Quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand

We study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated (semi-altruistic); prices are regulated and firms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices; competition is based on quality, and demand adjusts sluggishly. Health or education are sectors in which the mentioned features are the rule. We show that the presence of motivated providers makes dynamic competition tougher, resulting in higher steady-state levels of quality in the closed-loop solution than in the benchmark open-loop solution, if the price is sufficiently high. However, this result is reversed if the price is sufficiently low (and below unit costs). Sufficiently low prices also imply that a reduction in demand sluggishness will lead to lower steady-state quality. Prices below unit costs will nevertheless be welfare optimal if the providers are sufficiently motivated.     

Apple's disaster: Linking two‐sided markets and strategic delegation

Asymmetric pricing structure and different intergroup network externalities are characteristics of two‐sided markets not captured in the analysis of one‐sided markets. Focusing on Cournot duopoly where membership decision may be delegated to a manager, several equilibrium regimes are sustained depending on the fixed cost of managerial hiring and strength of the network externality exerted by the side whose demand is more price sensitive. The change from null to full delegation sharpens the asymmetric pricing structure and reduces the price level in two‐sided markets. Contrary to one‐sided markets with direct network effects, the prisoner's dilemma holds for sufficiently strong indirect network externalities. Imperfect interside discrimination of managerial incentives ensures profit maximization and efficient consumers' allocation. Private hiring should occur when the two‐sided market exhibits symmetric pricing structure. An explanation for Apple's unprecedented event is provided. The reduction of revenue and managerial bonus in 2016 may be justified by the dissemination of full delegation in the Chinese information technology industry. Apple's upcoming strategy may consist on reducing both access prices, although the side whose demand is more price sensitive should have a greater price reduction. Alternatively, improving the content quality may constitute Apple's corporate strategy, thereby inducing a skimming pricing strategy on Chinese rivals.     

Resale price maintenance in a model of consumer search

A retail search model of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) is adapted to analyze manufacturer incentives for resale price maintenance. For some retailer cost functions and distributions of consumer search costs, imposition of a minimum price for retailers causes a price distribution to collapse to an intermediate price. Manufacturers may benefit from price floors when sales to high-search-cost consumers that have obtained lower prices increase sufficiently so as to offset decreased sales to other consumers facing higher prices. In contrast to previous work, no free-riding problem with respect to dealer services is necessary for manufacturers to prefer banning discounting of their products.     

Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner–manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade‐off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity‐lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant‐strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low‐cost manager and output control for a high‐cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Note on Managerial Delegation with Asymmetric and Convex Costs

In this note, we investigate if the standard result by the managerial delegation literature, i.e., the sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium is not Pareto‐optimal from the firms' viewpoint, still applies when asymmetric and convex costs are introduced into the analysis. In such a framework, the managerial delegation choice still represents a sub‐game Nash perfect equilibrium, but the more efficient firm may obtain higher profits provided that the degree of cost asymmetry between firms is sufficiently large. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The economics of property taxes and land values: The elasticity of supply of structures

Land values are explained by diminishing returns to a variable factor, structure, added to fixed land. The total cost minimizing structural density determined by land value, occurs where the marginal cost of increased density equals the average cost of structure plus land. Structural demand prices equal marginal costs in equilibrium determining land demands. A general equilibrium land price establishes the uses, prices and densities of structures. A simple method of calculating structure supply elasticity and the incidence and deadweight loss of property taxes is developed. Differing property tax rates are found to be efficient.     

A two-part incentive scheme to implement productive efficiency over time

Under rate-of-return regulation the firm is not induced to minimize cost. All the incentive regulatory schemes thus far suggested in the literature have the desirable feature of inducing the firm to do so, but they either require the regulator to have full information about demand or take a number of periods to induce the firm to converge to the optimal output level. Hence they do not work well in the dynamic situation where demand and/or cost changes. In this paper a two-part negative price incentive scheme is suggested whereby the regulator will implement the subsidy scheme only if the firm charges a price higher than its unit expenditure. This scheme (1) requires limited information for implementation; (2) induces the firm to minimize costs; and (3) under certain situations leads to optimal behavior in one period. More importantly, it will continue to have the above features over time.     

