On the differences between the political economy of introducing and implementing tax reforms — Israel 1975–1978

Theorists of public finance consider implementation of tax reforms as a problem of obtaining political agreement on issues involving diverse interests. But, between ideas formulated in laws or policies and their actual implementation separate deeds. Policies must not only be agreed upon but also administered by organizations and complied with by taxpayers. The experience of three years of implementing the reform described by Ben-Porath and Bruno in the July 1977 issue of this Journal, shows that despite broad political support, the Department of Income and Property Tax reached few of the reform's original goals.     

对国有经济改革的再思考

20多年来,中央和地方、政府和企业,对国有企业改革都采取了不少措施,但见效仍然不大。1999年全国国有企业的亏损面仍达到50％以上,有些部门甚至全行业亏损。     

The conspicuous absence of examination questions concerning the Great Irish Famine: political economy as science and ideology *

To advance our general understanding about the development of nine-teenth-century Irish political economy in the wake of the Great Irish Famine (1846–51), this article analyses the Famine's impact on a previously unstudied, yet uniquely authoritative, element of the displine: the questions given to candidates for the Whately Professorship of Political Economy at Trinity College, Dublin from 1832 to 1882. This article concludes, contrary to previous arguments, that the Famine did not fundamentaly influence the discipline's development, and relates this conclusion to debates over whether and how political economy functioned as an ideology in shaping policy responses to the Famine.     

On the political economy of immigration

We study how immigration policies that impose capital and skill requirements would be determined under majority voting when native agents differ in their wealth holdings and vote to maximize their income.     

Principles of political economy

As a guide to efficient social organization, neo-classical economics is deficient in two major ways. First, it uses simplifying assumptions about the decision-environment which destroy its possible relevance to an understanding of decision situations in the real world: notably in its inability to embrace the unknowability of the future and the subjectivity of human decisions. Second, it specifies the nature of policy-relevant choice in too restrictive a fashion to explain the major (constitutional and political) choice-situations inherent in any system of social organization. A more satisfactory intellectual construct can be derived from a political economy-public choice model. This follows broadly the contractarian-liberal model developed notably by Buchanan and Brennan, but envisages a much more thoroughgoing rejection of neo-classical (Paretian) concepts. Thenew political economy would identifyefficiency with the ability of the citizen to constrain government-as-leviathan in a context of multi-level choice. The opportunity-cost situation of citizens-as-choosers is specified by reference to their ongoing possibilities of usingvoice to change unsatisfactory institutional constraints orexit to escape their consequences. The model is used to appraise the constitutional characteristics of fiscal federalism. I am indebted to the Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University and the Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australian National University, for the provision of facilities. Colleagues at both institutions also provided valuable advice and comment.     

Welfare impacts of equal-yield tax reforms in the UK economy

A multisectoral dynamic general equilibrium tax model with and without announcement effects for open and closed capital markets is used to evaluate efficiency gains and transitional effects from equal-yield tax reforms for seven different taxes in the UK economy. Impacts of an unanticipated tax reform on investment, capital accumulation, output and employment are compared to those of anticipated tax reforms. Households, producers, traders, investors and the government are found to be more capable of adjusting their economic behaviour when tax announcements are made in advance. In equal-yield tax experiments welfare gains up to 1.4% of base year GDP can occur by removing distortions in taxes. Welfare loss of up to 2.05% of it can happen if a less distortionary tax, such as the labour income tax is replaced by more distortionary taxes. These simulation results hold whether the capital markets are closed or open.     

On the political economy of zoning

Households choose a community in a metropolitan area and collectively set a minimum housing quality and a property tax to finance a local public good. The collective imposition of a lower bound on housing consumption induces an income-stratified equilibrium in a specification where meaningful community differentiation would not arise without zoning. We show computationally that zoning restrictions are likely to be stringent, with a majority facing a binding constraint in communities that permit it. By inducing a stratified equilibrium, zoning causes Tiebout-welfare gains in aggregate but with large welfare transfers. Relative to stratified equilibrium without zoning, the zoning equilibrium is significantly more efficient as it reduces housing-market distortions.     

