Fiscal federalism approach for controlling global environmental pollution

This paper finds that optimal international carbon taxes are country specific and we can decompose a tax on a domestically produced carbon-intensive commodity into a revenue tax, a tax to control local atmospheric pollution and an international carbon tax. It shows that an institutional arrangement for the world economy similar to the fiscal federalism in the federal countries can be useful to internalize the global externalities of atmospheric pollution.     

Withholding taxes or information exchange: the taxation of international interest flows

This paper considers withholding taxes and information exchange as alternative means to tax international interest income. For each regime, we consider the maximum level of taxation of foreign-source income that can be sustained as the equilibrium of a repeated game. The best regime is the one that brings the level of taxation in the repeated game closest to the cooperative level of interest taxation. Sustainable levels of taxation in either regime depend on the importance of bank profits and on the marginal cost of public funds, among other things. Simulations with the model illustrate the choice between withholding taxes and information exchange. An explicit possibility is the emergence of a mixed regime, with one country imposing a withholding tax and the other country providing information. The basic model is extended to allow for size differences between the two countries and to incorporate a third, outside country.     

TAX REFORM

After brief individual presentations, panelists discuss among themselves and with the audience a broad spectrum of issues regarding various taxes and tax reform proposals. The discussion includes such issues as privatizing Social Security and Medicare, eliminating income tax withholding, and the merits and demerits of income taxes, consumption taxes, value added taxes, sales taxes, and taxes on resources that have an inelastic supply. One panelist relates his recent experiences using his tools as an economist to deal with tax and related issues as a current member of the Canadian Parliament. Another cites practical problems of implementing tax reform from his long experience advising governments, especially in Latin America. A major focus of the exchange of views is on public choice problems involved in passing and implementing a so-called flat tax. However, the discussion also deals with economic efficiency and equity considerations and with nearly all other types of taxes. The discussion includes not only the impact on the country within which tax reform occurs, but international implications, as well.     

Tax Effects on the Real Exchange Rate

This study examines the impact of taxes on the real exchange rate through their marginal effects on economic activity. We hypothesize that an increase in the capital interest tax rate leads to real domestic currency depreciation while an increase in wage or consumption tax rates leads to a real domestic currency appreciation. These hypotheses are supported by an empirical study using panel data estimations of annual data from 10 OECD countries over 17 years.     

Foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes

Governments impose multiple taxes on foreign investors, though studies of the effect of tax policy on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes. This paper examines the impact of indirect (non-income) taxes on FDI by American multinational firms, using affiliate-level data that permit the introduction of controls for parent companies and affiliate industries. Indirect tax burdens significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of foreign affiliates of American companies. Estimates imply that 10% higher local indirect tax rates are associated with 7.1% lower affiliate assets, which is similar to the effect of 10% higher income tax rates. Affiliate output falls by 2.9% as indirect taxes rise by 10%, while higher income taxes have more modest output effects. High corporate income tax rates depress capital/labor ratios and profit rates of foreign affiliates, whereas high indirect tax rates do not. These patterns reveal the impact of indirect taxes and suggest the mechanisms by which direct and indirect taxes affect FDI.     

Room to Manoeuvre? International Financial Markets and the National Tax State

Globalisation has triggered a downwards trend in direct taxation as governments compete for internationally mobile capital. This popular postulation has blurred the attention to potential upward constraints on tax policy-making emanating from globalised capital markets. In this paper, we illustrate when and how capital markets exert an upward pressure on taxes. While the increasing access to international capital allowed governments in developed democracies to indulge their voters with deficit-financed spending, the most recent crisis has shown that this is no panacea. When international loans become costly, governments have to revert to raising revenue domestically. Using comparative time-series data since the 1980s, we investigate how rising bond yields affect the number and the direction of tax reforms, as well as the tax mix in the OECD. The empirical analysis provides some evidence that international capital markets place an upward pressure on taxes, recently above all on consumption taxes. Yet, governments have also retained room to manoeuvre as a number of tax decisions are more dependent on domestic political factors than on pressure from the capital markets.     

