现代不确定性经济理论的比较研究:凯恩斯与奈特

奈特和凯恩斯都是公认的不确定性经济分析的大师。奈特对经济不确定性问题的贡献在于对风险和不确定性的严格区分 ,并成功地构筑了以不确定性 -风险为核心的利润理论 ,由此揭示了企业存在的本质 ;凯恩斯将不确定性作为其宏观经济理论的逻辑起点 ,预期的不确定性构成其消费、投资及货币需求三大心理规律的支撑 ,不确定性理论亦成为其建立宏观经济理论的基石。对两位大师不确定性经济理论的探究、对比 ,能更好地把握不确定性经济学的形成基础。     

传统交易费用兼并理论的演进及其评析

交易费用理论和企业理论是以科斯为代表的新制度学派理论体系的重要组成部分。伴随着企业兼并实践的不断发展，著名新制度学派人表人物科斯，威廉姆森以及其他经济学家分别运用这两个理论（尤其是交易费用理论）对企业兼并进行了深入的研究，形成了独具特色的传统交易费用兼并理论，该兼并理论无论从理论还是实践角度都存在较大的局限性。     

不确定性理论:现代宏观经济分析的基石

自李嘉图之后，经济学理论的构建遇到了两难的选择：经济分析只有排除不确定性和变动才能进行，而经济政策只有仔细考虑到不确定性和变动才有可能实行。凯恩斯的一个重要贡献就是将不确定性牢固地置于经济各阶段的中心，不确定的预期在消费、投资及货币需求三大心理规律起着决定性作用。在当今宏观经济学的演进过程中，对不确定性问题的态度和处理方式已成为划分诸多宏观分支理论的一把标尺，而在经济学层面对不确定性问题的深化，也是未来宏观经济学变革的一个重要方向。     

不确定性理论与现代宏观经济学的演进

在宏观经济学的演变过程中 ,一个一致不变的主题和中心是古典主义和凯恩斯主义的争论 ,而凯恩斯的一个重要贡献就是将不确定性牢固地置于经济各阶段的中心 ,不确定的预期在消费、投资及货币需求三大心理规律中起着决定性作用。在当今宏观经济学发展的历史进程中 ,对不确定性问题的处理成为判定诸多宏观分支理论的分界 ,而对不确定性问题的深化 ,也是未来宏观经济学变革的一个重要方向。本文旨在对这一问题进行梳理 ,力图给人们一定的启示。     

经济增长不确定性理论研究新进展

经济增长不确定性是宏观经济学的重要研究领域,我们可以通过经济增长不确定性来解释经济增长差异等问题。经济增长不确定性包括局部不确定性与全局不确定性。局部不确定性是指对应唯一的均衡点(平衡增长路径),经济中存在无穷条收敛路径;全局不确定性是指经济中存在多重均衡点(平衡增长路径),初始状态不同,经济会收敛到不同的均衡点(平衡增长路径)。本文较为详细地综述了近年来经济增长不确定性研究的理论文献,旨在通过介绍经济增长不确定性理论的新进展,为国内学者研究类似的问题提供一些研究线索。     

对现代企业组织结构动态变化的研究

现代技术的迅猛发展导致企业组织结构的动态适应性越来越成为其重要的核心竞争要素。本文探讨了企业理论的演进与发展对现代企业组织结构动态变化研究的启示，并通过对现代企业组织结构动态变化的影响因素分析，提出了现代企业组织结构动态变化的发展趋势。     

不确定性、风险态度与内生权威

本文依循奈特有关不确定性和权威的思想,为内生权威问题提供了一个正式的模型。我们证明：团队成员间的风险态度差别越大,该团队就越可能形成等级制结构,其成员中的风险偏好者成为领导者,风险规避者成为追随者。团队成员间认知水平差别越大,该团队越可能形成等级制结构,其中认知水平高的成员成为领导者,认知水平低的成为追随者。     