The political economy of naturalization

This paper presents a political economy model in which self‐interested natives decide when citizenship and/or voting rights should be granted to foreign‐born workers. Native voters know that immigrants hold different ‘political’ preferences and would thus tend to postpone their enfranchisement as much as possible. They also consider, however, that a more restrictive naturalization policy may reduce the gains from immigration. We find that the optimal timing of naturalization depends on the quantity, quality (productivity), and preferences of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, as well as the sensitivity of migration choices to the citizenship issue.     

The political economy of industrialisation

This paper analyses how incentives under different sets of political institutions map into policies that promote industrialisation. I set out an endogenous growth model with non-overlapping generations, where agents are heterogeneous with respect to wealth, skills and political power. The skills of the political elite play a crucial role for industrialisation to occur. It is shown that a flat wealth distribution and a skilled political elite enhance development the most in elitist regimes, while democracies perform as well as elitist regimes in terms of industrialisation. The theoretical results regarding elitist regimes are in line with evidence on the Industrial Revolution.     

Unemployment and the dynamics of political support for economic reforms

I analyze the dynamics of political support for economic reforms using a version of Rodrik's (1995) two-sector model of the transition economy. The key role is played by the pattern of flows between the state and private sectors and unemployment. It is shown that while the workers in the private sector always support rapid reforms, the workers in the state sector and the unemployed will support rapid reforms only at the outset of the transition. Later, state-sector workers and unemployed vote for a reduction in the speed of reforms.     

The political economy of regionalism

We examine the incentives of regions to unite and separate. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of government. Our paper explores the influence of size, location and the diversity within regions in shaping this trade-off. We then examine the way in which alternative political institutions aggregate regional preferences and thereby define the number of countries.     

The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960–1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.     

The political economy of the impossible trinity

This paper reconsiders the policy trilemma in an open economy by incorporating political economy concerns. We argue that the impact of government ideology on monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and capital flow restrictions should be analyzed in the broader context of restrictions imposed by the impossible trinity instead of the usual single-dimensional constraints. Employing a de facto measurement of these restrictions for a sample of 111 countries from 1980 to 2010, we show that the impact of government ideology on a country's position in this trilemma is highly context dependent: we find that its impact on exchange rate stability and monetary independence varies between developed and developing countries. We also show that the impact of government ideology on these two trilemma components is contingent on the stance of the respective economy's business cycle. Left-leaning governments seem to favor exchange rate stability over monetary independence in case of a negative output gap; suggesting a reversal of their commonly assumed partisan preferences in economically tight times.     

Religion and political economy in Saint-Simon

Abstract

The project of Henri Saint-Simon (1760–1825) was to complete the French Revolution by a social change in order to eliminate the so-called “feudal-military” system and to bring about a new society which he named “the industrial system”. Everything had to be changed, including religion and its relation to political economy. In this paper, I examine: (i) the recurring problem of religion, raised by Saint-Simon as early as his first text; (ii) the emergence of the economic problem of identifying production with politics; (iii) and finally, the metamorphosis of the Christian religion into a moral and industrial religion.     

The political economy of housing in England

Problems of housing affordability have been afflicting parts of the UK, especially the South East of England, for a number of years. The problem is closely related to shortages in housing supply, which are, in turn, largely associated with constraints imposed by the English land planning system. A leading theory for explaining these constraints posits that they reflect political economy forces that convey the interests of current homeowners to planning decisions in disproportionate and excessively influential ways. We test this theory by examining survey data on public attitudes to house building in local communities; and by investigating whether these attitudes are related to local planning decisions. We find that there is a tendency for owner-occupiers to express greater opposition to local house building and that, in the decade to 2011, the housing stock grew significantly less in local authorities with higher proportions of owner-occupiers among local households. The results suggest the risk that planning decisions might have been distorted in favour of current homeowners is real and economically significant. We discuss a range of historical, socio-economic and policy trends that help explain why successive governments of various stripes have been reluctant to address head-on problems in housing supply and put a curb on house prices.