VAT and the taxation of rents

Cash-flow corporate taxes can tax corporate-source rents and avoid some of the distortions on investment and financing caused by conventional corporate taxes. However, cash-flow taxes applied on an origin basis are prone to international profit-shifting, which can lead to a competitive reduction in tax rates. While this can be avoided by a destination-based cash-flow tax, most countries have opted for origin-based taxation, asserting the right to tax rents generated within their jurisdictions. Since a value-added tax (VAT) implicitly includes rents in its base, it can complement origin-based corporate taxation. We compare and contrast the use of destination and origin VATs as complements to an origin-based cash-flow corporate tax.     

How should commodities be taxed?: Market structure,product heterogeneity and the optimal structure of commodity taxes

This paper is concerned with the form in which commodity taxes are best imposed, and particularly with the appropriate balance between specific and ad valorem components. This neglected issue is of policy importance in relation to the harmonization of tax structures within the EEC, and of theoretical interest as a point of contact between optimal tax theory and models of non-price competition. The roles of the two taxes as purely corrective devices under a variety of market forms are established and discussed. The analysis suggests that heavily taxed commodities should normally be subject to high specific rather than high ad valorem taxes.     

Optimal Commodity Taxes in Australia

The recent changes to commodity taxes in Australia have led to renewed interest in a classic question in public finance: should the tax rates be uniform or differentiated? This article attempts to answer this question by calculating optimal commodity taxes in Australia for a nine‐item disaggregation. The estimates point to non‐uniform commodity taxes, even from the viewpoint of an inequality‐insensitive tax planner. The optimal commodity taxes bear little resemblance with the pre‐GST or post‐GST tax rates. No less significant is our observation that even the purely efficiency‐driven optimal commodity taxes imply lower real expenditure inequality than the actual taxes.     

Fiscal Rules,Interest Payments on Debt,and the Irrelevance of the Taylor Principle

We show that in New Keynesian models with non‐neutral government debt, the Taylor principle ceases to be relevant for equilibrium determinacy if the government follows a fiscal rule of levying taxes in proportion to its interest payments on existing debt. This is in contrast with previous studies, which typically have assumed that taxes respond to the level of debt, and have found either a confirmation or reversal of the Taylor principle depending on the feedback from debt to taxes. We find, instead, that the equilibrium effect of the interest rate on debt is crucial for determinacy. If, as in our model, taxes are raised in response to debt interest payments, the range of indeterminacy monotonically decreases with the fiscal feedback parameter. When interest payments are completely tax‐financed, indeterminacy is ruled out without any restrictions on monetary policy.     

Efficiency aspects of increasing inheritance taxes while decreasing income taxes

This article tries to shed some light on the economic efficiency aspects of a tax reform that would increase inheritance taxes while decreasing income taxes. An analysis of labour market decisions following the activation of such a reform is presented. An international comparison of inheritance tax collection shows that almost all industrial countries impose an inheritance tax. However, government revenue from inheritance and gift taxes in Europe is lower than 1% of GDP and is very low in the United States as well. Applying the proposed reform could increase work hours and delay retirement decisions.     

中国税制改革的路径与现实选择

在经济全球化的国际形势下,中国税制改革势在必行。基于税制优化理论,借鉴大多数市场经济国家的成功做法,建立以增值税、所得税和社会保障税为主体的税制结构,取消不合理的税种,调整并增加一些税种是中国税制改革的现实选择。     

Profit taxation and the mode of foreign market entry

Abstract This paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm's decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market – through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI) and local supply. We show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can enforce exporting instead of FDI. This leads to a Nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization.     

Strategic Environmental Policies when Waste Products are Tradable

The paper deals with international trade in hazardous waste products when there is an international oligopoly market for waste, and both waste‐importing and waste‐exporting countries act strategically to utilize national environmental policies to attach rents arising from trade in waste. The authors model a multiple‐stage game where waste is generated in an industrialized country as a byproduct of production, and potentially is exported to some less‐developed countries, if not abated locally, or imposed on local residents at a cost of an environmental tax. In the market for waste, an oligopolistic supply is assumed. The demand for waste is perfectly competitive, with waste‐processing firms guided by marginal disposal costs and environmental taxes levied by foreign countries. With each country playing Nash, the analysis finds domestic and foreign taxes to be distorted from the Pigouvian taxes in such a way that the domestic (waste‐exporter) tax rate is set below, and the foreign tax rate is set above, the Pigouvian taxes. However, a global welfare optimum requires tax distortions in the opposite direction, in the sense that foreign environmental taxes must be set below the Pigouvian tax rate.     

