Pension Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Frozen Defined Benefit Plans

We study the impact of freezing defined benefit (DB) pension plans and replacing them with defined contribution (DC) plans on liquidity, financial leverage, investment, and market value of a sample of firms over 2001‐2008. We find evidence that the pension freeze tends to attenuate the drain on corporate liquidity and relieve the pressure to borrow to pay for mandatory contributions (MCs) associated with underfunded DB plans. Although investors seem to favor the pension freeze as evidenced by positive announcement abnormal stock returns, there is little reliable evidence that the freeze increases investment efficiency and long‐term stock performance.     

Does freezing a defined benefit pension plan affect firm risk?

This paper examines the impact of a defined benefit (DB) pension plan freeze on the sponsoring firm's risk and risk-taking activities. Using a sample of firms declaring a hard freeze on their DB plans between 2002 and 2007, we observe an increase in total risk (proxied by the standard deviation of EBITDA and asset beta), equity risk (standard deviation of returns), and credit risk following a DB-plan freeze. The increase in credit risk is reflected in a decline in credit ratings and an increase in bond yields for freezing firms. When we examine investment strategies, we observe a shift in investment from capital expenditures before the freeze to more-risky R&D projects after the freeze, and an increase in leverage. These strategies (increased focus on R&D and higher leverage) increase the operating and financial risk the firm faces. Overall, we observe an increase in risk-taking following DB plan freezes, consistent with theories that DB plans act as “inside debt” that aligns managers’ interests with bondholders’.     

Pension plan accounting estimates and the freezing of defined benefit pension plans

This study provides evidence that, when “hard” freezing their defined benefit pension plans, employers select downward biased accounting assumptions to exaggerate the economic burden of their benefit plans. Downward biased expected rates of return and discount rates allow managers to increase reported pension expenses and, for discount rates, allow managers to increase reported pension liabilities. We find that prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, both rates are downward biased when firms freeze their plans, whereas after SOX the bias is lower. This finding is consistent with managers opportunistically biasing pension estimates to obtain labor concessions during periods of reduced regulatory scrutiny.     

The impact of duration on management's discount rate choice

Previous research finds that firms increase their assumed discount rates to minimize their reported pension benefit obligation. This paper demonstrates that firms whose pension plans have short durations lower their discount rates (rather than increase them), since a lower discount rate decreases their pension expense. These results are especially relevant in the present climate of low interest rates and more firms freezing their defined benefit pension plans, thereby shortening the duration of their obligations. Given its importance in shaping management motivation we believe that firms should be required to disclose the duration of their future obligations.     

Pension de-risking choice and firm risk: Traditional versus innovative strategies

We examine the determinants of firms defined-benefit pension plan de-risking strategy choices and their impact on firm risk. We compile a hand-collected dataset for FTSE 350 firms for the period of 2009–2017. We find that hard freezing and pension buy-ins are more likely to be implemented when pension plans have longer investment horizons. In particular, pension plans that are exposed to higher investment risk are more likely to adopt pension buy-ins. Firms with larger capital expenditure and market capitalization are more likely to utilise innovative de-risking strategies (i.e. buy-in and longevity swap) in addition to traditional strategies (i.e. soft and hard freezing). Financially constrained firms are more likely to implement longevity swap over pension buy-ins. We also find that implementing pension de-risking strategies reduce firm risk. However, the effectiveness varies depending on the strategy with buy-ins having the largest impact in reducing risk.     

Pay me now (and later): Pension benefit manipulation before plan freezes and executive retirement

Large US firms modify top executives’ compensation before pension-related events. Top executives receive one-time increases in pensionable earnings through higher annual bonuses one year before a plan freeze and one year before retirement. Firms also boost pension payouts by lowering plan discount rates when top executives are eligible to retire with lump-sum benefit distributions. Increases in executive pensions do not appear to be an attempt to improve managerial effort or retention and are more likely to occur at firms with poor corporate governance. These findings suggest that in some circumstances managers are able to extract rents through their pension plans.     

Do Markets Like Frozen Defined Benefit Pensions? An Event Study

An increasing number of North American companies are freezing or terminating their traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans. In this article we document a positive announcement effect when a publicly traded company discloses that it has partially or fully frozen its DB plan and replaced it with—or enhanced—the 401(k) defined contribution (DC) plan. This positive risk‐adjusted return is greater for firms with higher beta and/or lower return on equity (ROE) prior to the freeze. In other words the positive impact is more pronounced for firms that are likely to face financial distress if they maintain their traditional pension plan and the associated long‐term promises.     

How does the Funding Status of Defined Benefit Pension Plans Affect Investment Decisions of Firms in the United States?

We investigate whether the flexibility in making contributions towards defined benefit pension plans sponsored by firms in the United States allows managers to save cash and increase investments. Firms invest more at higher levels of pension deficit, defined as pension benefit obligations less pension assets, and scaled by total assets. At the median level (90^th percentile) of pension deficit, investments increase by 6.7 cents (9.4 cents) for every dollar increase in cash. As the pension deficit increases, firms deviate more from the predicted level of investment. These findings suggest that the incremental investments are more likely to represent overinvestment by managers. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and endogeneity concerns that may arise if investments are jointly determined with the funding policy of pension plans and the firm's target cash level. We repeat our main analysis for the United Kingdom and also find for that country that, at a fixed cash level, total investment increases as pension deficit increases.     

