Multimarket contact and sales growth: evidence from insurance

Research on pricing, profits, and firm survival has shown that multimarket contact causes mutual forbearance against competition, but has not considered the consequences of imperfect observability of competitive moves. Here, predictions are developed to explain how mutual forbearance occurs—but sometimes fails—in markets with imperfect observability. Mutual forbearance means that firms do not seek to take market share from each other through price cuts or nonprice competition, and thus that sales grow at uniform rates. Firms defect from mutual forbearance, and hence have higher sales growth, if the potential rewards are high and the likelihood of being discovered is low. This theory is tested on a panel of firms operating in the Norwegian general insurance industry. The evidence suggests that sales growth is most rapid in firms that do not meet many multimarket competitors in a given market and firms that are economically troubled. Growing or highly concentrated markets have higher heterogeneity of growth rates. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price asymmetries and the path dependence of market power: Evidence from the U.S. airline industry

This paper uncovers price asymmetries across oligopolistic and monopolistic markets that are seemingly identical in structure but different in competitive history. This is done by identifying “quiet life” markets that have not (yet) experienced a change in structure, and “non-quiet life” markets that have been disrupted by firm entry and/or exit. Using a long panel dataset from the U.S. airline industry, we find that quiet life duopolies price significantly higher than duopolies that come about by entry in monopoly, and that quiet life monopolies price significantly lower than monopolies that come about by exit in duopoly. We show that the path towards a particular market structure matters for the determination of prices and explore several mechanisms that likely explain the price asymmetries, including engagement in anticompetitive behaviour, adjustment behaviour to market structure changes, and the cost heterogeneity of competing firms.     

The advantage of being first and competition between firms

It is frequently suggested that the first brand in a product market enjoys a price advantage over its imitators due to imperfect information about product quality. This article considers the effect of this advantage on prices and market shares in a dominant firm price leadership model. An established firm with a price advantage faces free entry by firms producing unbranded products (generics). In equilibrium, the first brand enjoys a market share advantage over entrants in entry and post entry periods. If the initial price disadvantage is large, entry will not occur.     

How New Product Introductions Affect Sales Management Strategy: The Impact of Type of "Newness" of the New Product

How do firms adjust sales management strategy for new product launch? Does sales management strategy change more radically for different types of new products such as new‐to‐the‐world products versus product revisions? Because firms introducing a new product rely considerably on their sales force in the product launch effort, the types and degree of changes made in managing the selling effort are important issues. Past studies have demonstrated that firms make substantial adjustments in their sales management strategy when they introduce a new product. This study expands on previous investigations by examining whether sales management strategy changes are conditioned by the type of newness of the new product to the market and to the firm. Australian sales managers were asked to respond to a mail questionnaire concerning pre‐ and post‐new product launch sales management activities. Three groups of firms were compared: (1) those with new‐to‐the‐market and new‐to‐the‐firm products (i.e., new‐to‐the‐world products); (2) those with products new to the firm but not new to the market; and (3) those with products that are revisions to the firm and not new to the market. The study finds that firms do not make the most adjustments for products with the greatest degree of market newness—the new‐to‐the‐world types of products—except in the sales management strategy categories of compensation and supervision. In the other sales management strategy categories defined for study—organization, training, quotas and goals, and sales support as well as for all categories in the aggregate—sales management strategy changes were greatest in incidence, as measured both by the percent of firms making changes and the average number of changes per firm, when the new product was new to the firm but not new to the market. These results suggest that, because different types of new products face different competitive environments, there may be greater incentive for a not‐new‐to‐the‐market new‐to‐the‐firm product to make changes in sales strategy. Uncertainties about market size and customer location with new‐to‐the‐world products may limit the understanding of what changes to make in the strategy categories of quotas and territories. Similarly, uncertainties about product use and customer acceptance of new‐to‐the‐world products may limit the development of training and sales support materials by these firms. Instead, these firms may rely more on compensation and supervision to direct sales efforts for new‐to‐the‐world products. However, observing the market experience and performance of the first‐to‐market product can benefit firms launching a not‐new‐to‐market and new‐to‐the‐firm product, allowing them to rely more on strategy changes in training, sales support materials, organizational adjustments such as redeployments, and quotas.     