Bargains Followed by Bargains: When Switching Costs Make Markets More Competitive

In markets where consumers have switching costs and firms cannot price‐discriminate, firms have two conflicting strategies. A firm can either offer a low price to attract new consumers and build future market share or a firm can offer a high price to exploit the partial lock‐in of their existing consumers. This paper develops a theory of competition when overlapping generations of consumers have switching costs and firms produce differentiated products. Competition takes place over an infinite horizon with any number of firms. This paper shows that the relationship between the level of switching costs, firms' discount rate, and the number of firms determines whether firms offer low or high prices. Similar to previous duopoly studies, switching costs are likely to facilitate lower (higher) equilibrium prices when switching costs are small (large) or when a firm's discount rate is large (small). Unlike previous studies, this paper demonstrates that the number of firms also determines whether switching costs are pro‐ or anticompetitive, and with a sufficiently large (small) number of firms switching costs are pro‐ (anti‐) competitive.     

Incentive pay and rent in oligopoly

Our purpose is to examine strategic delegation in nonlinear Cournot oligopoly. The findings generalize earlier results and show that managerial contracts reward sales under the condition of a fixed input price. Alternatively, under a variable input price, owners might punish sales even when goods are strategic substitutes. We conclude that optimal strategic motivation depends critically on the input price. For example, motivation that supports positive owner profit under a fixed input price nullifies owner-profit if an upstream monopolist with convex costs sets the input price. In a vertical relationship between a duopoly and an upstream monopolist, strategic delegation punishes sales.     

Quality and Location Choices under Price Regulation

In a model of spatial competition, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version of the Hotelling model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the quality of the product they supply. We derive the optimal price set by a welfarist regulator. If the regulator can commit to a price prior to the choice of locations, the optimal (second-best) price causes overinvestment in quality and an insufficient degree of horizontal differentiation (compared with the first-best solution) if the transportation cost of consumers is sufficiently high. Under partial commitment, where the regulator is not able to commit prior to location choices, the optimal price induces first-best quality, but horizontal differentiation is inefficiently high.     

The Design and Efficiency of Loyalty Rewards

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards (LRs) in markets for final consumption goods. Although the literature to date has emphasized the role of LRs as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), l analyze instead the ability of alternative designs to foster consumer participation and increase total surplus. First, the efficiency of LRs depends on their specific design. A commitment to the price of repeat purchases can involve substantial efficiency gains by reducing price‐cost margins. However, discount policies imply higher future regular prices and are likely to reduce total surplus. Second, firms may prefer to set up inefficient rewards (discounts), especially in circumstances where a commitment to the price of repeat purchases triggers Coasian dynamics.     

Prices and factor demand in an endogenized input–output model

This paper combines factor demand functions (for intermediate input and labour) and price equations (derived from a Generalized Leontief cost function) with the traditional input–output price model. The cost functions determine factor demands for materials and labour as well as output prices at given input prices. At the second level of aggregation, the intermediate demand as a single input is split proportional to the elements in the column of the technical coefficients matrix. The emphasis in this endogenization of technical coefficients is on two features. First, the repercussion of output on input prices, and, second, the link between the econometric model for the supply side and the input–output demand model.     

Estimating the Demand for Housing, Land, and Neighbourhood Characteristics

This paper provides estimates of the structure of demand for individual housing and neighbourhood characteristics and for land in two British cities. We estimate a hedonic price function, and from this obtain the implicit prices of house attributes. These prices are used to estimate a demand system for each city. These perform well, and enable us to calculate price and income elasticities for each of the non-dichotomous characteristics and for land. To counteract criticisms of demand estimates derived within the hedonic framework a method is developed for selecting an appropriate set of instrumental variables. Estimates derived from this method, however, differ only slightly from those obtained using the conventional techniques. Several features of these estimates provide insights into the unusual characteristics of the British housing market, the effects of constraints imposed by land use planning, and the effects of changing income distribution on the structure of demand.     

