终极产权与公司价值——对中国上市公司激励与壁垒效应的实证检验

在终极产权的框架下,通过对2005年中国上市公司样本的研究,文章检验了公司大股东的激励效应与壁垒效应。实证结果表明,大股东现金流权与控制权的适当集中,一方面具有提高公司价值的作用,另一方面,随着控制权超过现金流权,二者发生偏离,公司的价值下降。对国有公司而言,其现金流权与控制权的偏离对价值并没有显著影响,但对家族公司而言,现金流权与控制权的偏离却与价值显著受相关,二者的偏离程度越大,公司的价值就越低。     

民营上市公司实际控制人掏空行为探析——基于东盛科技的案例研究

股权质押是民营上市公司实际控制人融资的重要途径,但频繁的股权质押却会造成实际控制权和现金流权的分离。实际控制人希望通过对公司现有股权的再设计,使其控制权远大于现金流权,达到利益侵占和资金攫取的目的。而实际控制人对董事会和管理层的垄断,为实际控制人提供了方便的逐利途径,让利益的侵占无人监督。解决这个问题,应该避免实际控制人持股比例与董事会代表比例差距过大,适当培养其他股东对实际控制人的制衡能力,从而一定程度上抑制实际控制人的机会主义行为。注意民营上市公司监督权与经营权的高度重合,切实保证中小投资者的利益。而对于频繁的股权质押行为,一方面应加强债权银行的治理作用,另一方面则是强化对公司信息的披露。     

机构投资者与公司治理的绩效研究-来自我国上市公司的经验数据

20世纪80年代末开始，英、美：事国的机构投资者开始积极参与公司治理，这些国家的机构投资者已经取代公司控制权市场，形成了一种重要的公司外部治理机制。而在我国大股东监督链条过长和外部监督机制不健全的情况下，机构投资者可望成为国家大股东和外部市场监督公司的一种有效替代机制，在公司治理中发挥较大的作用。因此，本文探讨了机构投资者这一外部治理机制在公司治理中的作用以及对企业价值提升的影响。     

隧道行为与盈余管理——基于我国家族上市公司的实证研究

本文利用"隧道行为"理论解释我国家族上市公司的盈余管理活动。通过对2002-2004年间我国家族上市公司样本的实证检验,结果发现,控制性家族控制权偏离现金流量权的程度越大,公司盈余管理幅度越高。这说明控制性家族有动机操纵盈余以隐藏其掏空公司资源的"隧道行为",从而补充了现有对公司盈余管理动机的研究。     

基于外部性视角的家族企业治理改革

随着家族控股上市公司的激增,控股股东和中小股东之间的利害冲突问题越来越引起人们的关注。冲突的根本原因是家族企业金字塔形所有权结构导致控制权和现金流权的分离。换句话说,家族控股股东能利用较小的现金流权来实现较大的控制权,这就给公司治理①造成了外部性问题。本文运用外部性理论分析了家族企业的内部治理问题,并通过对日本和韩国财阀治理结构改革的比较,提出了关于中国家族企业治理改革的建议。     

我国民营上市公司控制权特征的统计分析

本文从终极控制人视角,对我国民营上市公司控制权获取途径、实施控制方式以及现金流权和控制权分离程度进行了统计分析,结果表明我国民营上市公司三分之二以上的终极控制人选择通过买壳上市等途径来获得上市公司的控制权。在控制方式上,我国民营上市公司终极控制人普遍采用金字塔持股方式、指定管理者等方式来加强对上市公司的控制。这些控制方式的运用,使得我国民营上市公司的现金流权与控制权发生了较大程度的分离。     

机构投资者角色发凡:2004～2007年部分上市公司样本

随着机构投资者的壮大,机构投资者在公司治理是扮演何种角色已成为我国制定相关政策的基础。利用2004～2007年沪深两市机构持股的上市公司为样本进行的实证研究发现,越高比例的机构持股及长线机构有助于提升公司业绩,表现为投资者角色;与预期相反,短线机构也表现为投资者角色。进一步的研究发现,机构表现出投机者或投资者角色,主要由其在公司的持股比例决定。现阶段应积极推进公司持股的机构化和机构持股的长期化。     

中国民营上市公司金字塔结构特征研究

本文利用我国2007年底全体个人和家族上市公司样本,对我国民营上市公司控制权结构的现状及特征进行了分析。结果表明,终极控制人通过1或2层中间公司控制上市公司的情况最为普遍,不同的控制权结构和不同的控制权获取方式对终极控制人的现金流权和控制权特征具有显著影响。     

公司治理与机构投资者持股偏好研究综述

本文对国内外关于公司治理与机构投资者持股偏好的最新研究做了一个综述。侧重点在如下四个方面:公司治理质量与机构投资者持股偏好;“审慎人”假说,交易成本与机构投资者的持股偏好;信息不对称、投资者保护与机构投资者的持股偏好;机构投资者在公司治理中的角色。     

境外机构投资者能促进企业投资效率提升吗?

