Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case

We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication (e.g., [Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]) and optimal delegation (e.g., [Bengt Holmström, On the theory of delegation, in: M. Boyer, R.E. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, North-Holland, 1984, pp. 115-141]): a principal-agent model with hidden information, no monetary transfers, and single-peaked preferences. We demonstrate that under the common assumption of quadratic payoffs and a certain regularity condition on the distribution of private information and the agent's bias, the optimal mechanism is deterministic. We also provide an explicit characterization of this mechanism.     

Joint production in teams

Consider Holmström's moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has an a_i-dimensional strategy space and output is m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation generically exists if and only if . Moreover, under a weak additional condition, the equilibrium implemented by this mechanism is unique in the class of pure strategy Coalition-Proof equilibria.     

Optimal information acquisition and monetary policy

I study optimal monetary policy with an expectational AS curve and private agents who optimally choose their amount of information pertinent to predicting policy. Shocks with time-varying variance (ARCH) induce interesting information acquisition (IA) dynamics; optimal IA affects optimal policy and vice versa. Under discretion, IA dynamics cause time-varying effectiveness of policy because of the expectational AS curve; policy may be rendered completely ineffective. In policy game equilibrium, a fall in the shock’s variance typically induces less IA and raises welfare. In one exceptional case the opposite occurs, a result which does not require implausible unstable equilibria. An agent becoming informed increases the endogenous component of economic volatility; IA therefore has a negative externality. Under commitment policy’s effectiveness is again time-varying, but policy is never completely ineffective: commitment enables the central bank to credibly limit policy’s volatility; this limits private agents’ incentive to become informed, so limits expectation-induced policy neutrality.     

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

Summary. In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when the manager’s ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previous results, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjusted contracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gather information. We find that the risk-averse manager’s effort is an increasing function of her share in the portfolio’s return. This result affects the risk-averse investor’s choice of contracts. Unlike previous results, the purely risk-sharing contract is now shown to be suboptimal. Using numerical methods we show that under the optimal linear contract, the manager’s share in the portfolio return is higher than what it is under a purely risk sharing contract. Additionally, this deviation is shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager’s risk aversion and (ii) larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. As the constraint is relaxed the deviation converges to zero.Received: 25 July 2002, Revised: 12 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D81, D82, J33.Juan-Pedro Gómez: Correspondence toAn earlier version of the paper was circulated under the title “Providing Managerial Incentives: Do Benchmarks Matter?” We are grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments helped to improve the paper. We also thank comments by Viral Acharya, Alexei Goriaev, Ernst Maug, Kristian Rydqvist, Neil Stoughton, Rangarajan Sundaram, Fernando Zapatero and seminar participants at the 1999 SED meetings in Sardinia, the 1999 Workshop in Mutual Fund Performance at EIASM, Brussels, the 2000 EFA meetings in London, the Bank of Norway, the Stockholm Schools of Economics, the Norwegian School of Management and the 2001 WFA meetings in Tucson. Sharma gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Asociacion Mexicana de Cultura.     

Some empirical evidence on the ‘discouraged worker’ effect

This note produces empirical evidence on the existence of a significant ‘discouraged worker’ effect in US data–namely, on the tendency for groups of secondary workers to move in and out of the labor force with the business cycle, looking for jobs when these are available, while giving up job search during recessions — by focusing on the behavior of the ‘not in the labor force’ series, as well as of two of its segments (‘going to school’, and ‘keeping house’), at the business-cycle frequencies. Both in the aggregate, and for a number of age–sex groups, the series display a clear counter-cyclical pattern, thus lending support to the discouraged worker notion.     

An econometric model of potential output, productivity growth, and resource utilization

This paper specifies a macroeconometric model providing a simultaneous framework for estimating the natural rate of unemployment, the full-employment (FE) labor force and hours of work, the FE productivity growth rate, and the growth path of potential (FE) output during 1960–2000. The estimated output and unemployment gaps are consistent with Okun’s Law. Historical perspective is provided on the expansion of the nineties by comparing it with those of the three previous decades in terms of growth and utilization of potential output. Factors accounting for the growth of potential output, productivity and labor supply are identified and compared.     

The effects of one-way compatibility on technology adoption in systems markets

This paper analyzes the effects of one-way compatibility on technology adoption in a market that is characterized by a free-entry condition on the software side. We show that hardware-backward compatibility increases a new-generation hardware firm’s profit; the effects of software-backward compatibility on the hardware firm’s profits depend on the distribution of consumer types.     

