Effects of international institutional factors on earnings quality of banks

We examine the relation between legal, extra-legal and political institutional factors and earnings quality of banks across countries. We predict that earnings quality is higher in countries with legal, extra-legal and political systems that reduce the consumption of private control benefits by insiders and afford outside investors greater protection. Using a sample of banks from 35 countries during the pre-crisis period from 1993 to 2006, we find that all five measures of earnings quality studied are higher in countries with stronger legal, extra-legal and political institutional structures. We also find that banks in countries with stronger institutions are less likely to report losses, have lower loan loss provisions, and higher balance sheet strength during the 2007–2009 crisis period. Our findings highlight the implications of country level institutional factors for financial reporting quality and are relevant to bank regulators who are considering additional regulations on bank financial reporting.     

Management insulation and bank failures

How does management insulation from shareholder pressure influence banks’ resilience to crises? To address this question, we develop a measure of management insulation based on legal provisions. Unlike the existing alternatives, our measure considers the interactions between different provisions. We use this measure to study the relationship between management insulation and bank failure during the 2007–09 financial crisis. We find that banks in which managers were more insulated from shareholders in 2003 were less likely to be both bailed out in 2008/09 and targeted by activist shareholders. By contrast, alternative measures of management insulation fail to predict both bailouts and shareholder activism.     

Determinants of loan securitization in European banking

Analyzing 75 securitizing and non-securitizing stock-listed banks in the EU-13 plus Switzerland over the period from 1997 to 2010, this paper provides empirical evidence that loan securitization in Europe is a composite decision based on bank-specific as well as market- and country-specific determinants. In addition, we find that these determinants remarkably change when separately investigating securitization transactions during the pre-crisis and crisis period. Moreover, results from several subsample regressions reveal that determinants of loan securitizations in Europe depend on the transaction type, the underlying asset portfolio and the regulatory and institutional environment under which banks operate.     

Derivatives usage,securitization, and the crash sensitivity of bank stocks

We show that the information on derivatives usage and securitization activities of U.S. banks as disclosed in their pre-crisis 10-K filings explains extreme equity returns of banks during the financial crisis. Stocks of banks that had previously disclosed a more extensive use of financial derivatives and loan securitization were more likely to experience extreme losses. Our findings are consistent with investors viewing banks that used derivatives for non-hedging purposes as highly vulnerable to the crisis. Moreover, banks which had significant securitization activities and were thus potentially exposed to under-capitalized risks from conduits possess a higher vulnerability of their equity to market downturns.     

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

This research examines the effects of securitization on the bank's risk exposure both in terms of individual expected shortfall and marginal expected shortfall as a measure of systemic risk. The relationship between securitization activity and tail risks is especially relevant in light of the consequences for financial stability, both for the individual securitizing banks and for the market as a whole, as the financial crisis 2007–2008 reveals. By using a sample of Italian listed banks over the period 2000–2009, we find that securitizing banks have, on average, higher expected losses in case of extreme events. This adds new evidence on the main findings in the literature that focused on the evidence that risk transfer through securitization is relatively insignificant compared to the risk retained by the originating bank. We show that this risk retention is in terms of an increase of tail risk. We also find that securitization increases the probability of banks to become “systemically” riskier, but we find no difference when comparing the pre-crisis with the post-crisis period. This suggests that the systemic exposures of Italian banks are still as high as before the crisis with severe implications for financial stability.     

Capital regulation,deposit insurance and bank risk: International evidence from normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations.     

An evaluation of bank measures for market risk before,during and after the financial crisis

We study the performance and behavior of Value at Risk measures used by a number of large U.S. banks before, during and after the financial crisis. Alternative benchmark VaR measures, including GARCH-based measures, are estimated directly from the banks’ trading revenues to explain the bank VaR performance results. While overly conservative in both the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, bank VaR exceedances were excessive and clustered in the crisis period. This contrasted with mostly unbiased benchmark HS and GARCH VaRs in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, and vastly superior GARCH-based VaR performance in the crisis period with lower exceedance rates and no exceedance clustering. Our results document the bank VaRs very slow adjustment to changing market conditions and their systematic bias in all studied periods. Our results indicate that bank VaRs could be improved by the use of models with time-varying volatility, and built on banks’ knowledge of their current positions.     

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.     

Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide

This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis, we find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Further exploration suggests that this is because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Overall, our findings add to the literature by examining the corporate governance determinants of financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 crisis.     

