Tax evasion and tax morale: A social network analysis

We study the effects of tax morale and social norms on tax evasion when individuals interact in a network. We present a model that incorporates incentives for tax compliance in the form of punishment and fines, tax morale, and reputation for social behaviour. We assume that individuals adjust their tax morale by observing the neighbours' tax morale. We simulate the model for different values of the parameters and show that the steady-state share of taxpayers as opposed to tax-evaders is affected by the probability of finding like-minded peers in the reference group (network integration), the weight that individuals attribute to reputation, and the share of individuals who update their tax morale. Last, we consider the possibility of a fiscal authority using the knowledge of the network structure and targeting ‘central’ individuals. We show that by positively affecting the tax morale of individuals whose influence within the network is high, a fiscal authority can increase tax compliance.     

The erosion of personal norms and cognitive dissonance

In this article, we study how personal norms and behaviour interact and evolve when agents try to reduce cognitive dissonance, and how this dynamic relates to Nash equilibrium. We find that in long run, agents play, and norms prescribe, Nash equilibrium in material payoffs (in the absence of norms). Our model captures two main facts: (i) norms erode along the play of the game; (ii) the erosion of norms depends on the set of possible economic choices, so that the policy maker can potentially influence them.     

Exploitation,international taxation,and global justice

Abstract

I investigate the central principle that underlies the OECDs tax base erosion and profit shifting initiative. The principle claims that (corporate) profits should be taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is created. First, I argue that its plausibility depends on establishing that states have an entitlement to the productive factors in their territory, and therefore to a share of the value created by employing those factors. Second, I maintain that this cannot presently be established. If states fail to discharge duties requiring wealth redistribution, they do not have an unqualified right to the productive factors in their territory. Even if they are not subject to such duties, states can only legitimately claim a share in the fair value of the goods created. I show that given widespread exploitation in global value chains, the market prices of (intermediary) goods do not reflect their fair value.     

How history matters for student performance. lessons from the Partitions of Poland

This paper examines the effect on current student performance of the 19th century Partitions of Poland among Austria, Prussia and Russia. Using a regression discontinuity design, I show that student test scores are 0.6 standard deviations higher on the Austrian side of the former Austrian-Russian border, despite the modern similarities of the three regions. However, I do not find evidence for differences across the Prussian-Russian border. Using a theoretical model and indirect evidence, I argue that the Partitions have persisted through their impact on social norms toward local schools. Nevertheless, the persistent effect of Austria is puzzling, given the historical similarities of the Austrian and Prussian education systems. I argue that the differential legacy of Austria and Prussia originates from the Austrian Empire’s policy to promote Polish identity in schools and the Prussian Empire’s efforts to Germanize the Poles through education.     

Are modern philosophical accounts of well-being excessively ‘individualistic’?

Do modern accounts of well-being which have influenced, or been adopted by, some economists encourage excessive ‘individualism’? I suggest that this question can be answered by considering two objections to modern views of welfare: (1) that they involve an impoverished view of persons and (2) that they decompose all goods into goods for individuals and do not give intrinsic value to collective goods. I argue that two influential views of well-being—the informed desire view and the capability approach—can convincingly respond to these objections. Both views allow for our distinct social roles and identities: the ways in which social norms and institutions shape values and a concern for others. Neither view sees goods as goods only of specific individuals, nor do they require us to separate out neatly the realisation of values in the lives of various individuals. But that does not imply that goods such as friendship are collective rather than individual goods or that collective goods have intrinsic value. Nonetheless, accounts of well-being may need to be more explicit than they have been in incorporating the social dimension.     

Inequality Perceptions,Distributional Norms,and Redistributive Preferences in East and West Germany

This paper analyzes differences in inequality perceptions, distributional norms, and redistributive preferences between East and West Germany. As expected, there are substantial differences with respect to all three of these measures. Surprisingly, however, differences in distributional norms are much smaller than differences with respect to inequality perceptions or redistributive preferences. Moreover, individuals from East Germany tend to be more supportive of state redistribution and progressive taxation and they are less likely to have a conservative political orientation. I finally show that a substantial part of these differences in political preferences can be explained by underlying differences in redistributive preferences.     

Tax morale and tax evasion reports

The study proposes a new measure of tax morale for Italy based on voluntary tax evasion reports. Using this measure, I detected a positive relationship between tax morale and social capital, political participation, and immigration, but a negative relationship between tax morale and the dissatisfaction with public services and unemployment.     

