The why, what, and how of management innovation

For organizations like GE, P&G, and Visa, management innovation is the secret to success. But what is management innovation? Why is it so important? And how can other companies learn to become management innovators? This article from expert Gary Hamel answers those questions. A management breakthrough can deliver a strong advantage to the innovating company and produce a major shift in industry leadership. Few companies, however, have been able to come up with a formal process for fostering management innovation. The biggest challenge seems to be generating truly unique ideas. Four components can help: a big problem that demands fresh thinking, creative principles or paradigms that can reveal new approaches, an evaluation of the conventions that constrain novel thinking, and examples and analogies that help redefine what can be done. No doubt there are existing management processes in your organization that exacerbate the big problems you're hoping to solve. So how can you learn to identify them? Start by asking a series of questions for each one. For instance, Who owns the process? What are its objectives? What are the metrics for success? What are the decision-making criteria? How are decisions communicated, and to whom? After documenting these details, ask the people involved with the process to weigh in. This exploration may reveal opportunities to reinventyour management processes. A management innovation, the author says, creates long-lasting advantage when it meets at least one of three conditions: It is based on a novel principle that challenges the orthodoxy; it is systemic, involving a range of processes and methods; or it is part of a program of invention, where progress compounds over time. So far, management in this century isn't much different from management in the previous one, says Hamel. Therein lies the opportunity. You can wait for a competitor to come upon the next great management process and drive you out of business-or you can become a management innovator right now.     

Charting your company's future

Few companies have a clear strategic vision. The problem, say the authors, stems from the strategic-planning process itself, which usually involves preparing a large document, culled from a mishmash of data provided by people with conflicting agendas. That kind of process almost guarantees an unfocused strategy. Instead, companies should design the strategic-planning process by drawing a picture: a strategy canvas. A strategy canvas shows the strategic profile of your industry by depicting the various factors that affect competition. And it shows the strategic profiles of your current and potential competitors as well as your own company's strategic profile--how it invests in the factors of competition and how it might in the future. The basic component of a strategy canvas--the value curve--is a tool the authors created in their consulting work and have written about in previous HBR articles. This article introduces a four-step process for actually drawing and discussing a strategy canvas. Readers will learn how one European financial services company used this process to create a distinct and easily communicable strategy. The process begins with a visual awakening. Managers compare their business's value curve with competitors' to discover where their strategy needs to change. In the next step--visual exploration--managers do field research on customers and alternative products. At the visual strategy fair, the third step, managers draw new strategic profiles based on field observations and get feedback from customers and peers about these new proposals. Once the best strategy is created from that feedback, it's time for the last step--visual communication. Executives distribute "before" and "after" strategic profiles to the whole company, and only projects that will help move the company closer to the "after" profile are supported.     

Making strategy: learning by doing

Companies find it difficult to change strategy for many reasons, but one stands out: strategic thinking is not a core managerial competence at most companies. Executives hone their capabilities by tackling problems over and over again. Changing strategy, however, is not usually a task that they face repeatedly. Once companies have found a strategy that works, they want to use it, not change it. Consequently, most managers do not develop a competence in strategic thinking. This Manager's Tool Kit presents a three-stage method executives can use to conceive and implement a creative and coherent strategy themselves. The first stage is to identify and map the driving forces that the company needs to address. The process of mapping provides strategy-making teams with visual representations of team members' assumptions, those pictures, in turn, enable managers to achieve consensus in determining the driving forces. Once a senior management team has formulated a new strategy, it must align the strategy with the company's resource-allocation process to make implementation possible. Senior management teams can translate their strategy into action by using aggregate project planning. And management teams that link strategy and innovation through that planning process will develop a competence in implementing strategic change. The author guides the reader through the three stages of strategy making by examining the case of a manufacturing company that was losing ground to competitors. After mapping the driving forces, the company's senior managers were able to devise a new strategy that allowed the business to maintain a competitive advantage in its industry.     

