Exchange rate regimes and FDI in developing countries: A propensity score matching approach

Theory suggests that regimes of relatively fixed exchange rates encourage inward foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to regimes of more flexible exchange rates. We use propensity score matching (PSM) to investigate the relationship between the exchange rate regimes of 70 developing countries and FDI into such countries using de facto regime classifications. We include a large number of variables in the logit equation that estimates the propensity score, the probability of regime choice. We also use general-to-specific modeling to get alternative, parsimonious versions. Based on four matching procedures, the average treatment effects suggest, with overall modest statistical significance, that relatively fixed de facto regimes do encourage FDI compared with relatively floating regimes. In addition, the estimated effects are sometimes economically large.     

A multinomial logit approach to exchange rate policy classification with an application to growth

We model a country's de jure exchange rate policy as the choice from a multinomial logit response conditioned on the volatility of its bilateral exchange rate, the volatility of its international reserves, and the volatility of its effective exchange rate. The category with the highest predictive probability implied by the logit regressions serves as our de facto exchange rate policy. An empirical investigation into the relationship between the de facto classifications and GDP growth finds that growth is higher under stable currency-value policies. For non-industrialized countries, a more nuanced characterization of exchange rate policy finds that those who exhibit ‘fear of floating’ experience significantly higher growth.     

Flexible inflation targets,forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in emerging countries

Emerging economies with inflation targets (IT) face a dilemma between fulfilling the theoretical conditions of “strict IT”, which imply a fully flexible exchange rate, or applying a “flexible IT”, which entails a de facto managed-floating exchange rate with foreign exchange (forex) interventions to moderate exchange rate volatility. Using a panel data model for 37 countries we find that, although IT lead to higher exchange rate instability than alternative regimes, forex interventions in some IT countries have been more effective to lower volatility than in non-IT countries, which may justify the use of “flexible IT” by policymakers.     

De facto exchange rate regimes and currency crises: Are pegged regimes with capital account liberalization really more prone to speculative attacks?

This paper empirically examines whether de facto exchange rate regimes affect the occurrence of currency crises in 84 countries over the 1980–2001 period by using the probit model. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find that pegged regimes significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises compared with floating regimes. By using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find interesting evidence that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization significantly lower the likelihood of currency crises compared with other regimes. These results are robust to a wide variety of samples and models. From the standpoint of the macroeconomic policy trilemma, we can conjecture that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to speculative attacks because they can enhance greater credibility in their currencies by abandoning monetary policy autonomy.     

Exchange rate regimes,capital controls,and currency crises: Does the bipolar view hold?

This paper empirically examines the link between de facto exchange rate regimes and the incidence of currency crises in 84 countries from 1980 to 2001 using probit models. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find no evidence that, as the bipolar view argues, intermediate regimes have a significantly higher probability of currency crises than both hard pegs and free floats. Using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find that hard pegs with capital account liberalization have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than intermediate regimes with capital controls and free floats with capital controls. Hence, the bipolar view does not strictly hold in the sense that intermediate regimes are significantly more prone to currency crises than the two extreme regimes. However, the fact that hard pegs with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to currency crises is worthy of note.     

Price clustering in foreign exchange spot markets

This paper documents the existence of price clustering in the foreign exchange spot market for the German mark, the Japanese yen, the United Kingdom pound, the French franc, the Italian lira, and the Swedish krona. The U.S. dollar exchange rate indicative quotes for these currencies tend to exhibit clustering around right-most digits that end in either a “zero” or a “five.” The tendency for exchange rates to cluster has increased with increases in trading volume and volatility. Moreover, the tendency for exchange rates to cluster differs across currencies.     

Monetary and exchange rate stability in South and East Asia

Regaining exchange rate stability has been a major monetary policy goal of East Asian countries in the aftermath of the 1997/98 currency crisis. While most countries have abstained from re-establishing a formal US Dollar peg, they have typically managed the US Dollar exchange rate de facto. We show that most of these countries were able to regain their monetary credibility within a relatively short time period. The Argentine crisis in 2001 caused a minor setback in this process for some countries. We measure the credibility of monetary policy by separating the fundamental and excess volatility of the exchange rate on the basis of a chartist-fundamentalist model. The degree of excess volatility is interpreted as the ability of the central bank to manage the exchange rate via the coordination channel.     

Exchange Rates and the Conversion of Currency‐Specific Risk Premia

How do the risk factors that drive asset prices influence exchange rates? Are the parameters of asset price processes relevant for specifying exchange rate processes? Most international asset pricing models focus on the analysis of asset returns given exchange rate processes. Little work has been done on the analysis of exchange rates dependent on asset returns. This paper uses an international stochastic discount factor (SDF) framework to analyse the interplay between asset prices and exchange rates. So far, this approach has only been implemented in international term structure models. We find that exchange rates serve to convert currency‐specific discount factors and currency‐specific prices of risk – a result linked to the international arbitrage pricing theory (IAPT). Our empirical investigation of exchange rates and stock markets of four countries presents evidence for the conversion of currency‐specific risk premia by exchange rates.     

