Do auditors react to real earnings management?

Prior research has documented an association between audit effort and real earnings management [REM]. Specifically, audit report lags have been shown to be positively associated with REM. We investigate the auditor and firm characteristics underlying this association. Our results indicate that overall, REM is associated with longer abnormal audit report lags [ARLs]. We find, however, that this association is driven largely by non-accelerated filers. This result holds for both suspect firms (those firms just meeting earnings benchmarks) and non-suspect firms, for specialist as well as non-specialist auditors, and for profit as well as loss firms. Together our results indicate that when auditors are not constrained by the time pressure of accelerated filing, encountering REM is associated with greater audit effort. Our results may indicate, however, that with respect to accelerated filers, abnormal ARLs may be an imperfect proxy for additional effort. These results have implications for both future research and for the impact of accelerated filing deadlines on audit quality.     

Managerial myopia and the unintended real consequences of conditional conservatism

We examine whether the demand for conditional conservatism produces unintended real consequences that are exacerbated by managerial incentives to report higher earnings. We document a robust positive association between conditional conservatism and real earnings management (REM), particularly for firms whose CEOs face greater compensation incentives and capital market incentives to report higher earnings. Using mediation analyses, we find that conservatism has a negative indirect relation with future returns via REM over the next 1–3 years. In additional tests, we find that the relation between conservatism and REM is attenuated for firms with higher debt-to-equity, which suggests that debtholders moderate the negative relation between conditional conservative reporting and REM. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to its monitoring benefit, conditional conservatism can exacerbate managerial myopia, resulting in negative consequences for future firm value.     

Real earnings manipulation and future performance: A revisit using quarterly data of firms with debt covenants

We investigate the implications of real earnings manipulation (REM) and reversals of REM on firms’ future operating performance using quarterly data of firms with debt covenants. In the presence of debt covenants, firms are under persistent pressure to deliver financial results that exceed the thresholds of the debt covenant requirements. We find that REM is associated with lower future operating performance. More importantly, the reversals of REM in the following quarter have an incremental positive effect on future performance, which largely offsets the negative effect of REM. These results provide new evidence on REM reversals that differs from the existing literature. Instead of interpreting the reversals as an indication of true REM based on their negative association with future performance documented in Vorst (2016), our results suggest that REM reversals may be indicative of firms rewinding REM subsequently, which reduces the REM damage to firms’ future operations.     

Reexamination of earnings management before and after SOX: Evidence from SEC staff accounting bulletins 99-100

A substantial literature suggests that earnings management improved for U.S. firms in the post-2002 time period as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (henceforth, SOX) (Coates and Srinivasan, 2014) which was passed in the latter part of 2002. However, few papers have explored the impact of the Security and Exchange Commission’s Staff Accounting Bulletins (SABs) 99-100 in the year 2000 following their passage in late 1999. As a result, some of the reductions in earnings management that prior research attributes to SOX may have been due to these two SABs. We find that in 2000 there was a significant decline in the zero earnings discontinuity in quarterly earnings considered by prior research to be evidence of earnings management to avoid small losses. Surprisingly, we find only mixed evidence that SOX provided an incremental impact to that of the SABs, which occurs mainly in the quarterly distribution of EPS rather than in scaled quarterly earnings. We also find evidence that the passage of the SABs significantly reduced the practice where firms take write-offs in the fourth quarter that turn a profit for the year into a loss. Overall, our findings suggest that the decline in quarterly earnings management started well before SOX due to the SEC’s initiatives.     

The impact of abnormal real earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks on future operating performance

Motivated by agency conflicts of real earnings management (e.g., opportunistic and signalling perspectives), this study investigates the association between firms that manipulate their business operations to meet earnings benchmarks (i.e., zero earnings, last year's earnings) and subsequent operating performance. We examine the effects of the magnitude of real earnings management on firms' future performance for the period 2009 to 2015 for UK firms. Our analysis shows that the manipulation of operating activities such as sales, discretionary expenditures, and production costs to meet earnings benchmarks has a significantly positive consequence for firms' subsequent operating performance and signals firms' good future performance. We also find that firms that manipulate their operating activities in the absence of meeting earnings benchmarks experience a decline in their subsequent operating performance. The findings of this research lend support to our understanding of the process that management follows to evaluate costs and benefits of real earnings management.     

