Asymmetric Monotone Comparative Statics for the Industry Compositions

Within a standard model of international trade with heterogenous firms and two asymmetric countries, we derive sufficient conditions for monotone comparative statics (MCS) for the industry composition. This model outcome is defined as first‐order stochastic dominance shifts in the equilibrium distributions of all activities across active firms. MCS for the industry composition occurs in a country that experiences a decline in its costs of serving the foreign market and meanwhile experiences an increase in its level of competition. In the other country, the industry‐level implications are exactly opposite. These clear industry‐level results hold while firms respond asymmetrically to the trade shock.     

The importance of government commitment in attracting firms: A dynamic analysis of tax competition in an agglomeration economy

Agglomeration tendencies of industrial firms significantly affect the nature of tax competition. This paper analyzes tax competition between two countries over an infinite time horizon in an economy with trade costs and internationally mobile industrial firms. Most of the previous studies on tax competition in the ‘new economic geography’ framework employ static models. In this study, two governments dynamically compete with each other to attract firms through their choices of taxes and subsidies. It is shown that the commitment of the governments to their policies is crucial in determining the distribution of firms in the long run. Specifically, if governments find each others׳ tax policies credible, then one country will attract all the firms when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration forces dominant. If policies are not credible, both countries may attract an equal share of firms even when trade costs are low, as the lack of commitment by governments acts as a dispersion force.     

The labor market effects of trade union heterogeneity

Empirical evidence suggests that the bargaining power of trade unions differs across firms and sectors. Standard models of unionization ignore this pattern by assuming a uniform bargaining strength. In this paper, we incorporate union heterogeneity into a Melitz (2003) type model. Union bargaining power is assumed to be firm-specific and varies with firm productivity. This framework allows us to re-analyze the labor market effects of (i) a symmetric increase in the bargaining power of all unions and (ii) trade liberalization. We show that union heterogeneity unambiguously reduces the negative employment effects of stronger unions. Firm-specific bargaining power creates a link between unionization and the entry and exit of firms, implying a reduction of the unions' expected bargaining power. Moreover, union heterogeneity constitutes an (un)employment effect of trade liberalization. If unions are most powerful in the high-productivity (low-productivity) firms, trade liberalization will increase (decrease) unemployment.     

The impact of trade on employment,welfare, and income distribution in unionized general oligopolistic equilibrium

This paper sets up a multi-sector general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model in which all firms face wage claims of firm-level unions. By accounting for productivity differences across industries, the model features income inequality along multiple lines, including inequality between firm owners and workers as well as within these two groups of agents, and involuntary unemployment. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on key macroeconomic performance measures. In particular, we show that a movement from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country lowers union wage claims and therefore stimulates employment and raises welfare. Whether firms can extract a larger share of rents in the open economy depends on the competitive environment in the product market. Furthermore, the distribution of profit income across firm owners remains unaffected, while the distribution of wage income becomes more equal when a country opens up to trade with a fully symmetric trading partner. We also analyze how country size differences and technological dissimilarity of trading partners affect the results from our analysis.     

Location of vertically linked industries: agglomeration versus comparative advantage

This paper analyses the effects of trade liberalisation on the location of manufacturing firms that are vertically linked and differ in factor intensities. I extend the new economic geography literature, by embedding a model with vertical linkages within a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. I show that lower trade costs can lead to an agglomeration of all upstream and downstream firms in one country, even when they differ in factor intensities. These industrial location patterns do not always lead to factor price convergence; and may result in an increase in returns to both factors in the country where the agglomeration locates.     

The effect of technology choice on specialization and welfare in a two‐country model

This study presents a simple two‐country model in which firms in the manufacturing sector can choose a technology level (high or low). We show how trade costs and productivity levels affect technology choices by the firms in each country, where the fixed cost of adopting high technology differs between the two countries. This depends on the productivity level of the high technology. In particular, if the productivity of high technology is medium and trade costs are not too low, then a technology gap between countries arises. In this case, improving the productivity of the high technology country reduces the welfare level of consumers in the country in which low technology is adopted. To compensate for the welfare loss of the country from the technological improvement, trade costs should be reduced.     