Valuation of diversified banks: New evidence

This paper reconsiders the effect of diversification on bank valuation. Our objective is to provide new evidence based on a unified estimation framework that places particular emphasis on separating the effects of diversification (specialised banks vs. diversified banks) from those of bank type (investment banks vs. commercial banks). Consistent with prior studies, we find a significant diversification discount at the end of the 1990s. Our main finding is that it decreases over time and practically vanishes after the financial crisis. We do not find support for the hypothesis that the diversification effect is influenced by geographical or regulatory factors. The valuation impact of bank characteristics varies over time, particularly in the financial crisis, but this structural break does not explain the observed decrease of the diversification discount. We show that the pre-crisis discount is considerably smaller in a robust regression, which in part is driven by banks with a large share of non-interest income.     

金融产品持股与银行系统性风险——兼论《商业银行股权管理暂行办法》的影响

基于金融机构通过金融产品增持上市银行股份现象日益普遍的背景,本文运用2011-2019年上市银行数据,采用系统GMM和合成控制法(SCM),分析金融产品持股¹对银行系统性风险的影响及其异质性,并探讨《商业银行股权管理暂行办法》(以下简称《股权办法》)限制金融产品超比例持有上市银行股份规定的效果。结果表明:(1)当单家金融产品股东的持股比例均低于5%²时,其会利用专业优势更好地监督银行行为,金融产品总持股比例有助于降低银行系统性风险。(2)当第一大金融产品股东的持股比例超过5%时,其会利用话语权为自身牟利,导致银行系统性风险增加,削弱金融产品总持股比例对银行系统性风险的降低作用。(3)由于保险产品持股在金融产品总持股中占主导地位,其对银行系统性风险的影响与金融产品持股的作用一致;保险产品以外的其他金融产品总持股比例会降低银行系统性风险。(4)《股权办法》的实施有助于约束持股比例超过5%的机构投资者的冒险行为,进而降低相应银行的系统性风险。     

银行表外国际融资业务快速增长带来的风险和管理思考

2010年以来,随着我国经济逐步走出金融危机的影响以及外贸形势的好转,银行表外国际融资业务增长迅猛,在给银行带来经营收入的同时,其风险也不容忽视。该文阐述了银行表外国际融资业务快速增长的成因,及其潜在的宏观与微观风险,并从加强银行内部管理和外部监管两个层面就完善表外国际融资业务的风险管理提出建议。     

Macroprudential stress testing of credit risk: A practical approach for policy makers

Drawing on the lessons from the global financial crisis and especially from its impact on the banking systems of Eastern Europe, the paper proposes a new practical approach to macroprudential stress testing. The proposed approach incorporates: (i) macroeconomic stress scenarios generated from both a country specific statistical model and historical cross-country crises experience; (ii) indirect credit risk due to foreign currency exposures of unhedged borrowers; (iii) varying underwriting practices across banks and their asset classes based on their relative aggressiveness of lending; (iv) higher correlations between the probability of default and the loss given default during stress periods; (v) a negative effect of lending concentration and residual loan maturity on unexpected losses; and (vi) the use of an economic risk weighted capital adequacy ratio as the relevant outcome indicator to measure the resilience of banks to materializing credit risk. The authors apply the proposed approach to a set of Eastern European banks and discuss the results.     

Does CSR matter in times of crisis? Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic

The debate over how firm stakeholder engagement is tied to preserving shareholder wealth has received growing attention in recent years, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. Against this backdrop, we examine the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and stock market returns during the COVID-19 pandemic-induced market crash and the post-crash recovery. Using a sample of 1750 U.S. firms and two major sources of CSR ratings, we find no evidence that CSR affected stock returns during the crash period. This result is robust to various sensitivity tests. In additional cross-sectional analysis, we find some supporting evidence, albeit weak, that the relation between CSR and stock returns during the pandemic-related crisis is more positive when CSR is congruent with a firm's institutional environment. We also find that Business Roundtable companies, which committed to protecting stakeholder interests prior to the pandemic, do not outperform during the pandemic crisis. We conclude that pre-crisis CSR is not effective at shielding shareholder wealth from the adverse effects of a crisis, suggesting a potential disconnect between firms' CSR orientation (ratings) and actual actions. Our evidence suggests that investors can distinguish between genuine CSR and firms engaging in cheap talk.     