Exchange rate regimes and prices: The cases of Italy,Spain and the United Kingdom (1874–1998)

This paper studies the relationship among Italian, Spanish and United Kingdom prices over the period 1874–1998, for most of which the currencies of these three countries maintained a floating exchange rate regime. By using cointegration techniques with broken linear trends, we find a single vector for the period 1874–1935 and two vectors and, consequently, a single common trend for the period 1940–1998. Therefore, this paper provides new evidence of no long-run monetary independence under floating regimes. Furthermore, the price differential dynamics captured by deterministic trends in the period 1940–1998, as well as agreeing with the evidence of long-run transmission of interest rates in the floating post-Bretton Woods era, fit in perfectly with the new de facto taxonomies on exchange rates.     

The monetary model in the presence of I(2) components: long-run relationships, short-run dynamics and forecasting of the Greek drachma

This paper re-examines the long-run properties of the monetary exchange rate model using data for the drachma–dollar and drachma–mark exchange rates under the hypothesis that the system contains variables that are I(2). Using the recent I(2) test by Paruolo (On the determination of integration indices in I(2) systems. J. Economet. 72 (1996) 313–356) to examine the presence of I(2) and I(1) components in a multivariate context we find that the system contains two I(2) variables in both cases and this finding is reconfirmed by the estimated roots of the companion matrix (Do purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity hold in the long-run? An example of likelihood inference in a multivariate time-series model. Juselius, J. Economet. 69 (1995) 211–240). The I(2) component led to the transformation of the estimated model by imposing long-run but not short-run proportionality between domestic and foreign money. Two statistically significant cointegrating vectors were found and, by imposing linear restrictions on each vector as suggested by Johansen and Juselius (Identification of the long-run and the short-run structure: an applicaion to the ISLM model. J. Economet. 63 (1994) 7–36) and Johansen (Identifying restrictions of linear equations with applications to simultaneous equations and cointegration. J. Economet. 69 (1995b) 111–132), the order and rank conditions for identification are satisfied, but the test for overidentifying restrictions was not significant only for the case of the drachma/mark rate. The main findings suggest that we reject the forward-looking version of the monetary model for the drachma/dollar case but not when the drachma/mark rate is used, a result that is attributed to the monetary and exchange rate policy followed by the Greek authorities since Greece's joining of the European Union. Furthermore, we test for parameter stability using the tests developed by Hansen and Johansen (Recursive estimation in cointegrated VAR-models. Working paper (1993) University of Copenhagen) and it is shown that the dimension of the cointegration rank is sample independent while the estimated coefficients do not exhibit instabilities in recursive estimations. Finally, it is shown that the monetary model outperforms the random walk model in an out-of-sample forecasting contest.     

Income repatriation decision for multinational corporations: Tax issues

This paper analyzes the existing asymmetry in the US corporate tax law governing the determination of foreign tax credits earned by US firms with foreign subsidiaries. The existing asymmetry results in the US government de facto holding foreign currency put options against US firms with foreign subsidiaries. Combined with the exchange rate volatility, this tax law asymmetry reduces the effective foreign after-tax rate of return and, thus, makes it profitable for US firms to repatriate their foreign source income earlier even when the foreign after-tax rate of return is higher than the domestic rate. Although this paper identifies this asymmetry in the tax law and analyzes its potential effect on the timing of foreign source income repatriation, it is an open question as to the economic significance of this tax code feature provided the firms’ ability to curry the unused tax credit forward for up to 10 years.     

Identifying the effects of an exchange rate depreciation on country risk: Evidence from a natural experiment

A natural experiment is used to study exchange rate depreciation and perceived sovereign risk. France suspended coinage of silver in 1876 provoking a significant exogenous depreciation of all silver standard countries versus gold standard currencies like the British pound – the currency in which their debt was payable. The evidence suggests an exchange rate depreciation can significantly increase sovereign risk if a country is exposed to foreign currency debt. We implement a difference-in-differences estimator and find that the average silver country's spread on hard currency debt increased over ten percent relative to non-silver countries.     

Public Policy and Accounting Research: What Is to Be Done?

