A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.     

Sovereign credit spreads

The paper develops a structural credit risk model to study sovereign credit risk and the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads. The model features endogenous default and recovery rates that both depend on the interaction between domestic output fluctuations and global macroeconomic conditions. We show that sovereigns choose to default at higher levels of economic output once global macroeconomic conditions are bad. This yields to default rates and credit spreads that are substantially higher compared to normal times. We derive closed-form expressions for sovereign debt values and default times and focus on the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads. As opposed to standard theories of sovereign debt, this paper’s structural model generates much richer default patterns and non-linearities through regime-shifts in the global macroeconomic environment. Moreover, changes in the global environment reveal the interconnectedness of the financial system.     

U.S. Monetary Policy and International Bond Markets

This paper analyzes how U.S. monetary policy affects the pricing of dollar‐denominated sovereign debt. We document that yields on dollar‐denominated sovereign bonds are highly responsive to U.S. monetary policy surprises—during both the conventional and unconventional policy regimes—and that the passthrough of unconventional policy to foreign bond yields is, on balance, comparable to that of conventional policy. In addition, a conventional U.S. monetary easing (tightening) leads to a significant narrowing (widening) of credit spreads on sovereign bonds issued by countries with a speculative‐grade credit rating but has no effect on the corresponding weighted average of bilateral exchange rates for a basket of currencies from the same set of risky countries; this indicates that an unanticipated tightening of U.S. monetary policy widens credit spreads on risky sovereign debt directly through the financial channel, as opposed to indirectly through the exchange rate channel. During the unconventional policy regime, yields on both investment‐ and speculative‐grade sovereign bonds move one‐to‐one with policy‐induced fluctuations in yields on comparable U.S. Treasuries. We also examine whether the response of sovereign credit spreads to US monetary policy differs between policy easings and tightenings and find no evidence of such asymmetry.     

Toward a Bottom‐Up Approach to Assessing Sovereign Default Risk

The authors propose a new approach to assessing sovereign risk that focuses on the underlying profitability and financial condition of a nations private corporate sector. More specifically, the authors show how their new Z‐Metrics™ approach—an updated and expanded version of the Alt‐man Z‐score methodology—can be used to measure the (cumulative) median probability of default of the non‐financial sector for the next five years, both as an absolute measure of corporate vulnerability and a relative measure that can be compared to the risk of other sovereigns and to the market's assessment as reflected in the prices of credit default swaps. In testing their approach, the authors measure the default probabilities of listed corporate entities in nine European countries, as well as the U.S., at two different points in time: the start of 2009 (and thus prior to the recognition of the Euro crisis by markets and most credit professionals) and for the first four months in 2010 (essentially, the beginning of the recognition of the crisis). Based on these two observations, the authors suggest that their corporate health index of the private sector would not only have served as an effective early warning indicator, but provided a (mostly) useful hierarchy of relative sovereign risks. In addition to predicting sovereign default risk, another potentially valuable use of the authors' model is to remind policy makers of the importance of a profitable private sector to the financial health of sovereign governments.     

Systemic risk spillovers in the European banking and sovereign network

We propose a framework for estimating time-varying systemic risk contributions that is applicable to a high-dimensional and interconnected financial system. Tail risk dependencies and systemic risk contributions are estimated using a penalized two-stage fixed-effects quantile approach, which explicitly links time-varying interconnectedness to systemic risk contributions. For the purposes of surveillance and regulation of financial systems, network dependencies in extreme risks are more relevant than simple (mean) correlations. Thus, the framework provides a tool for supervisors, reflecting the market's view of tail dependences and systemic risk contributions. The model is applied to a system of 51 large European banks and 17 sovereigns during the period from 2006 through 2013, utilizing both equity and CDS prices. We provide new evidence on how banking sector fragmentation and sovereign-bank linkages evolved over the European sovereign debt crisis, and how they are reflected in estimated network statistics and systemic risk measures. Finally, our evidence provides an indication that the fragmentation of the European financial system has peaked.     

The dynamics of sovereign yields over swap rates in the Eurozone market

We explore the dynamics of the adjusted swap spread (calculated as the difference between the swap rate and sovereign yields over the credit default swap premium) in the Eurozone market by studying three markets simultaneously: 1) sovereign bonds, 2) credit default swaps (CDS), and 3) swap rates. We find a strong relationship between the markets. Specifically, based on the no-arbitrage argument, we show that the difference between the Euribor and Repo rates is a key driver of the adjusted swap spread. However, illiquidity premiums and systemic risk also play an essential role in times of economic stress and for less creditworthy countries. The findings also shed light on the recent negative swap spreads puzzle in the United States.     