Growth and income inequality: a canonical model

Summary. We develop an endogenous growth model with elastic labor supply, in which agents differ in their initial endowments of physical capital. In this framework, the growth rate and the distribution of income are jointly determined. The key equilibrating variable is the equilibrium labor supply. It determines the rate of return to capital, which in turn affects both the rate of capital accumulation and the distribution of income across agents. We then examine the impact of various structural shocks on growth and distribution. We find that faster growth is associated with a more unequal, contemporaneous distribution of income, consistent with recent empirical findings.Received: 7 October 2004, Revised: 18 February 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: O17, O40.Cecilia García-Peñalosa: Correspondence toGarcía-Peñalosa would like to acknowledge the financial support received from the Institut d’Economie Publique (IDEP), Marseille. Turnovsky’s research was supported in part by the Castor endowment at the University of Washington. The paper has benefited from seminar presentations at the University of California, Riverside, and the University of Kansas, as well as from the comments of an anonymous referee.     

The effect of labor market monopsony on economic growth

In this endogenous growth model, a minimum efficient scale of production and workers’ home-to-work travel costs combine to give firms monopsony power, and this monopsony power leads to slower growth. Monopsony drives the wage below the marginal product of labor. This lower wage leads to lower investment in human capital and thereby to a lower growth rate. This makes investment in human capital – and therefore the growth rate – suboptimal. We provide evidence from a cross-country panel to support our model: Urbanization, which we assume is determined by a country’s exogenous population density and cropland area, positively impacts the wage share of output; the wage share positively impacts educational attainment; higher-income countries have higher wage shares; and within-country upticks in the wage share have a positive lagged effect on the growth rate.     

Labor standards, labor-management bargaining and international rivalry

Using the labor union's bargaining power as an indication of government policy on labor standards issues, we analyze the competition between a domestic (North) firm and a foreign (South) firm, and their relationship with optimal labor standards (LS). First, we show that the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when they are not. Second, it is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if labor unions are employment-oriented. Third, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS occurs in the case of wage-oriented unions. Fourth, the North's imposing a tariff to force the Southern government to raise its LS is effective only if the Southern union is wage-oriented. In order to raise Southern LS, both countries may need some deeper form of economic integration, if the North does not want to abandon its free trade system.     

Growth and employment differentials under alternative wage-setting institutions and integrated capital markets

This paper compares the effects of different labor market institutions on economic growth and employment. In the general equilibrium model here presented, a mechanism causing persistence (on-the-job training) interacts with the strategic complementary between investors’ decisions on capital accumulation and workers’ decisions on labor-market participation. Within this framework (i) structurally and institutionally similar economies preserve forever their differences in output and employment levels, (ii) the steady-state growth rate is higher in an economy with competitive wage determination than in an unionized economy, (iii) this growth differential enlarges when the product and the capital markets of these two economies are integrated.     

Tournaments, minimum wage, and money non-neutrality

To reconstruct the micro-foundation of Keynesian macro-economics, the efficiency wage theory has generally been considered a success in providing a plausible explanation for the existence of involuntary unemployment. However, little has been said about how monetary policy causes fluctuations in aggregate employment and output in the efficiency wage theory. This paper extends Lin and Yang’s [Econ. Inq. 39 (2001) 644] shirking-type efficiency wage model with tournaments to account for money non-neutrality. A distinct feature of our model is that, due to the adoption of tournaments, there will be a hierarchical wage structure rather than a flat wage in the economy. As will be argued, the labor market characterized in this paper is in a sense a reversion to Keynes’ General Theory, but also an improvement upon it.     

The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmström-Milgrom type

The paper extends the Holmström-Milgrom [B. Holmström, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives, Econometrica 55 (1987) 303-328] analysis of intertemporal incentive provision to allow for the implementation of actions on the boundary of the feasible set. Boundary actions provide the principal with some freedom in choosing incentive schemes. This can be used to reduce premia. The paper characterizes optimal incentive schemes for the continuous-time Brownian-motion model and its discrete-time approximations. Linearity of incentive schemes in “accounts” is confirmed. However, for models with effort costs depending only on mean returns, the availability of boundary actions destroys the linearity of optimal incentive schemes in profits.     