Strategy as stretch and leverage

Global competition is not just product versus product or company versus company. It is mind-set versus mind-set. Driven to understand the dynamics of competition, we have learned a lot about what makes one company more successful than another. But to find the root of competitiveness--to understand why some companies create new forms of competitive advantage while others watch and follow--we must look at strategic mind-sets. For many managers, "being strategic" means pursuing opportunities that fit the company's resources. This approach is not wrong, Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad contend, but it obscures an approach in which "stretch" supplements fit and being strategic means creating a chasm between ambition and resources. Toyota, CNN, British Airways, Sony, and others all displaced competitors with stronger reputations and deeper pockets. Their secret? In each case, the winner had greater ambition than its well-endowed rivals. Winners also find less resource-intensive ways of achieving their ambitious goals. This is where leverage complements the strategic allocation of resources. Managers at competitive companies can get a bigger bang for their buck in five basic ways: by concentrating resources around strategic goals; by accumulating resources more efficiently; by complementing one kind of resource with another; by conserving resources whenever they can; and by recovering resources from the market-place as quickly as possible. As recent competitive battles have demonstrated, abundant resources can't guarantee continued industry leadership.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Capitalizing on capabilities

By making the most of organizational capabilities--employees' collective skills and fields of expertise--you can dramatically improve your company's market value. Although there is no magic list of proficiencies that every organization needs in order to succeed, the authors identify 11 intangible assets that well-managed companies tend to have: talent, speed, shared mind-set and coherent brand identity, accountability, collaboration, learning, leadership, customer connectivity, strategic unity, innovation, and efficiency. Such companies typically excel in only three of these capabilities while maintaining industry parity in the other areas. Organizations that fall below the norm in any of the 11 are likely candidates for dysfunction and competitive disadvantage. So you can determine how your company fares in these categories (or others, if the generic list doesn't suit your needs), the authors explain how to conduct a "capabilities audit," describing in particular the experiences and findings of two companies that recently performed such audits. In addition to highlighting which intangible assets are most important given the organization's history and strategy, this exercise will gauge how well your company delivers on its capabilities and will guide you in developing an action plan for improvement. A capabilities audit can work for an entire organization, a business unit, or a region--indeed, for any part of a company that has a strategy to generate financial or customer-related results. It enables executives to assess overall company strengths and weaknesses, senior leaders to define strategy, midlevel managers to execute strategy, and frontline leaders to achieve tactical results. In short, it helps turn intangible assets into concrete strengths.     

The Empire strikes back. Counterrevolutionary strategies for industry leaders

Industry leaders frequently worry that their companies will fall victim to some revolutionary business model or disruptive technology. But new research shows that it's strategically better for incumbents to counter a revolution than to ignore or fully embrace it. Successful incumbents rely on one or more of five approaches to restrain, modify, or, if necessary, neutralize a revolutionary threat. A company that perceives a revolution in its earliest stages can use containment strategies. By throwing up roadblocks--raising switching costs, perhaps, or launching discrediting PR efforts--an incumbent can often limit the degree to which customers and competitors accept a nascent insurgency. And, sometimes, revolutions die there. If not, early containment buys a company some time to shape the revolution so that it complements, rather than supersedes, the incumbent's strengths. And even if shaping efforts fail, they can give an industry leader more time to work out how to absorb the threat by bringing the new competencies or technologies inside the firm in such a way that they don't destroy its existing strengths and capabilities. When revolutions have progressed too far to slow them down, incumbents must take a more aggressive tack. Neutralizing strategies meet a revolution head-on and terminate it--by, say, temporarily giving away the benefits offered by the challenger for free. Annulment strategies allow the market leader to leapfrog over or sidestep the threat. These five strategic approaches need not be used in isolation, as a detailed case study of the way Anheuser-Busch countered the craft-beer revolution dramatically demonstrates. Sensible industry leaders do not lead revolutions; they know they may not survive the attempt. Instead, they prefer to lead counterrevolutions.     