对不确定性会计若干理论的研究

一般而言,不确定性是指对导致一系列可能结果的一种或多种备选方案的认识,但这些结果的可能性要么无法知道。要么无实际意义。不确定性不同于风险,风险虽然也具有不确定性,但它可以通过概率予以计算,而不确定性是无法进行计算的,它是决策中必须考虑的一个因素。本文对会计不确定性的原因进行了简要的分析,并提出了合理的会计处理原则及方法。     

School Expenditures and Educational Discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment

This paper examines the decline in use of the Knight-Keynes uncertainty concept in mainstream economics. Using electronic archives, it shows that the frequency of its appearance in leading journals of economics has fallen rapidly from the 1950s. As well as to the declining popularity of Keynesian ideas since about 1970, the decrease in this use of the uncertainty concept is additionally related to the increasing mathematical formalization of economics and to the prevalence of a positivist emphasis on prediction. Some possible causes of this formalization are examined. Finally the essay discusses the prospects for a broadening of economics within universities, beyond a relatively narrow preoccupation with predictive formalism and including a reinvigorated Keynesianism.     

Bargaining with a possibly committed seller

We consider negotiations with an open time horizon where a buyer has private information about his valuation and does not know whether the seller is committed to the advertised price. This setting combines two common specifications made in the non-cooperative bargaining literature: one side is privately informed about its valuation, which is drawn from a continuum, and the other side is possibly committed to a fixed offer. We analyze the game both in discrete and in continuous time and show convergence of the two settings, which extends results from Abreu and Gul [2000. Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica 68, 85–117]. One interesting result is that as time proceeds, the non-committed seller becomes less likely to concede in a given period, i.e., it appears as if he becomes more “stubborn.” We further show that a seller may prefer to negotiate with a “worse” buyer as this enhances the value of his possible commitment.     

The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.     

威廉姆森交易费用理论述评

通过对威廉姆森关于交易费用的界定、合同人的假设、交易维度及契约类型和治理结构等内容介绍和评价,并且概括了威廉姆森关于交易费用理论应用范围和领域,旨在客观地评价威廉姆森关于交易费用理论的学术贡献及其理论渊源及实质。     

Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem

We examine a setting in which property rights are initially ambiguously defined. Whether the parties go to court to remove the ambiguity or bargain and settle before or after trial, they incur enforcement costs. When the parties bargain, a version of the Coase theorem holds. However, despite the additional costs of going to court, other ex-post inefficiencies, and the absence of incomplete information, going to court may ex-ante Pareto dominate settling out of court. This is especially true in dynamic settings, where obtaining a court decision today saves on future enforcement costs. When the parties do not negotiate and go to court, a simple rule for the initial ambiguous assignment of property rights maximizes net surplus. A paper circulated under the same title and dated 6 March 2000 contained the basic structure examined in this paper, but did not develop many of the results reported here. For comments, we would like to thank participants at the WZB-CEPR contests conference and seminar audiences at the University of Southern California, the University of British Columbia, UC Davis, and UC Riverside.     

论传统外部性理论解决环境代际外部性的失效

代际外部性问题主要是人类代际之间行为的相互影响,尤其是前代对后代、当代对后代的影响。在解决代际外部性上,施害者、受害者和政府生活在不同的时空中,新古典方法几乎就无能为力。产权的界定是在产权主体存在的前提下进行的,所以产权在代际进行界定是不可能实现的,所以通过科斯定理来消除代际的外部性也行不通。     

Coase on the nature of economics

Recent writings on Coase's methodology largely focus on method,at the risk of underappreciating his substantive view of economics.That economics has as its subject matter the working of thereal world economic system is Coase's main methodological messageand is also the key to understanding Coase's other methodologicalconcerns. Coase's methodological position is illustrated inthis paper by comparing him with other economists in terms oftheir differing research programmes informed by their methodologicalstances. Along the way, this paper outlines the new institutionaleconomics, a research programme inspired by Coase's methodology.