Liquidity Dry-ups in equity markets

This paper examines how mutual fund investors’ demand for liquidity provision endogenously affects stock liquidity in the equity market. We find that actively managed funds in the US tend to hold less liquidity than their respective benchmarks, which leads them to rely on only a small fraction of liquid stocks when it comes to liquidity demand. Using mutual fund sell transactions, we further show that mutual funds tend to sell more liquid stocks in their holdings when experiencing outflows. Concentrated sales of liquid stocks, however, significantly reduce the liquidity of these stocks, resulting in liquidity deterioration or dry-up among highly liquid stocks in periods of high market-wide liquidity demand. Overall, the results indicate that mutual funds fail to predict the liquidity of the asset at purchase.     

隐性杠杆约束、流动性风险和投资者情绪

本文以2003—2019年间开放式主动管理型的股票型和偏股型基金为样本,以持仓占比为权重估算基金投组中A股的总市场风险暴露,检验结果表明,该序列上升反映了基金面临的隐性杠杆约束收紧,刻画了市场的弱流动性。内在逻辑在于,流动性收紧时,投资者难以通过融资直接增加杠杆,更倾向于重仓持有高市场风险头寸的股票而间接实现杠杆。本文发现隐性杠杆约束所刻画的风险在股票或基金收益截面上的无条件定价基本失效,而条件定价则依赖于低市场情绪与弱流动性。分解基金持股的敞口,进一步发现,因中小盘基金在流动性收紧时具有更强的流动性偏好,其持股的市场风险头寸能够更敏锐地捕捉到弱流动性风险。     

Hedge funds as liquidity providers: Evidence from the Lehman bankruptcy

Hedge funds using Lehman as prime broker faced a decline in funding liquidity after the September 15, 2008 bankruptcy. We find that stocks held by these Lehman-connected funds experienced greater declines in market liquidity following the bankruptcy than other stocks; the effect was larger for ex ante illiquid stocks and persisted into the beginning of 2009. We find no similar effects surrounding the Bear Stearns failure, suggesting that disruptions surrounding bankruptcy explain the liquidity effects. We conclude that shocks to traders' funding liquidity reduce the market liquidity of the assets that they trade.     

Liquidity and information asymmetry considerations in corporate takeovers

ABSTRACT

We examine how stock market liquidity and information asymmetry considerations influence the wealth effects of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). We present a simple model predicting that M&As of listed targets that have relatively illiquid stocks are profitable for acquirers due to (a) the weak bargaining power of the targets’ shareholders, and (b) the limited information asymmetry concerns when evaluating takeover synergies. Our results show that cash-financed M&As of listed targets that have relatively illiquid stocks are associated with an increase in acquirer risk-adjusted returns. These gains are equivalent to those realized from comparable private target M&As. When engaging in stock-financed listed-target M&As, acquirers with liquid stocks enjoy significant gains when the targets have relatively illiquid stocks. This result holds especially when the deal is announced during periods of deterioration in the overall stock market liquidity. Lastly, we find that liquidity considerations affect the acquirer’s choice of the target firm’s listing status, as well as the M&A method of payment.     

MUTUAL FUND TRADES: ASYMMETRIC LIQUIDITY PREFERENCES AND FUND PERFORMANCE

We investigate the role of the liquidity of stocks traded by mutual funds on the performance of funds experiencing substantial and sustained redemptions (outflows) or inflows. Accordingly, we identify 770 redeeming fund‐periods and 1,757 inflow fund‐periods and find a statistically significant relation between the liquidity of the stocks they trade and the quantity of the stock traded. Notably, when funds experience redemptions, those with low portfolio liquidity have an elevated preference for selling more‐liquid stocks. In the following period, such funds statistically and economically underperform funds that sell less‐liquid stocks. This is consistent with redemptions detrimentally affecting shareholders that remain in a fund.     

Mutual Fund Stock‐Picking Skill: New Evidence from Valuation‐ versus Liquidity‐Motivated Trading

We propose a novel Trade Motivation Matrix that allows differentiating funds’ valuation‐motivated (VM) and liquidity‐motivated (LM) trades on single trade level. It thus enables analyses of stock‐picking skill on three levels: trade, stock, and fund. On trade level, we find significant outperformance of VM buys and significant underperformance of VM sells, indicating manager stock‐picking skills, especially during illiquid market periods. VM trades outperform LM trades, confirming negative performance effects due to flow risk, especially when market liquidity is low. On stock level, collective VM buying explains high future stock returns while collective VM selling is related to future losses, indicating wisdom of the crowd. On fund level, higher trading discretion, measured by a higher degree of VM trading, is observed for smaller, older funds holding higher cash buffers. Finally, higher trading discretion is related to higher future fund alpha, especially during illiquid times.     