Pension Funding Regulations and Actuarial Gains and Losses

With pervasive pension funding deficits, Korean firms have been under pressure to improve their funding levels. We examine whether firms have incentives to set obligation‐decreasing pension assumptions when they have large pension deficits (pension obligations in excess of plan assets) and when they make insufficient contributions to external pension funds. We find that firms report larger actuarial gains (or smaller actuarial losses) associated with the remeasurement of pension liabilities when their pension funding ratio (the ratio of the fair value of plan assets to defined benefit obligations) is lower and when contributions to plan assets relative to pension service costs are smaller. Next, upon the introduction of a minimum pension funding guideline, we find that the effect of the funding ratio and contributions to pension funds on actuarial gains and losses is more pronounced for firms whose funding ratios are slightly below the minimum funding ratio than it is for firms whose funding ratios exceed or fall short of the minimum by a large margin. Our results indicate that firms opportunistically exercise discretion regarding corporate pension accounting under International Financial Reporting Standards to comply with pension funding regulations, thereby reducing perceived pension deficits.     

Briys,Eric, and de Varenne,François,Insurance: From Underwriting to Derivatives: Asset Liability Management in Insurance Companies

Abstract

This paper uses economic principles to analyze alternative recognition schemes for end-of-period retirement plan liabilities; the candidates, using U.S. nomenclature, are the vested benefit obligation (VBO), the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) and the projected benefit obligation (PBO).

In competitive employment markets with rational contracting we are unable to justify projected costing (PBO-based) for typical pay-related defined benefit plans. Projected costing misrepresents the economic obligations incurred by shareholders and invites moral hazard.

Employee exposure to moral hazard may be minimized by exit costing (VBO-based) which recognizes only those benefits to which an exiting employee is entitled under the explicit benefit contract. But exit costing may not fully inform shareholders about the obligations that they have incurred under implicit contracts that extend beyond the plan document. Accrued costing (represented in the United States by the ABO) may better measure shareholders’ economic commitments.

Small differences between the ABO and the VBO may measure a human capital asset incented by delayed vesting and benefit eligibility. Large differences are a marker for frail benefit design and potential moral hazard.

Moral hazard options exercised by employers disappoint employees and may lead to unwelcome ex-post results-oriented repairs imposed by legislators, regulators and courts.     

Cash-Balance Plan Conversions: Evidence on Excise Taxes and Implicit Contracts

Firms that wish to switch from a traditional defined‐benefit pension plan to a defined‐contribution‐type plan have a choice between converting to a cash‐balance plan or replacing the defined‐benefit plan with a full‐fledged defined‐contribution plan. According to Ippolito and Thompson's (1999; Industrial Relations, 39: 228‐245) excise tax avoidance hypothesis, a number of firms have switched to cash‐balance plans because conversion allows the firm to avoid excise taxes on its excess pension assets. In contrast to existing studies, our evidence supports the excise tax avoidance hypothesis. Cash‐balance plan conversions also have been criticized for imposing pension losses on older employees. The implicit contract theory of pensions predicts that poorly performing firms would be the ones that would impose losses on employees. However, our evidence indicates that firms converting to cash‐balance plans typically are not poor performers.     

THE EFFECT OF SFAS 87 ON CORPORATE FUNDING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS

Statement of Financia1 Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87) modifies the method of accounting for pensions by requiring companies sponsoring defined benefit pension plans to (1) recognize a balance sheet liability for unfunded pension benefits and (2) disclose their obligation for pension benefits based on expected future compensation levels (the projected benefit obligation). These requirements may affect users' perceptions of a company's financial position, especially if these plans are underfunded. This research examines whether the requirements of SFAS 87 result in increased funding of corporate pension plans to counteract possible adverse perceptions of users about these plans. The results indicate that early adopters (companies adopting SFAS 87 in 1985 and 1986) increased the funding of their defined benefit pension plans in response to SFAS 87 ; however, later adopters did not do so. These findings provide evidence that companies may alter economic policies when faced with significant changes in financial disclosure requirements. Further analysis suggests that the effect of SFAS 87 on the pension expense recognized by the sample companies provided impetus for early adoption of this pronouncement.     

Investment and Financing Constraints: Evidence from the Funding of Corporate Pension Plans

I exploit sharply nonlinear funding rules for defined benefit pension plans in order to identify the dependence of corporate investment on internal financial resources in a large sample. Capital expenditures decline with mandatory contributions to DB pension plans, even when controlling for correlations between the pension funding status itself and the firm's unobserved investment opportunities. The effect is particularly evident among firms that face financing constraints based on observable variables such as credit ratings. Investment also displays strong negative correlations with the part of mandatory contributions resulting solely from unexpected asset market movements.     