Internal control weaknesses and evidence of real activities manipulation

We examine whether US public firms that file internal control weakness (ICW) disclosure reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as part of the reporting requirements under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act, exhibit higher levels of real activities manipulation (RM), compared to firms that do not file such reports. Using firm-level data for the post-SOX period, 2004–2010, we find a positive relationship between firms reporting internal control weaknesses and real activities manipulation. Further, those ICW-firms that use RM to beat earnings benchmarks have lower performance in the subsequent year. Our results also show that firms do not use discretionary accruals as a substitute for RM when they report internal control weaknesses. Overall, our findings suggest that ICW-firms are prone to using real activities manipulation as a form of earnings management. Our findings also have implications for audit quality as auditors need to gain a better understanding of how real activities manipulation influences the operations of the firm.     

Ownership structure and real earnings management: Evidence from China

Although ownership structure is fundamental to corporate accounting behaviors, the current literature provides scarce evidence about the governance effect of ownership structure on real earnings management (REM). We seek to address this issue by using a sample of Chinese listed firms which are likely to engage in earnings management during 2003–2014. We find that Chinese firms with more influential largest shareholders are more prone to REM; and that firms with state control and managerial ownership are less likely to engage in REM. We further find that there exists a joint and sequential relationship between REM and accrual-based earnings management in China. Our findings are robust to different variable measurements, samples and regression models. Our study contributes to the research on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management and contributes to the understanding of REM in emerging economies. Our findings have significant implications for shareholders, analysts and regulators, and are important and relevant given that MSCI decides to include China mainland stocks in its indexes starting 2018.     

The influence of CEO and CFO power on accruals and real earnings management

In this study, we examine the effect of CEO and CFO power on both accruals and real earnings management (AEM and REM, respectively), and the extent to which CEO and CFO power mitigate the effect of one another on AEM and REM. We further examine whether the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered these effects. In the pre-SOX period, we find that AEM (REM) is greater when the CEO (CFO) is powerful relative to the CFO (CEO). In the post-SOX period, however, we find that the effect of relative CEO power on AEM subsides, whereas the effect of relative CFO power on REM persists. Additionally, we find evidence to suggest that powerful CFOs inhibit the AEM preferences of powerful CEOs in both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that powerful CEOs inhibit the REM preferences of powerful CEOs in the pre-SOX period, but not in the post-SOX period. Collectively, our results suggest that the power of the CEO relative to the CFO is an important factor in the both the type and magnitude of earnings management.

     

Earnings quality and short selling: Evidence from real earnings management in the United States

Prior research provides evidence consistent with managers using real earnings management (REM) to increase earnings. This study examines whether short sellers exploit the overvaluation of firms employing REM. I find that firms with more REM have higher subsequent short interest. The positive relation between REM and short interest is more pronounced in settings where the costs associated with accrual‐based earnings management are high, such as when a firm has low accounting flexibility or faces greater scrutiny from a high quality auditor. I also find some evidence that short sellers respond to REM more than to other fundamental signals of firm overvaluation. My inferences are robust to the use of propensity score matching. Collectively, my evidence suggests that short sellers not only trade on REM information, but they also trade as if they understand the substitutive nature of alternative earnings management methods. This study provides additional insight into the important role that short sellers play in monitoring managerial operating decisions and overall earnings quality.     

