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1.
Günther Rehme 《Journal of Economics》2007,91(1):1-40
Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing
(“left-wing”) governments mimic non-redistributing (“right-wing”) policies for fear of capital loss if capital markets become
highly integrated and the countries are technologically similar. “Left-right” competition leads to more redistribution and
lower GDP growth than “left-left” competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one's opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, “left-wing” governments have higher
GDP growth when competing with other “left-wing” governments. The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation
between redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and current account deficits may be good for relatively
high growth. 相似文献
2.
John Marangos 《Forum for Social Economics》2011,40(1):119-137
The “transition” process in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) was one of the most dramatic non-marginal adjustments
in economic systems ever experienced. During the transition process, elements of centrally administered socialism and embryonic
market relations co-existed. This made traditional economic theory irrelevant. The purpose of this paper is to discover policy
concerns and outcomes that orthodox “transition” literature ignores. Stanfield’s contribution to the economic literature,
a cultural-holistic approach of radical institutionalism, makes it possible to understand the “transition” process from a
new and more enlightened perspective. Stanfield provides a better understanding of the complexities involved, since the nature
of change in the EEFSU is social and ever-lasting, not an end-state in the form of “transition”. Students of transition and
of international development would benefit from this novel approach, which dismisses “transition” and substitutes “social
change”, as the proper designation and manifestation of what actually took place in EEFSU. 相似文献
3.
Dimitrios Xefteris 《Constitutional Political Economy》2011,22(3):221-237
Constitutions are multidimensional objects with non-trivial implications on the structure of the political environment and,
therefore, on the policy outcomes. This paper models constitutions as sets of “restraints” on the authority’s choice freedom
(absolute and democracy restraints). We argue that even if both kinds of restraints seem to be serving the same purpose (increase
social welfare), “democracy restraints” prolong the “life” of a constitution while “absolute restraints” not. We moreover
use the proposed way of modelling constitutions in order to explain the dominance of intermediate (in terms of tightness of
“democracy restraints”) constitutions in the real world. 相似文献
4.
Frédéric Lordon 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(1):1-21
The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies,
and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing
that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn
“productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path.
Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by
the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as
long term and endogenous outcomes. 相似文献
5.
André Varella Mollick 《Empirical Economics》2011,41(3):769-785
We estimate the world elasticity of substitution between labor types on a very well-known data set. Using enrollment ratios
and government expenditures on education as instruments, the plausible elasticities varying from 2.00 to 3.21 for the “college-completed”
definition suggests imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor. Considerably higher values are found for the
“secondary” and “primary-completed” definitions. Overall, the higher the threshold for defining skilled labor, the lower the
elasticity and less likely is the switch between types of labor. These findings complement micro-evidence and support stronger
links between productivity and output for the “college educated” labor definition. 相似文献
6.
Emerging from the Hobbesian jungle: Might takes and makes rights 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Bruce L. Benson 《Constitutional Political Economy》1994,5(2):129-158
The conflict over scarce resources in the Hobbesian jungle may be avoided if rules of obligation delineating property rights
develop along with institutions of governance. One possibility is a “duress contract” as the strongest individual threatens
others who agree to enslavement. Thus, “might takes rights.” Alternatively, individuals with similar capacities for violence
may enter a “consent contract” establishing rules of obligation and then voluntarily participating in governance. They will
not agree to a rights assignment that produces less wealth than they expect through violence, however, so “might makes rights.”
A might-takes-and-makes-rights analysis is outlined to explain the continuum of legal institutions and property rights allocations
that can evolve between these two extremes of duress and consent. Increasingly finely delineated private property rights tend
to evolve under institutions produced by consent contracts, while common pool problems tend to arise near the duress contract
end of the spectrum.
This paper draws from a larger project on “The Evolution of Law” which has been supported by the Earhart Foundation. Discussions
with and comments by Randy Holcombe, Kevin Reffit, and two anonymous referees led to significant improvements in the development
and presentation of the arguments, as did discussant comments on a related paper made by Douglas Ginsburg and participants
in the Friedrich August von Hayek Symposium on “Competition Among Institutions” in Freiburg, Germany, June 1–4, 1994, sponsored
by the International Institute at George Mason University and the Walter Eucken Institute, Freiburg. 相似文献
7.
This paper's goal is to construct a positive theory of economic fairness. Using the theoretical schema developed by Hurwicz
and others, the paper makes precise the notions of an “institution,” “fairness fraiming,” and “institutional framing.” Four
fairness propositions yield an important corollary: the economic environment, the operative institution and history give meaning
to the often used FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (“equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequellay, in
proportion to relevant similarities and differences”). We support these four propositions and corollary by an analysis of
laboratory, survey, and anecdotal evidence. Finally we describe a number of areas for future research.
