Reduction of child poverty in Serbia: Benefit or employment strategy?

Based on the Serbian Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) and tax benefits and structural microsimulation models, we evaluate the labour supply and distributive effects of several reform strategies concerning two major social transfers in Serbia: child allowance and social monetary assistance. Our results show that, in a context of a low labour participation rate, and high unemployment and informality rates, a benefit strategy is by far the more cost‐effective option for reducing child poverty than an employment strategy that aims to raise the work incentives for parents. Both proposed reforms are found to be progressive.     

The employment effect of reforming a public employment agency

By how much does an increase in operating effectiveness of a public employment agency (PEA) and a reduction of unemployment benefits reduce unemployment? Using a recent labour market reform in Germany as background, we find that an enhanced effectiveness of the PEA explains about 20% of the observed post-reform unemployment decline. The role of unemployment benefit reduction explains just about 5% of the observed decline. Due to disincentive effects resulting from the reform, the reform of the PEA could have had an even higher impact on unemployment reduction if there had been less focus on long-term unemployed workers.     

Fixing the Leak: Unemployment Incidence before and after a Major Reform of Unemployment Benefits in Germany

We present first empirical results on the effects of a large scale reduction in unemployment benefit entitlement lengths on unemployment inflows in Germany. We show that this highly disputed element of the Hartz‐Reforms in 2006 induced a rush of workers and firms to take advantage of the previous legislation in its last days. Furthermore, we find a considerable decline in transitions to unemployment and an increase in employment rates among older workers after the reform. Our results provide new evidence for the importance of changes in unemployment inflows for the analysis of changes in unemployment outflows.     

Potential duration of unemployment benefits and labor market outcomes for older workers with health impairments in Germany

This research note estimates the causal effects of a cut in the potential duration of regular unemployment benefits for older workers in Germany on the labor market outcomes of individuals with health impairments. The analyzed reform is a natural experiment that allows a difference-in-differences strategy with treatment intensity. The results provide evidence for a significant decrease in the number of days in regular unemployment benefits and an increase in the number of days in employment. However, the results also suggest a significant increase in the number of days in unemployment (social) assistance, which are granted upon exhaustion of regular unemployment benefits.     

MIGRATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND WAGES: THE CASE OF THE CALIFORNIA SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY

The California San Joaquin Valley labor market appears to be at odds with basic economic principles in the sense that despite higher unemployment rates and lower wages, it has continually attracted an influx of in‐migrants, domestic and international. By examining county‐level data for the last two decades, the analysis in this paper is built around two main questions. First, in what proportion does local employment growth reduce local unemployment, increase labor force participation and attract outsiders who will likely take the newly created jobs? Second, to what extent regional migration rates respond to regional relative wages and unemployment differentials? Both questions aim to gain a better understanding of the San Joanquin Valley labor market and the migrants’ decisions to move there, which might shed light in the design and implementation of development policies aimed at reducing unemployment. Results provide evidence that market forces alone are insufficient to correct regional unemployment disparities. Three main findings are offered. First, in‐migrants workers fill most of the newly created jobs. Second, migration seems unresponsive to the unemployment level but responsive to changes in farm income. Third, migration is sensitive to government‐based benefits, property crime rates and housing prices. (JEL R11, R23, R58)     

Welfare and Macroeconomic Effects of the German Pension Acts of 1992 and 1999: A Dynamic CGE Study

The German Pension Act of 1992 raises the mandatory retirement age while the Act of 1999 adjusts pension benefits to demographic changes. To examine welfare and macroeconomic effects of these reform schemes, we have carried out a dynamic CGE study. The model used is an enlarged version of the Auerbach–Kotlikoff model with endogenous retirement decisions, unemployment, age-dependent rates of unemployment, health, and long-term care insurance. The simulation is performed in two stages: first, the effects of the population decline in Germany are computed ignoring the reforms and, second, the effects of the reform schemes are examined and compared with the benchmark case. The results suggest that the Act of 1992 implies welfare gains while suspending the Act of 1999 induces welfare losses.     

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.     

