Notes and comments. Ricardo on income tax: a note

Despite the fact that Ricardo experienced Pitt's income taxpolicies, and that he regarded taxation as the most importantissue to which the principles of political economy should beapplied, he rarely referred to actual tax reforms. This paperindicates that Ricardo's system of economics cannot bring aboutany tax that is completely compatible with his main criteriafor taxation (distribution neutrality, price neutrality andminimum taxation) as well as certainty, convenience and thesecurity of property. This result may explain why Ricardo didnot say which type of taxation system the British governmentshould establish.     

城镇化进程中的房地产税制改革研究

近年来，我国部分地区城镇化扩张现象比较突出，造成土地闲置、资源浪费，致使失地农民生活缺乏保障。房地产税，作为调节房产和土地资源的重要手段，理应发挥其积极作用。我国房地产税的改革方向应为：在公平与效率兼顾的条件下，通过合并部分税种、完善部分税种的课税要素等措施来适度增加地方财政收入，一方面满足地方财政的正常开支，另一方面为失地农民的社会保障提供充足的资金，同时，增强其对土地市场的调控能力，抑制对土地资源的过度需求以及房地产的过度开发，提高土地资源的使用效率。     

Efficient decentralized fiscal and environmental policy: A dual purpose Henry George tax

One consequence of decentralized responsibility to set tax policy and environmental standards is that local governments might try to attract industry and jobs by underproviding local public goods with lower taxes or lax environmental standards or both. But if local authorities exploit fixed property site (i.e., land) taxation to fund local public goods, affect firm migration, and internalize potential local emission rents, herein we find decentralized efficiency is supported. This result reflects a dual form of the classic Henry George theorem previously overlooked.     

On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives

Taxation in an economy containing land and labor is studied. The tax system is a compromise based on the relative power of all groups of individuals. (The model extends one of Aumann and Kurz.) In response to the threat of taxation by a majority, individuals can evade taxation of their labor-time (by destroying it), but cannot avoid taxation of the land they own. One result is that the compromise tax rate on land is higher than that on labor. This contrasts with the classical normative result that in order to minimize the efficiency loss, this tax rate should be higher.     

Consumption tax and economic growth in an overlapping generations model with money holdings

This paper examines the effect of a consumption tax on economic growth using an overlapping generations (OLG) model with money holdings. We show that the neutrality of the consumption tax does not hold in the money-in-the-utility-function model, because a change in consumption taxation induces the substitution of money holdings for consumption, and the money is the net wealth within the OLG structure. An increase in the consumption tax rate lowers (raises) the growth rate under a low (high) monetary expansion rate. On the other hand, in the cash-in-advance model and the money-in-the-production-function model, the neutrality of consumption taxation holds even within the OLG structure, because in these models there is no substitution of consumption and money holdings.     

Progressive taxation and the intensity and timing of investment

This paper examines the effect of progressive taxation on a firm's investment intensity and timing decisions using a real options approach. The firm possesses a perpetual option to invest in a project at any instant by incurring an irreversible investment cost at that time. The amount of the irreversible investment cost determines the intensity of investment that augments the value of the project. Tax progression is specified in a particular case of a constant marginal tax rate with an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. We show that the firm's investment decisions are neutral to tax progression only when the exogenously given tax exemption threshold is sufficiently large. When tax neutrality does not hold, we show that progressive taxation has a perverse effect on investment intensity. Finally, we show that progressive taxation induces the firm to invest earlier as compared to the case under proportional taxation (i.e., in the absence of any tax exemption).     

Should land and capital be taxed at a uniform rate?