Abstract

Singleton-Green [2010. The communication gap: Why doesn't accounting research make a greater contribution to debates on accounting policy? Accounting in Europe, 7(2), 129–145] argues that a communication gap between researchers and those involved in public debates on accounting problems significantly reduces the impact of accounting research. A new ICAEW report, The Effects of Mandatory IFRS Adoption in the EU: a Review of Empirical Research, tries to bridge the communication gap on the subject that it covers. The report found not only a significant amount of relevant research, but also that its usefulness was limited in various ways. The paper makes a number of recommendations to researchers: they should point out any biases in the data they use, address some issues through field work, not assume that surrounding institutions are unchanged, be careful to understand the specific features of the countries they cover, investigate differences in previous research, and state the economic significance of their findings. The paper also makes recommendations for non-academic participants in public policy debates, including: they should actively promote relevant research, help researchers get access to information, and help ensure that researchers have the incentives to do what is needed to benefit public policy.     

Auditors and base rates revisited

In their 1981 study “Are Auditors' Judgments Sufficiently Regressive?” [Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1981) pp. 323–349] Joyce & Biddle found that auditors underweighted base rates relative to a normative standard (Bayes' theorem), but appeared to be more sensitive to base rates than other subject groups. This study extends their results by addressing three questions raised by their findings: (1) Do auditors generally possess greater ability to recognize and utilize base rates than other decision makers? (2) Did the auditing context of the Joyce & Biddle experimental problems influence the results? and (3) Is it the framing of the experimental problems that influenced the apparent integration of base rates?Using students and auditors as subjects, the following five experiments replicate selected Joyce & Biddle experimental problems. The results suggest that it is the framing of the Joyce & Biddle experimental problem that drive their results rather than attributes of auditors or auditing context.     

Gauging exchange rate targeting

In this paper, we examine whether a monetary authority targets the exchange rate, per se, or instead simply appears to do so as it responds to the exchange rate and other variables in service to inflation and output targets. We combine data-rich estimation with a system of forward-looking equations in order to disentangle the possibilities. The combined approach reveals the potentially misleading nature of standard estimates of the extent of exchange rate and inflation targeting. We illustrate the approach by applying it to two de jure inflation targetters, Canada and Korea. In contrast to standard methods and much past work, we find that neither country targets its exchange rate; and, both are bona fide inflation targetters.     

Psychology, meaning and the challenges of longevity

Humankind has begun to reap one of the most valued harvests of its scientific and technological pursuits: a significant increase in human longevity. We now live longer than ever before, due in large part to advances in medicine and health care that provide those who have the opportunity to afford them a lifespan that for many approaches or exceeds the 100-year mark. It is now within the realm of possibility that people will live lives of 125 years or more within the next century. However, our ability to increase physical longevity may have outstripped our ability to deal individually and socially with these new lives, these new existences that go well beyond what has traditionally been considered a “working life”. How well-prepared are we psychologically to cope with the meaning of a life that extends to as much as 150 years or more? In this new “age of longevity”, what are the challenges for psychology as a resource for humanity in its quest to give definition to the experience of being alive, as well as for managing the affairs of everyday life? Traditional developmental theories in psychology tend to articulate early stages of life in detail, but are generally mute on the matter of later life. Cognitive psychology has been inclined to view longevity as leading to a deterioration of mental faculties due to “aging”. This paper examines the psychological implications of increased lifespans from an optimistic perspective by reviewing current developments in research on cognition, emotion and aging. The review identifies trends in psychology that, if emphasized and strengthened, may lead to improved theoretical frameworks that cast longevity in a positive light, and that identify how people can find meaning and fulfillment throughout their whole lifespan.

“Grow old along with me! The best is yet to be, The last of life for which the first was made.” Robert Browning “Rabbi Ben Ezra”