Asymmetric Price Adjustments in Airlines

This paper uses a unique daily time series data set to investigate the asymmetric response of airline prices to capacity costs driven by demand fluctuations. We use a Markov regime‐switching model with time‐varying transition probabilities to capture the time variation in the response. The results show strong evidence of asymmetric price adjustments: positive cost shifts have a large positive effect, whereas negative cost shifts have no effect. The asymmetry is also explained by summer travel but not by the size of cost shifts. The findings show the importance of consumer heterogeneity and capacity constraints as a source of asymmetric responses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equilibrium price and advertisement distributions

We consider an economy where many sellers sell identical goods to many buyers. Each seller has a unit supply and each buyer has a unit demand. The only possible information flow about prices is through costly advertising. We show that in equilibrium the sellers use mixed strategies in pricing which leads to price and advertisement distributions. With convex advertising costs each seller sends only one advertisement in the market. We also delineate a class of advertising costs which ensures that sellers may send multiple advertisements in equilibrium. Higher prices are advertised more than lower prices.     

Drivers of optimal prices in two-sided markets: the state of the art

In two-sided markets, a platform has two groups of customers and enables their interactions. Demand on one market side depends on demand on the other; therefore, when platforms set prices, they must consider this interdependency and set prices on both sides simultaneously. By surveying the vast theoretical marketing and economics literature, this article provides a clear and systematic overview of profit-maximizing pricing in two-sided markets. It identifies and structures the various drivers of those optimal prices. Using this framework, it summarizes the findings from prior research and offers an assessment of the state of the art with regard to drivers of optimal prices and their impacts on a platform’s price setting. This improves understanding of both the principles of two-sided markets and their optimal pricing. Finally, this state of the art paper suggests some directions for further research.     

The New Economic Sociology of Prices: An Analysis Inspired by the Austrian School of Economics

The new economic sociology includes some reference studies on the sociology of prices. They have not until now been studied by economists, and this article attempts to fill that gap by offering a detailed analysis, inspired by the Austrian School of Economics, of their object and approach. We first show that, from a theoretical point of view, the explanations advanced by these sociologists are based implicitly on basic models of economics, such as the “law of supply and demand” and the “law of costs,” and that they cannot therefore replace economic explanations of prices. Secondly, from a methodological point of view, these studies are based on field surveys that provide concrete information on certain markets but they lose sight of an aspect that is fundamental to the Austrian School, the interdependence of prices in different markets. And when this interdependence is taken into account, namely, in the case of the relationship between cost and price, the causal link postulated by sociologists goes from cost to price when Austrian economists argue that it goes in the opposite direction.     

On Price Competition with Market Share Delegation Contracts

We identify a mistake in the specification of the demand system used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn, whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the alternative delegation scheme à la Fershtman and Judd (1987). Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How far can reduced childcare prices push female labour supply?

Exploiting exogenous variation in childcare prices stemming from a childcare price reform, this paper estimates effects of reductions in childcare costs on female labour supply. The reform introduced a cap on childcare prices, and lead to considerable reductions in prices depending on family type and region of residence. Since the price is determined by a handful of observed characteristics, we are able to match households that are similar in all relevant aspects, but experienced quite different price changes. Our difference-in-differences regression matching estimates are very precise, and close to zero.     

On the land assembly problem

We consider a segment of the land market where the entire available land stock is needed for the realization of some indivisible development project. The stock is shared by several landholders who either collude or negotiate independently with the developer over the prices of their lots. Investigating the price setting behavior of the landowners and the optimal strategy of the developer, we show that landowners set more moderate prices under collusion than when acting independently; in the latter case, the individual asking price falls with the size of the land share, and the total price increases with the number of landowners. As regards the optimal strategy, we find that the developer will in general not offer the lowest price he expects to be accepted by the landowners.