The authors would like to thank Allen Buchanan, James Buchanan, Joel Feinberg, Elizabeth Hoffman, David Schmitz, Linda Schnabel
Stizer, Vernon Smith, Richard Wagner, the participants in the Aspen Institute's Conference on “Local Justice and Fair Allocation”,
the members of the Industrial Organization Workshop of the Department of Economics at the University of Arizona, and panel
participants at the Public Choice Society Meeting for their help and comments at various stages of this paper's preparation.
Responsibility for errors is the authors' alone. 相似文献
8.
Pavel Pelikan 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2012,22(1):1-8
I thank Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbj?rn Knudsen for their thought-provoking response to my latest generalization of Darwinism,
and welcome their proposal to cooperate, after many years of our independent searches. I agree with them that our searches
contain more similarities than both they and I had previously seen, but consider our remaining differences—especially in the
terms employed and in the definitions of the terms we both employ, including “information,” “instructions,” “programs,” and
“Lamarckism”—more important than they do. Their response also exaggerates or distorts some of my arguments. All this needs
to be clarified before our cooperation can start. 相似文献
9.
Michael C. Munger 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2009,22(2):169-175
The use of the “principal–agent” model makes an implicit assumption about the existence of an underlying global optimum or
“general will.” This assumption is debatable, and Besley does not defend it sufficiently or even seem to realize how strong
an assumption it is. Still, it is standard in the literature, and Besley’s book is a very strong contribution to that literature.
Its two greatest strengths are its solid microfoundations, and its use of the classical “comparative statics” approach to
analyze dynamics.
相似文献
10.
We analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of “credence goods” via alternative labelling procedures.
When consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute, producers can either self-label their
products, or have them certified by a third party. The government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on
either the “green” or the “brown” producers. Our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of
third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information. We extend our analysis
to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers. When corrupt producers can affix spurious labels, the
government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities. We find that mandatory self-labelling
schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling, unless the “market share effect” greatly exceeds the “incentive-to-cheat
effect”.
相似文献
11.
Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows accompanied with globalization have raised the concern of a “race to the
bottom” phenomenon in environmental protection. This is because footloose investors of “dirty” industries tend to relocate
to “pollution havens” of the developing world. However when pollutant is transboundary (as in the case of greenhouse gases),
the source country’s incentive to relocate and the recipient country’s willingness to host such industries are not straightforward.
This article studies the relationship between FDI and environmental regulation using a North–South market share game model
in a two-country setting, when pollution is transboundary. Contrary to the pollution haven hypothesis, our model shows that
if market sizes of the two countries are small, FDI will raise the emission standard of the host country, resulting in a “race-to-the-top”
phenomenon; but if market sizes are large enough, FDI will not change the emission standard of the South (from its laxest
form), a finding that is consistent with the “regulatory chill” argument. Equilibrium FDI is contingent on the fixed cost
of FDI, as the traditional proximity–concentration tradeoff theory predicts. 相似文献
12.
The service industry in China is underdeveloped, in comparison with not only the past experience of developed countries at
the similar level of GDP per capita, but also other similar developing countries at present. We define this deviation of China’s
service industry from the development trend in other countries as the “development deviation puzzle,” and propose a conceptual
framework based on the “manufacturing cost disease” hypothesis to understand the reasons behind this puzzle. We test our hypothesis
using the data from the urban cluster in Yangtze River Delta. The results indicate that labor productivity growth in service
industry is driven by capital investment and the “development deviation puzzle” is indeed rooted in the “manufacturing cost
disease.” Our analysis suggests that, to correct the underdevelopment of service industry, the strategy of investment-driven
industrialization and urbanization must be changed. Expansion of producer services is important in increasing the intensities
of human capital and foreign investment. 相似文献
13.
We develop a model for economic growth applicable to a group of countries, constituting around half of the gross global production,
that have been consistently “catching up” to the US since 1960 or so. This group can be termed “the convergence club.” The
model has a theoretical basis developed in other publications (cited), but the present work is essentially empirical. It demonstrates
that there is a very strong correlation between “catchup” growth, with respect to the US, and an energy proxy (EP). The energy
proxy that works best is a linear combination of domestic electric power consumption petroleum (oil) consumption, per capita,
compared to the US levels. The results presented here do not constitute a theory of growth, but they are consistent with theory
presented elsewhere. On a practical level, we argue that consistent “catchup” trends over the past 40 years can safely be
extrapolated for a few more decades for scenario construction purposes. We also believe that the observed catchup trends can
be regarded as “potential” mid-term or long-term growth trajectories for transition economies and others that have recently
been adversely affected by conflict or mismanagement. 相似文献
14.
Maria-Soledad Castaño 《International Advances in Economic Research》2007,13(2):139-145
The main goal of this paper is to analyse the relationship between social capital and economic growth taking into account
the role of fiscal policy from theoretical and empirical points of view. To achieve this goal, “Human Capital and Public Capital
Effects on Economic Growth” is focused on the effects of two traditional factors: human capital and public capital effects
on economic growth. “Social Capital Effects on Economic Growth” considers qualitative variables introducing some socioeconomic
effects on economic growth process analysis. In this case, social capital the main variable will be considered. “Empirical
Analysis,” an empirical analysis is developed considering the case of European countries prior to the EU enlargement. Finally,
in Conclusions,” the main conclusions will be resumed.
