Austrian themes,data, and sports economics

This paper uses data from Major League Baseball and themes from Moneyball by Michael Lewis to empirically illustrate Kirznerian entrepreneurship. While Kirzner envisioned competition in markets for profit, the sports economics literature shows that sporting competition has things in common with market competition. This is important because a strength of sports economics, namely, the abundant data, can help overcome a perceived weakness of Austrian economics, namely, the lack of empirical content. This paper describes and empirically confirms how certain front office decision makers of the Oakland Athletics were alert to opportunities that were being overlooked by other baseball executives.

Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective

The economic approach to politics revolutionized the way scholars in economics and political science approached the study of political decision-making by introducing the possibility of government failure. However, the persistent and consistent application of neoclassical models of economics also seemed to suggest that once the full costs were accounted for, this failure was an illusion. This paper counters these arguments, typically associated with George Stigler, Gary Becker and Donald Wittman, by focusing on the underlying economic theory. We develop an alternative model of political economy grounded in the Austrian conception of the dynamic market process.

On good government

Besley’s treatment of principled agents is a major contribution to public choice and political economy. By focusing on politics as an agency problem, he has shown the way to a new generation of research on the interface of politics and economics.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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The rise and fall of monopolistic competition revolution

The widespread idea among economists is that monopolistic or imperfect competition is a set of realistic models that were invented in the 1930s and their purpose was to fill the gap between the polar and, at the same time, hypothetical models of perfect competition and pure monopoly. The main argument of this paper is that the monopolistic competition revolution set in motion a reaction—partly driven by methodological considerations, partly ideological—that ultimately led to the restoration of perfect competition, as the benchmark for evaluating market outcomes. In the end, monopolistic competition eclipsed, and perfect competition from the fridges of economic analysis that was up until the 1920s was placed to the very core of microeconomic model-building.

Freedom,barriers to entry,entrepreneurship, and economic progress

While entrepreneurs benefit from unrestricted free entry into markets, they have a time-inconsistent incentive to lobby for government entry restrictions once they become successful. Bad political institutions yield to these demands, and growing barriers are placed on domestic and international competition. Good institutions do not, and this effort is instead channeled toward further wealth creation. We find that productive entrepreneurship depends on both the freedom to succeed and discipline of failure that free markets provide. Trade barriers result in fewer combinations of goods and inputs attempted, and less productive entrepreneurial resource use. We also provide evidence on the value of business failure.

Trade liberalization,intra-industry trade and the environment: competition mode and the order of firms’ moves

This paper explores the implications of trade liberalization by extending the intra-industry trade framework à la Fung and Maechler (J Int Trade Econ Dev 16(1):53–69, 2007) to the case of sequential move and taking the mode of firms’ competition into consideration as well. It is shown that the existing results obtained for the case of simultaneous price competition are robust in quantity competition and sequential move cases. Moreover, it studies the likelihood that the environmental effects of trade liberalization occur.

Institutional change from an evolutionary perspective: the Mexican experience

The fall of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in July 2000 marked a milestone in Mexico’s political history. Throughout its 71 years of incumbency, the PRI had incarnated the set of social, political and economic institutions of the country to the extent of becoming synonymous with governance and stability. Using a simple model in which institutional change is the result of the strategic interaction between citizens, an incumbent ruler and a potential new ruler or entrant, we provide a systematic interpretation of this experience emphasizing the role of evolutionary factors such as history, uncertainty, learning and experimentation.

Imperfect competition and the modelling of expectations in macroeconomics

We show that when a model of the macroeconomy is based on imperfect, rather than perfect, competition, this may increase the problem of how to model agents’ expectations. We provide a simple example using an overlapping-generations economy with the potential for unemployment. Under certain assumptions about how consumers migrate between locations between the first and second periods of their lives, this extra issue regarding expectations arises. Imperfect competition may increase agents’ forecasting difficulties because they have to forecast not only future equilibrium prices, but also future out-of-equilibrium prices, and by definition the latter are never actually observed.

Principles and politics: Like oil and water

In a democracy, public policies require majority support to be enacted, so politicians must enlist the support of others to further their political agendas. Successful politicians are those who can negotiate in the political marketplace to steer outcomes their way, and to succeed, politicians must be willing to set their principles aside and trade their votes away to get something better. In contrast with the principled politician whose support cannot be bought, the unprincipled politician’s support must be bought, so unprincipled politicians accumulate political IOUs that they cash in to advance their agendas. Democratic politics by design reinforces unprincipled behavior and punishes principled behavior.

Legal positivism and property rights: a critique of Hayek and Peczenik

Scholars such as Friedrich Hayek and Aleksander Peczenik have criticized legal positivism for undermining constitutionalism and the rule of law, an implication of which is weakened private property rights. This conclusion is far from evident. First, I contend that legal positivism is compatible with a strong support for property rights. Second, the causal relationship between legal positivism and the degree to which property rights are applied and protected is analyzed. The main arguments for a negative relationship—that legal positivism centralizes and politicizes legislation and that it makes the legal culture servile in relation to the political sphere—are considered unconvincing.