Shocks and the unavoidable road to higher taxes and higher unemployment

This paper considers a matching model in which multiple steady-state unemployment rates exist if government expenditures and unemployment benefits are high enough. The focus on the extensive margin and a possible transition to a steady state with higher unemployment rates imply that the effect of tax rates can be high even when the elasticity between consumption and leisure is low. The matching friction limits transitions between steady states due to self-fulfilling expectations. After a sufficiently large increase in the unemployment rate and after a large enough increase in the tax burden caused by an exogenous increase in government spending, however, transition towards the high-unemployment steady state is unavoidable in an economy with generous unemployment benefits.     

Unemployment Duration and Inflows onto the Disability Support Pension Program: Evidence from FaCS LDS Data

From the administrative data of the Australian Department of Family and Community Services it is found that a large proportion of Disability Support Pension (DSP) recipients transferred from unemployment benefits. Among those who transferred to DSP from unemployment benefits, a large proportion experienced multiple spells of income support receipt prior to the transition and a majority had more than a half‐year pre‐transition unemployment duration, with the average pre‐transition unemployment duration being more than one year. These findings suggest that the unemployment benefit is not simply a‘hold‐on’ benefit for those who experienced the unemployment—DSP transition. This article further examines what factors are associated with the transition. It is found that, among other things, the probability of transition to DSP from unemployment increases with duration on unemployment benefits.     

Prices,Productivity and Wage Bargaining in Open Economies*

According to the standard union bargaining model, unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages, but product‐market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain. We formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model, where labour and product‐market conditions together determine wages. A wage equation is derived and estimated on aggregate data for four Nordic countries. Wages are found to depend not only on unemployment and the replacement ratio, but also on productivity, international prices and exchange rates. There is evidence of considerable nominal wage rigidity. Exchange rate changes have large and persistent effects on competitiveness.     

Persistence and stochastic convergence of euro area unemployment rates*

This paper analyzes unemployment rates in the euro area (EA) countries to test for EA-related benefits and economic integration of the EA in the form of lower unemployment rates and unemployment rates convergence. We employ recently developed unit root tests with structural breaks and non-normal errors to analyze the persistence, test the stochastic convergence and locate structural break(s) in EA unemployment rates from 1995q1 to 2016q2. Our results imply a certain degree of unemployment hysteresis in the EA. Even though the results support the stochastic convergence of the majority of EA countries, we find that EA membership is not a sufficient condition for stochastic convergence. Nevertheless, EA-related breaks are followed by the periods of convergence to the EA11 average. Crisis-related breaks are followed by the periods of divergence. Although providing initial benefits, EA is not functioning as an optimal currency area.     

Long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment benefits: The changing nature of non-employment subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe

Non-employment rates in all central and eastern European countries have increased dranatically thoroughout the transition and are currently larger than those of the lowest income OECD countries. Non-employment benefits other than unemployment benefits are providing income support to this growing number of able-bodied individuals out of work. Under the present design of unemployment benefits and social assistance, there may be serious incentive problems related to the shift from unemployment benefits to other, means-tested, non-employment benefits and this shift occurs in transition countries at rather early stages of an unemployment spell; these incentive problems are bound to become particularly acute in a less inflationary environment.     

Do Conditional Benefits Reduce Equilibrium Unemployment?

Although unconditional unemployment benefits destroy jobs in competitive and noncompetitive labor markets, conditional benefits can spur job growth in noncompetitive labor markets. Unconditional benefits reduce the penalty of shirking and misconduct, while conditional benefits increase this penalty. This is shown for the efficiency‐wage, no‐shirking model of the labor market developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . Switching from unconditional to conditional benefits lowers unemployment. Tough eligibility requirements are thus important components of the welfare state. However, if conditional benefits are financed by a payroll tax, conditional benefits exert upward wage pressure so that unemployment falls by less and may even increase.     