Factor decomposition of the Eurozone sovereign CDS spreads

In the present study, we examine the factors driving Eurozone sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. For identifying factors we utilize independent component analysis (ICA), a technique similar to principal component analysis (PCA). We identify three factors that impact spreads and capture the features specific to the crisis such as the breakup risk of the Eurozone: peripheral factor, global factor, and Eurozone common factor. In contrast, when PCA is applied, only a single factor is identified. Moreover, using ICA with a GARCH model, we show that the source of volatility for CDS spreads shifted from the global factor in 2009 and the peripheral factor in 2010 to the Eurozone common factor in 2012, and that the dynamic correlation reflects the decoupling between low credit risk countries such as Germany and high credit risk countries such as Greece. We also show that the goodness-of-fit of the ICA-based model is better than other models used such as the Student's t copula model.     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Systemic risk in the European sovereign and banking system

We investigate the systemic risk of the European sovereign and banking system during 2008–2013. We utilize a conditional measure of systemic risk that reflects market perceptions and can be intuitively interpreted as an entity’s conditional joint probability of default, given the hypothetical default of other entities. The measure of systemic risk is applicable to high dimensions and not only incorporates individual default risk characteristics but also captures the underlying interdependent relations between sovereigns and banks in a multivariate setting. In empirical applications, our results reveal significant time variation in systemic risk spillover effects for the sovereign and banking system. We find that systemic risk is mainly driven by risk premiums coupled with a steady increase in physical default risk.     

Terrorism and its impact on the cost of debt

We extend the literature on the costs of terrorism by examining its long-term impact on financial markets, an underdeveloped strand of research within the terrorism construct. Specifically, we look at its effect on the sovereign risk of 102 countries (a much broader sample than examined before), which forms the basis of the cost of debt in those countries, postulating that it results in a lower credit rating and that this impact is more pronounced in developing as opposed to developed markets. In operationalizing the risk of terrorism, we utilize the Institute for Economics and Peace's Global Terrorism Index, the most comprehensive index constructed to date which incorporates both the economic and social dimensions of terrorism and is based on the Global Terrorism Database covering 104,000 documented incidents. The results of the study support the hypothesis that terrorism results in a higher cost of debt for sovereigns and by extension, firms in impacted countries. In fact, a two-point increase in terrorism on the utilized 10-point scale on average results in a half notch reduction in a sovereign's credit rating, roughly equivalent to a change in outlook. Furthermore, this impact is more pronounced in developing markets where we find that a comparable two-point increase in terrorism on average results in an entire notch downgrade in the sovereign credit rating, e.g., from BB to BB-. Finally, we find that our model demonstrates predictive power on an out-of-sample basis and as such, could be useful for investors seeking to construct more efficient diversified asset portfolios.     

Sovereign to Corporate Risk Spillovers

The first Greek bailout on April 11, 2010 triggered a significant reevaluation of sovereign credit risk across Europe. We exploit this event to examine the transmission of sovereign to corporate credit risk. A 10% increase in sovereign credit risk raises corporate credit risk on average by 1.1% after the bailout. The evidence is suggestive of risk spillovers from sovereign to corporate credit risk through a financial and a fiscal channel, as the effects are more pronounced for firms that are bank or government dependent. We find no support for indirect risk transmission through a deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals.     

ECB policy and Eurozone fragility: Was De Grauwe right?

Paul De Grauwe's Eurozone fragility hypothesis states that sovereign debt markets in a monetary union without a lender-of-last-resort are vulnerable to self-fulfilling dynamics fuelled by pessimistic investor sentiment that can trigger default. We test this contention by applying an eclectic methodology to a two-year window around Mario Draghi's “whatever-it-takes” pledge that can be understood as the implicit announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. A principal components analysis reveals that the perceived commonality in default risk among peripheral and core Eurozone sovereigns increased after the announcement. An event study reveals significant pre-announcement news transmission from Spain to Italy, France, Belgium and Austria that clearly dissipates post-announcement. Country-specific regressions of CDS spreads on systematic risk factors reveal frequent days of large adverse shocks affecting simultaneously those five Eurozone countries, but only during the pre-announcement period. Altogether these findings support the fragility hypothesis and endorse the OMT program.     

A comprehensive approach to measuring the relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market.     

The impact and the contagion effect of natural disasters on sovereign credit risk. An empirical investigation

This paper investigates the relationship between natural disasters and the reaction of sovereign CDS spread in Europe. By applying an event study methodology during the period January 2007–December 2021 on an original database in which we identify 92 natural disasters in 17 European countries, we assess the reaction of the sovereign CDS market to a natural disaster. We find a heterogeneous response of the European sovereign risk to a natural disaster, as the response of the sovereign CDS market differs from region to region. The advent of a natural disaster can increase inequality between the regions due to the higher cost of credit for sovereigns and the reduced scope for manoeuvring public finances. Also, the results of the contagion effect confirm the hypothesis of a cross-border propagation effect, as natural disaster, in general, is not local event but spreads to other countries.     