A COMPARISON OF INDEXING AND BETA AMONG PENSION AND NONPENSION ASSETS

In this article I contrast the investment behavior of institutional portfolios having pension assets with portfolios having nonpension assets. Differences in incentive compensation plans and regulation give pension executives unique incentives to track benchmark indices. Accordingly, pension assets are more likely than nonpension assets to be allocated to index funds. Also, portfolios composed of pension assets are more likely than other portfolios to (i) have low tracking error in absolute value, (ii) be index funds, and (iii) have market betas close to one. Portfolios with relatively large pension asset market share exhibit similar characteristics and the tendency to index increases with asset class risk. Actively managed pension assets are also more likely to be invested in lower risk asset classes than actively managed nonpension assets.     

Earnings management and the allocation of net periodic pension costs to interim periods

We examine the pattern of reported quarterly net periodic pension costs. Quarterly pension costs are one of the largest single expense items for firms with pension plans (around 15% of income before extraordinary items in our sample). Under ASC 270, net pension costs should be recognized as incurred, or as the benefit provided by the expense is realized. We find that over the period of 2004–2010, there is significant variation in the amount of quarterly pension cost firms report. In addition, we find that income-increasing changes in pension costs are significantly associated with meeting or beating analysts' forecasts in a given quarter. We also show that income-decreasing changes to net periodic pension costs that would cause a firm to miss its earnings forecast are extremely rare. Finally, we find evidence that income-increasing and income-decreasing changes in quarterly pension costs are “settled up” in the fourth quarter (e.g., they are reversed).     

Politics, Insurance Regulation, and Unfunded Pension Liabilities

ABSTRACT: Insurance regulators operate in an environment in which resources are scarce and issues are most often complex and not salient to affected persons. Consequently, regulatory agencies, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), need to use resources efficiently by making issues salient and not complex if regulatory goals are to be attained. To further its goal of full funding of defined benefit pension plans, the PBGC annually published a list of the Top Fifty Companies With the Largest Underfunded Pension Liability (LIST). This article investigates the issue of the economic effects of pension plan disclosure by measuring the share price response of the companies included on the LIST; then policy implications are drawn. The event study findings show that, on average, publication of the LIST did not have a negative effect on firm value. However, cross-sectional analysis provides some support for the contention that publication of the LIST had an economic cost on LISTed firms. The authors' results show that the value of large firms on the PBGC's list is less negatively affected at arrival (ARRIVAL) than smaller LISTed firms. Conversely, when firms leave the list (DEPARTURE), the value of large growth-oriented firms is more negatively affected than the value of other firms that reduce their unfunded pension liability. From a policy perspective, as hypothesized by Meier (1991), the PBGC used its scarce resources effectively by publishing the LIST. The issue of unfunded pension liability became less complex and more salient to interested parties. Consequently, consumer groups and political elites provided their support to further the regulatory agency's stated goal, which was the full funding of defined benefit pension plans. Furthermore, increased awareness of the underfunding problem contributed to the passage of the Retirement Protection Act of 1994.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

The Pension Protection Fund*

We develop a model of the Pension Protection Fund (PPF), a defined benefit pension guarantee system for the UK, based on an analogy between pension liabilities and corporate debt obligations. We show that the PPF is likely to face many years of low claims interspersed irregularly with periods of very large claims. There is a significant chance that these claims will be so large that the PPF will default on its liabilities, leaving the government with no option but to bail it out. The cause of this problem is the double impact of a fall in equity prices on the PPF: it makes sponsor firms more likely to default and it makes defaulted plans more likely to be underfunded. We use our model to derive a fair premium for PPF insurance under different circumstances, to estimate the extent of cross‐subsidies in the PPF between strong and weak sponsors, and to show that risk‐rated premiums are unlikely to have a substantial effect on either the size or the lumpiness of claims. We argue that for the PPF to operate effectively, it should be introduced in tandem with strong minimum funding requirements and a lower level of benefit guarantee than at present.     

Were internal capital markets affected by the ‘perfect’ pension storm?

We examine capital expenditures in multi-segment firms before and after the “perfect storm” that affected pension plans between 2000 and 2002, when bond yields and stock prices both fell precipitously. Our sample of firms went from having overfunded to underfunded pension plans as a result of the storm. We examine the segment-level relation between investment, Tobin's q, and cash flow both before and after the event. We find mixed evidence on the change in the relation between investment and q, which may be a result of measurement error in q. We find stronger evidence for the conclusion that after the pension storm, firms with underfunded pension plans directed more investment towards segments that produce higher cash flow.     

Employers' accounting for pensions: A theoretical approach to financial accounting standards no. 87

The extensive disclosure mandated for defined benefit pension plans by FAS 87 resulted in part from the ongoing controversy concerning the nature of the pension plan obligation. Based on a review of the pension chapters of seven intermediate accounting texts, conflicting perspectives of the nature of the plan obligation have not been thoroughly and appropriately integrated in textbook discussions of FAS 87 reporting requirements.The objective of this article is to present a teaching method which interprets the reporting requirements of FAS 87 as a reconciliation of the conflicting perspectives concerning the pension obligations. Examples are provided demonstrating how FAS 87 reconciles the opposing perspectives in the basic financial statement presentation, and how the perspectives are useful in understanding the reporting requirements related to the minimum liability and actuarial gains and losses.