Strengthening a weak rival for a fight

We provide a new model wherein firms of different productivities survive in an industry despite the threat of entry by high productivity firms. We demonstrate that an efficient incumbent has a unilateral incentive to establish a relational contract, softening price competition to strengthen its inefficient rival in a war of attrition that emerges post-entry, and raising the price of the inefficient firm in the acquisition market. We show that this equilibrium gives rise to persistent performance differences, market compression, and stability in the identity of firms in the market. Moreover, the relational contracting equilibrium is facilitated by strong anti-trust laws.     

On Stability in Competition: Tying and Horizontal Product Differentiation

We combine Hotelling’s model of product differentiation with tie-in sales. A monopolist in one market competes with another firm in a second market. In equilibrium firms choose zero product differentiation. Due to the tying structure no firm can gain the whole market by a small price reduction. A differentiation effect due to tie-in sales leads to this equilibrium stability.      

Impact of Strategic Type on Success Measures for Product Development Projects*

Does the strategic type of firm affect which success measures should be used for product development (PD) projects? This paper theorizes that it should and finds that it does because the PD projects undertaken are usually an expression of the strategic type of the firm. The purpose of this research is to affirm a 1996 survey of members of the Product Development & Management Association (PDMA) that proposes that firms' PD performance measures should vary by their strategic type. Thus, for example, prospectors, the strategic type most likely to introduce new products to new markets, should place greater importance on PD success measures consistent with their characteristic strategies of changing product lines and early market entry. In contrast, defenders, the strategic type most likely to maintain stable product lines for existing markets, should place greater importance on PD success measures consistent with their characteristic strategies of stable product lines and market penetration. Analyzers, a hybrid type between prospectors and defenders, should prefer measures consistent with their characteristic strategies for improving products and being early followers in newer markets. To relate strategic types to specific success measures for PD projects, this paper proposes a model of the relationship based on the degree of project newness to the firm and then catalogs measures of PD project success and groups them according to degree of project newness. The research findings are based on survey responses from 222 individuals who are employed by financial service providers, who identified their firms by strategic type and rated the importance of PD success measures to their firms. The importance of 21 performance measures is compared by strategic type to find significant differences among prospectors, analyzers, and defenders. This research finds several significant relationships. prospectors, for example, attach greater importance to customer satisfaction, launch timeliness, and product return on investment, all of which may be characterized as relating to a higher degree of project newness to the firm. defenders and analyzers, on the other hand, attach more importance than prospectors to measures of unit volume, cost reduction, and margin goals, all of which relate to a lower degree of project newness to the firm. In short, because prospectors seek to introduce new products to new markets, they consider important those measures, which accord with greater product and market newness. The major conclusion of this paper is that strategic type affects the importance of project performance measures and that all firms should not use the same success measures. Firms should contextualize their success in PD projects based on their strategic type. This conclusion resonates with previous findings that strategy is a key determinant of PD success, though it is infrequently included in PD success studies. This paper, therefore, challenges the implicit assumption in the mainstream of PD success literature that success can be determined without regard to firm strategy.     

How marketing capabilities and current performance drive strategic intentions in international markets

Drawing from two strategic views of the firm—the capability-based view and performance-feedback theory—this study examines the role of both marketing capabilities and current market performance as potential influencers of two key aspects of the intended future competitive strategy of firms operating in international markets: efficiency and marketing differentiation. Hypotheses are developed and tested in a survey of a sample of British exporting manufacturers. The findings are supportive of a more prominent role of marketing capabilities over recent market performance on future strategic intentions in export markets. Additional analyses of firms with an already established market position reveal a clear effect of informational capability on marketing differentiation and of product development capability and current market performance on efficiency intentions. We also find that target international market competitive intensity is a direct driver of efficiency-related but not differentiation-related strategic intentions.     