Sovereign Credit Risk,Banks' Government Support,and Bank Stock Returns around the World

We explore the joint effect of expected government support to banks and changes in sovereign credit ratings on bank stock returns using data for banks in 37 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find that sovereign credit rating downgrades have a large negative effect on bank stock returns for those banks that are expected to receive stronger support from their governments. This result is stronger for banks in advanced economies where governments are better positioned to provide that support. Our results suggest that stock market investors perceive sovereigns and domestic banks as markedly interconnected, partly through government guarantees.     

The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks stocks. Some evidence of shift contagion in Europe

This paper analyzes the influence of the recent European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns for 15 countries. Our data span the period December 14th 2007 - March 8th 2013 that encompasses several episodes of economic and financial turmoil since the collapse of the subprime credit market. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we use an explicit multifactor model of equity returns extended with a sovereign risk factor. Second, we adopt a Smooth Transition Regression (STR) framework that allows for an endogenous definition of crisis periods and captures the changes in parameters associated with shift contagion. We find that the negative impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns has been mostly confined to European banks, whereas U.S. banks appear to be unharmed by its direct impact and may even have benefited from it. Besides, we find some evidence of shift contagion across Europe.     

Fear or fundamentals? Heterogeneous beliefs in the European sovereign CDS market

This paper proposes a model for credit default swap (CDS) spreads under heterogeneous expectations to explain the escalation in sovereign European CDS spreads and the widening variations across European sovereigns following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In our model, investors believe that sovereign CDS spreads are determined by country-specific fundamentals and momentum. By estimating the model we find evidence that, while some of the recent movements in sovereign CDS spreads can be explained by deteriorating fundamentals for core European Union (EU) countries, momentum has also played a destabilizing role since the GFC in all sovereign credit markets studied.     

Tail Risk Networks of Insurers Around the Globe: An Empirical Examination of Systemic Risk for G-SIIs vs Non-G-SIIs

In this article, we investigate systemic risk of 157 insurers around the globe. We construct tail risk networks among these insurers using a single-index model for quantile regressions with a variable selection technique. We develop a new network-based systemic risk indices, taking into account expected tail losses of insurers, direct and indirect contagion effects, and the time-varying strength of tail risk spillover. Our systemic risk indices successfully recognize global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs). We find that on average G-SIIs are more systemically relevant than non-G-SIIs, particularly during the recent U.S. financial crisis. We also find a small group of non-G-SIIs that are more important than G-SIIs. Our results have significant implications for systemic risk regulation.     

债务上限与信评机构的政治悖论性选择

金融危机后,以危机推手著称的美国信评机构因群体性道德风险和贩卖劣质公信力而备受国际谴责.为此,三大机构不同程度地修订了主权信用评级规则,并自2010年下半年以来,联袂发布了美国主权信用评级的负面意见,尤其是2011年轮番下调美国主权信用评级前景展望至负面,希望借此塑造其公正、客观的商业形象.但是,三大机构的政治附属物属性决定了三大机构发布的美国主权信用评级负面意见,本质上是一场政治逻辑与资本逻辑的较量,更多展现为一种政治博弈的需要,并使自己陷入了债务上限与主权信用评级的政治悖论困境.     

Economic policy uncertainty and risk spillovers in the Eurozone

This paper focuses on the impact of economic policy uncertainty on risk spillovers within the Eurozone and contributes to these two growing literatures. To this end, we adapt the two-step procedure developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (forthcoming) in the framework of financial systemic risk to the sovereign bond market. Accordingly, we attempt (i) to measure the extent to which distress affecting one given country's sovereign spreads can affect the Eurozone's bond market as a whole and then (ii) to identify the determinants of risk spillovers by estimating a panel data model with macroeconomic state variables and economic policy uncertainty (EPU) indices introduced by Baker et al. (2013) as regressors. EPU indices considered concern the four largest Eurozone countries, i.e. Germany, France, Italy and Spain, as well as the United States. The model is estimated with quarterly data for ten countries representing the bulk of debt issuances within the Eurozone over a period ranging from Q4/2008 to Q2/2013, which is characterized by historically high dispersion of sovereign bond spreads either across time or across countries. Our results support the idea that economic policy uncertainty in the core economies of the Eurozone, i.e. Germany and France, as well as in the largest periphery countries, i.e. Italy and Spain, can create an environment likely to exacerbate the transmission of risk arising from abnormal developments of individual countries' sovereign spreads to the Eurozone bond market as a whole. In this respect, our results plead for larger effort of Eurozone “leaders” to reduce the uncertainty surrounding their economic policy in periods of crisis not only to avoid adverse effects on their own economies but also to reduce the risk of a destabilization of the Eurozone sovereign bond market as a whole.