Exchange-traded fund ownership and underlying stock mispricing

In response to the increasing proliferation of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and a warning from the Wall Street hero Michael Burry that passive investing has put the stock market into ‘bubble’ territory, we examine the relation between stock ownership by ETFs and mispricing from 2002 to 2018. We find that increased ETF ownership induces overpricing in underlying stocks. We then identify three mechanisms for this relationship: the overpricing of stocks attributable to increased ETF ownership is stronger for stocks that experience an increase in passive ETF ownership; during periods characterised by high investor sentiment; and for illiquid stocks. Our results are robust to a battery of tests including alternative measures for all key variables and are not confounded by the global financial crisis. Additional analyses show that mispricing caused by ETF ownership change is not driven by firm fundamentals and does not exacerbate stocks' information environment around earnings announcement.     

Real Estate Fund Flows and the Flow-Performance Relationship

Convexity in the flow-performance relationship of traditional asset class mutual funds is widely documented, however it cannot be assumed to hold for alternative asset classes. This paper addresses this shortcoming in the literature by examining the flow-performance relationship for real estate funds, specifically open-end, direct-property funds. This investment vehicle is designed to provide the risk-return benefits of private market real estate and is available to retail investors in many countries across the globe. An understanding of fund flow dynamics associated with this investment vehicle is of particular interest due to the liquidity risk associated with holding an inherently illiquid asset in an open-end structure. Our analysis draws on the theoretical foundations provided in the literature on mutual fund flows, performance chasing, liquidity risk, participation costs and dynamics across market cycles. We focus on German real estate funds from 1990 to 2010 as this is the largest market globally and there is a high level of confidence in the data. The results show that real estate fund investors chase past performance at the aggregate level and the relationship between flows and relative performance is asymmetric (i.e., convex) at the individual fund level. Fund-level liquidity risk tends to weaken convexity, while sensitivity increases with higher participation costs. We find the flow-performance relationship varies across time, though our interpretation is asset and investment vehicle specific. The implications are applicable to investors and fund managers of open-end, direct-property funds and, more broadly, other alternative asset funds where the underlying asset may not be liquid.     

The dark and the bright side of liquidity risks: Evidence from open-end real estate funds in Germany

During the 6-month period from December 2005 to June 2006, the German Real Estate mutual fund industry suffered an unprecedented liquidity crisis. We investigate to what extend competing theories of liquidity crises help explain this event. Our results show that fundamental factors not only mattered for the liquidity outflow in normal times but also during the crisis. However, strategic complementarities accelerated the withdrawals during the crisis suggesting that pure panic behavior contributed substantially to the massive outflows. Thus higher liquidity buffers might help mitigating these tail events. Furthermore, we find that funds with a lower fraction of shares held by institutional investors suffered from less significant outflows suggesting that a segmentation of funds for different investor groups might help mitigate panics.     

A global approach to mutual funds market timing ability

In this paper, we globally investigate market timing abilities of mutual fund managers from the three perspectives: market return, market-wide volatility and aggregate liquidity. We propose a new specification to study market timing. Instead of considering an average market exposure for mutual funds, we allow mutual fund market betas to follow a random walk in the absence of market timing ability. As a consequence, we capture market exposure dynamics which is really due to manager market timing skills while allowing dynamics to come from other sources than market timing. We find that on average 6% of mutual funds display return market timing abilities while this percentage amounts to respectively 13% and 14% for volatility and liquidity market timing. We also analyze market timing by investment strategies and for surviving and dead funds. Dead funds exhibit lower volatility and liquidity timing skills than live funds.     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

Inter-temporal variation in the illiquidity premium

We find evidence of a systematic link between monetary conditions and inter-temporal variation in the price of liquidity. Specifically, following an expansive monetary policy shift, funding conditions improve and market-wide liquidity increases, which is especially beneficial for illiquid securities. The improved liquidity and funding conditions reduce the returns required for holding illiquid securities. Consequently, illiquid stocks experience relatively large price increases when monetary conditions become expansive, and thus, the measured return spread between illiquid and liquid stocks expands substantially. Overall, our evidence supports the claim that the price of asset liquidity is dependent on monetary conditions.     

Which institutional investor types are the most informed?

We examine the informativeness of quarterly disclosed portfolio holdings across four institutional investor types: hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds and private banking firms. Overweight positions outperform underweight positions only for hedge funds. By decomposing holdings and stock returns, we find that hedge funds are superior to other institutional investors both at picking industries and stocks and that they are better at forecasting long‐term as well as short‐term returns. Furthermore, our results show that hedge funds, mutual funds and pension funds are able to successfully time the market. The outperformance of hedge funds is not explained by a liquidity premium.     