Market size and entry in international trade: Product versus firm fixed costs

This paper develops a theoretical framework to infer the nature of fixed costs from the relationship between entry patterns in international markets and destination market size. If fixed costs are at the firm level, firms take advantage of an intrafirm spillover by expanding firm‐level product range (scope). Few firms enter with many products and dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, an interfirm spillover reduces the fixed costs to export for all firms producing the product. The resulting entry pattern consists of many firms exporting different varieties of the same product. Using cross‐country data on firm and product entry, I find empirical evidence consistent with product‐level costs. More firms than products enter in larger markets offering their consumers lower prices and a greater variety of goods within the product category.     

The endogenous national minimum wage institution

This paper offers reasoning for the endogenous sustainability of the National Minimum Wage Institution (NMWI). In an economy with asymmetries in productivity among unionized firms, high-tech firms may often opt for minimum wage agreements covering all unionized workers, in order to raise the relative costs of their rival low-tech firms. Their workers’ unions as well as the unions of workers in low-tech firms share this interest, provided that the degree of product substitutability is not too low and the wage agreement is not too high. Hence, since economy-wide minimum wage agreements prove to be compatible with the interest of all unions and high-tech firms, the NMWI can be sustained in equilibrium under politically convenient circumstances.     

Trade and Relative Wage in a Global Economy

The effects of trade among similar countries and that among dissimilar countries on the relative wage are examined. Product quality is a choice variable by firms. Quantity production is assumed to satisfy constant costs, while quality production is more skilled-labor intensive than quantity production and obeys increasing costs. Compared to autarky, free trade, by fostering more competition, leads to quality improvement, which in turn tends to increase the relative wage. Trade among similar countries increases the relative wage in all trading countries, while trade among dissimilar countries, in a two-country model, increases it in one country but may increase or lower it in the other.     

The Interaction Between Technology Adoption and Trade When Firms are Heterogeneous

This paper develops a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms to study the interaction between technology adoption and trade in a world of two countries facing different technology adoption costs. It shows that a reduction in the technology adoption cost in one country increases productivity, induces more firms to adopt advanced technology, and improves welfare in this country, while decreasing productivity, inducing more firms to switch back to old technology, and reducing welfare in the other country. Furthermore, although a reduction in transport costs always makes the country with the lower adoption cost better off, it can hurt the other country.     

PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS AND FALLING TRADE COSTS: BOON OR BANE?*

This article looks at two features of globalization, namely, productivity improvements and falling trade costs, and explores their effect on welfare in a monopolistic competition model with heterogenous firms and technological asymmetries. Contrary to received wisdom, and for reasons different from adverse terms of trade effects, it is shown that improvements in a partner's productivity must hurt us. Moreover, falling trade costs can raise welfare in the technologically advanced country while reducing it in the backward one, if technological asymmetries are large enough.     

THE SCOPE FOR NON‐PROFIT OBJECTIVES IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY UNDER INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We ask how the scope for non‐profit objectives in a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) in a mixed oligopoly changes because of competition from firms in another country. There is no change if costs and demand are given, unless the trade partner is a low‐cost country. However, the scope for non‐profit objectives is limited by the country's relative size if wages are market‐clearing and if workers and firms are stationary, because of reduced competitiveness caused by higher real wage rates. The total surplus is then not affected by the actions of the SOE. International trade does not otherwise reduce the scope for its non‐profit objectives if workers and firms are mobile, but productivity differences might require restrictions in order to avoid a complete relocation of the workforce in either country.     

Risk Preferences and Gender Differences in Union Membership in Late Nineteenth-Century Swedish Manufacturing

Women are generally seen as less inclined to join trade unions. This study matches firm–worker data from the Swedish cigar and printing industries around 1900 and examines information on men and women holding the same jobs; such data are rare but important for understanding gender gaps. The results explain the gender gap in union membership among compositors, but not among cigar workers. Differences in union membership varied considerably across firms, with the largest differences found in low-union-density cigar firms where indirect costs (that is, uncertainty and risk) accrued in particular to women workers. The lack of gender differences in mutual aid membership indicates that women were not hard to organize but avoided organizations associated with greater risk for employer retaliation and uncertain returns according to a cost–benefit analysis.     