How do Migrants Choose Their Destination Country? An Analysis of Institutional Determinants

We analyze the effects of socio‐economic and institutional determinants, especially labor‐market institutions and features of social protection systems, on migrants’ location choices. Based on micro‐data for France, Germany, the UK, and the USA, we study migration to one of these four countries using a multinomial choice framework. Our estimates confirm conventional results regarding wages, networks, and unemployment rates. In addition, we find that there are indications of “insider–outsider effects” for union coverage and unemployment benefits, while employment protection does not have a clear‐cut impact on migration. Good education and health systems tend to attract migrants, while generous pension systems deter them.     

A Search Model of Unemployment and Inflation*

This paper introduces money into the standard labor‐matching model. A double‐coincidence problem makes money necessary as a medium of exchange. In the long run, a rise in the growth rate of money leads to higher inflation and higher unemployment, such that the long‐run Phillips curve is not vertical. The optimal monetary growth rate decreases with greater worker bargaining power, the level of unemployment benefits, and the payroll tax rate.     

Squandering European Labour: Social Safety Nets in Times of Economic Turbulence

This paper reviews the argument that high long‐term unemployment in Europe is caused by generous social safety nets in times of economic turbulence. We report on the empirical evidence of a more turbulent economic environment and present the theoretical arguments that establish a link between turbulence and high unemployment. We conclude that a cure to the European unemployment problem must entail a reform of the unemployment insurance system so that benefits decline over the unemployment spell. If the social consensus in Europe makes it difficult to implement declining benefits, we suggest that a complementary way of providing incentives for the unemployed would be to reduce their leisure by imposing work requirements.     

Labour market institutions in open economy: Sectoral reallocations,aggregate adjustments,and spillovers

We introduce frictional unemployment in a multiworker heterogeneous firm model with a dynamic matching process, one‐ and two‐sector equilibria, and international markets. A change in labour market policies transforms the share of exporters and affects average productivity. The closure of equilibrium with or without sectoral arbitrage plays an important role in generating macro‐level outcomes for employment subsidies. Unemployment benefits, on the other hand, make unemployment and openness rise, independently of sectoral reallocations. We also find that simultaneous implementation of labour market policies remove potential gain in the trade share, and, when it comes to unemployment benefits, may even be detrimental.     

The Gift Paradox: Complex Selves and Symbolic Good

Generous unemployment benefits are a conventional explanation of the high rates of unemployment in many OECD countries. However, this perception has been challenged on the basis that cross-national evidence comes only from regression analyses of unemployment on the OECD's gross replacement rate but that results are not robust to improved, multidimensional measures of generosity. In this article, I conduct a detailed empirical analysis of how social welfare programs affect unemployment in 17 OECD countries, from 1975 to 2000, using a detailed concept of labor “decommodification” to make cross-national comparisons of generosity. The results show that unemployment benefits remain an important, robust determinant of unemployment even when the new measure is used.     

Moral hazard among the sick and unemployed: evidence from a Swedish social insurance reform

This paper studies a specific type of moral hazard that arises in the interplay between two large public social insurance systems in Sweden, namely the sickness insurance (SI) and the unemployment insurance (UI). Moral hazard can arise from the structure of the benefit levels as for some unemployed persons benefits from the SI are higher than benefits from the UI. We use a reform of the SI system that came into force on 1 July 2003 to identify the effect of economic incentives arising from the different benefit levels. The purpose of the reform was to eliminate the difference in benefits between the two social insurance systems. Our results from a duration analysis show clearly that the higher the sickness benefits, the higher the probability of reporting sick.     

Job protection,housing market regulation,and the youth

Young Europeans experience high unemployment rates, job instability, and late emancipation. Meanwhile, they do not support reforms weakening protection on long‐term contracts. In this paper, we suggest a possible rationale for such reform distaste. When the rental market is strongly regulated, landlords screen applicants with regard to their ability to pay the rent. Protecting regular jobs offers a second‐best technology to sort workers, thereby increasing the rental market size. We provide a model where nonemployed workers demand protected jobs despite unemployment and the share of short‐term jobs increases, whereas the individual risk of dismissal is unaffected. Our theory can be extended to alternative risks and markets involving correlated risks and commitment under imperfect information.