Reexamining the permanent income hypothesis with uncertainty in permanent and transitory innovation states

In this paper, we reexamine the permanent income–consumption relationship analytically and empirically, based on the innovation regime-switching (IRS) model developed in [Kuan, C.M., Huang, Y.L., Tsay, R.S., 2005. An unobserved component model with switching permanent and transitory innovations. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 23, 443–454]. A novel feature of the IRS model is that it explicitly allows for uncertainty in innovation states. When the labor income follows an IRS process, it is shown that the agent’s perception on the likelihoods of income innovations being permanent and transitory plays a crucial role in determining the optimal forecasts on the change of consumption. The effect of a current labor income innovation on consumption is a weighted average of two distinct effects resulting from permanent and transitory innovations with the weights equal to the perceived likelihoods of the respective states. Also, past innovations may affect consumption when there are revisions in the perceived likelihoods of previous states. Our empirical study on US data shows that consumption indeed reacts significantly to the perceived likelihoods of innovation states. However, even after controlling for the effect of state uncertainty, we find consumption vastly underreacts to permanent innovations in labor income but reacts about the right magnitude to transitory ones when compared with the prediction of the permanent income hypothesis. This evidence is similar to [Elwood, S.K., 1998. Testing for excess sensitivity in consumption: A state-space unobserved components approach. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 30, 64–82] but in sharp contrast with that found in [Hall, R.E., Mishkin, F.S., 1982. The sensitivity of consumption to transitory income: Estimates from panel data on households. Econometrica, 50, 461–480].     

Do liquidity constraints generate excess sensitivity in consumption? New evidence from a sample of post-bankruptcy households

Previous work linking liquidity constraints to excessive consumption sensitivity have used household level information on wealth and assets to split the sample into households that are likely to be constrained from those with access to credit and liquidity. In this paper, we use the sample splitting methods of previous authors but refine the criteria by using direct information on whether the household filed for bankruptcy in the last 10 years. Legally, a flag can appear on a bankruptcy filer’s credit report for up to 10 years after bankruptcy. This bankruptcy flag affects an individual’s credit score, and therefore the individual’s access to credit, which may make post-bankruptcy consumers liquidity constrained. Our results indicate that post-bankruptcy consumers exhibit excess sensitivity likely due to the bankruptcy flag. Consistency checks confirm that the source of sensitivity is due to liquidity constraints and not other observationally equivalent behavior.     

Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers

This paper considers collusion between a supervisor and an agent within a Principal–Supervisor–Agent model. Other papers consider the possibility of collusion after the supervisor has exerted costly effort to obtain hard (“verifiable”) evidence regarding the agent’s actions, information which, if reported would result in the agent being fined with a certain probability. That is, collusion occurs because the supervisor may accept a bribe in exchange for hiding the information he has obtained. This paper allows the supervisor and the agent to enter into a collusive contract either before or after the supervisor has exerted effort to find verifiable information regarding the agent’s actions. The former type of collusion, which occurs after the supervisor has exerted effort, entails ex-post corruption, while the latter, which occurs before the supervisor has exerted effort, entails preemptive corruption. This paper shows that although raising the supervisor’s reward discourages ex-post corruption, it can simultaneously encourage preemptive corruption. Hence, raising the supervisor’s reward will not always discourage collusion. This result further implies that though privatizing law enforcement can always be used to eliminate ex-post corruption, it cannot be used to eliminate preemptive corruption. Furthermore, when compared to ex-post collusion, an equilibrium without corruption is always socially preferred. However, when compared to preemptive collusion, an equilibrium without corruption may not always be socially preferred.     

Negative externalities and Sen’s liberalism theorem

Summary. Sen’s seminal, negative theorem about minimal liberalism has had a profound effect on economics, philosophy, and the social sciences. To address concerns raised by his result, we show how Sen’s assumptions must be modified to obtain positive conclusions; e.g., one resolution allows an agent to be decisive only if his choice does not impose “strong negative externalities” on others. We also uncover a significantly different interpretation of Sen’s societal cycles: rather than describing the rights of individuals to choose, the cycles identify when these choices impose difficulties on others. Other ways to address Sen’s difficulties come from game theory.Received: 14 October 2004, Revised: 7 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, C70, D62.Donald G. Saari: Correspondenc toThe research of D. Saari was supported by NSF grant DMI-0233798. Our thanks to P. Hammond for suggesting some useful references. Some of our joint results were reported in Brunel (now Petron) (1998).