When less family is more: Trademark acquisition,family ownership,and internationalization

This study examines the relationship between international performance and the orientation of the firm towards trademark acquisition, and discusses family ownership as a moderator of this association. We conceptualize our study along three interrelated lines of ‘openness’ i.e. openness towards external resources, openness of governance, and openness towards international markets. The empirical investigation relies on a panel data analysis over four years, and on a cross-industry sample of European listed companies consisting of 712 observations. Our outcomes reveal that the attitude of the company to enrich the brand portfolio with externally developed trademarks is positively associated with the firms’ international performance. We also find that this relationship is moderated by family ownership. “Less family is more”: we find a positive relationship of openness towards trademark acquisitions with the firms’ international performance, which decreases with the presence of a family in a dominant position.     

Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational firms and their choice of capital structure

This paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk. We focus on two choice variables, the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate, and we distinguish different types of political risk, such as expropriation, unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation. In our theoretical analysis we find that, as political risk increases, the ownership share tends to decrease, whereas leverage can both increase or decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Using the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find supportive evidence for these different effects.     

Who is afraid of political risk? Multinational firms and their choice of capital structure

This paper investigates how multinational firms choose the capital structure of their foreign affiliates in response to political risk. We focus on two choice variables, the leverage and the ownership structure of the foreign affiliate, and we distinguish different types of political risk, such as expropriation, unreliable intellectual property rights and confiscatory taxation. In our theoretical analysis we find that, as political risk increases, the ownership share tends to decrease, whereas leverage can both increase or decrease, depending on the type of political risk. Using the Microdatabase Direct Investment of the Deutsche Bundesbank, we find supportive evidence for these different effects.     

Conflict,Participative Decision‐Making,and Generational Ownership Dispersion: A Multilevel Analysis*

This study examines how participative decision‐making and generational ownership dispersion affect conflict in a sample of privately held U.S. family firms. Our study utilizes a hierarchical linear model approach to investigate “cross‐level” effects between variables from different levels of analysis. Participative decision‐making among family members was found to be associated with cognitive and relationship conflict. Furthermore, the relationship between participative decision‐making and conflict as individual‐level variables was moderated by generational ownership dispersion, a firm‐level variable. When ownership was dispersed through multiple generations, participative decision‐making was found to be positively related to cognitive and relationship conflict; however, in one‐ and two‐generation ownership firms participative decision‐making was found to be negatively related to cognitive and relationship conflict.     

Family firms and financial performance: The cost of growing

This study examines the relationship between financial performance and family involvement for 523 listed and non-listed Colombian firms over 1996–2006. Using a detailed database and performing several panel data regression models, we find that family firms exhibit better financial performance on average than non-family firms when the founder is still involved in operations, although this effect decreases with firm size. With heirs in charge, there is no statistical difference in financial performance. Both direct and indirect ownership (control through pyramidal ownership structures within family business groups) affect firms' financial performance positively. However, this positive effect decreases with firm size. The results suggest that some kinds of family involvement appear to make firm growth expensive.     

The value impact of international and industrial diversifications on public‐listed firms in Malaysia

This study examines the relationship between firm value and both international and industrial diversification involvements for a sample of 267 listed firms in Malaysia over 2001–2009. We find no evidence that international diversification has any significant impact on the firm value but industry diversification locally slightly increases firm value, even after controlling for the degree of ownership concentration. Our research further indicates that without any diversification involvement, family ownership presents lower value than foreign and government ownerships; and with industrial diversification family ownership presents significant higher value than foreign and government ownerships.     

Ownership Concentration and CSR Policy of European Multinational Enterprises

This study investigates how ownership concentration in European multinational firms is associated with these firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). We employ factor analysis on responsibility data from EIRiS and use a regression analysis. Using firm-level data for almost 700 European firms, we find that shareholder concentration is significantly related to such policies. That is, more concentrated ownership goes hand in hand with poorer CSR policies. In our analysis, we control for size, leverage, profitability, industry, and country of origin. We use several indicators for ownership concentration. We also find that with more concentrated ownership, CSR of the firm gets worse. We suggest that especially with large shareholders, CSR would need to be included in their performance assessment.     

How Does the Largest Shareholder Affect Dividends?

Focusing on the legal protection of minority shareholders in Japan, which suggests that manager‐owned firms are better governed than corporation‐owned firms, this study presents a new test of two dividend models: the substitute model and the outcome model. In support of the latter, I find that manager‐owned firms pay higher dividends than corporation‐owned firms. The paper also examines the association between ownership by the largest shareholder and dividend payments. I find an inverted U‐shaped relationship for manager‐owned firms and a U‐shaped relationship for corporation‐owned firms between them. These results can be explained by the benefits and drawbacks of concentrated ownership.     