产品兼容、网络效应与企业竞争力

在网络效应较强的产业中，技术设置的兼容性是左右企业成长的关键因素。随着技术进步、新兴产业的发展和市场竞争的加剧，产品兼容、网络效应对企业竞争力具有越来越重要的意义。在计算机、电信、银行、旅游、媒体、软件等产业中，用户在购买时十分注重产品或服务的兼容性和网络效应。本文以差异产品竞争模型为基础，考察了产品兼容、网络效应对企业竞争力的影响，就在位企业和新进入企业如何利用这两个产品差异变量增强其竞争力进行了分析。     

The Small Firm in a Quantity Choosing Game: Some Experimental Evidence

We demonstrate with a grim trigger strategy that the small firm should be more willing to collude tacitly as its market share declines; large firms should be less willing to cooperate. The small firm is not a maverick. The intensity of rivalry between two firms with asymmetric market shares is studied in experimental markets. Treatments give duopolists (1) 50% shares, (2) a 60 or 40% share, and (3) an 80 or 20% share. Choices for the small firm in the latter treatments are not significantly larger than the collusive choice. Irrespective of relative size, firms in all three market environments exhibit collusive behavior.     

Fertilizer market liberalization and private retail trade in Kenya

This paper examined the factors influencing the entry and sales decision of private traders in fertilizer retail trade in a liberalized market using survey data from Kenya. A two-stage econometric model is used to examine traders’ entry and sales decision. The results provide insights into factors that are associated with private retail traders’ entry and sales decisions in an era of liberalized fertilizer markets. It shows substantial entry into fertilizer retail trade following market liberalization. Relatively limited investments in trading assets and equipment are predicted to hold back firm expansion. Implications drawn from the study provide insights into likely research and policy interventions.     

COLLUSION AND FIGHTS IN AN EXPERIMENT WITH PRICE‐SETTING FIRMS AND ADVANCE PRODUCTION*

We present results from 50‐round duopoly and triopoly experiments. Firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. Most markets evolve either to monopolies as a consequence of bankruptcies or to collusion at the monopolistic price. Evolution is faster in markets with two than in those with three firms. Therefore, over time average price is lower with three than with two. Consumer surplus is higher with three firms, but efficiency is lower in markets with three firms.     

New Product Development in Rapidly Changing Markets: An Exploratory Study

Rapid technological change can be both a blessing and a curse. For example, investors and firms of all sizes hope to reap the rewards that may arise from the apparent convergence of the computer, telecommunications, and entertainment industries. With the high level of uncertainty inherent to such rapidly changing markets, however, those potentially dazzling returns are counterbalanced by a daunting level of risk. John Mullins and Daniel Sutherland suggest that firms operating in such markets require NPD practices that can mitigate risk, manage uncertainty, and, of course, increase the likelihood of new product success. To gain insight into the NPD practices that can meet those challenges, they conducted in-depth interviews with managers who were directly involved in NPD projects at US WEST, Inc., a large, multinational firm in the telecommunications industry. The study focused on identifying practices that help the firm bring new products into rapidly changing markets quickly, efficiently, and effectively. A key objective of their study was to go beyond the basics—for example, the use of cross-functional teams—to identify specific practices that allow the firm to address the various levels of uncertainty that characterize its markets. They identify three levels of uncertainty that confront firms operating in rapidly changing markets. First, potential customers cannot easily articulate needs that a new technology may fulfill. Consequently, NPD managers are uncertain about the market opportunities that a new technology offers. Second, NPD managers are uncertain about how to turn the new technologies into products that meet customer needs. This uncertainty arises, not only from customers' inability to articulate their needs, but also from managers' difficulties in translating technological advancements into product features and benefits. Finally, senior management faces uncertainty about how much capital to invest in pursuit of rapidly changing markets as well as when to invest. The study identifies six practices that help the firm address the uncertainty and risk inherent in its rapidly changing markets. For example, market research in this firm's NPD process focuses more on probing than it does on measuring. Involvement of prospective customers in idea generation and the use of prototypes early in the NPD process help the firm uncover customer needs and market opportunities. Large-scale, quantitative market research focuses primarily on determining market size and price points.     