Organigraphs: drawing how companies really work

Walk into any organization and you will get a snapshot of the company in action--people and products moving every which way. But ask for a picture of the company and you will be given the org chart, with its orderly little boxes showing just the names and titles of managers. Now there's a more revealing way to depict the people and operations within an organization--an approach called the organigraph. The organigraph is not a chart. It's a map that offers an overview of the company's functions and the ways that people organize themselves at work. Perhaps most important, an organigraph can help managers see untapped competitive opportunities. Drawing on the organigraphs they created for about a dozen companies, authors Mintzberg and Van der Heyden illustrate just how valuable a tool the organigraph is. For instance, one they created for Electrocomponents, a British distributor of electrical and mechanical items, led managers to a better understanding of the company's real expertise--business-to-business relationships. As a result of that insight, the company wisely decided to expand in Asia and to increase its Internet business. As one manager says, "It allowed the company to see all sorts of new possibilities." With traditional hierarchies vanishing and newfangled--and often quite complex--organizational forms taking their place, people are struggling to understand how their companies work. What parts connect to one another? How should processes and people come together? Whose ideas have to flow where? With their flexibility and realism, organigraphs give managers a new way to answer those questions.     

The end of corporate imperialism

As they search for growth, multinational corporations will have no choice but to compete in the big emerging markets of China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. But while it is still common to question how such corporations will change life in those markets, Western executives would be smart to turn the question around and ask how multinationals themselves will be transformed by these markets. To be successful, MNCs will have to rethink every element of their business models, the authors assert in this seminal HBR article from 1998. During the first wave of market entry in the 1980s, multinationals operated with what might be termed an imperialist mind-set, assuming that the emerging markets would merely be new markets for their old products. But this mind-set limited their success: What is truly big and emerging in countries like China and India is a new consumer base comprising hundreds of millions of people. To tap into this huge opportunity, MNCs need to ask themselves five basic questions: Who is in the emerging middle class in these countries? How do the distribution networks operate? What mix of local and global leadership do you need to foster business opportunities? Should you adopt a consistent strategy for all of your business units within one country? Should you take on local partners? The transformation that multinational corporations must undergo is not cosmetic--simply developing greater sensitivity to local cultures will not do the trick, the authors say. To compete in the big emerging markets, multinationals must reconfigure their resources, rethink their cost structures, redesign their product development processes, and challenge their assumptions about who their top-level managers should be.     

How Managers' everyday decisions create or destroy your company's strategy

Senior executives have long been frustrated by the disconnection between the plans and strategies they devise and the actual behavior of the managers throughout the company. This article approaches the problem from the ground up, recognizing that every time a manager allocates resources, that decision moves the company either into or out of alignment with its announced strategy. A well-known story--Intel's exit from the memory business--illustrates this point. When discussing what businesses Intel should be in, Andy Grove asked Gordon Moore what they would do if Intel were a company that they had just acquired. When Moore answered, "Get out of memory," they decided to do just that. It turned out, though, that Intel's revenues from memory were by this time only 4% of total sales. Intel's lower-level managers had already exited the business. What Intel hadn't done was to shut down the flow of research funding into memory (which was still eating up one-third of all research expenditures); nor had the company announced its exit to the outside world. Because divisional and operating managers-as well as customers and capital markets-have such a powerful impact on the realized strategy of the firm, senior management might consider focusing less on the company's formal strategy and more on the processes by which the company allocates resources. Top managers must know the track record of the people who are making resource allocation proposals; recognize the strategic issues at stake; reach down to operational managers to work across division lines; frame resource questions to reflect the corporate perspective, especially when large sums of money are involved and conditions are highly uncertain; and create a new context that allows top executives to circumvent the regular resource allocation process when necessary.     

Fix the process, not the problem

In 1983, a paper company was on the verge of filing Chapter 11 for a subsidiary, a mill acquired two years earlier that was losing more than $1 million a month. One year later, the paper mill was just about breaking even. Today it is a highly profitable operation. What happened? Everyone at the mill became a problem solver. Both managers and mill workers learned to take the initiative not just for identifying problems but also for developing better ways to fix problems and improve products. The key to the mill's success: a multiyear learning process in which employees developed four progressively more sophisticated problem-solving loops: Fix-as-fail-solving problems after they occur. prevention-keeping problems from occurring. Root causes-discovering what is truly causing a problem. Anticipation-solving problems before they occur and finding innovative solutions to customers' problems. Drawing on the paper mill's experience, the authors illustrate the four loops and suggest ways managers can help this organizational learning process move ahead. Paradoxically, a key to becoming a faster, smoother running operation is to start slow and avoid the temptation to jump to root-cause problem solving before you truly understand what your problems are or have freed up the resources to go after them.     