Improving the measures of real earnings management

Firms often change their operating policy to meet a short-term financial reporting target. Accounting researchers call this opportunistic action real earnings management (REM). They measure REM by the difference between a firm’s costs and those reported by its industry peers. Firms that pursue distinct competitive strategies also display different cost patterns than peers. However, the models that measure REM do not control for differences in competitive strategy. Hence a researcher can misinterpret a cost difference that stems from a firm’s competitive strategy as REM. The researcher would also find a spurious correlation between earnings management and a firm characteristic that varies with competitive strategy. A cause or effect relationship with earnings management could be wrongfully inferred. I suggest improvements in measurement models to avoid misspecification.

     

Institutional ownership stability and real earnings management

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management. Our findings indicate that firms held by more stable institutional owners experience lower real activities manipulation by limiting overproduction. We further examine how the stability in the shareholdings of pressure-sensitive and insensitive institutional investors affect target firms’ use of real earnings management, respectively. Unlike pressure-sensitive institutional investors, the stability in the share ownership of pressure-insensitive institutional investors (i.e., investment advisors, pension funds and endowments) mitigates target firms’ use of real earnings management. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that institutional investors presence acts as a monitor on target firms’ use of real earnings manipulation activities.     

Top management team expertise and corporate real earnings management activities

This study investigates the effects of top management team (TMT) expertise on real earnings management (REM) activities by examining a hand-collected data set that contains 4,690 firm-year observations from Taiwanese listed firms during 2006 to 2010. The results of this study show that the percentages of TMT members possessing master's degrees (PMS) and managing core functional areas (CORE) negatively relate to REM activities, whereas the percentage of TMT members possessing a CPA certificate (PCPA) has the opposite effect. We also find that the PMS and CORE effects are mainly demonstrated through the channel of raising firm performance and thereby reduce managers' incentives to manage earnings. In addition, the effect of TMT expertise on REM activities becomes weaker with increasing firm age. Finally, the outcomes of several robustness tests, such as suspect firm analyses, endogeneity analyses, employing other TMT expertise variables, and additionally controlling for accrual-based earnings management also support our results.     

Takeover protection and managerial myopia: Evidence from real earnings management

We examine whether takeover protection exacerbates or mitigates real earnings management (i.e., using abnormal real activities to meet near-term earnings targets). Consistent with Stein’s (1988) prediction that takeover pressure induces managerial myopia, we find that less-protected firms are associated with higher levels of real earnings management. We further disentangle the value-destroying and signaling effects of real earnings management by finding that although abnormal real activities in general are associated with lower future performance, abnormal real activities intended to just meet earnings targets are associated with higher future performance, consistent with real earnings management conveying a signal of superior future performance in addition to a general value-destroying effect. Taken together, our evidence suggests that takeover protection reduces managers’ pressure to resort to real earnings management as a costly means of signaling better future performance.     

New debt issues and earnings management

We empirically examine the influence and effects of real earnings management (REM) procedures on the debt market by investigating the bond rating and actual market price of a firm's new debt offerings. Extant research provides conflicting representations concerning the effects of REM techniques on equity shareholders and debt market participants. Our results indicate a negative association between all three REM manipulation methods and perceived credit risk resulting in a lower bond rating, and higher market yield of the firm's debt at issuance. Additional analyses exploring the use of REM techniques to achieve analyst's earnings forecasts indicates that this negative effect is particularly significant for firms who only achieve the earnings forecast by utilizing REM methods. Our research adds to the literature by empirically describing the effects of REM techniques on new debt issuances, and contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the efficacy of engaging in real earnings management to achieve known targets.     

Mandatory IFRS adoption: the trade-off between accrual-based and real earnings management

This paper examines whether firms substituted real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management after the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became mandatory. Using a sample of 101,331 firm-year observations from 33 countries between 2000 and 2010, we show that IFRS adoption came with the unintended consequence of certain firms substituting real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management, especially among firms in countries with strict enforcement regimes. Furthermore, we document that the trade-off is confined to EU countries in which strong firm-level characteristics (i.e. the firm-level mechanism of control, the market’s level of scrutiny, and firm-specific incentives to provide transparency) are coupled with strong enforcement. We also show that IFRS had an effect in countries outside the EU, albeit at a different time. Overall, the results suggest that accounting regulators’ efforts to increase earnings quality might have had the unintended consequence of increasing real earnings management activities.     