Abstract If jurisdictions are allowed to tax land and capital separately, they tax only land, because capital taxation distorts the allocation of mobile capital. To exploit absentee owners, however, jurisdictions tax land beyond the efficient level. As absentee ownership increases throughout the economy, land taxation results in greater inefficiency. To alleviate the inefficiency of overtaxing land, the higher‐level government intervenes to require jurisdictions to tax both capital and land at a uniform rate, because the desire to attract capital lowers the tax rate. Uniform taxation of land and capital, or property taxation, thus may be more efficient than separate taxation. JEL Classification: H21, H71 Est‐ce que la terre et le capital devraient être taxés d’une manière uniforme? Si on permettait aux diverses juridictions de taxer capital et terre séparément, elles taxeraient seulement la terre parce que la fiscalité imposée au capital crée des distorsions dans l’allocation du capital mobile. Mais, pour exploiter les propriétaires absents, les diverses juridictions imposent un fardeau fiscal sur la terre qui va au delà de ce que l’efficacité commande. A proportion que la propriété absente se développe dans l’économie, la fiscalité imposée à la terre devient source de plus en plus grande inefficacité. Pour réduire cette inefficacité attribuable à la sur‐taxation de la terre, le niveau sénior de gouvernement intervient pour forcer les juridictions juniors à taxer capital et terre au même taux, parce que le désir d’attirer le capital réduit le taux de taxation. Il se peut donc que la taxation uniforme de la terre et du capital, ou de la taxation sur la propriété, soit plus efficace que des taux d’imposition différents.     

After‐tax Valuation of Convertible Bonds and Participation Exemption

This paper studies the after‐tax valuation of convertible bonds in the light of Europe's participation exemption (PEX) rules and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The focus is on Italy's representative case. PEX rules exempt from company taxation capital gains realized by companies selling stocks. PEX rules raise the value of convertibles as investor companies can strategically convert the bond into stock to enjoy PEX. Historical cost‐based national accounting standards imply taxation upon realization and valuable tax timing options (TTOs). ‘Fair value’ based IFRS entail mark‐to‐market taxation, which ‘kills’ TTOs, but investor companies can convert the bond early in order to enjoy PEX. Early conversion can be valuable.     

Property taxation as incentive for cost control: Empirical evidence for utility services in Norway

Recent theoretical research suggests that property taxation has incentive effects that can help control cost problems in the public sector. The institutional setting in Norway allows this first empirical investigation of the incentive effect of property taxation, since we can separate between local governments with and without property tax. The raw data of the variation in the unit cost level for utilities show that local governments with property tax have 20% lower unit cost. Using both linear regression and propensity score matching, we are not able to wash out the difference in unit costs. Our interpretation is that having a visible and controversial local tax related to property stimulates voter interest in local government activities and thereby may help cost control.     

An extension of the Tiebout hypothesis of voting with one’s feet: the Medicaid magnet hypothesis

This study empirically extends the Tiebout hypothesis of ‘voting with one’s feet’ in two ways. First, it provides updated estimates using net migration data for the period 2000–2008. Second, in addition to investigating variables reflecting public education outlays, property taxation and income taxation, it investigates whether migrants are attracted to states with higher Medicaid benefits per recipient. The latter hypothesis is referred to as the ‘Medicaid magnet hypothesis’. The analysis includes three economic variables, three quality of life variables and three Tiebout-type factors in addition to Medicaid benefits. Results indicate that consumer voters were attracted to states with higher per pupil public school spending, lower property and income tax rates, and that certain consumer-voters may be attracted to states that offer higher levels of Medicaid benefits.     

Wine Tax Reform: The Impact of Introducing a Volumetric Excise Tax for Wine

The recent Henry tax review recommended substantial changes to Australian alcohol taxation policy. Here, the implications for the Australian wine industry of the Henry tax review's recommendations are explored using a computable general equilibrium model. The results show that: (i) replacement of the Wine Equalisation Tax (WET) with a revenue‐neutral volumetric excise tax would have a small negative impact on the wine industry; (ii) removal of the WET rebate would have a substantial negative impact on small wineries; and (iii) applying the packaged beer excise rate across all alcoholic beverages would have a notable negative impact on the wine industry.     

Optimal firm behaviour under different fiscal regimes

This paper presents a theoretical framework for studying tax effects on optimal entrepreneurial behaviour; this is done within the context of a partial equilibrium model of the firm. Several regimes of corporate income taxation are evaluated with respect to their (non-)neutrality characteristics. Subsequently, the degrees of tax shifting and tax compensation have been derived by means of a model specified in rather simple terms. Evaluating it numerically, we find that the Dutch regime tends to neutrality, or possibly to slightly negative non-neutrality.     

Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective

Abstract Models of fiscal federalism rarely account for the efficiency implications of intergovernmental fiscal ties for federal tax policy. This paper shows that fiscal institutions such that federal tax deductibility, vertical revenue‐sharing, and fiscal equalization (being common features of existing federations) encourage local taxation, but may discourage federal taxation. Furthermore, the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending. We also show that, when considering Leviathan governments, fiscal institutions reduce confiscatory taxation by the federal government. The result is contrary to the Cartelization Hypothesis ( Brennan and Buchanan 1980 ). Finally, we characterize the efficient design of intergovernmental fiscal ties.     

Principles and Practice of Resource Rent Taxation

The Henry Review placed the taxation of rents from mines back on the national policy agenda. Mineral rent is potentially a source of neutral taxation. However, the various means of taxing resource rents in practice either fall short of the ideal of neutrality or collect for the revenue only a small proportion of the mineral rent. This article discusses the six principle instruments for taxing resource projects. It evaluates these forms of taxation in relation to stability, neutrality and government revenue maximisation. It suggests a combination of instruments that is likely to establish a good balance among objectives.     

Viewpoint: Empirical evidence and tax policy design: lessons from the Mirrlees Review

Abstract This paper examines the role of evidence in drawing up the recommendations for tax reform in the Mirrlees Review. The arguments are organised loosely under five related headings: (i) Key margins of adjustment. (ii) Measurement of effective tax rates. (iii) The importance of information and complexity. (iv) Evidence on the size of responses. (v) Implications from theory for tax design. Although the Mirrlees Review focuses on all aspects of tax reform, the focus is this paper is on the taxation of earnings with some examples drawn from the taxation of consumption and savings.     

The Effects of Bequest Tax on Land Prices and Land Use

The paper examines whether bequest taxation affects land use, using an overlapping-generations model. In Japan, in assessing land for the purpose of inheritance taxation, the assessed value is less than the market value; however, other assets are valued at market value. Such an asymmetry creates a greater incentive for the older generation to hold land, because the probability of decease is higher for older than younger persons. With constant technology available in each generation, the inheritance tax is found to lead to inefficient land use, sluggish conversion of land over time and higher land prices.
JEL Classification Numbers: H24, R14.     

Endogenous growth through investment-specific technological change

This paper examines a model in which growth takes place through investment-specific technological change, which in turn is determined endogenously through research spending. In particular, the role of the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction is explored. It is shown that the effect of a change in the capital tax rate on the growth rate can depend on the degree of substitutability between research spending and new capital construction. Research subsidies tend to have a larger impact on the growth rate than would an investment tax credit of the same magnitude. Increases in the capital tax rate can increase the growth rate of the economy, even in the absence of externalities. In contrast to the existing literature, the welfare cost of capital taxation in this model can be negligible. There may be multiple tax rates on capital that achieve the same growth rate. It is demonstrated that in the presence of certain types of positive externalities, the optimal growth rate can be attained through the use of capital taxes—rather than subsidies.     

The incidence of a tax on pure rent in a small open economy

This paper analyzes the effects of a land rent tax on capital formation and foreign investment in a life-cycle small open economy with endogenous labor-leisure choices. The consequences of land taxation critically depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government. A land tax depresses capital formation, crowds out foreign investment and increases national wealth and consumption when the land tax revenues are distributed as lump-sum payments. If the proceeds from land taxation are used to finance unproductive government expenditure, the land tax will be neutral in its effects on the capital stock, nonhuman wealth and labor. When the tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes, the land rent tax spurs nonhuman wealth accumulation and ambiguously affects the capital stock and labor.     

Relative Wealth, Consumption Taxation, and Economic Growth

This paper examines the role of the relative wealth-induced status motive in affecting the neutrality of consumption taxation in an optimizing growth model. It is found that a key factor determining the validity of the neutrality of consumption taxation in both the level sense and the growth rate sense is the desire for relative wealth-induced social status. When individuals care about their relative wealth, a rise in consumption tax enhances the steady-state level of capital stock and consumption. Furthermore, if the production function takes a linear technology form as the engine of sustained growth, then increases in consumption taxation raise the economy's long-run growth rate. In addition, an optimal consumption tax policy provides full subsidies to consumption so as to induce the economy to achieve the social optimum and the optimal growth rate.