相似文献
15.
Jean-Pierre Aubin 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2003,13(2):95-124
Socio-economic networks, neural networks and genetic networks describe collective phenomena through constraints relating
actions of several actors, coalitions of these actors and multilinear connectionist operators acting on the set of actions
of each coalition. We provide a class of control systems governing the evolution of actions, coalitions and multilinear connectionist
operators under which the architecture of the network remains viable. The controls are the “viability multipliers” of the
“resource space” in which the constraints are defined. They are involved as “tensor products” of the actions of the coalitions
and the viability multiplier, allowing us to encapsulate in this dynamical and multilinear framework the concept of Hebbian
learning rules in neural networks in the form of “multi-Hebbian” dynamics in the evolution of connectionist operators. They
are also involved in the evolution of coalitions through the “cost” of the constraints under the viability multiplier regarded
as a price. 相似文献
16.
Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Viktor J. Vanberg 《Constitutional Political Economy》2007,18(3):199-222
The paper examines the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from the perspective of constitutional economics, focusing
on the distinction between a political community’s constitutional choice of the rules of the “market game,” and the market
players’ sub-constitutional choice of strategies within these rules. Three versions of CSR-demands are identified and discussed,
a “soft,” a “hard”, and a “radical” version. The soft version is concerned with the issue of how “socially responsible” corporations ought to play the market game within existing
rules. The hard version is about how the rules of the market ought to be changed in order to induce “socially responsible” corporate behavior.
And the radical version questions the compatibility of CSR and the logic of the market game, calling in effect for adopting some alternative
economic regime.
相似文献
Viktor J. VanbergEmail: |
17.
Stability of risk preference parameter estimates within the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Duncan James 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):123-141
This paper reports new data from both selling and buying versions of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure. First, when
using the selling version of BDM, the cross-sectional mean of CRRA risk preference parameter estimates shifts from a value
consistent with “as if” risk-seeking behavior in the early baseline to a value closer to “as if” risk neutrality in the late
baseline. Second, when using the buying version of BDM, the cross-sectional mean of CRRA risk preference parameter estimates
does not appear to change over time in a statistically significant manner. The cross-sectional mean from the late baseline
of the buying version of BDM is closer to “as if” risk neutrality and to the late baseline estimates from the selling version
of BDM than it is to either early baseline estimates from the selling version of BDM or typical estimates from the first price
auction. Use of dominated offers is correlated with deviations from “as if” risk neutrality; this suggests the possibility
that the early deviations from “as if” risk neutrality reflect errors.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at .
JEL Classification D80 相似文献
18.
Peter Egger 《Empirica》2010,37(1):5-17
Trade economists have for long considered gravity models to estimate unexhausted potentials for bilateral trade. Similar to
the discrepancy between “normal” and “actual” bilateral trade, one may ask the question about the difference between “normal”
and actual bilateral multinational activity. However, with multinational activity, zero bilateral data and heteroskedasticity
are very important, even more so than with trade data. Therefore, this paper suggests using generalized linear rather than
log-linear models to specify “normal” FDI and obtain estimates of unexhausted FDI potentials. I use panel data on Austria’s
bilateral multinational activity across 25 countries and 7 country-blocs, 4 sectors and 13 years to illustrate the disadvantage
of log-linear model estimation at quasi-maximum likelihood estimation. 相似文献
19.
Thomas O. Nitsch 《Forum for Social Economics》1994,24(1):1-40
From Aristotle to Scitovsky the nature and scope of human economy and economics have remained essentially the same, viz. the
prudent/efficient/welfaremaximizing administration/utilization of the scarce resources (chrèmata, “choses utiles,” etc.) comprising the household and the expertise there-of. Aristotle’s protégé, Theophrastus (d. 287 B.C.),
went to the extent of counseling that, for the “health and well-being” of all its members (including the livestock), theoikos “should be airy in the summer and sunny in the winter,” it no doubt going without saying that its roof should be kept in
good repair. Today, it behooves us to critically re-examine our traditional concepts of wealth, “land,” “the environment,”
and the socioeconomic unit whose storehouse of resources is to be managed aright, particularly along the history-of-thought
lines presented here.
Address delivered at a session on March 25, 1994 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics,
Chicago. The author thanks Tom Coffey (Latin), Brace Malina and Plinio Prioreschi (Italian) for linguistic assistance. 相似文献
20.
The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term
growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets
for “old” innovative products and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which
tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest positive growth potentially
requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though
a locally saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets
is sufficiently high, as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap”
may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The policy implications
are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can
lead to stagnation in the long term.
相似文献