特别保障措施的解读及法律应对思考--从我国纺织品服装国际贸易摩擦入手

2005年1月1日起全球纺织品配额终结。但我国与美欧等国的纺织品服装摩擦却有增无减，究其原因，是其利用我国入世承诺所接受的特别保障措施条款对我国实施限制。本文对特别保障措施条款进行了较为详细的分析解读，并就法律上如何应对提出了自己的见解。     

中国保险业发展的回顾与展望

一、入世五年来保险业发展回顾 2001年12月我国正式加入世贸组织，按照关贸总协定的规定，保险业信守入世承诺，履行了最惠国待遇、透明度规定、市场准入规定、国民待遇问题等义务性条款以及保护性条款，做出了高水平、宽领域、分阶段的开放。2003年底，外国非寿险公司在华设立形式无限制。2003年底，除有关法定保险业务外，     

入世、市场化进程与农业政策性金融

入世正极大地加快和推动我国农业和粮食流通的市场化和贸易自由化进程，同时深刻地改变了农业政策性金融的经营环境，日益市场化的经营环境、政府职能的转变和国有粮食企业的战略性改组都给农业政策性金融工作带来新的挑战。本文首先说明入世条款与农业承诺的实质，然后分析入世给我国农业和粮食流通体制以及农业政策性金融的经营环境带来的深刻影响，最后是对做好农业政策性金融工作的对策思考。     

兑现入世承诺与全面推进开放

入世谈判的16年，是我国国民观念调整的16年；兑现入世承诺的8年，是我国全面推进开放型经济发展的8年。 全面兑现入世承诺的8年 全面解读兑现入世承诺全面兑现入世承诺，结束了作为新成员与世界贸易组织的关系，开始了与世界贸易组织其他成员一道共同行为推进贸易自由化的时期，尽管出现了数十年来罕见的全球金融危机，但我国并未放缓或停滞兑现入世承诺的进程，充分显示出我国作为发展中大国的国际信誉与责任。     

浅谈涉外经济总体趋势和发展

七十年代,我国经济已开始走向世界。九十年代,我国承诺接纳国际货币基金组织协定第八条款,人民币经常项目可兑换开始运行。到了二十一世纪,我国正式成为世贸组织成员,我国对外开放也进入"内涵"开放阶段。从入世关键时期开始,从国际收支角度分析我国涉外经济总体趋势、展望我国涉外经济未来发展,准确处理当前我国涉外经济发展存在问题,进一步深化我国对外开放具有极为主要的现实价值。     

浅析“非市场经济国家地位条款”

我国入世时接受“非市场经济国家地位条款”,主要是WTO的相关规定在四个方面大大制约了我国在具体谈判中的回旋余地。国内对该条款作了影响甚大的误读或曲解,它对我国出口的羁绊作用被过分夸大,而它为防止被滥用所采取的手段和可能发挥的积极作用却被忽略或低估。围绕如何正确对待该条款的问题,还可从中获得一些重要的启示。     

我国纺织品出口特别保障措施的应对

中国是纺织生产，贸易大国。尽管从2005年1月1日起，根据WTO相关协议规定，在全球范围内取消纺织品配额，但是我国纺织品出口仍然受到中国入世承诺的一些特殊条款的制约，受到发达国家和发展中国家更加严厉的双重挤压。在入世过程中，一些WTO成员特别是美国坚持认为中国是非市场经济国家认为中国庞大的纺织品出口贸易总额给其他成员方的国内工业造成了严重的威胁。     

改革新视角

龙永图：入世效应须从两方面理解外经贸副部长龙永图日前表示，入世给中国带来的最大影响，主要来自信心效应与观念效应两方面。而信心因素并非从天而降，它主要来自中国入世所做的两个承诺：承诺按国际规则办事，完善法律规则和提高透明度，这大大增强了外资对中国体制稳定和法律保障的信心；承诺开放市场，最具代表性的就是汽车市场，２００２年中国汽车市场表现出前所未有的购销两旺的局面，这其实也是信心问题。因为激活车市的并不仅仅是关税降低，入世才是引发积累已久的旺盛需求的导火索。随着中国经济和社会的发展完善，无论是国外对…     

WTO规则与中国国家利益的维护

WTO规则在强调国家之间基本权利和义务对等的基础上,对发展中国家的权利义务作出了一些特殊安排,体现了WTO规则对成员国利益的考量与妥协,反映了WTO致力于促进自由贸易、提高人民生活水平、协调不同经济发展水平的国家之间共同与可持续发展的终极目标。自"入世"至今,中国已全面兑现《中国入世议定书》中的承诺,除有关认定我国非市场经济地位的特殊规定尚未终止使用外,过渡性具体产品保障机制等一系列不利于中国对外经济发展的限制性条款均已届满,中国已成功融入世界经济一体化进程之中。当今时代,经济利益已成为各国追求的核心价值目标,因此,充分利用WTO规则维护我国国家利益具有重大的现实意义。     

