The Recent Critique of Theoretical Economics: A Methodologically Informed Investigation

My purpose is to appraise the recent critique of theoretical economics by applying the methodological perspective. Therefore, I start by identifying the main lines of criticism raised against theoretical economics in the aftermath of the post-2008 global economic crisis: namely, the voices criticizing economics for its unrealistic models, excessive mathematization, and overconfidence in its theoretical claims. First, I show that these issues are interconnected and should be jointly analyzed. Next, I investigate these lines of critique from the perspective provided by the latest achievements in the philosophy of economics (e.g., studies on the epistemic role of economic models). Taking this perspective reinforces some allegations against economics (e.g., these voices accusing economists of treating economic laws as universal laws of nature) and makes some criticisms more nuanced (e.g., the issue of unrealistic assumptions). I conclude by stating that such a methodological perspective is necessary in critically apprising the recent critique of economics.     

Philosophy of Economics Rules: introduction to the symposium

ABSTRACT

Economists have long been criticized for their use of highly idealized models. In Economics rules: Why economics works, when it fails, and how to tell the difference [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015] Dani Rodrik responds to this criticism by offering an account of models that emphasizes the diversity of models in economics. Rodrik’s account presents a rare opportunity for economists and philosophers of economics to engage in a mutually beneficial exchange that could improve our understanding of the power and limits of economics, and the rights and wrongs of the dismal science. The symposium on Rodrik’s Economics Rules is the first attempt to seize this opportunity.     

A probabilistic ghost in the experimental machine

This paper focuses on the opposition between two contemporary research programs in economics: behavioral economics (BE) and experimental market economics (EME). Our claim is that the arguments of this opposition can be clarified through the lens of another opposition in the philosophy of probability and in probability theory, between Bayesianism and frequentism. We show how this probabilistic opposition has indirectly shaped a controversy in psychology that opposes two research programs – Heuristics and Biases and Ecological Rationality – which play respective roles in the foundations of individual rationality in BE and EME. To understand these theoretical interrelationships, we investigate the 1996 controversy between Kahneman, Tversky, and Gigerenzer. Those psychologists held different views on how probabilistic representations influence the context-dependency of rationality. This provides a rationale to suggest that a probabilistic ghost may be haunting the experimental machine in economics, and explains how and why the oppositions between BE and EME are structured around the interplay between the norms of rationality and the context in which rationality is exercised.     

Comments on “The Corporate State,Economic Performance,and Social Policy”

This paper provides an introduction to the Minsky-Veblen Cycles as a specific example of pluralist economic thinking in the context of the recent global economic crisis. It illustrates how pluralism can be applied to economic research. Specifically, the Minsky-Veblen Cycles combine three elements of institutional and post-Keynesian thought to explain key features of the current crisis. These elements are (1) John Maynard Keynes's postulate of effective demand, (2) Hyman Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, and (3) Thorstein Veblen's concept of conspicuous consumption. In this paper, we have a two-fold approach to them: First, we systematize the connection between the Minsky-Veblen Cycles as a theoretical argument and the epistemological rationale of a pluralist approach to economics. Second, we contrast the implications of our approach for incorporating behavioral assumptions in macroeconomic arguments to mainstream claims for a "microfoundation" of macroeconomic theory.     

Design of Stated Preference Surveys: Is There More to Learn from Behavioral Economics?

We discuss the design of stated preference (SP) surveys in light of findings in behavioral economics such as context dependence of preferences, learning, and differences between revealed and normative preferences. More specifically, we discuss four different areas: (1) revealed and normative preferences, (2) learning and constructed preferences, (3) context dependence, and (4) hypothetical bias. We argue that SP methods would benefit from adapting to some of the findings in behavioral economics, but also that behavioral economics may gain insights from studying SP methods.     

‘On the Econ within’: a reply to Daniel Hausman

This note replies to a comment by Daniel Hausman on our paper ‘Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics’. We clarify our characterisation of behavioural welfare economics and acknowledge that Hausman does fully endorse this approach. However, we argue that Hausman’s response to our critique, like behavioural welfare economics itself, implicitly uses a model of an inner rational agent.     

