受贿罪主体认定中的争议问题探讨

受贿罪是腐败的重要表现形式,具有严重的社会危害性,玷污了国家工作人员职务的廉洁性,破坏了国家机关的正常活动和秩序,因此准确认定受贿罪的主体对于打击贪污贿赂犯罪具有重要意义.由于篇幅所限,本文仅就离退休国家工作人员能否成为受贿罪的主体和混合受贿共同受贿问题进行探讨.     

受贿在职权管辖内的企业购买未上市股份的认定研究——陈某某受贿案法律适用分析

中国刑法中收受型受贿罪必须具备"为他人谋取利益"这一构成要件。但是由于理论界和司法界对这一构成要件的理解不同,直接影响着对受贿罪的定性。从"为他人谋取利益"作为构成要件的困境、取消的意义及取消后处理馈赠与受贿的关系等方面,以个人案例的形式阐述了应取消"为他人谋取利益"作为受贿罪的构成要件,结合司法实践,其客观方面的规定还存在不完善的地方,需要通过立法和司法解释加以完善,以此最大限度地发挥利用影响力受贿罪的实践价值。     

受贿罪主体认定中的争议问题探讨

受贿罪是腐败的重要表现形式，具有严重的社会危害性，玷污了国家工作人员职务的廉洁性，破坏了国家机关的正常活动和秩序，因此准确认定受贿罪的主体对于打击贪污贿赂犯罪具有重要意义。由于篇幅所限，本文仅就离退休国家工作人员能否成为受贿罪的主体和混合受贿共同受贿问题进行探讨。     

受贿罪中“为他人谋取利益”之分析

＂为他人谋取利益＂是是否受贿罪的一个要件,一直是困扰刑法理论和司法实务的疑点、难点问题。＂为他人谋取利益＂应作为受贿罪的构成要件。从分析受贿罪的立法缺陷出发,对流行的两种观点：主观要件说和客观要件说进行了评析,并阐述了自己的独立见解和理由,结合司法实践,对＂为他人谋取利益＂在理论的认定和实践的认定方面进行了具体分析,最后提出了相关立法建议以供参考。     

浅谈受贿罪的犯罪对象

在和谐社会、国家提倡反腐倡廉、大力查处职务犯罪的环境下,有一些腐败分子以权谋私,为达目的不择手段,谋取不正当利益.因此对贿赂型犯罪的惩治应不断加强,而在司法实践中,应首先对受贿罪的犯罪对象做出一些深入的研究.随着改革开放和社会经济的不断发展,受贿罪犯罪对象的范围已发生了新的变化,出现了"财物"以外的许多新形式,因此,正确认识现行刑法中受贿罪犯罪对象,准确对其界定,是势在必行的.     

利用影响力受贿罪的客观要件认定

利用影响力受贿罪从行为构造上来说,包含两个运作过程:一是行为人索取或收受贿赂过程；二是行为人利用影响力过程——允诺行为.而联系两者的就是本罪所侵犯的法益——职务行为的不可收买性.将两个运作过程都看做是客观方面的构成要件,既可以达到预防犯罪的目的,又避免主观归罪和罪责刑相适应原则.     

受贿罪中贿赂的范围研究

文章重点研究了受贿罪中"贿赂"范围问题.通过对贿赂的本质进一步澄清.突破了作为受贿罪犯罪对象的"贿赂"必须是"财物"的传统理论.提出了应将贿赂的范围扩大到所有能够满足行为人生活需要和精神欲望的一切物质性利益和非财产性利益的观点.     

论公务受贿罪刑罚种类之完善

公务受贿罪在我国发案率居高不下,其法定刑种尚不健全,预防效果不理想,应亟待从立法上予以完善。     

HEALTH TAP 在iPhone上看医生

有没有想过不用排队,也不用付钱,你的健康咨询可能有上万名认证医生看见,在短时间内有专业的医生为你解答？这就是美国移动医疗Q＆A应用“Health Tap”的在线服务,患者在上面可以找到专业的医生解答疑惑,该网站已经推出了移动端的APP。     

改革开放以来被查处的省部级领导干部备忘录（三）

2007年9月14日,浙江省温州市中级人民法院以受贿罪判处中共福建省委原常委、宣传部原部长荆福生无期徒刑,剥夺政治权利终身。     

Preemptive bribery and incomplete information: Does prior knowledge matter?

This paper studies bribery between a firm and a supervisor who monitors the firm for regulatory compliance. Bribery occurs preemptively, that is before the supervisor exerts costly effort to discover the firm's level of noncompliance and collect evidence for successful prosecution. In contrast to previous papers, preemptive bribery is modeled as a Bayesian signaling game because the supervisor is uninformed about the firm's level of noncompliance. We show that under normal informational assumptions, some (possibly all) firms always engage in preemptive bribery. However, if knowledge of the firm's level of noncompliance has implications for the supervisor's ability to collect evidence and prosecute (prior knowledge), preemptive bribery can be completely eliminated. Results which apply to preemptive bribery under complete information do not apply here.     

Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control

The control of bribery is a policy objective in many developing countries. It has been argued that asymmetric punishments could reduce bribery by incentivizing whistle‐blowing. This paper investigates the role played by asymmetric punishment in a setting where bribe size is determined by Nash bargaining, detection is costly, and detection rates are set endogenously. First, if whistle‐blowing is infeasible, the symmetry properties of punishment are irrelevant to bribery deterrence but not to bribe size. Bribery disappears if expected penalties are sufficiently high; otherwise, bribe sizes rise as expected penalties rise. Second, when the bribe‐giver may whistle‐blow, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment eliminates bribery only if whistle‐blowing is cheap and the stakes are low. When bribery persists, multiple bribe sizes could survive in equilibrium. The paper derives parameter values under which each of these outcomes occurs, and discusses implications for welfare and the design of policy.     

Optimal antibribery policy when bribery type is endogenous

This paper analyzes the optimal allocation of antibribery resources when bribery type is endogenously determined by corrupt bureaucrats. A firm is supposed to invest to get licenses for production from bureaucrats. The bureaucrat commits to a bribes schedule that specifies bribes demanded from compliant firms (therefore, engaging in extortion) and noncompliant firms (engaging in collusion) as a precondition of granting the license. The allocation of antibribery resources determines the probability that each type of bribery is detected and prosecuted and thus affects the bureaucrat's choice of bribes schedule and the equilibrium bribery type. We find that the government should prioritize combating collusion when the resources are sufficiently scarce, should abstain from combating extortion after it wipes out collusion when the resources are less scarce, and should eradicate both types of bribery when the resources are sufficiently abundant. When there are multiple investment dimensions, however, there exists a special case where the government targets both types of bribery when the resources are at some intermediate level.     

On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms

Past studies on laboratory corruption games have not been able to find consistent evidence that subjects make “immoral” decisions. A possible reason, and also a critique of laboratory corruption games, is that the experiment may fail to trigger the intended immorality frame in the minds of the participants, leading many to question the very raison d’être of laboratory corruption games. To test this idea, we compare behavior in a harassment bribery game with a strategically identical but neutrally framed ultimatum game. The results show that fewer people, both as briber and bribee, engage in corruption in the bribery frame than in the alternative and the average bribe amount is lesser in the former than in the latter. These suggest that moral costs are indeed at work. A third treatment, which relabels the bribery game in neutral language, indicates that the observed treatment effect arises not from the neutral language of the ultimatum game but from a change in the sense of entitlement between the bribery and ultimatum game frames. To provide further support that the bribery game does measure moral costs, we elicit the shared perceptions of appropriateness of the actions or social norm, under the two frames. We show that the social norm governing the bribery game frame and ultimatum game frame are indeed different and that the perceived sense of social appropriateness plays a crucial role in determining the actual behavior in the two frames. Furthermore, merely relabelling the bribery game in neutral language makes no difference to the social appropriateness norm governing it. This indicates that, just as in the case of actual behavior, the observed difference in social appropriateness norm between bribery game and ultimatum game comes from the difference in entitlement too. Finally, we comment on the external validity of behavior in lab corruption games.     

How corruption hits people when they are down

Using Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune.     

How corruption hits people when they are down

Using Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune.     

Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence

Exploiting a unique data set containing information on the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms, we study the relationship between bribery payments, taxes and firm growth. Using industry-location averages to circumvent potential problems of endogeneity and measurement errors, we find that both the rate of taxation and bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth. A one-percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in firm growth of three percentage points, an effect that is about three times greater than that of taxation. This provides some validation for firm-level theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards the development process to an even greater extent than taxation.     

Can bribery buy health? Evidence from post-communist countries

Corruption is pervasive, but we know little about its effects on individual lives. Using individual-level data from 28 post-communist countries, we demonstrate that bribing for public services worsens self-assessed health. We account for endogeneity of bribery and show that bribing for any type of public service, not just for health services, has an adverse impact. We also find that bribery lowers the quality of services received. Moreover, there are potentially high indirect costs of bribery since, as we show, it comes at the expense of cutting food consumption. These findings suggest that corruption is a potentially important source behind the poor health outcomes in many developing countries.     

转型经济中的贿赂与企业增长

运用欧洲复兴与开发银行(EBRD)在转型经济国家进行的BEEPS调查数据,本文研究了转型经济中企业增长与贿赂的关系.控制了企业、行业、制度和宏观经济的相关因素,以及控制了遗漏企业隐含特征所造成的内生性问题后,发现企业的贿赂与增长间存在显著的正向关系.进一步的研究表明贿赂能够通过降低官员掠夺(保护费功能),或帮助企业获得资源(润滑剂功能)来促进企业增长,这体现了贿赂的关系资本作用.     

商业贿赂成因与治理的经济学分析

垄断为商业贿赂的产生和蔓延创造了条件,特别是供求失衡和信息不对称的存在为经营者进行商业贿赂带来了动力。虽然我国近年来更加重视和加强了对商业贿赂的治理,但在成本约束和信息不对称的作用下,单纯依靠政府的监管来治理商业贿赂成本高昂且效果有限。所以要想有效治理商业贿赂,我们就要从商业贿赂的成因出发,瓦解其滋生的环境,在加强政府监管的同时进一步完善法律规制,并借助全社会力量构筑全方位的商业贿赂治理体系。