Ownership and capital structure in Latin America

This study evaluates the capital-structure determinants of Latin American firms using a comprehensive sample covering seven countries. Firms in the region have debt levels similar to those of U.S. firms, which is puzzling, given that Latin American firms experience relatively lower tax benefits and higher bankruptcy costs. This study argues that ownership-concentrated firms avoid issuing equity because they do not want to share control rights. Latin American firms have high ownership concentration, which creates an ideal setting to study how ownership concentration explains firms' capital structure. Consistent with the control argument, this study finds a positive relation between leverage and ownership concentration, when losing control becomes an issue. Also, the study shows a positive relation between leverage and growth. In addition, the study reports that other determinants that do not proxy for control rights are consistent with previous findings. Firms that are larger, have more tangible assets, and are less profitable are also more leveraged.     

How does FX liquidity affect the relationship between foreign ownership and stock liquidity?

This study investigates the roles foreign investors play in a representative emerging market, focusing on the relationship between foreign ownership and stock market liquidity as well as this relationship's response to foreign exchange (FX) liquidity. Our analyses yield three main results. First, the bid–ask spread and price impact of stock trades decrease along with foreign ownership, supporting the view that foreign investors tend to improve stock liquidity. Second, foreign ownership decreases along with a decline in FX liquidity, suggesting that foreign investors care about FX liquidity when determining their stock holdings. Third, stock liquidity increases continuously along with foreign ownership as FX liquidity decreases. Overall, this study's evidence indicates that foreign investors, as liquidity providers, can play a positive role in an emerging economy even when FX liquidity declines.     

How Do Ownership Concentration and Family Control Affect R&D Investments? New Evidence from Taiwan

This study finds a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investments. Specifically, ownership concentration is positively related to R&D investments at a low level of ownership concentration; the relationship becomes negative when ownership concentration is at a high level. However, the impact of ownership concentration on R&D investments is lessened in family‐controlled firms; that is, family control moderates the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investments. Overall, this study suggests that the ownership concentration's nonlinear impact on R&D investments differs between family‐controlled firms and nonfamily‐controlled firms.     

Promoting employees’ pro-environmental behaviour through empowering leadership: The roles of psychological ownership,empowerment role identity,and environmental self-identity

This study develops a theoretical model to investigate when and why empowering leadership promotes employees’ pro-environmental behaviour (PEB). Synthesising psychological ownership theory and role identity theory, we propose that empowering leadership positively affects the employees’ PEB and that this relationship is mediated by psychological ownership. Furthermore, we examine the moderating roles of empowerment role identity and environmental self-identity in this relationship. By employing 203 leader–follower dyads as a sample, we find that empowering leadership is positively related to employees’ PEB and that employees’ psychological ownership mediates this relationship. Besides, we find that empowerment role identity plays a moderating role in the relationship between empowering leadership and employees’ psychological ownership such that the relationship is positive and significant when empowerment role identity is high but not significant when it is low. Finally, we observe that environmental self-identity moderates the relationship between employees’ psychological ownership and PEB such that the relationship is positive and significant when environmental self-identity is high, but not significant when it is low. Practically, we offer new insight into how and when organisations can leverage the positive effect of empowering leadership in the pursuit of promoting employees’ PEB.     

Variance of Firm Performance and Leverage of Small Businesses

We investigate the relationship between leverage and firm performance using small business data from Japan by estimating the effects of leverage on both average firm performance and the variance of firm performance. We find that leverage has a negative effect on average firm performance and a positive effect on the variance of firm performance. This suggests that the problem of moral hazard is severe for highly leveraged firms. However, when highly leveraged firms have sufficient collateral assets, the effects of leverage are positive for average performance, but negative for the variance of performance. This implies that when small firms have sufficient collateral assets, highly leveraged businesses are better performers.     

Ownership structure and earnings management in emerging markets—An institutionalized agency perspective

Previous earnings management research has largely focused on firm-level governance mechanisms in single countries or on macro-level variables in multiple countries. Building on this research, we incorporate firm ownership predictors along with national institutional dimensions to explore why firm decision makers in emerging markets vary in their earnings management behavior. Our theoretical framework integrates agency and institutional theories proposing that firm-level ownership mechanisms do not function in isolation, but are reinforced or attenuated by elements of the institutional governance environment. The multilevel empirical analysis of 1200 firms in 24 emerging markets indicates that controlling ownership is positively related to earnings management. We find that the level of minority shareholder protection in a country weakens this positive relationship. We also find that regulatory quality strengthens the negative relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management activity. It is hoped that awareness of how firm ownership structures interact with national-level institutions in affecting firm-level behavior will help managers and investors develop skills and practices to better cope with business norms in emerging economies.     