To diversify or not to diversify

One of the most challenging decisions a company can confront is whether to diversify. The rewards and risks are extraordinary. Success stories such as General Electric, Disney, and 3M abound, but so do stories of failure-consider Quaker Oats' entry into the fruit juice business with Snapple. What makes diversification such an unpredictable, high-stakes game? First, companies usually face the decision in an atmosphere that is not conducive to thoughtful deliberation. For example, an attractive company comes into play, and a competitor is interested in buying it. Or the board of directors urges expanding into new markets. Suddenly, senior managers must synthesize mountains of data under intense time pressure. To complicate matters, diversification as a corporate strategy regularly goes in and out of vogue. In short, there is little conventional wisdom to guide managers as they consider a move that could greatly increase shareholder value or seriously damage it. But diversification doesn't need to be quite such a roll of the dice, argues the author. His research suggests that if managers consider six questions, they can reduce the gamble of diversification. Answering the questions will not lead to an easy go-no-go decision, but by helping managers weigh risks and opportunities, it can help them assess the likelihood of success. The issues that the questions raise, and the discussion they provoke, are meant to be coupled with the detailed financial analysis usually conducted before a diversification decision is made. Together, these tools can turn a complex and often pressured decision into a more structured and well-reasoned one.     

The sales force as an information transfer mechanism for new service development in the Thai insurance industry

New service development (NSD) is becoming increasingly important as the insurance industry in many countries opens up and becomes more competitive. This paper examines how customer views are integrated into the NSD process in the Thai insurance industry. The qualitative research was conducted using in-depth interviews with top officers, sales managers, senior vice-presidents of marketing and actuary managers in a number of leading life insurance and non-life insurance companies. The interviews investigated how NSD works in the Thai industry, focusing on how customer views enter the process. The results showed that the NSD process in Thailand is not oriented towards developing truly innovative products, but there is much NSD for adaptation of products from other markets. Sales agents act as a main information transfer mechanism, bringing in customer views through the sales managers, who play a role in NSD. Lack of cross-functional teamwork can cause failure in developing new products and services.     

Funding growth in an age of austerity

Everyone knows that corporate growth--true growth, not just agglomeration--springs from innovation. And the common wisdom is that companies must spend lavishly on R&D if they are to innovate at all. But in these fiscally cautious times, where every line item of every budget in every company is under intense scrutiny, many organizations are doing just the opposite. They tighten their belts, subject nascent product-development programs to rigorous screening, and train R&D staffers to think in business terms so the researchers will be better able to decide whether an idea for a product or service is worth pursuing in the first place. Such efficiency measures are commendable, say authors Gary Hamel and Gary Getz. But frugality is not a growth strategy, they point out, and, in truth, there is very little correlation between corporate performance and the amount spent on innovation. Companies like Southwest, Cemex, and Shell Chemicals have shown that businesses don't have to spend a fortune on R&D to reap the benefits of innovation. To produce more growth per dollar invested, companies must produce more innovation per dollar invested. Hamel and Getz explain how businesses can dramatically improve their innovation yields. They offer these five imperatives: Increase the number of innovators among existing employees (whatever their job titles) by involving them in innovation processes and events. Focus on developing truly radical ideas--ones that change customers' expectations and behaviors and industry economics--not just incremental ideas. Look for innovation sources outside the organization, as well as inside. Increase the learning from small, low-risk experiments. And commit to long-term, consistent development efforts.     