Socio-economic Research in Personnel versus Personnel Economics

This paper argues that personnel economics is still dominated by the assumptions of orthodox microeconomics, and also that newer fields such as transaction cost theory are far removed from socio-economics. Personnel economics is characterised by assumptions of unbounded rationality, stable preferences and functioning markets; power differences are seen as unimportant for explanations. By contrast, a socio-economic perspective works with the assumption of bounded rationality; it takes preferences into account, assumes that markets are characterised by ‘non-equilibrium’ states and power differences. The paper outlines a socio-economic mode of explanation and suggests that any explanation should include assumptions about three theoretical mechanisms: pursuit of utility, power and sense-making.     

Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic.     

How modern economics learned French: Jacques Drèze and the foundation of CORE

The Center of Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), founded in 1966, was one of the channels through which economic modelling practices were imported from the USA to Europe. Officially modelled after the Cowles Foundation for Economics Research, it reflected Jacques Drèze's broad experiences in the USA during the 1950s when modelling techniques were not yet anchored in disciplines. CORE gained an international reputation, however, through the rather exclusive community of Neo-Walrasian economists represented by Werner Hildenbrand, Jean Gabszewicz, and Gérard Debreu. After this community modified the disciplinary divisions at CORE, the influence of CORE on continental economics occurred mainly through disequilibrium economics, which still represents a “French accent” in modern macroeconomics. At the same time, operations research and econometrics prospered at CORE while receiving scant attention from economists. This essay tells the story of how CORE changed continental economics through the unique career path of its founder, Jacques Drèze.     

Autism in Economics? A Second Opinion

A popular claim among critics is that economic science is suffering from autism, a severe developmental disorder characterised by impairments in social relations and communication, combined with rigid and repetitive behaviour. So far, this allegation has not been substantiated. This essay explores the claim of autism in economics based on modern schemes of diagnostics. A key finding is that the structure of the critique against mainstream economics bears a striking resemblance to the structure of the diagnostic criteria for autism. Based on an examination of three groups of key symptoms, I conclude that the required set of criteria for the autism diagnosis are not met. However, there are parallels which may serve as constructive reminders for the future development and application of economic theories and models.     

Holding back from theory: limits and methodological alternatives of randomized field experiments in development economics

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we critically and constructively examine the methodology of evidence-based development economics, which deploys randomized field experiments (RFEs) as its main tool. We describe the context in which this movement started, and illustrate in detail how RFEs are designed and implemented in practice, drawing on a series of experiments by Pascaline Dupas and her colleagues on the use of bednets, saving and governance in Kenya. We show that this line of experiments have evolved to address the limitation of obtaining policy-relevant insights from RFEs alone, characterized as their lack of external validity in the literature. After examining the two prominent responses by leading figures of evidence-based development economics, namely machine learning and structured speculation, we propose an alternative methodological strategy that incorporates two sub-fields, namely experimental economics and behavioral economics, to complement RFEs in investigating the data-generating process underlying the treatment effects of RFEs. This strategy highlights promising methodological developments in RFEs neither captured by the two proposals nor recognized by methodologists, and also guides how to combine different sub-fields of economics.     

The participant observer in the formation of economic thought Summa Oeconomiae Perlmanensis

This essay addresses issues related to the History of Economic Thought, Comparative Economic Analysis, and Institutional Economics alluded to in Mark Perlman's “The Character of Economic Thought, Economic Characters, and Economic Institutions”. Specifically, some differences between the strands of American Institutionalism and Schumpeterian economics are brought into focus. Against the background of a review, the ideas of a major participant in the historical analysis of economic thought are discussed. The conclusion is that an evolutionary approach to economics would benefit from any attempt to substitute systematic-discursive theorizing for the received genre of an abstract-deductive approach.     

On some ‘Austrian’ misreadings of Cantillon's notions of intrinsic value and market price

The article clarifies some aspects of the Cantillonian notions of intrinsic value and of market prices. Furthermore, the major flaws of the ‘Austrian’ interpretations put forward in recent years by Rothbard and Thornton are highlighted. This criticism provides an additional dimension to the view already expressed by Groenewegen against the new edition of Cantillon's Essai by Thornton. Finally, the connection between the Essai and mature classical economics is highlighted and the proposed ‘Austrian’ interpretation of Cantillon is strongly rejected.     