How efficient ownership structure monitors income manipulation? Evidence of real earnings management among Malaysian firms

This study investigates income manipulation through real earnings management, by listed companies in Malaysia, prior to being officially designated as “financially distressed”, by this country’s stock exchange listed rules. The hypotheses relate to whether the degree of upwards real earnings management, conducted during the four-year period prior to financial distress, can be explained by ownership structure (measured with three variables: managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership). Using a sample of 1180 firm-year observations of financially distressed companies, over the investigation period 2001–2011, the findings suggest that the degree of real earnings management is not associated with ownership by management or institutional investors. Conversely, the evidence indicates that foreign shareholders are able to constrain upwards real earnings management related to discretionary expenditure but not the operating cycle. This study contributes to the importance of diversity of ownership structures in monitoring income manipulation among firms.     

The mediating effect of REM on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and subsequent firm performance moderated by IFRS adoption: A moderated-mediation analysis

The present paper is pursuing a new direction in the analysis of behavioral finance based on examining whether future performance of the firm is related to overconfidence displayed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). We suggest two channels for this relationship, real earnings management (REM) and the mandatory IFRS adoption. First, examining the impact of IFRS adoption on firms’ future performance, we find that overconfident CEOs who do not adopt IFRS exhibit poorer future performance. Other interactions related to overconfidence and IFRS are not significant. Second, examining the relationship between overconfidence and IFRS adoption on REM, we find that overconfident CEOs indulge in higher REM than non-overconfident CEOs. Further, overconfident CEOs who adopt IFRS display greater REM than do those who not adopt IFRS. Therefore, we prove that the indirect effect of CEO overconfidence on the subsequent firm performance through REM is contingent on the mandatory IFRS adoption.     

Boards,takeover protection,and real earnings management

We investigate the effect of board governance and takeover protection on real earnings management. Four types of real earnings management are considered: sales manipulation, overproduction, the abnormal reduction of research and development (R&D) expenses, and the abnormal reduction of other discretionary expenditures. Using panel data from US public firms in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act period, we find that the level of real earnings management (sales manipulation, abnormal declines in R&D expenses, and other discretionary expenses) increases with better board governance and decreases with higher takeover protection. These two governance factors generally have no significant effect on overproduction. We further find that firms substitute accrual-based earnings management with sales manipulation and abnormal cuts in discretionary expenses, and the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms with stronger board governance. Overall, our findings indicate that the level of real earnings management is higher when a firm is faced with tough board monitoring, and that takeover protection may reduce managerial incentives for real earnings management.     

Stock market listing status and real earnings management

This study analyzes real earnings management among privately held versus publicly listed firms. Our first finding is that public firms engage in more earnings management through operating activities. When a clear incentive to manage earnings in a specific direction is present we continue to find that public firms manage their earnings more than private firms. We reason that capital market pressure and ownership characteristics drive our results. Additional analyses reveal that public firms employ more real earnings management as a proportion of the total earnings management strategy. Furthermore, we find that mitigating factors of real earnings management have stronger impact in public firms. This study contributes to literature on non-accrual earnings management and to the broader understanding about the private vis-à-vis public firm reporting and operating behavior. Finally, we contribute by identifying an important societal cost of stock market listing, which is the increase in potentially value-destroying real earnings management.     

Individual Large Shareholders,Earnings Management,and Capital‐Market Consequences

Using a large hand‐collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual‐based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This association is driven primarily by these large shareholders influencing rather than selecting firms’ financial reporting practices. Second, the market's reaction to earnings announcements suggests that investors recognize the heterogeneity in blockholders’ influence on earnings management. The results highlight the highly individualized effects of blockholders and a mechanism through which shareholders impact reported earnings.