Small-cap equity mutual fund managers as liquidity providers

This paper examines the relation between the performance of small-cap equity mutual funds and the liquidity characteristics of their asset holdings. We study the trading behavior of fund managers and show that on average, they tend to buy less liquid stocks and sell more liquid stocks. We introduce the notion of net “liquidity creation” by fund managers and examine its role in explaining the cross section of small-cap equity mutual fund returns. Our empirical results show that on average, small-cap mutual fund managers are able to earn an additional 1.5% return per year as compensation for providing such liquidity services to the market.     

Short-selling,margin-trading,and stock liquidity: Evidence from the Chinese stock markets

This paper examines the impacts of two forms of leveraged trading—margin trading and short selling—on the trading liquidity of individual stocks in China. We find that trading liquidity for relevant stocks generally improves after restrictions on leveraged trading are removed. However, margin trading and short selling have opposite impacts on liquidity. During ordinary periods, margin trading benefits liquidity, whereas short selling damages liquidity; however, during market downturns, their roles are reversed. We also provide evidence suggesting that short sellers are informed traders in China and that short selling reduces stock liquidity because of the increased risk of adverse selection faced by uninformed traders.     

A new family of equity style indices and mutual fund performance: Do liquidity and idiosyncratic risk matter?

We propose and test novel multifactor models of daily mutual fund performance. To this aim, we set up equity style indices and derive risk factors, which nest the established Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) factors. We add two additional risk factors, namely idiosyncratic risk and Amihud (2002) liquidity. Our sample contains 528 actively managed mutual funds with European stock market focus during 2002 to 2009. Model estimation reveals that—while market excess return and size appear significant for the cross-section of all funds—the remainder factors explain the performance of subsets of funds. About one third of the funds exhibit significant factor sensitivities not only with respect to valuation or momentum, but also with respect to liquidity or idiosyncratic risk. No single risk factor is dominated and hence our six factor model may serve as a valid performance benchmark. In a four factor model setting, the Carhart model and a model with valuation replaced by liquidity perform best. Our results remain stable under various robustness checks. We further document that managers on average prefer liquid stocks, show no aggregate idiosyncratic risk preference and deliver results that are consistent with equilibrium models of fund performance.     

Mutual Fund Liquidity Costs

One dollar in purchases or redemptions generates an average cost of $0.006 for US equity mutual funds during the period 1997‐2009, approximately 70% lower than prior estimates derived from older data. However, large cross‐sectional differences exist between funds. Many funds have costs near zero, but funds that hold relatively illiquid equities, have relatively concentrated portfolios, and manage relatively large amounts of assets have average liquidity costs significantly greater than the full sample average. Furthermore, despite a large difference in underlying asset liquidity, US bond funds and US equity funds have similar average liquidity costs.     

What Style Liquidity Timing Skills Do Mutual Fund Managers Possess?

Recent studies claim that mutual fund managers demonstrate strong MARKET liquidity timing skills. We extend their liquidity timing tests to the four‐factor case and investigate liquidity timing skills with respect to the MARKET, SIZE, VALUE and MOMENTUM factors. Contrary to these claims, we find no evidence that fund managers adjust market exposure in anticipation of market liquidity changes. We find rather strong evidence that fund managers successfully overweight small stocks as market liquidity increases. Our study also demonstrates that it is easy to misidentify SIZE liquidity timing as MARKET liquidity timing in models that focus only on MARKET liquidity timing.     

Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses

We use a new database to perform a comprehensive analysis of the mutual fund industry. We find that funds hold stocks that outperform the market by 1.3 percent per year, but their net returns underperform by one percent. Of the 2.3 percent difference between these results, 0.7 percent is due to the underperformance of nonstock holdings, whereas 1.6 percent is due to expenses and transactions costs. Thus, funds pick stocks well enough to cover their costs. Also, high-turnover funds beat the Vanguard Index 500 fund on a net return basis. Our evidence supports the value of active mutual fund management.     

Who influences the fundamental value of commodity futures in Japan?

We present evidence on the asymmetric information content of six investor groups' transactions in the gold, platinum, gasoline and rubber futures markets on the Tokyo Commodity Exchange. Microstructure theory suggests that traders with superior information regarding the efficient price should be more profitable in the long run. We find that foreign investors have the greatest influence over the efficient price in the gold market, domestic retail investors in the gasoline market and domestic investment funds in the platinum and rubber markets. Differences in the relative influence of investor groups over commodity futures are likely to reflect the degree of contract homogeneity and associated market liquidity. Foreign (domestic retail) investors have larger information shares for the homogeneous liquid (heterogeneous illiquid) contracts than for the heterogeneous illiquid (homogeneous liquid) contracts.