地方政府应对入世的几项突出任务

WTO 更意味着规则的建设,而不是竞争;受到最大冲击的是政府,而不是企业。浙江省自1999年以来逐步开展政府入世应对工作,但从总体上看还刚起步。根据世贸组织规则要求和我国的入世承诺,结合浙江实际,做好政府应对入世工作,需着力研究解决好以下几个重大问题。     

Responsibilities of China after Accession to the WTO

China became a full member of the WTO on 11 December 2001. China has not only increased its presence in mainstream world trade but has gained knowledge about the basic rules of market economies and become more adaptable to changes in the international economy. As a new member of the WTO, being adaptable to changes in the international economy is essential. As a large developing country, China, with its rapid economic growth, huge volume of trade and substantial market potential, has exerted and will continue to exert profound influence on the world economy. It is commonly recognized that China's influence cannot be ignored in the world economy. Five years since its accession to the WTO, China is considering where it stands as a member of the WTO. What does China hope to achieve by being a member of the WTO, how can these hopes be shared among all trading partners, what is China's responsibility in this, and what are the responsibilities of other trading partners?     

WTO过渡期结束后中国政府对外开放战略与对策刍议

我国加入WTO后享受的过渡期2006年结束。过渡期结束后,我国对外开放将面临许多新问题。本文分析了过渡期结束后我国对外开放将面临的问题和战略,探索了我国政府应采取的措施和对策。     

China's WTO Commitments in Agriculture and Impacts of Potential OECD Agricultural Trade Liberalizations*

After accession to the WTO, China's agriculture is affected by the implementation of its WTO commitments and will be impacted by any multilateral liberalization (actions by the rich OECD economies in particular) resulting from the Doha negotiations. Using the actual commitment data, our computable general equilibrium simulation results show that China's WTO commitments will lead to increased agricultural imports and slightly declined outputs in China. The resulting efficiency gains will be negated by terms‐of‐trade losses, leading to quantitatively small welfare impacts. Furthermore, sectoral results depend critically on correctly representing the more complex policy measures, such as the tariff rate quotas. The negative output effects on Chinese agriculture can be alleviated/reversed if the rich OECD countries commit to reform their agriculture policies. The present paper concludes that trade liberalization should be carried out in both developing and developed countries. Reforming the latter will be particularly helpful in easing the problems facing those developing countries that are carrying out ambitious trade reforms.     

The U.S. proposed carbon tariffs, WTO scrutiny and China’s responses

With governments from around the world trying to hammer out a post-2012 climate change agreement, no one would disagree that a U.S. commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions is essential to such a global pact. However, despite U.S. president Obama’s announcement to push for a commitment to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 17% by 2020, in reality it is questionable whether U.S. Congress will agree to specific emissions cuts, although they are not ambitious at all from the perspectives of both the EU and developing countries, without the imposition of carbon tariffs on Chinese products to the U.S. market, even given China’s own announcement to voluntarily seek to reduce its carbon intensity by 40–45% over the same period. This dilemma is partly attributed to flaws in current international climate negotiations, which have been focused on commitments on the two targeted dates of 2020 and 2050. However, if the international climate change negotiations continue on their current course without extending the commitment period to 2030, which would really open the possibility for the U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wants from the other, the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures seems essential to secure passage of any U.S. legislation capping its own greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the joint WTO-UNEP report indicates that border carbon adjustment measures might be allowed under the existing WTO rules, depending on their specific design features and the specific conditions for implementing them. Against this background, this paper argues that, on the U.S. side, there is a need to minimize the potential conflicts with WTO provisions in designing such border carbon adjustment measures. The U.S. also needs to explore, with its trading partners, ccooperative sectoral approaches to advancing low-carbon technologies and/or concerted mitigation efforts in a given sector at the international level. Moreover, to increase the prospects for a successful WTO defence of the Waxman-Markey type of border adjustment provision, there should be: 1) a period of good faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing such trade measures; 2) consideration of alternatives to trade provisions that could reasonably be expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions; and 3) trade provisions that should allow importers to submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products. Meanwhile, being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures, China needs to, at the right time, indicate a serious commitment to address climate change issues to challenge the legitimacy of the U.S. imposing carbon tariffs by signaling well ahead that it will take on binding absolute emission caps around the year 2030, and needs the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute emissions caps. This paper argues that there is a clear need within a climate regime to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level. As exemplified by export tariffs that China applied on its own during 2006–08, the paper shows that defining the comparability of climate efforts can be to China’s advantage. Furthermore, given the fact that, in volume terms, energy-intensive manufacturing in China values 7 to 8 times that of India, and thus carbon tariffs have a greater impact on China than on India, the paper questions whether China should hold the same stance on this issue as India as it does now, although the two largest developing countries should continue to take a common position on other key issues in international climate change negotiations.     

How much did China's WTO accession increase economic growth in resource-rich countries?