Social norms,cooperation and inequality

This paper analyzes the outcomes that can be supported by social norms in a society of infinitely lived and patient agents that are randomly matched in pairs every period to play a given game. I find that any mutually beneficial outcome can be supported by a self-enforcing social norm under both perfect information and a simple local information system. These Folk Theorem results explain not only how social norms can provide incentives that support cooperation in a community, providing support to the concepts of social capital and corporate culture, but also how they can support inequality and discrimination.I am grateful to David Levine for invaluable guidance and ideas. I also thank Anna Aizer, Hongbin Cai, Walter Cont, Ernesto Dal Bó, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Federico Weinschelbaun, William Zame, anonymous referees and seminar participants at Universidad de Buenos Aires, UCLA, Universidad T. Di Tella, Harvard Business School and Stockholm School of Economics for very useful comments and discussions     

The Ethics of Swearing: The Implications of Moral Theories for Oath-Breaking in Economic Contexts

Many readers will share the judgement that, having made an oath, there is something morally worse about consequently performing the immoral action, such as embezzling, that one swore not to do. Why would it be worse? To answer this question, I consider three moral-theoretic accounts of why it is ‘extra’ wrong to violate oaths not to perform wrong actions, with special attention paid to those made in economic contexts. Specifically, I address what the moral theories of utilitarianism, Kantianism and a new communitarian-relational principle entail for the wrongness of oath-breaking. I argue that the former two do not adequately capture why it is extra wrong to perform an immoral action that one swore not to do, but that the latter appeal to a morality of communal relationship offers a promising account.     

Gender quotas and the selection of local politicians: Evidence from French municipal elections

Using data on the universe of elected politicians in French municipalities, this paper studies the impact of a gender quota law on the political representation of women and on the composition of municipal councils. The empirical strategy, a Difference-in-Discontinuities design, takes advantage of the fact that the policy applies to cities above a population threshold, and that this threshold has been modified over time. I find that the quota policy has a substantial impact on the share of female candidates and elected politicians, but fails to promote female mayors and list leaders, even in cities that have been exposed to the policy for 13 years. Women do not reach leadership positions because they are more likely to resign than male politicians. This higher propensity of women to leave politics is correlated with local gender norms concerning the place of women in society, and also varies with individual characteristics such as age and professional background. In a second part, I show that quotas have little effect on the composition of municipal councils in terms of socio-economic background, age, and political experience.     

Law and Preferences

Legal rules do more than provide incentives, they change people.When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via aprocess of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affectingthe market outcome, may affect the dynamics of preference formation.Analyzing the effect of different legal rules should thereforego beyond the analysis of the incentives they provide. It shouldalso include an analysis of their effect on the distributionof preferences and norms of behavior. We illustrate this claimby considering a simple market game in which individuals mayhave preferences that include fairness concerns. We show thatdifferent legal rules change not only the pattern of trade ina market game, but also individuals' fairness concerns. Thatis, different rules may eventually make individuals care more(or less) about a fair outcome. Specifically, our model suggeststhat enhanced remedies for breach of contract may reduce equilibriumpreferences for fairness.     

Religion,administration & public goods: Experimental evidence from Russia

In this paper, I argue that religion matters for the provision of public goods. I identify three normative foundations of Eastern Orthodox monasticism with strong economic implications: 1. solidarity, 2. obedience, and 3. universal discipline. I propose a public goods game with a three-tier hierarchy, where these norms are modeled as treatments. Obedience and universal discipline facilitate the provision of threshold public goods in equilibrium, whereas solidarity does not. Empirical evidence is drawn from public goods experiments run with regional bureaucrats in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. The introduction of the same three norms as experimental treatments produces different results. I find that only universal discipline leads to the provision of threshold public goods, whereas solidarity and obedience do not. Unlike in Protestant societies, in Eastern Orthodox societies free-riding occurs at lower than at higher hierarchical levels. Successful economic reforms in Eastern Orthodox countries start with the restructuring of the middle- and lower-ranked public sector. Authoritarian persistence is defined by the commitment of the dictator to overprovide public goods.     

Understanding the Remittance Gender Gap among Hispanics in the US: Gendered Norms and the Role of Expectations

Using the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), this study analyzes the existence of a gender gap in favor of men in the monetary remittance behavior of Hispanics residing in the United States. Findings indicate that cultural gender norms and expectations in the country of origin play a key role. The study shows that women migrants are less likely to remit than men and, when they do, they transfer smaller amounts. The remittance gender gap is not universal among subgroups, since it is only observable among Hispanics who came to the US to improve their economic situation, plan to return to their home country, and have low income and low schooling. An index on migrants’ perceptions of gender roles as a proxy for cultural gendered norms is constructed and shows that more traditional gender views are associated with a significant gender gap in favor of men in remittances.     