I first encountered Browning’s works as an undergraduate, and being a pre-engineering student at the time my tendencies toward poetry were stunted to say the best. Few of the great works of literature my teachers compelled me to read at that stage of my life and development made enough of an impact to last beyond the length of the course requiring their reading. Much has changed since then and my interests in literature and what literature has to say that is of value for our lives has deepened. But Browning’s enthusiastic call to join him in aging has always been a fascination. Indeed, what could be more of a contradiction to modern attitudes about becoming elderly than to claim “the best is yet to be”? What can be more of a challenge to how we approach the relationship between being young and being old than to claim that the last of life is “for which the first was meant”? What can the possible rewards of the golden years be that transcend the glorious enthusiasms, unfettered optimisms, and just pure physical conveniences of being young? Or, was Browning simply trying to sucker us all into a fait accompli, the hopeful outcome of which is the envy of the very youth that the aged often envy so much?There is little enough envy of the aged today. I approach these years with great caution, recognizing that how I look upon those who are two decades older than myself will, in turn, condition me to see myself in those years much in the way that I see them now. “Aging” is not something anyone really wants to do. We want to, at best, “grow older”, a perspective that carries with it a more positive spin: growing wiser, growing up, or simply “growing” with all of its new-age connotations of personal enlightenment and becoming. I am not “aging”, I am “becoming at one”.The language we have adopted to talk about the time-course of life, and particularly about the years in the latter third of that course, does much to frame both how we live those years and how we anticipate them in our youth. Our expectations are ones of decline, physical debilitation and mental infirmity. We “retire”, as in withdrawal into seclusion, away from the mainstream of life and into the backwater eddy of inaction. On the shelf.Much of this view has been reinforced by how humanity has approached examining this aspect of its own time course through science. We study aging with an eye to how its effects influence the abilities of those so afflicted to perform or operate compared to those who still have a grasp on their full faculties. And, of course, we find that as people grow older, they do not approach life in the same way as do younger people.Part of our view on life comes from the very way in which science is funded: those interested in the last of life often receive their support from the National Institute on Aging, not the National Institute on The Last of Life for Which the First Was Made. Research agendas often focus on identifying sources of infirmity and potential prostheses, either physical or social, that can ease the lives of the elderly on their way toward achieving the goal of successful aging. All too often, success in aging means imposing relatively few demands on social resources or on the lives of younger people, such as family members. In our “ageist” society, elderliness is not generally equated with status and stature. Less and less, the young “listen” to the old out of deep interest in their lives and their experiences. Wisdom is the providence of the freshly matured and recently educated.The shortcomings of life in the advancing years are many and well-documented in the research literature. Memory spans decrease, information retrieval becomes less reliable, and new information is less readily assimilated. As people become older, they appear to rely more and more on automatic processing of information, quick associations and the like, rather than deliberative and conscious reasoning [1]. For the older mind, intuition is at least moderately preferred over analysis. For example, younger people tend to interpret stories analytically, focusing on details, while older people tend to focus less on a story’s details and more on its “gist” and its underlying significance to things that are important to them [2], and tend to do better at grasping and dealing with information in terms of its holistic meaning [3 and 4].The effects of these differences in information processing between young and old can be seen in practical matters of everyday life, such as decision making and judgment. Johnson [5], for example, found that older adults use simplifying decision strategies more often than younger adults. These strategies, such as noncompensatory rules that consider only the positive or the negative aspects of a decision option but not both, relieve one of the psychological burden of making complex and effortful tradeoffs, at the possible expense of efficiency and accuracy. Chasseigne et al. [6] found that as people age, they become less consistent in their use of information in making judgments and predictions; even reducing the overall information load and demands on memory does little to improve the reliability of their judgments. ¹     

Finance and international business cycles

Business cycles are more correlated among countries that have similar financial structures. We first document this empirical regularity using OECD data, and then build a two-country DSGE model with financial frictions that replicates it. Alternative monetary policy regimes and parameter values are explored. Output co-movements increase when the countries involved are linked by a credible exchange rate peg and when they open up to trade; they decrease when their financial openness increases. The model also accounts for a number of stylized facts of international business cycles, such as the positive international correlation of output, investment and employment.     

Are consistent pegs really more prone to currency crises?

This paper evaluates the treatment effect of consistent pegs (i.e., a policy in which countries actually adopt announced pegged regimes) on the occurrence of currency crises to examine whether consistent pegs are indeed more prone to currency crises than other regimes. Using matching estimators as a control for the self-selection problem of regime adoption, we find that countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than countries with other exchange rate policies. More interestingly, we find that countries with consistent pegs have a significantly lower probability of currency crises than those with a “fear of announcing a peg” policy (i.e., a policy in which countries actually adopt pegged regimes but do not claim to have pegged regimes). The results stand up to a wide variety of robustness checks.     

Choosing an exchange-rate system

The focus of academic discussions of exchange rate policy has shifted in recent years. The new literature on exchange rate regime choice emphasizes considerations relating to the problems of credibility in exchange rate targeting and the connections between exchange rate regime choices and choices of monetary and fiscal policy. Arguments for exchange rate targeting are reviewed. Under most circumstances and for most countries, a system of freely floating exchange rates is likely to be a better choice than attempting to peg the exchange rate.     

An actuarial analysis of the French bonus-malus system

The bonus-malus system in force in France differs from most of those used in industrialized countries around the world. Policyholders do not move inside a scale but their premium is obtained with the help of multiplicative CRM coefficients (CRM stands for the acronym of the French coefficient de réduction-majoration). The French bonus-malus system has been the topic of very few scientific investigations in the actuarial literature. This paper purposes to analyze this bonus-malus system in details. Despite its apparent simplicity, it will be seen that it leads to nontrivial mathematical problems. The financial equilibrium of the bonus-malus system is also investigated thanks to the multivariate De?Pril's algorithm for the convolution of independent and identically distributed random vectors.