We provide an estimate of China's impact on the growth rate of resource-rich countries after its WTO accession on 11 December 2001. Our empirical approach follows the logic of the differences-in-differences estimator. In addition to temporal variation arising from the WTO accession, which we argue was exogenous to other countries' growth trajectories, we exploit spatial variation arising from differences in natural resource wealth. This allows us to compare changes in economic growth in the post-accession period relative to the pre-accession period between countries that were able to benefit from the surge in demand for industrial commodities brought about by China's WTO accession and countries that were less able to do so. We find that roughly one tenth of average annual post-accession growth in resource-rich countries was due to China's increased appetite for commodities. We use this finding to inform the debate about what will happen to economic growth in resource-rich countries as China rebalances and its demand for commodities weakens.     

The development strategy for china's travel service industry after china's WTO entry: Present status and future prospects

China's tourism market is growing in importance since China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is likely that China's opening to the world market will lead to the further development of its travel service industry. Even though China will be confronted by some difficulties, its WTO commitment may have positive impacts on the travel service industry such as the development of technologies, introduction of advanced management strategies, improved industrial structure, and increased competition in the sector. This paper aims to explain the WTO‐related factors in China's travel service industry, analyzing and evaluating the sector's development strategy.     

中国加入WTO以来的美国对华贸易政策

中美贸易摩擦并未因中国加入WTO而得到缓解,相反却向更深层、更宏观、更关键的层面发展。这表明美国对华贸易政策的制定和实施有其自身的逻辑和规律,并不受具体事件或外在机制的影响。美国贸易政治的实质是政府、国会和利益集团三方之间的博弈和平衡,而本文就中国加入WTO承诺履行、知识产权、反补贴、特保措施以及人民币汇率等美国对华贸易政策中的重大议题展开分析,重点剖析美国政府、国会和利益集团在各个议题上的不同立场,探索美国对华贸易政策选择的政治和经济根源,并进而预测美国对华贸易政策的前景。     

基于改进的引力模型解析我国外贸发展的动因变化

本文通过将Novy改进的引力模型进行分解,发现影响外贸发展的主要因素是经济的发展和贸易成本的下降,通过结合中国、印度和20个国家近15年的贸易和经济发展数据,验证了Novy理论的普适性;在此基础上,本文还将中国与20个国家在中国加入WTO前后和金融危机爆发前后的贸易变化进行经验分析,得到的基本结论是:加入WTO后贸易成本的贡献度明显上升(提升17%),说明加入WTO后良好的贸易环境和各种壁垒的下降确实降低了我国的贸易成本,但经济增长对外贸发展仍然起到至关重要的推动作用(提升了51%)。而金融危机爆发之后,贸易成本的增加是导致金融危机后我国外贸下滑的主要原因,虽然经济增长对外贸有正向的贡献,但贡献度较小(仅为13%),不能弥补贸易成本的负面影响。     

China and the World Trade Organization

For nine long years China made determined but unsuccessful efforts to rejoin GATT, having gone through 21 rounds of protracted negotiations. China failed to become a founding member of WTO when it superseded GATT in January 1995. In 1989 GATT was about to work out the final terms of protocol for China's entry as a reforming socialist economy. But the Tiananmen event made the developed country members, led by the US, politicize the issue of China's membership. They also wanted to prise open the vast China market as a condition for China's entry; i.e. China to be admitted as a developed economy. China for its part regarded the price of its WTO membership as too exorbitant without being allowed a reasonable timetable for adjustment. Minister Wu Yi considered the US demands ‘absolutely unacceptable’. Hence the impasse over China's WTO membership continued. Apart from the imperative of trade diplomacy, however, the perceived benefits of WTO membership to China are difficult to capture. They are mainly general and long-term in nature, e.g. facilitating China's further economic reform and integrating China into the global economy. However, the costs and risks to China could be considerable, much depending on the exact protocol terms of China's membership. In general many state-owned enterprises and township-village enterprises would suffer from stiffer foreign competition. The effect of WTO on Chinese agriculture would be minimal, while the impact on the manufacturing sector could be quite disruptive. The service sector could fare even worse if no protective measures were to be taken. That explains why China needs to insist on developing-country terms of entry. Without doubt, China will eventually accede to WTO. It is a gross anomaly for this global multilateral trade body to continue excluding China, the world's 11th largest trading nation, on which also hinge the two other great trading entities of Hong Kong and Taiwan. There is increasing awareness of this point in the EU; and it will sooner or later also prevail in Washington.     

如何实现中国的银行在公共形象方面的品牌国际化——关于中外银行沟通推广的分析

1978年的改革开放使中国走进了新纪元，中国经济飞速增长；2001年，中国又加入了世界贸易组织（WTO），这对于改进中国企业或公司的公共形象是个机会．同时也是一种挑战。中国公司必须尽快改进自己的品牌形象。中国的银行面临的挑战来自于那些在世界各地取得巨大成功、拥有顶级服务，以及非常良好的公共形象的国外银行。尽管中国银行（BOC）和中国工商银行（ICBC）等四家银行已经成为世界前25位的大银行，但是中国的银行仍然存在着诸多问题．例如不够专业的形象，不完善的服务和给予消费者的模糊的商务感觉。所以，通过本篇论文，我将提出一种符合国际化标准的新品牌创建系统．为中国的银行增添一笔国际色彩