Tax Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets with Environmentally Conscious Consumers

This paper analyses the effects of tax competition on environmental product quality, pollution and welfare in a two-country, vertically differentiated, international duopoly, in which consumers are environmentally conscious. The firm in each country chooses first the environmental quality of its product (which reflects the emissions generated in the production process) and then the price. In equilibrium one country will be more polluted than the other because firms choose different levels of environmental quality of their products. We find that a country’s optimal commodity tax is higher if the domestic firm is the more polluting supplier. Furthermore, non-cooperative commodity tax rates are inefficiently high in equilibrium. This is because, in this framework with environmentally aware consumers, commodity taxes affect the choice of firms regarding their emissions. Therefore, a domestic tax reduction not only raises the profits of the foreign firm but also lowers its emission levels, resulting in higher welfare for the other country. We also analyse the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative commodity and emission taxes with border tax adjustments. With these two policy instruments available, commodity taxes are higher.     

Trade taxes and international investment

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that international investment disturbs the conventionally understood equivalence between import tariffs and export taxes. Fundamentally, remittances to foreigners introduce an additional pecuniary channel between countries so that two-good Lerner Symmetry generally will not hold. Moreover, because tariffs subsidize investors in the local import competing sector while export taxes can extract rent from foreign investors in the export sector, the pattern of international investment will influence government preferences over trade policy  instruments  as well as levels. Notably, trade tax symmetry is restored by introducing a third policy tool in the form of a direct a tax on international remittances.     

DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES UNDER INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY

This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in the absence of explicit trade policies when both governments and firms act strategically. We demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady‐state equilibrium in a dynamic environmental tax game is lower than that in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the beginning of policy competition, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax. This implies that it is important to set cooperative environmental taxes in the beginning of policy competition because non‐cooperative environmental taxes in the dynamic game result in the race‐to‐the‐bottom, which does not lead to environmental improvement.     

Are Consumption Taxes Regressive?

It is often argued that a general consumption tax is necessarily regressive, particularly because households with high incomes typically save relatively more than those with low incomes. This paper uses very simple tax models to examine the combination of income and consumption taxes. It suggests that it is preferable to consider the overall impact of all taxes and transfers rather than relating payments of a single tax to gross income, instead of the relevant tax base. Insofar as savings might be relevant, attention should be given to the income tax treatment of investment income.     

The taxation of capital income in an open economy: the importance of resident-nonresident tax treatment

The authors develop a simulation model of the United States and the rest of the world to demonstrate how international capital mobility alters the incidence and capital formation incentives of taxes on capital income. The model explicitly recognizes that U.S. and foreign investors hold a different mix of assets in each country. Only a modest degree of international mobility is necessary to substantially alter closed-economy patterns of tax incidence. Differences in the tax treatment of residents and foreigners are particularly important in evaluating tax reductions at the individual level or the integration of corporate and individual income taxes.     

Optimal taxation in a monetary economy with financial intrmediaries

The problem of optimal taxation when the government must levy distorting taxes to meet its revenue needs is considered for a monetary economy with financial intermediaries. In contrast to most other studies of optimal taxation in a monetary economy, money is treated as an intermediate good which is held because doing so economizes on the scarce resources that must be devoted to the exchange process. Attention is focused on the roles of the inflation tax, reserve requirements, and deposit taxes. The key result is that revenue considerations do not justify taxing cash and deposits. That is, the optimal tax structure calls for adopting the optimum quantity of money rule and setting deposit taxes to zero. When the optimal tax structure is in place, reserve requirements turn out to be irrelevant from both the fiscal and welfare perspectives.