Change and Continuity

Although there is considerable evidence that efforts to teach economic concepts to elementary school children are increasing, little research is being done at this level. William Walstad's article is, then, one of those rare pieces that reports the results of a controlled study in the elementary grades. In addition, it includes a discussion of research design and statistical techniques, and considers some of the problems one encounters in this type of research (such as problems in parameter estimation). The author measured the effects of a teacher in-service program that provided instruction in economics as applied to the Unified Sciences and Mathematics for Elementary School program. The new Test of Economic Literacy was administered to the teachers, while their pupils took the Test of Elementary Economics. Control groups were also tested. Pupil attitudes toward economics were measured, and it was found that achievement in economics had a direct influence on attitude toward economics. Walstad concludes that “teachers and students gain substantial benefits from the in-service program in practical economic problem solving.”     

Why Excel?

Advanced Placement economics leaves thousands of high school students with a misleading impression of modern economics. The courses fail to cover key sources of growth and prosperity, including private ownership, dynamic competition, and entrepreneurship. The tools of public choice economics are totally ignored. Government is modeled as a corrective device available to impose ideal solutions. Market failure is covered, but there is no such thing as government failure. The macroeconomics course reflects the simplistic 1960s Keynesian view of stabilization policy. Time lags, incentive effects, secondary effects of budget deficits, and other factors that complicate effective use of stabilization policy are almost entirely ignored. In contrast, the 20 Voluntary National Content Standards in Economics of the Council for Economic Education illustrate what a balanced course in modern economics would look like.     

Keynes against Kalecki on economic method

In the past twenty years, there has been considerable debate on the “coherence” of post Keynesian economics, in view of post Keynesian economists’ ambitions to develop a paradigmatic alternative to neoclassical economics. Given the growing importance of methodological aspects in this discussion, this article addresses the differences of approach to economic theory between the fathers of the two most important strands in post Keynesian economics. We thus focus on Keynes’s criticism of Kalecki’s theory of the business cycle and the tensions between Keynes’s logical approach and Kaleki’s formal modeling. We show that in criticizing Kalecki’s theory, Keynes made use of the same methodological criticism (based on detecting logical fallacies in reasoning) he had employed to attack both the classical theory and contemporary “pseudo-mathematical” models. After illustrating these fundamental differences between Keynes and Kalecki about the proper way of doing economics, we draw some conclusions on the possible future evolution of post Keynesian economics.     

Why do scientists cheat? Insights from behavioral economics

Abstract

Based on a review of the books by Wible (2014), Stephan (2012), and Lanteri and Vromen (2014), I discuss three different ways in which behavioral economics can enrich the understanding of scientific misbehavior. First, behavioral economics suggests that economic theories of scientific misbehavior, such as the one by Wible (2014), should consider moral costs of cheating, i.e. costs that arise from an individual’s desire to do the “right thing.” Second, behavioral economics demonstrates several ways in which the features of the reward scheme in science,as described by Stephan (2012), can favor cheating. Her conclusion that shirking is rarely an issue in science seems optimistic. Third, behavioral economics indicates that individual characteristics matter for cheating. According to Lanteri and Vromen (2014), economists possess different characteristics than other researchers. Hence, the reaction to incentives may differ across disciplines. Considering these insights is important to assess how a goal such as the pursuit of truth can be achieved efficiently.     

Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism

A variety of recent arguments emerging from behavioural economics claim to undermine the credibility, and even the conceptual coherence, of the economist’s traditional rejection of paternalism. Indeed, some suggest that the incoherent nature of preferences inevitably implies a form of paternalism, since some basis for officiating between expressed preferences is required, and some preferences will be over-ridden in favour of others. This paper reviews and contests these arguments. It argues that markets operate according to a normatively defensible and non-paternalistic principle of mutual advantage, and that this principle does not require preferences to be coherent.