Managing emotional fallout. Parting remarks from America's top psychiatrist. Interview by Diane Coutu

Last fall, the United States was brutally thrust into a new and dangerous world. As the twin towers of the World Trade Center collapsed and the Pentagon burned, the horrible reality of terrorism seared the American consciousness. It touched more than the victims and their families; everyone who sat transfixed before the horrific images on TV lived through the trauma. In a sense, we were all eyewitnesses, and we must all cope with feelings of anger, stress, and anxiety. That poses a huge immediate challenge for business, because it is largely in the workplace--where we spend so many of our waking hours--that we will confront these emotions. And many companies have risen to the challenge, establishing new guidelines for processing mail in light of anthrax fears and organizing stress reduction programs for employees. While the logic of taking such action is incontestable, it raises a much larger question: What responsibility does a company bear for the mental well-being of its work-force? If companies help employees deal with depression and anxiety in the wake of terrorist acts, doesn't that put mental health care on the business agenda? To answer these questions, HBR senior editor Diane Coutu talked with Dr. Steven Hyman, the former director of the National Institute for Mental Health. In this interview, he discusses the implications of coping with tragedy, the resilience of individuals, and the treatment of mental illness. And he suggests that September 11, 2001, may come to be seen as a tipping point--the moment when managers started to think about dealing with mental health issues on a regular basis.     

Evolution and revolution as organizations grow. 1972

The influence of history on an organization is a powerful but often overlooked force. Managers, in their haste to build companies, frequently fail to ask such critical developmental questions as, Where has our organization been? Where is it now? and What do the answers to these questions mean for where it is going? Instead, when confronted with problems, managers fix their gaze outward on the environment and toward the future, as if more precise market projections will provide the organization with a new identity. In this HBR Classic, Larry Greiner identifies a series of developmental phases that companies tend to pass through as they grow. He distinguishes the phases by their dominant themes: creativity, direction, delegation, coordination, and collaboration. Each phase begins with a period of evolution, steady growth, and stability, and ends with a revolutionary period of organizational turmoil and change. The critical task for management in each revolutionary period is to find a new set of organizational practices that will become the basis for managing the next period of evolutionary growth. Those new practices eventually outlast their usefulness and lead to another period of revolution. Managers therefore experience the irony of seeing a major solution in one period become a major problem in a later period. Originally published in 1972, the article's argument and insights remain relevant to managers today. Accompanying the original article is a commentary by the author updating his earlier observations.     

Enacting a European supply chain: a case study on the role of management accounting

This study reports on an action research project carried out in two non-Japanese, U.K. manufacturing companies that were considering the establishment of a strategic supply partnership. In the assembler company, materials constituted 80% of manufacturing costs with the result that managing supply chain costs has become a most critical element in overall cost control. The company was seeking closer ties involving information sharing and R&D collaboration with suppliers of strategic components. On its part, the supplier wished to move towards the level of co-operation and trust that the two companies had realized in their U.S. operations. The participation of the researchers as neutral intermediaries between the two companies gave them an opportunity to analyse the role of management accounting in the construction of a strategic partnership. The constitutional role of accounting is highlighted together with the need to develop costing and performance measurement technologies that can be understood and respected by both senior managers and non-accountants involved in the procurement process.     

Not all M&As are alike--and that matters

Despite all that's been written about mergers and acquisitions, even the experts know surprisingly little about them. The author recently headed up a year-long study sponsored by Harvard Business School on the subject of M&A activity. In-depth findings will emerge over the next few years, but the research has already revealed some interesting results. Most intriguing is the notion that, although academics, consultants, and businesspeople lump M&As together, they represent very different strategic activities. Acquisitions occur for the following reasons: to deal with overcapacity through consolidation in mature industries; to roll up competitors in geographically fragmented industries; to extend into new products and markets; as a substitute for R&D; and to exploit eroding industry boundaries by inventing an industry. The different strategic intents present distinct integration challenges. For instance, if you acquire a company because your industry has excess capacity, you have to determine which plants to shut down and which people to let go. If, on the other hand, you buy a company because it has developed an important technology, your challenge is to keep the acquisition's best engineers from jumping ship. These scenarios require the acquiring company to engage in nearly opposite managerial behaviors. The author explores each type of M&A--its strategic intent and the integration challenges created by that intent. He underscores the importance of the acquiring company's assessment of the acquired group's culture. Depending on the type of M&A, approaches to the culture in place must vary, as will the level to which culture interferes with integration. He draws from the experiences of such companies as Cisco, Viacom, and BancOne to exemplify the different kinds of M&As.     