Entry and fiscal policy effectiveness in a small open economy within a Monetary Union

In this article I develop an imperfectly competitive dynamic general equilibrium model for a small open economy integrated in a monetary union. Here, the type of entry in the non-traded goods’ sector affects fiscal policy effectiveness. Fiscal policy effectiveness is enlarged when aggregate demand stimuli increase intra-industrial competition (case I). This is due to the counter-cyclical mark-up mechanism generated by entry. Such a mechanism is absent in the usual monopolistic competition where entry only has a sharing effect (case II).

The Austrian income tax tariff, 1955–2006

Using official statistics and tax laws, we outline and discuss the evolution of the personal income tax in Austria since the beginning of the Second Republic in 1955. Focusing on the tax tariff and its progressivity properties, we identify a period of high (and increasing) progressivity before 1989, followed by a period of diminished progressivity since 1989. While still being a powerful revenue instrument, the Austrian income tax seems to have lost both redistributive impact and political allure.

Special issue: imperfect competition and contemporary macroeconomics. Editor’s introduction

This paper introduces the special issue by tracing out the history of imperfect competition in macroeconomics, particularly since 1980. It argues that in the search for a micro-foundation for nominal rigidity it was necessary to abandon the assumption of competitive equilibrium where all agents are price-takers. This led to models where firms and other optimising agents set wages and prices which were part of the new Keynesian economics of the 1980s. When these were combined with quantitative dynamic equilibrium methods it gave rise to the new neoclassical synthesis models which dominate macroeconomics today. The assumption of imperfect competition provides an equilibrium with different properties to the competitive, and one particular focus is on the relationship between the markup and the fiscal multiplier.

Locational choice and price competition: some empirical results for the austrian retail gasoline market

Using data from the Austrian retail gasoline market we find that a higher station density reduces average prices. Market (i.e. ownership) concentration does not significantly affect average price, however is negatively related to the density of stations. Estimation of the pricing and entry equations as simultaneous equations does not alter our conclusions, and suggests causality running from station density to price. We argue that the spatial dimension of markets allows the identification of market conduct, which is particularly relevant for competition policy.

Constitutional Interpretation: Burke and Buchanan and their 18th Century Intellectual Roots

There is a respectable tradition of Burkean constitutional interpretation in legal scholarship whereas Edmund Burke is a relatively neglected figure in constitutional political economy. A comparison of the constitutional interpretations of constitutional political economy and Burkean legal scholarship provides a potentially fruitful outcome for both. This is particularly so given the 18th century intellectual roots of each. An examination of the Burkean tradition demonstrates why it is methodologically inductive, evolutionary and pessimistic, compared to the deductive, individualistic and optimistic approach of the Smithian tradition of constitutional political economy. Interestingly, these sharp distinctions in method produce similar results.

Constitutional moments in Eastern Europe and subjectivist political economy

This article provides epistemic foundations for traditional rational-choice political science, to explain when and how ideas matter. Operational codes, epistemic communities and the structural patterns of ideas demonstrates the constitutional moments that occur during crises, and how ideas can underpin and direct the formation of interest groups. The implications for policy reform are discussed, along with an application to the Constitutional Moments during the transition of Central and Eastern Europe.

Voting on voting with the feet: a cross-county analysis of the Tennessee popular referenda to secede from the union

We analyze a unique case of voting on voting with the feet, when Tennessee twice considered secession from the Union in 1861 by popular referenda. The initial votes to hold a convention, and to send disunion delegates to a convention, failed, but after the Confederate states adopted a new constitution and the bombing of Fort Sumter took place, a second set of votes to separate from the union, and to join the confederacy, passed. Regression results support the importance of both economic interests and political tendencies, along with regional differences, in explaining the variation in votes across counties. Class distinctions were not found to be significant.

From scholarly idea to budgetary institution: the emergence of cost-benefit analysis

Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is typically portrayed as a technique for promoting efficiency in government. We don’t deny that CBA can be used in this manner, but instead focus on a different property of CBA, namely, its evolution from scholarly musings into a framing institution within which budgetary processes operate. The evolution of CBA into institutional status, moreover, shows the value of bringing a polyarchical perspective to bear on fiscal organization, wherein budgetary outcomes emerge through structured interaction among participants. CBA is a product of interaction within a political ecology, as distinct from being the product of some person’s optimizing choice.

How large is liquidity risk in an automated auction market?

We introduce a new empirical methodology that models liquidity risk over short time periods for impatient traders who submit market orders. Using Value-at-Risk type measures, we quantify the liquidity risk premia for portfolios and individual stocks traded on the automated auction market Xetra. The specificity of our approach relies on the adequate econometric modelling of the potential price impact incurred by the liquidation of a portfolio. We study the sensitivity of liquidity risk towards portfolio size and traders' time horizon, and interpret its diurnal variation in the light of market microstructure theory.

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