The relationship between liquidity,corporate governance,and firm valuation: Evidence from Russia

This paper examines the hypotheses that liquidity improves corporate governance, and better governance enhances valuation of Russian firms. We find a positive causal relationship between measures of liquidity and corporate governance. Additionally, we document the strong positive impact of corporate governance on valuation. Our results are economically significant. For example, we document that a 10% decrease in the proportion of zero return days implies a 0.34% increase in transparency and disclosure, which in turn leads to a 9.6% increase in firm valuation. Our research findings shed light on the important role of liquidity in improving corporate governance and valuation.     

The influence of ownership structure and board strategic involvement on international sales: The moderating effect of family involvement

This paper contributes to the family business and the international business literature by analysing whether and to what extent different compositions of the ownership structure and degrees of board strategic involvement impact on the level of international sales of family and non-family businesses. Our main hypotheses are tested on a sample of 342 Norwegian firms via regression analysis. The results from this study show the existence, in both in family and non-family businesses, of a positive and significant relationship between foreign investors’ ownership and the level of international sales. Furthermore, the relationship between CEO ownership impacts negatively on international sales in both family and non-family businesses. While board strategic involvement contributes positively to international sales in non-family businesses it becomes not significant when we only look at family businesses. Implications for theory and practice and future research directions are discussed.     

Founding Family Firms,CEO Incentive Pay,and Dual Agency Problems

This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with nonfamily firms, lower incentive pay adopted by family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and nonfamily firms.     

Corporate Social Responsibility,Ownership Structure,and Political Interference: Evidence from China

Prior research suggests that ownership structure is associated to corporate social responsibility (CSR) in developed countries. This article examines whether and how ownership structure affects CSR in emerging markets using Chinese firms’ social responsibility ranking. Our empirical evidences show that for non-state-owned firms, corporate ownership dispersion is positively associated to CSR. However, for state-owned firms, whose controlling shareholder is the state, this relation is reversed. We attribute the reversed relationship to political interferences and further test this hypothesis by demonstrating that regional economic development is negatively related to CSR for state-owned firms due to decreased political interference in more developed areas. This study is the first to directly examine the relationship between the dispersion of corporate ownership and CSR in emerging markets, and our results depict that it is important to consider ownership type in assessing CSR in emerging market where state ownership is still prevalent such as China. The results also reveal that firm size, profitability, employee power, leverage, and growth opportunity affect CSR in China.     

Innovation and export performance of emerging market enterprises: The roles of state and foreign ownership in China

This article examines the role of ownership for the relationship between innovation and exports. Analyzing a large firm-level data set on Chinese manufacturing firms during 2000–2007, we find that state ownership has a positive moderating effect on the innovation–export relationship. We ascribe this effect to state-owned firms’ privileged access to complementary resources and networks that strengthen their ability to use innovation to generate exports. In contrast to many earlier studies, we also find that foreign ownership has a negative moderating effect. One likely reason is that indicators of local innovation do not reflect the flows of knowledge between foreign-owned firms and their parent companies. This finding highlights the fact that innovation and production may be geographically separated within multinational enterprises. A policy implication of the analysis is that public support to innovation is likely to have stronger effects on exports when it targets firms that carry out most of their activities in domestic market.     

Corporate cash holdings and promoter ownership

We examine the relationship between corporate cash holdings and promoter ownership for a sample of Indian non-financial firms. Consistent with the arguments of the ‘efficient monitoring hypothesis’, our results broadly suggest that promoter ownership is negatively associated with cash holdings, thereby highlighting the role of large owners in preventing cash accretion in an emerging market context. Indicating prominent influence of corporate ownership on cash management, we find that corporate non-promoter ownership is also negatively related with cash holdings. With regard to promoter ownership of foreign entities, our results suggest that cash holdings share a U-shaped relationship with ownership of foreign promoter corporations. In addition, our findings provide weak evidence to support a more pronounced negative association between cash holdings and promoter ownership for group-affiliated firms as compared to non-affiliated firms since the former faces lower financial constraints on account of access to internal capital markets. Finally, we perform long-term effect analysis in order to reinforce robustness of our results.