R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests

Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If R&D spillovers are zero, a managerial firm will have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an entrepreneurial firm. If both owners endogenously decide about delegation, each owner's dominant strategy will be to delegate, given that the manager's reservation value is not too large. (3) If R&D spillovers are maximal, collusive market outcomes become very likely, which makes strategic delegation less important. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial delegation games and corporate social responsibility

In a duopoly in which firms universally engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, this paper shows that, in contrast to the main tenet of the received managerial delegation literature, if the CSR sensitivity is sufficiently high: (a) when both firms delegate output decisions to managers, at the equilibrium profit (resp. consumer welfare) is higher (resp. lower) than when firms are pure CSR; (b) in a managerial delegation game, asymmetric multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria emerge in which one firm delegates and the rival does not. These results hold under both the “sales delegation” and “relative profits” manager's bonus schemes.     

Managerial style and the strategic choice of executive incentives

This paper analyzes a two-stage duopoly model where owners provide incentives to managers who then select output levels. Unlike the previous Cournot models on the strategic use of incentives (e.g. Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987), managers hold different beliefs about their rivals. Managers and executives are classified by ‘management style’ based on the aggressiveness of their beliefs. It is shown that many of the standard results of the strategic managerial incentive literature no longer hold when executives have differing managerial styles. For example, owners may ‘penalize’ their managers for sales, or they may optimally instruct their managers to maximize profits, in contrast to the standard Cournot findings. Indeed, the model yields a necessary and sufficient condition for compensation contracts to specify pure profit-maximizing behavior when managers have differing managerial styles. Thus, the analysis suggests that when ownership and control are separated, owners must carefully assess the belief structure (management style) of their executives before designing the compensation package.     

Incentives to innovate in response to competition: The role of agency costs

This paper investigates the role of managerial ownership and incentive payment as potential drivers of innovation decisions by firms and as shifters of the competition-innovation link in the Russian manufacturing industry, where poorly protected property rights and a path-dependent market structure (typical for many transition economies) lead to a variety of outcomes. We use recent survey-based microdata for nearly 2000 non-listed companies in Russia. Our results suggest that managerial ownership, which initially evolved as a means of protecting against and resisting dysfunctional institutions, may stimulate decisions to undertake R&D and risky product innovations. Further, managerial ownership and competition are complementary motivations for R&D and innovation. Incentive payment to hired managers is a positive commitment instrument but has no impact on the competition-innovation link.     

Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition with managerial delegation

We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous‐timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the prices of their products as much as possible. Thus, in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of the entrepreneurial case, according to which firms choose prices simultaneously in the former stage. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Welfare Effects of the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 and the National Cooperative Production Amendments (NCPA) of 1993

A bstract .   Cooperative R&D and production joint ventures may enable firms to achieve significant cost efficiencies. However, they can also be a means of controlling industry output and raising product prices. A review of the literature on the welfare implications of allowing rival firms to cooperate in the R&D and production stages indicates that the issue is controversial from a theoretical perspective. There is need to examine the motivations of R&D and production joint ventures in order to assess the welfare implications of the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 and National Cooperative Production Amendments (NCPA) of 1993, which relaxed the antitrust treatment of R&D and production joint ventures. Using samples of 127 cooperative R&D joint ventures and 342 cooperative production joint ventures announced by U.S. domestic firms during 1979–1999, this article finds that these endeavors do not meet the criteria for collusive behavior specified by the market power doctrine. We interpret these findings as suggesting that cooperative R&D and production joint ventures are motivated by cost efficiencies and are, therefore, welfare enhancing. Our results pose some challenges to the doctrine that antitrust actions by regulatory authorities are always welfare improving.     