文章以2003 ～2019年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,基于手工收集的可细分到来源国的境外股东独特数据,考察了境外机构投资者对公司投资效率的影响.研究发现,境外机构投资者持股能够显著促进企业投资效率提升,而境外个人投资者持股的作用不显著.进一步研究发现,境外机构投资者对公司投资效率的影响主要是由大额持股的机构投资者和来...     

Information‐Processing Costs and Breadth of Ownership

Using the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's mandate of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) as a natural experiment, this study investigates whether and how the decreased information‐processing costs brought about by XBRL influence firms’ breadth of share ownership. We find that the XBRL mandate is associated with an increase in the total number of a firm's shareholders. This finding is consistent with the notion that XBRL facilitates a more transparent environment and decreases information‐processing costs, thereby attracting more shareholders in general. More interestingly, we find that while XBRL adoption is associated with an increase in share ownership of individual and non‐U.S. foreign institutional investors, it is associated with a decrease in share ownership of U.S. domestic institutional investors. Further evidence shows that this asymmetric shift in share ownership is more pronounced for more complex firms. Our findings, taken together, suggest that the decreased information‐processing costs brought about by XBRL help firms establish a level playing field by reducing the information disadvantages of individual and foreign institutional investors over domestic institutional investors. Our results are robust to potential endogeneity concerns and alternative research designs.     

关于股改前后日常关联交易影响因素的实证研究

本文对股改前后日常关联交易影响因素的实证研究发现，股权分置改革虽然引起股权集中度和第一大股东持股比例下降等变化，但并未改变控股股东在关联交易方面的影响力，就关联交易而言，股改后其他人股东对第一大股东的制衡作用有所增强。机构投资者在控制关联交易方面的影响力尚未发挥。股改前后独立董事比例与日常关联交易水平都不具有显着性，但在2006年二者之间开始呈负向关系，且t检验值明显增大．接近满足统计显着性的水平，这在某种程度上意味着独立董事的规定，由原证监会规则层次上升至《公司法》层次后，有助于独立董事监督作用的发挥。     

机构投资者有助于企业业绩改善吗？——来自2003-2007年中国上市公司的经验证据

本文区分不同类型的机构投资者,探讨其持股对企业业绩改善的影响。研究表明：（1）机构投资者持股对企业业绩改善具有显著的正面影响,持股比例越高越有动机和能力帮助企业改善业绩;（2）不同类型的机构投资者对企业业绩改善的作用不同,持股比例较高的基金、券商有望显著改善企业业绩,而持股比例低的信托公司、保险公司对企业业绩改善没有显著影响;（3）机构投资者对企业业绩改善的影响主要体现在短期,对企业长期业绩改善的作用逐步减弱。简而言之,目前机构投资者对企业业绩改善已开始初步发挥作用,但其作用还较为有限。本文建议进一步促进机构投资者的规模化发展,提高其改善企业业绩的动机和能力。     

Performance Commitments of Controlling Shareholders and Earnings Management

Since the Split Share Structure Reform took effect in China in 2005, holders of nontradable shares (controlling shareholders) have had to negotiate with holders of tradable shares (minority shareholders) to gain the liquidity right. In a typical deal reached, the controlling shareholder agrees to pay share compensation to minority shareholders and, in many cases, also pledges to meet a specific firm performance target (performance commitments). Using this reform setting, we examine the impact of performance commitments on earnings management behavior, and find the following results. First, less profitable firms have greater incentives to make performance commitments that help to reduce the share compensation that controlling shareholders have to pay. Second, firms entering into such commitments engage in earnings management to meet the promised performance target when actual performance falls short, and firms facing greater default costs tend to manage earnings more aggressively. Third, depending on the performance metric stipulated in the commitment contract, firms employ varying methods to manage earnings. We also find that firms that rely on earnings management to meet their performance targets display inferior performance in the postcommitment years relative to firms that do not. Overall, our evidence is consistent with performance commitment contracts (with costly defaults) between a firm's controlling and minority shareholders causing incentives for earnings management.     

