk population with and without the HD mutation.