R&D Spillovers on a Salop Circle

The paper describes quality/price equilibrium and welfare effects of R&D spillovers when firms are located around the circumference of a Salop circle, and the extent of the spillovers may depend on the geographic proximity between firms. In particular, we show that an increase in competition may have a positive effect on the provision of quality and firms' profits. We also extend the model allowing a multinational enterprise to locate at the centre of the circle. In this scenario it is important to understand the interplay of local R&D spillovers with the spillovers that propagate from and to the centre. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note

In this note we reconsider the paper of Zhang and Zhang (1997), published in Managerial and Decision Economics, who analyze a strategic delegation model with R&D spillovers in an imperfectly competitive market. We were motivated to study their setup by a puzzling result given in their paper: delegating the production and R&D decisions to managers is never beneficial for the owners of the firm. When we tried to understand the driving forces of this result, we found however that the findings of Zhang and Zhang (1997) are incorrect. We explain why their derivations are wrong and demonstrate via counterexamples that the main propositions in their paper do not hold. In addition, we show how the correct solution of this R&D model with spillovers can be obtained. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous R&D Networks among Upstream Firms

This paper studies the endogenous formation of R&D networks among upstream firms and the welfare implications thereof. Both under an upstream price setting and an upstream quantity setting, it is shown that the complete R&D network emerges in equilibrium but only if spillovers are sufficiently low. Yet, under a quantity setting, the complete network arises within a larger range of spillovers. In both cases, however, there is a potential conflict between private incentives for R&D collaboration and societal ones. We discuss policy measures that may help to steer firms towards a more socially desirable outcome. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly under uncertainty

Including R&D risk, this paper considers the choices of R&D spillovers in a simple non-tournament cost-reducing R&D duopoly game with Bertrand competition. It turns out that the two firms never disclose any of their R&D information when considering their R&D non-cooperatively. However, if the firms decide their R&D cooperatively, we show, though they would always fully share their information when the risk of R&D is low, they would not disclose any of their R&D information when the market competition is fierce, the R&D risk is high and the R&D is efficient.     

The impacts of family involvement on R&D investment intensity in firms: Evidence from China

Drawing on the perspective of socioemotional wealth, this paper explores the types of family involvement in family firms and their impacts on R&D investment intensity. Using data from the forecasts issued by A-share family firms listed on Chinese stock markets between 2008 and 2019, the study finds that the separation of ownership and control is negatively associated with R&D investment intensity in non-high-tech firms, whereas potential gains of socioemotional wealth from R&D activities by high-tech firms produce a positive influence that offsets the negative impact of the separation of ownership and control on R&D investments. It reveals the importance of gains of socioemotional wealth. In contrast to the separation of ownership and control, family involvement in management is negatively associated with firms’ R&D investment intensity in both high-tech firms and non-high-tech firms. Our results capture the diversity of family members’ identity recognition, which leads to family members’ different evaluations of the potential gains and losses of socioemotional wealth. Overall, the distinction between high-tech family firms and other family firms is shown to be significant, as is the distinction between the impacts of different types of family involvement.

     

Research collaboration and R&D outsourcing: Different R&D personnel requirements in SMEs

The literature on ‘open’ innovation emphasises the need to engage in external knowledge relations in order to innovate. Particularly for SMEs, research cooperation and R&D outsourcing can offer possibilities to complement the often limited internal research resources. However, they also bring in their wake requirements in terms of absorptive capacity and managerial skills of the internal R&D personnel.The paper focuses on the different requirements in terms of availability and training of research managers and R&D experts for research cooperation versus R&D outsourcing in SMEs. An empirical analysis of micro-level data provided by the OECD business R&D survey for Belgium reveals that the relation between R&D personnel requirements and research collaboration and R&D outsourcing depends upon the SME size. Therefore, to study this subject appropriately a distinction between very small, small, and medium-sized firms is relevant. Very small firms engage significantly less in research cooperation than medium-sized firms and the propensity to engage in research cooperation is positively associated with the share of PhD holders among the research managers and R&D experts. For R&D outsourcing a lower involvement is noted in medium-sized firms, and the propensity to outsource increases with the formal qualification level of the R&D personnel and with R&D training. Among the SME, small firms are most engaged in research cooperation and in R&D outsourcing. In the case of research cooperation they rely on highly qualified experts. For R&D outsourcing activities both the presence of research managers and R&D experts is important.     

Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly,with and without commitment

In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms' owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare. If products are either sufficiently differentiated or sufficiently close substitutes, owners use Relative Performance contracts. For intermediate levels of product substitutability, they use Market Share contracts. When owners do not commit over the types of contracts, each type is an owner's best response to his rival's choice. Product substitutability has differential effects on output levels and profits, depending on the configuration of contracts in the industry. Finally, managerial incentive contracts are welfare enhancing if they increase consumers' surplus. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cooperative and noncooperative R&D with spillovers: The case of labor-managed firms

This research focuses on the behavior of not-for-profit enterprises. In particular, using a familiar model of cost-reducing R&D with spillovers, we examine strategic interactions between labor-managed firms in a duopoly. Research spillovers have not been previously considered in the context of labor-managed firms. Among four market scenarios involving (i) competition in research and production; (ii) cooperation in research and production; (iii and iv) competition or cooperation in research and the reverse in production, our results show that research is greatest under full cooperation, while output is greatest under full competition. Output and R&D are the lowest in the case when firms compete in research, but form a production cartel. The degree of research spillovers has a crucial bearing upon these rankings. Some of these results differ from those for profit-maximizing firms. The effects of changes in research spillovers on employment (output) are shown to depend upon the nature of the underlying production technology. Policy implications are discussed.     

管理报酬机制的构建

两权分离制度形成了企业所有者和经营者的委托代理关系,由于双方利益的冲突,委托人必然采取措施促使两者利益的趋同,报酬机制就是其中的一种有效的激励措施。本文以S=S0 aS1 bS2 E作为报酬方案的简化模型,具体分析了模型相关的构成因素,并以美国大企业管理人员报酬构成为例加以说明。     

Spillovers,absorptive capacity and agglomeration

I study knowledge spillovers in an industry where firms are heterogeneous in their ability to adopt knowledge (absorptive capacity). I set up a model in which firms choose locations anticipating potential gains and losses from other firms’ R&D activity. I apply the model to the US software industry and obtain the following results: the data supports localized knowledge spillovers; firms that have higher absorptive capacity are sorted into more agglomerated counties; ignoring firm heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of gains from spillovers; spillovers play an important role in explaining the geographic distribution of firms, but only within regions with high R&D activity.     

Endogenous R&D spillovers and locational choice with discriminatory pricing

We present a model of spatial price discrimination where R&D spillovers are endogenous as they depend on firms' location. We establish that both the distance between locations and R&D efforts are an increasing function of the transportation cost coefficient and show that there is a continuum of cases where firms will choose an intermediate location. The managerial implications from the model are discussed using examples of marketing behavior by Internet retailers. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm governance and duopoly: in weakness may lie strength

The paper proposes a model of firm governance when two firms compete in a duopoly. The paper assumes that a motivational asymmetry exists between owners and managers: owners wish to obtain maximum profits, managers wish to maximize sales. Managers perceive that salary, social status or future job prospects are more closely associated with firm size (i.e. sales) than with firm profits. The paper takes an agency view of the firm where owners only indirectly influence the behaviour of firms through the level of control they exert over managers. The paper demonstrates that a weakly governed firm, acting as a sales maximizer, can gain a competitive advantage over a strongly governed firm, acting as a profit maximizer. The paper examines the extent of this advantage under cost leadership and differentiation strategies. The paper also demonstrates that the objectives of profit maximization and maximization of competitive advantage are not necessarily congruent. The paper graphically represents the profit functions of the two firms illustrating the Nash equilibrium under Cournot and Stackelberg conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Endogenous Technological Spillovers: Causes and Consequences

We develop a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. We analyze a game in which firms can first invest in cost-reducing R&D, then compete on the human-capital market for their knowledge-bearing employees, and finally enter the product market. If R&D employees change firms, spillovers arise. We show that technological spillovers are most likely when they increase total industry profits. We use this result to show that innovation incentives are usually stronger for endogenous than for exogenous spillovers and that endogenous spillovers may reverse the result that innovation incentives are stronger under quantity competition than under price competition. Finally, we explore the robustness of our results with respect to contractual incompleteness and the number of R&D workers.