Why high productivity growth of banks preceded the financial crisis

The high levels of operating efficiency, profits, and market values for banks in the years before the financial crisis raise reasonable doubts about the accuracy of the assessments of the efficiency of banking intermediation. We examine the productivity growth in Spanish banks in the pre-crisis period by separating out the contributions to productivity growth from business practices and from industry-wide technological progress. We find that more than two thirds of the estimated productivity growth in the years 2000–2007 is attributed to banks’ practices, such as the expansion of credit in the housing market, the high recourse to securitization and short-term finance, the reduction in liquidity holdings, and the leveraging process of banks’ balance sheets, that the literature claims are the ultimate causes of the crisis. We estimate that the remaining cumulative annual growth rate is 2.8% for the industry’s technical progress, which is similar to that in the period of 1992–2000.     

Credit growth in Central,Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe: The case of foreign bank subsidiaries

In this paper, we investigate the credit growth of foreign-owned banks in Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe from 2000 to 2014. We intend to show whether foreign capital in the banking sector should be treated as a monolith, as it currently is in the literature. To this end, we analyse credit growth based on the status of the parent company (global systemically important banks, or G-SIBs, vs. non-GSIBs) and European Union membership of the countries of the subsidiaries. The analyses are carried out on a panel of banks with the use of the panel corrected standard error methodology. Additionally, we differentiate between the pre-crisis and crisis/post-crisis periods to identify whether the policy of parents changed after the outbreak of the crisis. We find important differences in the determinants of the credit growth of subsidiaries, indicating that foreign capital in the banking sector should not be treated as a monolith.     

Bank Competition with Financing and Savings Substitutes

This paper models the banking competition in loan and deposit markets on two levels. We measure the competition among different banks and among banks and non-bank financing and saving alternatives. We estimate a model of demand, cost, and market equilibrium equations for differentiated products by using data from the confidential reports that Spanish banks provide to the Bank of Spain during the period from 1988 to 2003. This database contains information on the effective interest rates on new loans and deposits, and the expected loan losses obtained from the Spanish Credit Register. The estimated price elasticities show that the products offered by different banks are close substitutes, which puts pressure on the banks’ profits margins. However, the substitutability between bank and non-bank products is much lower than the substitutability among products offered by different banks. The results also show that Spain’s entrance into the Eurozone did not cause a structural change in the demand and cost conditions of Spanish banks. The banks financed most of the imbalances between bank loans and domestic deposits before the crisis through the interbank market.     

How using derivatives affects bank stability in emerging countries? Evidence from the recent financial crisis

Based on banks exclusively from emerging countries over the whole period 2003–2011, this paper aims to investigate whether the use of derivative instruments are responsible in the amplification of the recent and global financial crisis. To do that, we measure the effect of derivatives use on stability of banks from emerging countries during normal period “the pre-crisis period”, 2003–2006, and turbulent period “the crisis and post-crisis period”, 2007–2011. We use the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator technique developed by Blundell and Bond to estimate our regressions.The main findings show that contrarily to forwards and swaps – which are not disruptive factors – futures and especially options, weaken the stability of banks from emerging countries. The major conclusion is that only options and futures can be considered as risky derivatives and partly responsible in the intensification of the last financial crisis.     

Financing structure and insolvency risk exposure of Islamic banks

This study analyzes the impact of financing structure on Islamic banks’ insolvency risk exposure. By analyzing four models, we find that an increase in real estate financing decreases insolvency risk; however, an increasing concentration of financing structure increases insolvency risk. We discover that increasing the stability of the financing structure reduces risk in the short term, but not in the medium term. Interestingly, our findings show that the level of insolvency risk exposure during the 1997 Asian financial crisis was lower than it was for the overall period, whereas it is higher than the overall average in the ongoing global economic crisis. Thus, regulatory bodies, policymakers, and market players in the Islamic banking industry should take appropriate action to in manage the insolvency risk of Islamic banks.     

Market power in CEE banking sectors and the impact of the global financial crisis

The aim of this study is to undertake an up-to-date assessment of market power in Central and Eastern European banking markets and explore how the global financial crisis has affected market power and what has been the impact of foreign ownership. Three main results emerge. First, while there is some convergence in country-level market power during the pre-crisis period, the onset of the global crisis has put an end to this process. Second, bank-level market power appears to vary significantly with respect to ownership characteristics. Third, asset quality and capitalization affect differently the margins in the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. While in the pre-crisis period the impacts are similar for all banks regardless of ownership status, in the crisis period non-performing loans have a negative effect and capitalization a positive effect only for domestically-owned banks.