Strategy as simple rules

The success of Yahoo!, eBay, Enron, and other companies that have become adept at morphing to meet the demands of changing markets can't be explained using traditional thinking about competitive strategy. These companies have succeeded by pursuing constantly evolving strategies in market spaces that were considered unattractive according to traditional measures. In this article--the third in an HBR series by Kathleen Eisenhardt and Donald Sull on strategy in the new economy--the authors ask, what are the sources of competitive advantage in high-velocity markets? The secret, they say, is strategy as simple rules. The companies know that the greatest opportunities for competitive advantage lie in market confusion, but they recognize the need for a few crucial strategic processes and a few simple rules. In traditional strategy, advantage comes from exploiting resources or stable market positions. In strategy as simple rules, advantage comes from successfully seizing fleeting opportunities. Key strategic processes, such as product innovation, partnering, or spinout creation, place the company where the flow of opportunities is greatest. Simple rules then provide the guidelines within which managers can pursue such opportunities. Simple rules, which grow out of experience, fall into five broad categories: how- to rules, boundary conditions, priority rules, timing rules, and exit rules. Companies with simple-rules strategies must follow the rules religiously and avoid the temptation to change them too frequently. A consistent strategy helps managers sort through opportunities and gain short-term advantage by exploiting the attractive ones. In stable markets, managers rely on complicated strategies built on detailed predictions of the future. But when business is complicated, strategy should be simple.     

Strategic renewal for business units

Over the past decade, business units have increasingly taken the role of strategy formulation away from corporate headquarters. The change makes sense: business units are closer to customers, competitors, and costs. Nevertheless, business units can fail, just as headquarters once did, by losing their focus on the organization's priorities and capabilities. John Whitney--turnaround expert and professor of management at Columbia University--offers a method for refocusing companies that he calls the strategic-renewal process. The principles behind the process are straightforward, but its execution demands extensive data, rigorous analysis, and the judgment of key decision makers. However, when applied with diligence, it can produce a strategy that yields both growth and profit. To carry out the process, managers must analyze, one by one or in logical groupings, the company's customers, the products it sells, and the services it offers in light of three criteria: strategic importance, significance, and profitability. Does a given customer, product, or service mesh with the organization's goals? Is it significant in terms of current and future revenues? And is it truly profitable when all costs are care fully considered? Customers, products, and services that do not measure up, says the author, must be weeded out relentlessly. Although the process is a painstaking one, the article offers clear thinking on why-and how-to go about it. A series of exhibits takes managers through the questions they need to raise, and two matrices offer Whitney's concentrated wisdom on when to cultivate--and when to prune.     

How executives can shape their company's information systems.

When a big New York bank expanded in London, technical specialists in the two cities disagreed about which vendor's information system was best. The debate continued for several months until finally the technical experts took the issue to a senior-management policy committee. But the senior managers didn't understand the terminology and kept postponing the decision. Meanwhile, the London office complained loudly that the slowdown was threatening the unit's growth. Like the bank, most companies need a new approach to making decisions about information technology (IT), especially since it now affects so many aspects of the business. The company's technical experts seldom understand the overall business, and the senior managers who understand the business are usually lost when it comes to computers. One way to blend both perspectives is to establish a task force that solicits input from top management and creates a set of principles to guide subsequent investments in information technology. By drawing on 10 to 15 statements that reflect management's basic beliefs about how the company should use IT, the task force translates the language of corporate strategy into computerese. For instance, an electronics company wanted various functions to act more like one company. It created a principle that said, "Information systems will provide application that support cross-functional integration of business processes." Managers making subsequent decisions about computers could immediately rule out any technologies that contradicted that statement. Principles thus speed up the decision-making process, but more important, they ensure that every investment in IT helps the corporation achieve its strategic goals.