WTO as Moral Support

International cooperation in trade policies under the auspices of the WTO makes countries "feel" more obliged to uphold agreements. The paper emphasizes the role of the WTO to give moral support: countries incur "psychological costs" when they renege on the agreements that are formally signed under the WTO. Using the concept of Kandori's (2003 ) "morale equilibrium," we formalize this idea and show that countries can agree on a cooperative level of the binding tariffs but they occasionally deviate from the agreement, which lowers the morale and invites further deviations in the future.     

Violent conflict and institutional change*

Violent conflict such as civil war may influence institutional quality by changing the political equilibrium or by changing preferences and norms. This study presents empirical evidence that in some cases civil war deteriorates institutional quality. By applying the synthetic control method to 25 cases of civil war between 1960 and 2010, I construct the counterfactual path of institutional quality in the absence of civil war. The effects of civil war are heterogeneous, but for a substantial minority of cases civil war appears to deteriorate institutional quality. These findings have implications for post-civil war economic recovery as well as long run economic development.     

Gender Inequality,Endogenous Cultural Norms,and Economic Development

In this paper, I explore the joint dynamics between gender inequality and cultural norms along the process of development. Cultural norms regarding gender roles are shaped by the relative female labor supply, and thus depend on the gender gap in education. In turn, these norms influence the relative education provided to boys and girls. I show that this two‐way causality between the inegalitarian nature of norms and the educational gender gap might explain the emergence of high gender inequality and low development traps. The model also makes it possible to replicate a U‐shaped relationship between the relative status of women and the economic development.     

Mixed feelings: Theories of and evidence on giving

This paper examines possible motives and institutional factors that impact giving. Specifically, I consider alternative theories parallel to dictator experiments that generate evidence on both allocation decisions and their effect on feelings. A number of new empirical findings as well as new interpretations for previously reported findings result. A novel test distinguishes warm glow from impure altruism and rules out the former as the sole motive for giving. Very generous donations to charities that aid the needy (with modal gifts of the entire dictator's stakes) cannot be attributed to familiarity with the charities. A charity that offers a matching grant increases its revenues by drawing donors and donations away from one that does not, although aggregate charitable donations do not rise. Additional results on emotions paint a picture of “mixed feelings:” generosity creates good feelings when the recipients are charities and bad feelings when they are fellow students. No group of dictators, however, feels better, on average, than a control group that is given no opportunity to donate. I propose a simple model that accounts for these results on allocation behavior and feelings by incorporating elements of two approaches, unconditional altruism and social preference theories, that to date have mostly evolved independently. A critical feature of this model is the social norm, and the results of the experiments corroborate the theory in the context of two norms of distributive justice that are important to real world giving: equity and need.     

Economists as subjects: Toward a psychology of economists

Economists can reflect on their own field of research and themselves in a number of ways. The philosophy of science has long been the dominant way to reflect on the work of scientists, to be joined in more recent times by both the sociology of science and the rhetoric of science. In this paper I do not argue that these approaches are wrong, but I do argue that they should be complemented with a study of the individual scientist. A psychology of economists, in other words, is called for. One important theory in recent psychological literature (social learning/cognitive theory) is introduced as an instance to indicate what kind of suggestions concerning the reflective position of individual scientists might be derived. It would be preferable from this perspective that scientists set high standards for themselves, have an open mind to what happens in different disciplines, and set high standards by which to judge others. Then follows a discussion where some potential objections to the approach in general, or to the specific psychological theory in particular, are refuted.     

Economists as subjects: Toward a psychology of economists

Economists can reflect on their own field of research and themselves in a number of ways. The philosophy of science has long been the dominant way to reflect on the work of scientists, to be joined in more recent times by both the sociology of science and the rhetoric of science. In this paper I do not argue that these approaches are wrong, but I do argue that they should be complemented with a study of the individual scientist. A psychology of economists, in other words, is called for. One important theory in recent psychological literature (social learning/cognitive theory) is introduced as an instance to indicate what kind of suggestions concerning the reflective position of individual scientists might be derived. It would be preferable from this perspective that scientists set high standards for themselves, have an open mind to what happens in different disciplines, and set high standards by which to judge others. Then follows a discussion where some potential objections to the approach in general, or to the specific psychological theory in particular, are refuted.     

VOTING AND THE INTERTEMPORAL SELECTION OF TAX RATES IN A MACRO-ECONOMY*

This paper presents a macroeconomic model where governments are motivated both by their ideological preference for alternative fiscal policies that vary in their short run and long run consequences and by their reelection prospects. I prove that a sequential equilibrium exists in which moderate incumbents compromise their ideologies in order to get reelected, while extreme governments forego reelection but tie the hands of their successors. The view implied by this model is that incumbent governments, in order to get reelected, do not ideologically differentiate themselves from one another since such behavior is likely to result in loss of office. Alternatively, governments that are either subsequently not reelected or are lame ducks pursue ideologically preferred policies since they are less constrained by the electorate.