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No‐discrimination Constraint

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no‐discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour‐based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third‐degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.     

CREDIBLE RETALIATORY ENTRY AND STRATEGIC TOE‐HOLDS*

The anticipated profits from entry by an established firm into a new market will depend on how incumbents in that market are expected to respond. One possibility, suggested by cases and the literature, is that an incumbent may respond with ‘retaliatory entry’ into the first entrant's ‘home’ market. The model presented here describes conditions under which this can be a credible threat that deters the first entry. When the conditions are such that it is not credible, the paper shows how firms can provide credibility through the establishment of toe‐hold investments in other markets.     

企业兼容竞争的博弈分析

本文以双寡头博弈模型为基础，考察了产品兼容对企业价格和利润的影响，就在位企业和新进入企业如何利用兼容策略增强其竞争力进行了分析。本文的结论是，借助于历史销售优势和适当的兼容策略，优势企业可以设置策略壁垒来阻止潜在进入者的进入和胁迫市场内的竞争对手退出市场，劣势企业也可以凭借生产兼容性能相当优越或单向兼容的产品参与市场竞争。     

Investment dynamics in markets with endogenous demand

I examine entry into markets where demand is an increasing function of past sales because of learning, networks, or fashion. Demand is initially unknown (with firms learning in Bayesian fashion) and grows endogenously over time. The competitive expansion path and the efficient/monopoly solution differ not only with respect to levels (the market's investment is too low), but also time patterns : externalities contribute to S-shaped diffusion. There is also path-dependence: small initial differences may determine whether the market will grow or not open. Policy arguments for subsidizing entry into new markets, especially in infant export industries, are examined.     

Market Share in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry

This paper is concerned with the factors that determine the market share of listings and the market share of sales for brokerage firms. Models are developed and tested in a SMSA that conveniently corresponds exactly to a particular Multiple Listing Service area. Indices of firm specialization and market concentration were computed in addition to more conventional characterizations of the market and the data used in the study.
The regression results reveal a small degree of consistency in the impacts of the explanatory variables over the two years of the study and over the listing and sales markets. The number of salespeople is the most consistently significant variable. Indeed, market share per salesperson appears to be a non-monotonic function of the number of salespeople. The presence of a franchise and the quantity of display advertising are occasionally significant. Classified advertising, Yellow Pages advertising, and open houses all do not significantly affect market share per salesperson.     

Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms

We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where market demand is uncertain and where firms’ sales and prices are private information. We show that all firms can infer when at least one firm's sales are below some firm‐specific ‘trigger level.’ When firms use this public information to monitor the collusive agreement, price wars may occur on the equilibrium path. Symmetry facilitates collusion but, if price wars are sufficiently long, then the optimal collusive prices of symmetric capacity distributions are lower on average than the competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions. We draw conclusions for merger policy.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Employee Ownership and Employment Stability in the US: 1999–2011

Do firms with employee ownership (EO) programs exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economic downturns? In particular, are firms with EO programs less likely to lay off workers during negative shocks? In this article, we examine the relationship between EO programs and employment stability in the United States using longitudinal Form 5500‐CompuStat matched data on the universe of publicly traded companies during 1999–2011. We examine how firms with EO programs weathered the recessions of 2001 and 2008 in terms of employment stability relative to firms without EO programs, and also whether such firms were less likely to lay off workers when faced with negative shocks more broadly. In our econometric analyses, we use a rich array of measures of EO at firms, including the presence of EO stock in pension plans, the presence of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), the value of EO stock per employee, the share of the firm owned by employees, the share of workers at the firm participating in EO and the share of workers at the firm participating in ESOPs. We also consider both economy‐wide negative shock measures (increases in the unemployment rate, declines in the employment‐to‐population ratio) and firm‐specific negative shock measures (declines in firm sales, declines in firm stock price). Our results indicate that EO firms exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economy‐wide and firm‐specific negative shocks.