Payment choice in international trade: Theory and evidence from cross‐country firm‐level data

When trading across borders, firms choose between different payment contracts. Theoretically, this should allow firms to trade‐off differences in financing costs and enforcement across countries. This paper provides evidence for this hypothesis employing firm‐level data from a large number of developing countries. As predicted, international transactions are more likely paid after delivery when financing costs in the source country are high and when contract enforcement is low. We extend the theory and also show empirically that the more complex an industry is, the more important is contract enforcement and the less important are financing costs for the contract choice.     

Trade costs and foreign direct investment

This paper focuses on an apparent conflict between the theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) and recent trends in the globalized world. The bulk of FDI is horizontal rather than vertical, and standard theory predicts that horizontal FDI is discouraged when trade costs fall. This seems to conflict with the experience of the 1990s, when trade liberalisation and technological change led to dramatic reductions in trade costs yet FDI grew much faster than trade. Two possible resolutions to this paradox are explored. First, horizontal FDI in trading blocs is encouraged by intra-bloc trade liberalisation, because foreign firms establish plants in one country as export platforms to serve the bloc as a whole. Second, cross-border mergers, quantitatively more important than greenfield FDI, are encouraged rather than discouraged by falling trade costs.     

Trade Liberalization and the Degree of Competition in International Duopoly

This paper analyzes how a reduction in trade costs influences the possibility for firms to engage in international cartels, and hence how trade liberalization affects the degree of competition. We consider a particular intra‐industry trade model amended to allow for firms producing differentiated products. Our main finding is that trade liberalization may have an anti‐competitive effect. We find that there is no unique relation between a reduction in trade costs and the degree of competition. When products are differentiated, a lowering of trade costs is pro‐competitive if trade costs are initially high, but anti‐competitive if trade costs initially are low. Hence, trade policy is not necessarily a substitute for competition policy.     

Trade costs and the timing of competition policy adoption

Abstract This paper first presents stylized evidence showing how the date of the adoption of competition policy is correlated with country size. Smaller countries tend to adopt competition policy later. We then present a theoretical model with countries of different size, trade costs, and firms competing à la Cournot. In the model we show that reduced trade costs following from increasing globalization affect countries differently depending on their size. This has implications for the incentives to introduce competition policy. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical regularity presented.     

Union Wage Strategies and International Trade

We characterise a full set of possible international trade regimes for different combinations of wages in a two-country model of oligopoly with a homogeneous product. We show that the nature of any equilibrium trade will be either inter-industry (one-way) or intra-industry (two-way) depending on (endogenous) union choices between high and low-wage strategies. We show that intra-industry trade is the more likely the lower are trade costs, and that under intra-industry trade, falling trade costs lead monopoly unions to set higher wages, but the opposite obtains under inter-industry trade.     

Spillovers from Foreign Exporters

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that accounts for productivity spillovers transmitted by foreign exporters. Everything else equal, stronger spillovers increase welfare. We embed the model framework into a trade policy scenario where countries strategically set inter‐country variable trade costs for the trading partner. In the strategic Nash‐equilibrium policy, governments trade‐off welfare gains from protectionism and those that are due to spillovers from foreign exporters. The equilibrium degree of protectionism is decreasing in the strength of the spillover. Policy coordination induces welfare gains but these gains can be hump‐shaped in the spillover strength.     

Imperfect Competition, Capital Shortages and Unemployment Persistence

We construct a model integrating the traditions of imperfect competition macroeconomics and real business cycles. For this we study a dynamic economy with optimizing households, firms and trade unions subject to stochastic shocks. We can derive closed form solutions for the behaviour of all agents. It is found that the combination of capital shortages and imperfect competition in labor markets can give rise to unemployment, and that this unemployment is quite persistent, even when the underlying shocks are not.