Share portfolios in the early years of financial capitalism: London, 1690–1730

The dramatic expansion of public and private financial markets in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution has received extensive attention. Despite this, little is known about how ordinary individual investors managed risk within this framework. Using a newly constructed dataset of share ownership for those joint‐stock companies listed in the financial press of the day, we reconstruct individual portfolio holdings for investors in these companies. We examine individual portfolio holdings first for the decade after the Glorious Revolution and then for the years around the South Sea Bubble. Despite a fivefold increase in the number of unique individuals in the market between the 1690s and the 1720s, we find that in each period roughly 80 per cent of those active in the equity market held shares in only one company, even though many shareholders had the capacity or wealth to diversify share portfolios. These outcomes suggest diversification against idiosyncratic liquidity risk. Overall, however, there is limited evidence that individuals were using their financial portfolios to protect against diversifiable shocks. For many, we argue, company‐specific voting and firm governance rules drove market activity.     

论新股发行制度的改革

现行新股发行制度存在"新股的品种结构单一"、"原始股股东牟取暴利"、"机构投资者获得利益输送"、"新股上市首日价格操纵严重"等诸多弊病,对其加以改革势在必行。本文在如何进行新股发行制度改革的问题上,从"推动新股品种结构的多样性发展"、"依法科学规制新股发行的价格"、"改革完善新股询价配售机制"等方面,提出了若干具体建议。     

从股权分置改革谈中小投资者的自我保护与市场保护

股权分置改革进程表明,中小投资者对股改方案表决参与积极性不高,这在一定程度上折射了中小投资者自我保护意识不强,市场本身又没有形成保护中小投资者的有效机制,监管部门对保护投资者权益的制度安排也远远不够。因此,监管部门必须加强保护中小投资者的制度安排,引导形成有效的中小投资者市场保护机制,中小投资者也要理性地进行自我保护。     

Do Shareholders Fight for Firm Value or Market Value in Emerging Markets? The Mediating Effect of Board Structure Dynamics on Dividend Policy Decision

The paper examines the mediating effect of board structure dynamics on the relationship between dividend payout and shareholders’ wealth at the firm level and market level. Panel regression models are used by applying data from 27 listed firms in Ghana between 2010 and 2017. We find that board structure dynamics have a direct effect on shareholders’ wealth at both levels. However, the results reveal new evidence that board structure dynamics play a mediating role on the relationship between dividend policy decision and shareholders’ wealth only at the market level. We find that independent directors and CEO duality significantly reduce market value of shareholders through dividend payout decision. However, independent directors and longer CEO tenure in office mediate a positive effect on the relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth at the market level. Thus, the mediating effect of board structure dynamics, particularly independent directors and CEO tenure, are important in predicting a positive relationship between dividend policy and shareholders’ wealth at the market level than at the firm level. Therefore, regulatory bodies and investors should provide strong board structure dynamics that serve as a mediating mechanism for prudent dividend policy decisions that add value to shareholders’ wealth.     

Shareholder Empowerment and Board of Directors Effectiveness*

We develop a model to examine implications of empowering shareholders to replace directors. We find that shareholder empowerment functions as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can weaken ineffective boards' incentive to hold on to their position. On the other hand, it can induce both effective and ineffective boards to behave strategically to avoid a potential dismissal. As a result, empowerment does not necessarily increase firm value; in some cases, empowerment exacerbates the agency problem it is intended to address. Giving shareholders the power to set board compensation (have a “say on pay”) can mitigate these problems. However, even when empowerment benefits (harms) the shareholders, firm value may decrease (increase). Finally, we discuss empirical and policy implications of the main findings.     

Individual investors and local bias in the UK, 1870–1935

This article examines the long‐run evolution of local bias by UK investors between the 1870s and the 1930s. It uses a large sample of nearly 30,000 shareholders based on 197 sets of share records, a large and representative database of the investor population across sectors and time. It investigates the structure and the evolution of local investment preference between shareholders and the companies in which they invested, as measured by the distance between where they lived and corporate headquarters. The study offers evidence of strong initial local investment preference, which declined over time for non‐Londoners, but remained strong for Londoners until the 1930s. Local investment preference of security holders was related to the size of the board of directors and, for wealthy investors, was related to the age of the firm. For large firms, local networks between investors and directors appear stronger when director shareholdings and voting rights were important. This study supports the analytical hypothesis of local informal trust networks between investors and directors as a means to overcome informational asymmetries and weak legal protection, and provides evidence that local preference was a means to curb insider opportunism and private benefits of control.